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Religious Validity:
The Sacrament Covenant in Third Nephi
Richard Lloyd Anderson
I have just nished another reading of the Book of Mormon, and what a wonderful rejuvenation this has been as
vistas of doctrine open up. The spirit is a complex thing. It comes as it will, as Jesus said to Nicodemus (John 3:8).
Sometimes you feel a burning and a warmth, and sometimes you feel a peace and clarity of thought. The latter is
my experience in reading the Book of Mormon this time. In the rst reading I felt the warmth intensely. I can
remember my impressions of speci c chapters—for instance, Alma 42, where I could not put the book down for
the intensity of the feeling of its truth.
Years later I look back on a lifetime of historical study and writing. I now have experience with how history was
written in many different periods. History is a record of both spectacular and commonplace events. So an
authentic historical document may be dull, and the Book of Mormon has places like that. Having analyzed methods
of ancient historians, I recognize the accuracy of the steps described by Nephi, Mormon, and Moroni in putting
their documents together. Without any question, the Book of Mormon is a historically sophisticated book. A young
person like Joseph Smith did not write it. When you add the spiritual clarity of the doctrine to that archival
framework, the validity of the Book of Mormon is to me unquestionable. Full proof of the depth of the Book of
Mormon and the Pearl of Great Price is that these books have held the attention of Hugh Nibley for a lifetime,
with rich historical yields throughout ve decades of intense scholarship. He is personally unsurpassed at any
university in range of reading, languages mastered and utilized, facts retained, day and night hours given to his
eld, and spontaneous honesty.1
My topic of religious validity includes correctness of doctrine and also spiritual values in applying it. Because of the
statement of Joseph Smith stressed by our current Prophet, we are aware of the correctness of the Book of
Mormon.2 Surprisingly, that book does not contain the full range of teachings revealed in the Doctrine and
Covenants. However, the Book of Mormon is a guidebook for our age because it collects foundational doctrines,
and these are bound together in the central practice of partaking of the sacrament. As will be seen, Joseph Smith
singled out “precepts” or teachings in his “closer to God” statement about the Book of Mormon. And the concept
of covenant is one of the essential doctrines of salvation. Indeed, the Book of Mormon makes the change of “many
covenants” a sure mark of Christian apostasy (1 Nephi 13:26). The result of this study should be a far broader
understanding of Nephi’s prophecy and of how completely it is justi ed by ancient and recent history of worship.
“Covenant” in the Bible and the Book of Mormon
Joseph Smith’s well-known evaluation of the Book of Mormon will lead us to personal covenants as the heart of
the religious message of the Book of Mormon. Yet the original source of the Prophet’s tribute to the Nephite
scripture is little known. One reads the following in his of cial history under the date of November 28, 1841: “I
told the brethren that the Book of Mormon was the most correct of any book on earth, and the keystone of our
religion, and a man would get nearer to God by abiding by its precepts, than by any other book.”3 But these words
to the Twelve do not really come from the Prophet’s own journal. Like the Nauvoo Temple, the Prophet’s history
was planned by him but was completed according to his format after his death. His clerks assigned to draft the
history felt authorized to impose rst-person style on appropriate documents after the martyrdom took place.
When Joseph Smith died, the history had been basically compiled through the Missouri period. Wilford Woodruff,

who recorded so much of Joseph Smith’s public and private discourse, wrote down the Prophet’s “most correct”
comment. In the Woodruff journal of the above date, he outlines the Prophet’s visit with the Twelve, and adds:
“Joseph said the Book of Mormon was the most correct of any book on earth and the keystone of our religion. And
a man would get nearer to God by abiding by its precepts than any other book.” So the quotation in the of cial
history is exact, with the addition of one clarifying preposition, though shifted to the rst person to reproduce as
nearly as possible Joseph Smith’s original words.
Will the reader get “nearer to God” in every Book of Mormon chapter? About half of the Book of Mormon is
political and military history. As in the Old Testament or classical chronicles, the reader is often shocked by
bloodshed, one of the unfortunate realities in records of mankind. Another segment of the Book of Mormon
consists of occasional long quotations from Old World prophets, about ten percent. But the remainder of this
book—about forty percent—contains the teachings of New World prophets. Obviously these are the sections of
the Book of Mormon that Joseph Smith referred to in saying that we would get “nearer to God by abiding its
precepts.“4
There are tighter circles of signi cance in the Book of Mormon. Within the “teachings” category of this record,
main topics and terms appear. The dominating subject here is Jesus Christ. Reviewing the Book of Mormon after
years of New Testament teaching, I am struck with the difference in audience on each side of the world. Christ
often had to be subtle in teaching the Jews and used carefully wrought parables in his earlier ministry. Yet how
plain he could be with the Nephites, a people educated by their own mighty exodus tradition. Scholars’ vested
interests were a huge barrier when the Savior sought to cut through Jewish ceremonialism and stand as a Messiah
without earthly credentials. But his very direct American message is providentially preserved to correct our own
false sophistication in the latter days. Here is a simple book, for simple and faithful people, then and now.
Within the Book of Mormon doctrinal circle, there is the tighter circle of teachings about Christ and from Christ.
And within this is a precious core of what the Master expects of his disciples—his gospel as he very carefully
outlined it in 3 Nephi 11 and 3 Nephi 27. A central principle of gospel relationships is “covenant,” a main term of
God’s revelation on both hemispheres. That word appears in the Old Testament around 250 times, and scholarly
literature on the subject is seemingly endless because of the importance of “covenant” in all of God’s dealings with
Israel.5 So it is a test of religious authenticity that “covenant” is woven into the Book of Mormon with patterns
remarkably parallel to the Bible.
The word “covenant” appears in the Book of Mormon about a hundred times, so it is as historically prominent
there as it is in the Bible. Both books have oaths and covenants made between private parties. Indeed, the human
agreements of the Old Testament are extremely useful in assessing the kind of covenant God made with Israel’s
patriarchs. They made the same type of covenant with God that they made in private situations. There were
obligations and conditions on both sides. In pre-Christian sections of the Bible and Book of Mormon, the most
frequent use of “covenant” is the promise that God will honor the house of Israel, on the condition that Israel will
faithfully serve God. Despite many theological assertions to the contrary, God’s consistent covenant relationship
with Israel is that of a two-party covenant.
The English derivation of covenant is literally a “coming together,” a contract involving mutual obligations. Various
Christian theologies struggle with applying such a concept to God. If he is the all-powerful sovereign, can his plans
fail because mankind fails? If he is all-loving, does he not distribute his blessings without any condition?
Controversial terms are not far below the surface: predestination, unconditional election, salvation by grace alone.
Here we cannot directly discuss these issues, though they are doctrinally related to God’s covenant. Protestant

explanations tend to emphasize a one-sided covenant—the sovereign giver and the unworthy receiver. But in only
a very general sense do God’s promises appear without reciprocal obligations. Of course, Jesus acknowledged
that the Father showers sun and rain “on the just and on the unjust” (Matthew 5:45). Ancient and modern
scriptures also teach the unconditional and universal gift of the resurrection, while at the same time indicating
qualitative distinctions, for there is a higher “resurrection of life” (John 5:29), and there is the “ rst resurrection” of
the faithful before all the rest are called up (Revelation 20:5). God reserves his greatest blessings not for those
professing, but for those obeying (Matthew 7:21-23).
But much Christian literature rejects such personal responsibility by treating Moses’ revelations as a covenant of
works and the New Testament as a covenant of grace. However, Paul argued that the Gentiles had strict
obligations of faithfulness to maintain a covenant relationship with God (Romans 11:17-21). That Apostle
characteristically quoted Jeremiah’s prophecy. Because Israel broke the covenant of Exodus (Jeremiah 31:32),
God would give a “new covenant” (Jeremiah 31:31). Israel would be forgiven, and Israel would truly “know the
Lord” (Jeremiah 31:34). Although Jesus blessed bread and wine as symbols of newness, there is more than a free
promise of grace as the “new covenant.” Jeremiah really promised no change in a reciprocal relationship, but saw
the day when Israel would live up to its obligations. They would accept “my law” in their hearts (Jeremiah 31:33),
actually meaning that the covenant relationship would not change, but that Israel would nally keep God’s
requirements. And this conditional covenant is as religiously central in the New Testament as it is in the Old.
“Covenant” appears about thirty times in the New Testament. The word summarizes God’s relationship with the
Church, but “covenant” also is prominent in connection with the most frequent early Christian public ordinance,
the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper. Although there are other sacraments, or sacred ceremonies, Mormons follow
a Christian trend to use “sacrament” alone to refer to receiving the symbols of Christ’s body and blood. And
“sacrament” here will refer to that particular ceremony.
The New Testament Sacrament Covenant
Christ clearly established the sacrament. Three of the four Gospels plus Paul’s letter, 1 Corinthians, contain
concise reports. First Corinthians preceded the Gospels. Its date is about A.D. 57, some twenty- ve years after
the upper room. Paul repeats what he has reliably learned, introducing the account with these words: “For I have
received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you” (1 Corinthians 11:23, emphasis added). Not claiming a
vision, Paul has reports of what came from the Lord.6 Luke also says that his own information is from
“eyewitnesses” (Luke 1:1-4). And Matthew and Mark are similarly based.7 Each of these four accounts has
individuality, showing that none simply copied another. Yet all agree on the basics. Signi cantly, each quotes Jesus
as saying that the cup represents “the new testament.”
Today “testament” suggests “a solemn declaration” or “a formal witness.” However, the technical meaning of
Christ’s “new testament” is “new covenant.” In Acts and in Paul’s epistles, Old Testament verses about the Hebrew
“covenant” (brît) are translated by the Greek diatheke, which in secular Greek denoted a formal will, a legal bequest.
Thus the Gospels, Acts, and epistles are reapplying the Old Testament “covenant,” with its strong background of
reciprocal promises. Yet many Protestant commentators discuss the Greek “will” in the abstract, stating that New
Testament writers considered the new covenant as God’s unilateral gift. But the Greek diatheke developed an
expanded biblical usage, for it was consistently used to translate “covenant” in the Septuagint version long before
Christ. So New Testament authors de nitely use an Old Testament covenant concept, with its regular contexts of
mutuality. Moreover, we shall see that Christ spoke of strict conditions on which the new covenant is offered.

Evidence from the Gospels suggests that Jesus privately spoke Aramaic, a language closely related to Hebrew.
Thus, as Jesus held up the cup, he spoke the word “covenant,” calling up ancient images of continuity in the minds
of the Apostles. Early Christian literature suggests no change in the idea of covenant—newness consisted in the
change of the sacri ce that put the covenant into effect. In other words, the two-party promises between God and
his people did not change. But the bloody sacri ces of Abraham and of Moses were modi ed—they pre gured the
ultimate sacri ce of the Son of God. Here we are summarizing the argument of the last part of Paul’s letter to the
Hebrews, where half of the New Testament usages of the Greek word for “covenant” appear. The Apostle there
speaks of a “better testament” (Hebrews 7:22) or a “better covenant” (Hebrews 8:6) because Jesus is superior to
all former sacri ces.
This continuity is shown in the opening scenes of each Gospel in the New Testament, according to which John the
Baptist comes to renew the relationship of God with individuals who would meet God’s conditions. In the
prophetic context this is nothing less than the renewal of the covenant, as John’s father said in blessing his son.
John was sent to announce the Messiah’s mission, which was to reinstate God’s compact with the patriarchs: “To
perform the mercy promised to our fathers, and to remember his holy covenant; The oath which he sware to our
father Abraham, That he would grant unto us, that we . . . might serve him without fear, In holiness and
righteousness before him, all the days of our life” (Luke 1:72-75). John’s father saw “holiness and righteousness” as
Israel’s responsibility under the covenant, and his son single-mindedly preached that Israel must repent
individually to have a relationship with God restored.
Christ reapplied the language of the Mosaic covenant in instituting the sacrament, a reality noted by most Bible
commentaries on the Gospels. At the beginning of Exodus, Moses was called to remember the covenant of
Abraham and lead Israel out of bondage. At Sinai, Jehovah’s law was given only after Israel had promised to meet
prerequisites. They would be “a peculiar treasure unto me above all people,” with a major condition: “if ye will obey
my voice indeed, and keep my covenant” (Exodus 19:5). Here are mutual promises, and it is irrelevant that this is
not an agreement between equals. Of course God’s majesty and glory are on one side, and Israel’s fallible abilities
on the other. Nevertheless, the covenant is contingent. Eternal blessings will only come as the children of Abraham
commit themselves to obedience and follow the commitment.
God gave the core Ten Commandments accompanied by considerable expansion of their meaning. Soon after this,
the covenant was reiterated and consummated after another agreement of the people. Moses “told the people all
the words of the Lord, and all the judgments,” and they unanimously agreed to follow them (Exodus 24:3). Moses
then wrote these laws, clarifying what was required: “And he took the book of the covenant and read in the
audience of the people. And they said, All that the Lord hath said will we do, and be obedient. And Moses took the
blood, and sprinkled it on the people, and said, Behold the blood of the covenant, which the Lord hath made with
you concerning all these words” (Exodus 24:7-8).
These events were the Jewish constitution. And in giving the sacrament, Jesus quoted or closely paraphrased
Moses’ words in renewing the ancient covenant. Although this is obscured in the King James translation of
“testament,” the Savior surely did not use Greek then. Thus modern translations are correct in having Jesus offer
the cup as a sign of the “new covenant.” His words come in two closely related forms. The early converts—Paul and
Luke—use the same phrase of offering the cup: “the new covenant in my blood” (Luke 22:20; 1 Corinthians 11:25).
Matthew and Mark, Gospels based on apostolic testimony, use Moses’ words adapted by Jesus in offering the cup:
“This is my blood of the new covenant” (Matthew 26:28; Mark 14:24).8

Jesus’ sacramental words are too often quoted in a vacuum. But here he had an audience skilled in scripture. The
Lord was never outclassed in discussion with trained priests because he was steeped in Jewish tradition. So were
the Apostles. If Jesus presented a form of covenant that departed from the divine format to Moses, he would not
have used the words of Exodus. Repeating Moses meant repeating or renewing the covenant, with its mutuality.
Full grace was offered to ancient Israel conditionally. In reiterating the ancient words, Jesus asserted that much
was expected to receive his grace. Jesus did not revoke the ancient covenant—he restored it.
Arti cial walls are built by the existence of four different Gospels. Scholars intensify the problem by labeling John
theological and not historical, as if one reporting Jesus could not be both. Indeed, Matthew, Mark, and Luke
similarly present the public ministry, whereas John emphasizes intimate conversations among Christ and the
Twelve. It came down to church historian Eusebius that John wrote last, that he looked over the other Gospels
with approval but realized that a fuller story could be told. Thus John really wrote an appendix to the other
Gospels.9 This ts our records, because John’s letters are preoccupied with what Jesus taught “from the
beginning,” a phrase that introduces many major references to the Last Supper discourse. Thus we know that John
paid special attention to Jesus’ teachings during and after the Christian sacrament. With such concern, he
obviously took special care to preserve these teachings. To have the full picture of Christ’s rst sacrament, one
must take the words of its establishment from the Synoptic Gospels and 1 Corinthians, adding the beginning of the
Last Supper discourse, which appears only in John.
John’s story of the Last Supper blends well with those of Matthew and Mark, but Luke’s account does not as easily
t. Apparently he rst surveys the meal, then portrays the sacrament as the main event of the Last Supper, and
nally drops back to mention the accusation of Judas. This seems clear because the consecrated cup is described
as “the cup after supper” (Luke 22:20). In any event, Matthew and Mark agree that Jesus accused Judas during the
meal and before the sacrament. This is signi cant because John says that the betrayer left while others ate, which
brings us nearly to the end of John 13. Next John reports four short segments of teaching by Jesus toward the end
of the meal itself: the prophecy that Jesus will now be taken and his disciples left (John 13:33-34); Peter’s offer to
die to prevent Christ’s death (John 13:36-38); Christ’s assurance that by leaving he will prepare for the coming of
the Twelve into the Father’s kingdom; and a question and answer about the Father (John 14:1-12). After this point
Jesus speaks without interruption. The above topics would naturally arise from Jesus’ introduction of the
sacrament as the symbol of his atoning death.
Indeed, John’s words of leaving and reuniting closely t Matthew’s report of Jesus’ words immediately after
distributing the bread and wine—that he would not drink again with them until all would reunite “in my Father’s
kingdom” (Matthew 26:29). This correlates with John’s “my Father’s house” (John 14:2). So a comparison of the
two Gospels shows that the rst part of the Last Supper discourse came right after blessing the bread and wine.
Jesus’ continuous comments begin in the middle of John 14, but John soon interrupts the ow of Christ’s message
before twenty verses have been given: “Arise, let us go hence” (John 14:31). While more of Jesus’ farewell
instructions follow, John sharply terminates the words of the upper room. The Apostle clearly intended the second
half of chapter 14 to be Jesus’ explanations right after distributing the bread and cup.
What insight do Christ’s retrospective comments give on the sacrament? In the name of the Father, Jesus makes
speci c promises. On earth his followers will have the special relationship that insures answers to their deepest
prayers (John 14:13-14). On earth they will have the peace and instruction of the Holy Ghost (John 14:16-17, 2627). On earth they might have visions of the Father and Son, and their presence in the hereafter (John 14:19-23).
Is all this given by totally unmerited grace? To the contrary, God required the identical condition of the covenant at
Sinai: “All that the Lord hath said will we do, and be obedient” (Exodus 24:7). That same commitment was required

by the Lord to validate the sacrament. “If ye love me, keep my commandments” (John 14:15); “He that hath my
commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me” (John 14:21); “If a man love me, he will keep my words”
(John 14:23). Jesus not only paralleled Moses’ words in speaking of the “blood of the new covenant”—he required
the same obedience of the ancient covenant. Jesus gave the sacrament and then outlined its obligations and
promises. Because Jesus gave the bread and cup with mutual commitments, the sacrament itself is a covenant.
Changing the Baptismal Covenant
The Book of Mormon provides a clearer picture of Christ, and the sacrament covenant is more completely
explained there as well. President Benson reminds us that this American record was compiled for future readers—
and for the conversion of unbelievers.10 On the other hand, except for the Gospels, the New Testament is the
product of believers speaking to believers. The Book of Mormon records Hebraic treaty-covenants, but its
overarching covenant is that of God with his people, tenuous because of the constant threat that these
transplanted Israelites will forget their heritage and the miracles of their New World exodus. As John the Baptist
reminded Judah, a national relationship can continue only to the extent of valid individual relationships with God—
these add up to the general divine covenant. The Book of Mormon brings us closer to God because no scripture
more speci cally ties the Christian ordinances of baptism and the sacrament to the covenant concept. No book
does more to bring the national covenant down to individual responsibility.
The sacrament renews the baptismal covenant in the Book of Mormon. American prophets taught the religious
necessity of baptism and the clear doctrinal purposes for it. The most striking teaching is that baptism was
required even for the Savior. The visionary Nephi saw the future mission of Jesus, including Christ’s baptism (1
Nephi 11:27). Speaking by inspiration afterward, Nephi explained the Savior’s insistence on baptism at John’s
hands: “For thus it becometh us to ful l all righteousness” (Matthew 3:15). Since Nephi had a vision of this
baptism, he evidently heard these words. He explains that Jesus’ immersion was an act that “witnesseth unto the
Father that he would be obedient unto him in keeping his commandments” (2 Nephi 31:7). Here Nephi’s language
indicates more than the humility required to keep the commandment of baptism. He heard Christ’s voice declaring
immersion as a covenant for believers, who by that act “witnessed unto the Father that ye are willing to keep my
commandments” (2 Nephi 31:14). As quoted above, Nephi applies similar phraseology to Christ’s immersion,
really teaching that the Savior set the example by baptism as a promise of future virtue.
Thus Nephi presents a complete parallelism between the baptisms of Christ and of the believer. In this sermon,
Christ was immersed to prove his obedience through baptism, but also as a pledge of future loyalty “that he would
be obedient.” The believer’s baptism also indicates “that ye are willing to keep my commandments.” “To be willing”
is mainly future: it is the language of personal covenant in Book of Mormon religious contexts. Indeed, Nephi’s
sermon stresses the lifetime commitment to righteousness one makes through baptism (2 Nephi 31:15-21).
Nephi’s overall point is that the believer should follow Christ both in baptism and also in keeping the personal
promises made then. Immersion is a means of forgiveness, but covenant baptism is also preventive medicine. It is a
solemn promise not to sin—a promise even shared by Christ. He entered that baptismal covenant and lived up to it
perfectly, so Nephi nally calls on everyone baptized to “endure to the end, in following the example of the Son of
the living God” (2 Nephi 31:16).
In the Book of Mormon, the baptismal contract is best outlined when Alma reestablished the Church near the
wilderness waters. He explained baptism as a “testimony that ye have entered into a covenant to serve him”
throughout life (Mosiah 18:13). These inspired doctrines were well known when Jesus later came to the New
World. He gave baptismal messages at the beginning and end of his Nephite ministry. Christ taught the

interrelationship of repentance and baptism; the formalism of immersion without a subsequent change of life is
empty in the Lord’s sight. In summarizing his gospel, he identi ed baptism as a conditional promise of forgiveness:
“whoso repenteth and is baptized in my name shall be lled; and if he endureth to the end, behold, him will I hold
guiltless before my Father at that day when I shall stand to judge the world” (3 Nephi 27:16).
In the Book of Mormon puri cation by baptism always depends on righteousness. Does the New Testament
support this doctrine? Each Gospel stresses Jesus’ own baptism, and in each Gospel John the Baptist challenges
his Jewish generation to obtain forgiveness of past sins through baptism and retain that forgiveness by changing
their lives. John’s baptism was for “remission of sins” (Mark 1:4), and the Apostles’ baptism had the same purpose
(Acts 2:38). Based on this baptismal foundation, apostolic sermons and letters urge believers to retain a
relationship with God through righteous living. Thus the New Testament follows the covenant-righteousness
patterns of the patriarchal, Mosaic, and prophetic dispensations. In the fullest letter of free grace, Paul emphasizes
baptism as the burial of old sins, and the resurrection to a new moral life, which comes by the exercise of prayerful
self-control (Romans 6:3-13). Sometime later the Apostle repeats the baptismal-burial metaphor (Colossians
2:12), and insists on the baptismal commitment to live speci c moral standards (Colossians 3:1-10).
Thus Paul holds out full salvation to those who effect moral reform through their faith and baptism, and he denies
entrance into the kingdom to Christians who will not conform to its laws (1 Corinthians 6:9-11). Many Protestant
scholars talk meaningfully of God’s general covenant with his people but lack full understanding of baptism and
the sacrament as speci c promises to live the commandments. Protestantism in practice supports baptism, but in
theory has dif culty explaining it. For instance, we are told that God promises eternal life in the “covenant of
grace,” but man’s obligation is “faith in Jesus Christ as the only ‘work’ required of the believer (John 6:29).”11 By
Book of Mormon standards, such thinking is foggy. Peter did not invent baptism for the “remission of sins” (Acts
2:38). This interpretation went back to Christ, for Peter taught it on the day of Pentecost, a month after Jesus
commanded “the eleven disciples” to go to the world and baptize believers (Matthew 28:16-20).
An infant cannot sin, nor know enough to promise not to sin. Yet the major Christian churches—Protestant and
Catholic—divorce individual responsibility from baptism in the practice of baptizing infants. Adults must be proxy
for infants who cannot personally take upon themselves the name of Christ. This thinking is re ected in the
traditional Church of England ritual. The baby is presented, and the priest asks the sponsors: “Dost thou therefore,
in the name of this child, renounce the devil and all his works, the vain pomp and glory of the world and the sinful
desires of the esh, so that thou wilt not follow, nor be led by them?” The answer is: “I renounce them all, and by
God’s help will not endeavor to follow nor be led by them.” The priest asks again: “Having now, in the name of this
child made these promises, wilt thou also on thy part take heed that this child learn the Creed, the Lord’s Prayer,
and the Ten Commandments, and any other things which a Christian ought to know and believe to his soul’s
health?” Sponsors answer: “I will by God’s help.”12
Such a ceremony has religious value in committing the godparent or parent to teaching the child. Yet the sponsor,
not the child, makes the baptismal covenant. This is not the Lord’s way, for there is no example of infant baptism in
the Bible, and the Book of Mormon prophets denounce such practice by revelation. Since baptism is a covenant,
infant baptism usurps the agency of a child not yet ready to make the promise for himself. Thus it is Catholic and
Protestant practice to bring the child to the church for instruction and con rmation when old enough to be
accountable. In this case, the baptismal covenant is shifted to a later con rmation covenant. So the unauthorized
change in one ordinance has forced an unauthorized change in the purpose of another.
Christ’s Words and the Nephite Sacrament Prayer

The baptismal commitment is the companion covenant to the sacrament in the Book of Mormon. This is vivid in
the Nephite manual of ordinances, found at the beginning of Moroni, the nal book in the Book of Mormon. It
compiles documents of Nephite practices authorized by the Lord. Here Moroni summarizes the baptismal
covenant as taking upon them “the name of Christ, having a determination to serve him to the end” (Moroni 6:3).
And the accompanying sacrament prayer carries the same phraseology of personally taking the name of Christ.
The baptismal commitment of serving Christ to the end is paralleled in the sacrament promise to “always
remember him.” Those baptismal vows more closely follow the sacrament prayer over the bread, which will be
studied here because the prayer over the cup is a compressed restatement. In summary, the Book of Mormon
presents the overall covenant of God with his people, with individualized promises made in baptism, to be
renewed in the sacrament.
The Nephite sacrament prayer incorporates the “words of institution” when Christ gave the sacrament in America.
Background chapters are the Savior’s explanation of baptism in 3 Nephi 11, followed by his discourse on the
sacrament in 3 Nephi 18, the climaxing event of his rst appearance to them. Jesus clearly unfolded the meaning
of the bread and wine that should be administered “unto all those who shall believe and be baptized in my name” (3
Nephi 18:5). New World disciples were to witness through the symbols of his body and blood that “ye do always
remember me.” But their thoughts were to rise to plans for righteous acts, for the mutual covenant relationship
was valid only “if ye shall keep my commandments”; only then would they “have my Spirit to be with you” (3 Nephi
18:11-14).
All these commitments combine in the Nephite sacrament covenant, the prayer consecrating the bread. Although
Moroni gives it some centuries later, he leaves no doubt as to its source: “and they administered it according to the
commandments of Christ” (Moroni 4:1). This probably means that the Savior gave the prayer. Each of its promises
follow Jesus’ Nephite sacrament sermon. As Mormon nished his selection of Christ’s teachings, he mentioned the
fuller record “of the things which Jesus did truly teach unto the people” (3 Nephi 26:6-8). Indeed, his son Moroni
shows a special interest in rounding out the record with additional sayings of the Savior (Mormon 9:22-25), so
perhaps Moroni took the sacrament prayers from a fuller account of Christ’s teachings. This method parallels the
manner in which Christ’s teachings were kept in the New Testament and earliest Christian literature. Core
collections were later supplemented by additional sources and recollections. Here is another of the many stylistic
and structural patterns where the Book of Mormon has the marks of an ancient history. As stated, each phrase of
the Nephite sacrament prayer has an exact equivalent in Christ’s words of institution in 3 Nephi 18. And Moroni
insists that “the manner,” or form, of the prayer is “true,” meaning speci cally that it was authorized by Christ
(Moroni 4:1).13
Since the Savior established the sacrament on both hemispheres, the American consecration prayer can be tested
by the Gospels. The above discussion has correlated the covenant doctrine, but there are also speci c parallels in
the Nephite pledges. Comparison suffers because the New Testament—and early Christian literature—is more
fragmentary than the Book of Mormon. As we have seen, combining John with the three earlier Gospels enriches
the record. To do this requires synthesis—blending corresponding Gospel details. Most New Testament scholars
are untrained in this approach. Scholarly literature favors a dissecting method that sorts out and separates. But
one can see the need of synthesis by reading newspapers and news magazines. In major stories, no single reporter
will have the whole, but all responsible journalists will have pieces that nally combine well enough to re-create
the original event. Such an analogy is essential in handling the rst Christian literature, for the earliest stratum
contains apostolic letters responding to speci c problems, and the second stratum is the historical literature (the
Gospels and Acts) outlining the general story of Christ and the rise of the Church. Nothing like Moroni’s manual of
ordinances has survived in the New Testament itself.

Nevertheless, the biblical sources intricately supplement each other for Christ’s institution of the sacrament. In a
like manner, in Mormon journal work I regularly nd that several accounts of the same event agree on the basics,
but each recorder selects differing details. I have come to recognize general agreement plus unique individual
insights as sure marks of validity of independent accounts. The same is true with the four primary accounts of
Christ’s words about bread and wine, in the Synoptic Gospels and in Paul’s review in 1 Corinthians 11. As noted by
the Catholic Encyclopedia, “Their fundamental harmony amid difference of detail is a precious sign that they have
faithfully transmitted the thought of Jesus in His institution of the Eucharist.”14 Though fragmentary, these
accounts and John’s support the phrases of the Nephite consecration prayer on the bread: “That they may eat in
remembrance of the body of thy Son, and witness unto thee, O God, the Eternal Father, that they are willing to
take upon them the name of thy Son, and always remember him, and keep his commandments which he hath given
them, that they may always have his Spirit to be with them” (Moroni 4:3).
Remembering Christ is the rst purpose of the Nephite prayer and is also a characteristic of the biblical accounts
of Luke and Paul, both of which give slightly fuller detail than Matthew and Mark. To repeat, Paul’s rst Corinthian
letter was written before the Gospels, and speci cally bases the information on what the rst Christians had told
him (1 Corinthians 11:23). Indeed, the letter suggests its sources. Paul mentions the Jerusalem Apostles and gives
their personal testimonies of the resurrection as coming down to him (1 Corinthians 15:3-7). Since he knew the
detailed history of the resurrection from them, his information on the Last Supper no doubt came from them also.
The American prayer follows “remembrance” by a recommitment “that they are willing to take upon them the
name of thy Son.” That fundamental acceptance is made through baptism, whether in the Bible or Book of
Mormon. For instance, Paul talks of more than verbal confession: “For as many of you as have been baptized into
Christ have put on Christ” (Galatians 3:27). In fact, the most powerful insight into “putting on Christ” was given to
the faithful Eleven immediately after Christ handed them the bread and cup. As discussed earlier, John
supplemented the Synoptic Gospels, beginning Jesus’ postsacrament discourse in the middle of chapter 14. The
theme there is intimacy with Jesus Christ. Theologians can mysticize the remarks, but Jesus’ words t the
concepts of fellowship or communion. Right after ingesting the symbols of Christ’s person, Christ explained that
relationship. As Christ is in the Father, so are “ye in me, and I in you” (John 14:20). Neither here nor in the
subsequent prayer of John 17 is the individuality of any believer compromised. As in John 6, the act of eating
signi ed total acceptance of the Lord. Likewise, the Nephite prayer underlines the meaning of the act of eating—as
the elements are within the believer’s body, the name of the Lord is upon and within the believer’s soul.15
In the American consecration prayer, “remembering” and taking “the name” are followed by commitment to action.
Imitating Christ follows meditating on him. This purpose is hardly seen in scholarly commentary, which focuses on
Christ’s “words of institution” preceding the bread and wine. But as discussed above, John gives the phrase “keep
my commandments” (John 14:15) immediately following the bread and wine. Surprisingly, that is the exact
sequence of the American ministry. After eating and drinking, Nephite Christians were told by the Savior that their
act was a commitment “that ye are willing to do that which I have commanded you” (3 Nephi 18:10). In both
situations the Savior commented on the meaning of their act as they digested the elements. And there is another
intricate parallel. John, present at the Last Supper, gives the challenge to love and keep the commandments just
before the promise of the Holy Spirit. Commitment to “keep my commandments” (John 14:15) is immediately
followed by the assurance of the Comforter, “that he may abide with you for ever” (John 14:16). In the Nephite
sacrament prayer the sequence is the same: revered remembrance, commandment keeping, with the reward “that
they may always have his Spirit” (Moroni 4:3; cf. 3 Nephi 18:10-11).

These Bible-Book of Mormon correlations are more impressive because they are not super cially obvious. They
come with the slight opacity that one would expect in moving through language and culture barriers. Close verbal
parallels might suggest surface copying, but profound conceptual parallels show that Jesus’ thinking is found in
every element of the Book of Mormon sacrament prayer. Each petition is mirrored in Jesus’ rst instructions in the
upper room. In the American prayer of consecration, we indeed hear Christ’s voice.
The Early Christian Sacrament Covenant
Does the Book of Mormon sacrament prayer t the ceremony of the rst generations of Mediterranean
Christians? The answer is impressive, even though rst-century worship is thinly documented. Yet the regularity
of the sacrament appears in the rst postapostolic sources. Early in the second century a guard escorted the
bishop of Antioch across Asia Minor to martyrdom in Rome. Midway in this journey, Ignatius wrote seven letters
exposing the strong apostate sects. Four letters mention the bread or wine of the sacrament, showing that it was a
basic part of meetings. Since the Church was threatened by Christian seceders, Ignatius emphasized that true
administration of the sacrament required authority: “Let that be considered a valid Eucharist which is celebrated
by the bishop, or by one whom he appoints.”16 With other contemporaries, Ignatius uses “sacri ce” and “altar” in
connection with the sacrament, but these are Mosaic metaphors rather than New Testament doctrines. Ignatius
calls the broken bread “the medicine of immortality,” a phrase alluding to eternal life with God, as used by Jesus in
his bread of life sermon that foreshadowed the sacrament (John 6:48-51).17 Thus the sacrament is associated
with eternal salvation; this doctrine ts the thrust of every letter from this martyr bishop— honor Christ’s name by
living his teachings. In these letters, that result comes through faithfulness to scripture, to true church and
priesthood, to baptism and the sacrament.
Through Paul’s correction of the Corinthians, we can actually part the curtain on a rst-century “sacrament
meeting.” Their sel sh feasting merged with the sacred symbols and was offensive to the Apostle. We have already
seen that he reminded these Greco-Romans of Jesus’ words inaugurating the rst sacrament. Then Paul concisely
discussed what the Christian ceremony should accomplish (1 Corinthians 11:26-32). What did the Apostle mean
by warning careless Corinthians not to eat and drink “unworthily”? Many commentators are mechanical,
suggesting that Paul only commented on the abuse of feasting before the sacred memorial. But his repeated
phraseology is that of inner resolve.
In immediate connection with eating and drinking, Paul warns: “let a man examine himself.” Paul adds that the
thoughtless will eat, “not discerning the Lord’s body.” I emphasize “discerning” because the same verb (diakrino) soon
introduces the culminating purpose of the sacrament: “For if we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged.”
English translations scarcely disclose that the two italicized words are the same. Paul uses a verb of intense
evaluation. He elsewhere applies the noun form to the “discerning of spirits” (1 Corinthians 12:10) or discerning of
“good and evil” (Hebrews 5:14). In 1 Corinthians 11, Paul rst asserts that the unworthy do not discern the Lord’s
body, and then he repeats the verb to indicate that the faithful should discern themselves. Thus these are parallel
processes that occur while taking the sacred symbols—as one thinks on the Lord, he evaluates himself in relation
to the Lord. For this personal response to Christ, Paul uses three matching ideas: eating worthily, self-examination,
and self-discernment. True, Paul is condemning a particular practice of gluttony, but the correction goes beyond
narrow rebuke to explain and teach why Christians took the bread and wine.
Similarly, in 1 Corinthians 15, Paul starts with narrow errors concerning the resurrection and then broadens his
discussion to encompass the entire range of that doctrine. And in 1 Corinthians 11, Paul corrects the malpractice
and then outlines the true practice. In Paul’s personal preaching, “he reasoned about righteousness, self-control,

and the judgment to come” (Acts 24:25, New King James Version). This is precisely his logic at the end of the
Greek sacrament correction: “For if we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged. But when we are judged,
we are chastened of the Lord, that we should not be condemned with the world” (1 Corinthians 11:31-32). Thus
the criticism closes by indicating that self-judgment in the sacrament prepares the Christian for the nal judgment.
The worldly Corinthians would be condemned with the world unless true repentance would come through
remembering Christ in the sacrament. So Paul presents a double purpose—remembrance and resolve to live a
righteous life.
With slight subtlety, Paul gave the same perspective in the previous chapter. Most visible in 1 Corinthians 10 is the
inconsistency of social eating in pagan temples, and the most obvious sacrament teaching is that one cannot “be
partakers of the Lord’s table, and of the table of devils” (1 Corinthians 10:21). But again, many commentators see
only the narrow correction and miss the larger scope of the sacrament that Paul stressed. This oversight comes
mainly from underplaying the parallel that begins chapter 10. Paul’s examples come from ancient Israel, but he is
really warning volatile Greek converts. The Apostle was trained under Jewish scholars to use patterns and types.
In this case Paul loosely compares Christian baptism to Israel’s gurative immersion in the sea and under the cloud
of God’s presence in the Exodus (1 Corinthians 10:1-2). Then Paul adds the symbolic “spiritual food” of the manna
and the “spiritual drink” that Jehovah-Christ gave miraculously to “quench their thirst” (1 Corinthians 10:3-4; 1
Nephi 17:28-29). But the point is really what Christians commit to by taking the “cup” and the “bread” (1
Corinthians 10:16), and so Paul develops an intricate allegory, not only of Israel’s general unfaithfulness, but of
Israel’s unfaithfulness after immersion and eating and drinking. Several recognize that this is simply Paul’s parable
of Christian ceremonies: “The point of these illustrations is clear. The reception of sacraments will not by itself
save anyone. Paul emphasizes the fact that all of the Israelites had these bene ts, yet most of them were destroyed.
Despite their sacraments at the present time, the Corinthians may likewise be destroyed.”18
When Paul names Israelite sins in the next seven verses, he is historically matching Corinthian sins. The idolatry of
the Exodus is now eating at the idol’s feast (cf. 1 Corinthians 8 and 10); the adultery of the Exodus is the immorality
that Paul corrects (cf. 1 Corinthians 5 and 6); the murmuring against Moses is the criticism of the Apostle (cf. 1
Corinthians 4 and 9). As in Christ’s “new covenant” at the Last Supper, we are again reminded of the relevance of
the Old Testament to the Christian sacrament. The Jews of the Exodus had made a solemn covenant to obey and
then rebelled through the above sins. Paul begins his warning with ancient types of baptism and the sacrament,
showing clearly that Christian converts were obligated to avoid idolatry, immorality, and speaking against church
leaders. Baptism and the sacrament had raised speci c obligations of righteousness. Thus Paul treated these
ordinances as Christian covenants.
A Roman governor con rmed this picture after investigating whether Christian assemblies were subversive. He
reported to the Emperor concerning his province of Bithynia-Pontus, in the north of present Turkey. It bordered
on the province of Asia, where John spent his nal known days. It was approximately A.D. 110, and Pliny’s letter to
the Emperor Trajan is used here because the Apostle John was historically known just before this. That generation
of Christian leaders had been in touch with the last Apostle. Pliny’s long letter to Rome describes how pagan
worship had fallen off, blaming the vigorous Christian movement. Rome was suspicious of private associations, and
the governor had power to forbid assemblies—he could also interrogate by torture and order death.
Pliny was a capable administrator who was puzzled by the resolution of Christians who preferred martyrdom to
denying their faith. Although persecution details are intensely interesting, Pliny’s report on Christian meetings is
signi cant here. He asked Trajan to rule on punishing good citizens who were technically disloyal to the state
because they would not offer pagan sacri ce. Pliny found a highly moral people behind this rebellious conduct.

Trajan answered that the law required a penalty, unless the accused renounced Christ’s name. The
correspondence shows an Emperor and governor who are troubled. Pliny had carefully questioned former
Christians and learned of their meetings:
They had met regularly before dawn on a xed day to chant verses alternately among themselves in honor
of Christ as if to a god, and also to bind themselves by oath, not for any criminal purpose, but to abstain
from theft, robbery, and adultery, to commit no breach of trust and not to deny a deposit when called
upon to restore it. After this ceremony it had been their custom to disperse and reassemble later to take
food of an ordinary, harmless kind. But they had in fact given up this practice since my edict, issued on
your instructions, which banned all political societies.19
From this source some envision prayer and reading in the morning, plus a later gathering to eat and partake of the
sacrament. But that does not t Pliny’s description. The reassembly did not take sacred food, but “food of an
ordinary, harmless kind.” Paul’s Corinthian corrections suggest that the sacrament should be separated from the
fellowship meal. Pliny’s Christians easily gave up eating together, though they would not have renounced core
worship without a struggle. In their early meeting, an “oath” was taken to avoid all evil. No weekly Christian
practice ts such language except the sacrament, and this was while they gave “honor to Christ.” So the Book of
Mormon is historically on target to say that Christ gave the sacrament as both remembrance and commitment to
live his commandments. Some second-century evidence also supports this, such as Justin Martyr’s pro le of
Christian worship. But other second-century documents, including the miscellaneous collection known as the
Didache (“Teaching”), give a more generalized worship. This suggests a loss of the concise sacrament covenant
soon after the disappearance of directing Apostles. Even so, the Didache collects Christian practices of the
midsecond century, many of which have earlier roots, and John W. Welch has pointed out half a dozen striking
parallels between this work and the Savior’s American instructions in connection with the sacrament. This is all the
more impressive because the Didache was not discovered until half a century after the publication of the Book of
Mormon.20
About a decade before Pliny’s investigation, the Apostle John wrote his letters, and his Gospel not long before
that. All of John’s writings were composed in Asia Minor a little before Ignatius wrote to the same area about
similar dif culties.21 The surviving Apostle addressed the problem of how Christians could be faithful in the midst
of worldly evils and major Christian apostasy (1 John 2:18-19; 4:1-3). These issues are more obvious in John’s
letters, where the relevance of the Christian sacrament is suggested by upper-room teachings. The Apostle asks
for loyalty to what was taught “from the beginning.” And John repeatedly uses this phrase to underline two speci c
doctrines of Christ’s Last Supper discourse. One is the command to love one another, given by Christ at the meal
and afterward (1 John 3:11; 2 John 1:5). The other “beginning” doctrine is Jesus’ postsacrament challenge to keep
the commandments. John says it is really an “old commandment” after repeating Christ’s challenge in the upper
room (John 14:15): “And hereby we do know that we know him, if we keep his commandments” (1 John 2:3). John
paraphrases other teachings of Christ given right after the sacrament, such as the mutual indwelling, making the
same point: “And he that keepeth his commandments dwelleth in him, and he in him” (1 John 3:24). The key to
understanding John’s message is to realize that “from the beginning” is a Christian code for the Savior’s teachings
in connection with the rst sacrament. In reality the Apostle is saying that Christians can only be true to Christ by
honoring covenants of obedience made through the ordinance of baptism and the sacrament.22
The problems disclosed in John’s letters already existed when John wrote his Gospel, no doubt in the same area
and evidently but a few years before. His memory and probably his own records reached beyond half a century,

when he had walked with the Lord. From his personal experiences John added teachings of Christ not yet
recorded in any public Gospel. Since he could not write everything (John 21:25), he obviously chose what would
help the Church in the war against evil and desertion. This new material included Jesus’ Last Supper discourse and
also Jesus’ imagery of the bread and cup in the discourse after the feeding of the ve thousand. In the case of the
rst sacrament, the three earlier Gospels had narrated the event but had not given Jesus’ explanations afterward.
John, on the other hand, did provide Jesus’ teachings given both after the sacrament and after Jesus fed the
multitude and returned to the Capernaum synagogue to challenge the Galilee audience to accept him fully.
In the synagogue the Lord used the vivid comparison of eating and drinking his esh and blood. Jesus regularly
communicated to the Jewish culture in their striking metaphors, witness his illustration of straining at a gnat and
swallowing a camel (Matthew 23:24). Jews applied language of eating and drinking to digesting or accepting great
teachers and teachings. Indeed, Jesus had declined food from the Apostles in Samaria, saying that his real
nourishment was spiritual: “My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to nish his work” (John 4:34). This
eating-obeying equation was probably John’s deliberate foreshadowing to help the reader understand Jesus’
introduction of imagery of the sacrament two chapters later.
John relates how Capernaum Jews came back from across the lake, where they had eaten loaves and shes
miraculously supplied. In the synagogue Jesus began by offering eternal nourishment, not mere earthly food (John
6:27). Then he outlined that he would be their food, for he would give his esh and blood “for the life of the world”
(John 6:51). Those who took his esh and blood to themselves would have intimate fellowship with him (John
6:56). These statements make a double prophecy—that Jesus would give his life, and that its signi cance would be
commemorated by eating and drinking. In Capernaum Christ predicted not only the sacrament symbols, but the
full meaning of the future ceremony: “As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father: so he that eateth
me, even he shall live by me” (John 6:57). That is, the total obedience that Jesus gave the Father would be the
commitment of the believer in eating and drinking in the future. At the end of the rst century, John recorded
Jesus’ sacrament prophecy to teach the Church its duty. Jesus himself had insisted that the fellowship of the
sacrament was based on resolve to obey Christ as he had obeyed his Father.
The Sacrament in Christian History
How do contemporary Christians view the sacrament? Most agree that it is an acceptance and memorial of
Christ’s atonement for sin. Luke and 1 Corinthians 11 say that Christ gave the elements as a remembrance of his
blood shed for mankind. And Paul also insisted that eating and drinking are public af rmations of the atoning
death. Through eating and drinking, “ye do shew the Lord’s death till he come” (1 Corinthians 11:26). Here the LDS
edition of the Bible notes that “shew” is not strong enough. The Greek verb (katangéllo), as the footnote says,
means “proclaim, announce,” a term consistently used in Acts and the letters for preaching. Thus major
translations say that the believer “proclaims” Christ’s death in partaking of the sacrament. To whom? Obviously
other human beings see this witness, but Paul’s context of inner resolution highlights an act done in the presence
of God. Thus the commitment clause of the Book of Mormon prayer closely ts Paul’s context: “and witness unto
thee, O God, the Eternal Father, that they are willing to take upon them the name of thy Son.”
Christians share several sacrament titles generated from the Bible. Many faiths use the term Eucharist, adapting
the Greek word for giving thanks, which Jesus used in the accounts of the institution of the sacrament. But Jesus
also gave thanks in blessing the food at the feedings of the four thousand and of the ve thousand. Thus his
characteristic appreciation to the Father at the Last Supper was evidently not intended to be a continuing part of
the sacrament ceremony itself. Prayers of thanksgiving over the bread and wine are found in the second century,

but they seem creative adaptations of the Gospels rather than common practices of the early church. Another
regular Christian term derived from the New Testament is Communion, coming from Paul’s introductory remark to
the Corinthians on the sacredness of the sacrament: “The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion
of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?” (1 Corinthians
10:16).
“Communion” here is the simple Greek word “sharing,” often translated “fellowship.” There is a fellowship of the
Saints throughout the letters of Paul and John, but there is also a fellowship with God, Christ, and the Holy Ghost.
This divine fellowship is the main object of the sacrament in 1 Corinthians. Today’s Christians increasingly
emphasize brotherhood in their sacrament ceremony. Concern for others of the faith is a valid aspect of holy
commitments to God, as indicated in the rst sacrament services after the Gospels: “And they continued stedfastly
in the apostles’ doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers” (Acts 2:42). Yet 1 Corinthians
10:16 states a communion relationship primarily with body and blood, the symbolic sharing of Christ’s person,
which in application means the adoption of all that he stands for. Thus Paul’s “communion” is deeply harmonious
with the Nephite sacrament prayer—taking on the name of Christ and promising to keep his commandments.
“Communion” in thought without comparable conduct is not a full one, since the argument of 1 Corinthians 10 is
that Christians must not partake of baptism and sacrament and thereafter violate their covenants.
Roman Catholics go beyond taking Christ’s name in the sacrament to sharing the very presence. The historical
doctrine of transubstantiation asserts that the elements’ appearance is not changed but the substance or reality
becomes Christ at the words in the Mass: “this is my body . . . this is my blood.” Yet Jews spoke in vivid personal
metaphors. Jesus’ command that Peter “feed my lambs” (John 21:15) simply linked lambs to followers in a concise
leadership parable. Since Jesus so regularly used metaphors as illustrations, one should not argue change of
substance in the sacrament without Christ explaining such a strange doctrine. Through symbols of body and blood,
Jesus gives an object lesson that we take him to our spirits as we take the elements into our bodies. The accounts
must be read as a whole to get the entire meaning— the Lord’s full instruction to partake “in remembrance” is
found in Luke, Paul, and 3 Nephi.
What do Christian churches stress in their sacrament memorials? The answer is complex, yet it can be outlined
through handbooks of worship, explanations of religious leaders, or grass-roots understandings of the worshipper.
Catholic traditions are more mystical. Many know through television at Christmas time that the Roman Mass is
high drama. There is a place for some of this, as Mormons would agree in accepting the restored temple
endowment. But there are major questions. Is traditional complexity man-made? Does it obscure the personal
commitment to live Christ’s commands that the Master stressed while yet in the upper room?
Historians of every Christian persuasion document the radical changes from the primitive sacrament ceremony,
though their judgments on the meaning of these changes are quite different. This paper can only name main
modi cations of the sacrament in the nineteen centuries after Christ established it. Since there is little
disagreement on the highlights, one Catholic theologian’s summary will give a checklist of changes:
After 312 A.D., when Christianity became the of cial religion of the Roman Empire, the size of the
communities increased rapidly and the celebration of the Eucharist took on a more of cial character. . . .
More ceremonies and rituals were added to these eucharistic celebrations, which more and more came to
resemble of cial Roman ceremonies. . . . As the celebration of the Eucharist became enlarged and more
of cial, it lost some of the intimacy experienced in this sacrament in earlier times. . . . The celebration of
the Mass, however, became locked into the Latin language for many centuries. . . . This sense of all the

people participating in the celebration of the Lord’s Supper began to be lost in the sixth century, when
priests started saying Masses by themselves. Their original intention was to pray for special needs, but
this practice detracted greatly from the original purpose of the Eucharist. . . . During the Dark Ages (eighth
through eleventh centuries) the private character of the Mass began in uencing community Eucharists.
We see in the old missals the Mass prayers change from the use of “we” to “I,” and gradually almost all the
prayers were said silently by the priest alone. . . . The architecture of the churches re ected this
understanding by setting the action of the priest farther and farther from the people. Since the people in
the community were no longer actively participating in the eucharistic celebration, their main action
became worshiping the sacred objects of the Mass. . . . This led to . . . less frequent reception of
communion. Communion began to be received on the tongue while kneeling. Drinking from the cup was
eliminated altogether. . . . The bread and wine once shared as a symbol of unity, sacri ce and commitment
gradually became objects too “sacred” for the community to receive. With these developments the
sacrament of the Eucharist lost much of its original meaning. We can also see in these developments the
origins [of] the Benediction and processions with the sacred bread. The main action of the people had
become adoration rather than communal sharing.23
As the above quotation vividly shows, Roman Catholics have led out in self-criticism of the older Mass. How
Catholic worship could better conform to Christ’s concerns has been debated—and papacy, priesthood, and
scholars have united in the past decades to effect radical reforms in the name of “liturgical renewal.”24 Catholicism
in the twentieth century inherited the patterns of the medieval church. Consecration of the elements was then a
transcendent sacri ce in which the priest was central and the people peripheral. How far the pendulum has
reversed is too complicated for assessment here, but the basic trend is to restore personal involvement in the
sacrament. New principles were adopted by the Second Vatican Council, meeting 1962 to 1965. Papal
implementation afterward modi ed the Mass: “The general objectives were to make the liturgy more simple, more
participatory, more intelligible and more dynamic.”25 Speci c changes included “celebrating the liturgy in the
language of the people, moving the altar to a more central place, giving more emphasis to the reading of scripture,
encouraging more frequent reception of Communion, eliminating the many unnecessary signs and gestures that
accumulated during the Middle Ages, and restoring the action of drinking from the cup.”26
Note that the Mass early shifted to mystical sacri ce instead of the personal pledge documented in the Book of
Mormon and early Christian literature. Such signi cant reversals are a red ag. The covenant function of the
sacrament was obscured for over fteen hundred years. Specialists agree on the trends. Until the current century,
innovation moved from the simple to the complex in the ceremony, from personal participation to spectator status
in the worshipper. For instance, in the pre-Vatican American Mass, the altar boy regularly spoke to the priest for
the silent congregation, in the pattern of the baptismal sponsor making promises for the baby incapable of
speaking for himself.27 Catholic theologians would not dispute these patterns, but they would emphasize a theory
of sacred presence and evaluate personal participation as desirable but not basic for continuous divine approval.
But if Christ intended the sacrament as a personal covenant, moving the worshipper to the fringes changed its
central meaning.
Catholic spokesmen maintain that essentials were not lost but that unauthorized modi cations were corrected:
“The liturgical reforms mandated by Vatican II restored the Eucharist to its original purpose and structure.”28 Yet
after reading and pondering the new English Missal, I still ask what is considered central. I sense great devotion to
Christ, reverence for his incomprehensible sacri ce, recommitment to love and understand him, periodic promises
to do his will. But measured by the Last Supper and rst-century worship, the intricacies are confusing. What are

the main purposes? Current Catholic literature says essentially that the church has preserved the mystery of the
sacred presence while reemphasizing divine and brotherly communion and a responsive offering of the believer’s
life. This is a major move to restore essentials, but lengthy rituals wander. This is not seen as a weakness in current
Catholic analysis: “At its present stage of development, therefore, the eucharistic liturgy is a multivalent religious
ritual, that is, it is a complex sacramental sign which can express and reveal a variety of Christian values and
meanings. . . . It is as though the eucharist today is not a single door to the sacred but a multiple door to sacred
truth and mysterious reality.”29
If current Roman rites do not highlight the primary self-examination of earliest Christianity, how successful was
Protestantism in reestablishing the personal sacrament? The answer contains a paradox, for the traditional
Reformation mainly stands for renewing the individual’s relationship with God, a reaction against the
authoritarian Medieval Church. Yet major Protestant churches of the sixteenth century were surprisingly
conservative in modifying worship, whether from lack of knowledge of ancient models or doubts about authority
for striking out in new directions. So the structure of the Mass was adapted by the main Protestant groups. This
inherited ceremonialism was typically mixed with the simple promises to remember Christ by being loyal to him,
the underlying theme in formal Protestant worship services. These promises to serve and obey are traditionally
sprinkled through devotional sections that broadly correspond to medieval categories. Some informal names for
the main stages are: introduction, invitation, group confession, consecration, distribution, and thanksgiving.
The real issue of the sacrament covenant is how to remember Christ. Protestant services invariably incorporate
Paul’s or Luke’s remembrance summary. But since reformers stressed justi cation through faith alone, even
ceremonial words of loyalty to Christ may not be understood as an obligation to keep his commandments. The
theology of grace is of course re ected in the traditional Lutheran service. The distribution closed with the
admonition: “May this strengthen and preserve you in the true faith unto life everlasting.” Then the thanksgiving
closed with the prayer: “rule our hearts and minds by Thy Holy Spirit that we may be enabled constantly to serve
thee.”30 This phraseology names the active work of God and adds a certain passive acceptance of it. To the degree
that a worshipper takes active responsibility, he is committed to obey God. Indeed, in the whole range of formal
and informal Protestant sacrament services, the duty is implicit to live a Christian life in gratitude for Christ’s
sacri ce. But does a Communion service emphasize only meditation? What explicit commitment is there to keep
Christ’s commandments?
The traditional Episcopal service invited those to the sacrament table who intend “to lead a new life, following the
commandments of God, and walking from henceforth in his holy ways.” This commitment was repeated in the
closing thanksgiving—a prayer to be sustained to “do all such good works as Thou hast prepared for us to walk
in.”31 In the derivative Methodist worship, the opening call to a new life was retained, but salvation through grace
was stressed in the nal thanksgiving. There the worshipper offered himself to the Lord, but prayed not for good
works but to “be lled with thy grace and heavenly benediction.”32 Presbyterian worship was also in uenced by
the Episcopal ceremony. One invitation was extended to partake if one was willing to commit to a new life, in the
same words as quoted above. And a closing thanksgiving was similar but verbally more passive: “So enrich us by
Thy continual grace that . . . thy kingdom be furthered through all such good works as Thou hast prepared for us to
walk in.”33
The above churches represent the most structured Protestant groups. At the other end of the spectrum are
decentralized communions represented by Baptists and Congregationalists. The latter inherited covenant
concepts from their common Calvinistic heritage with the Presbyterians. But the present worship service is

principally praise and gratitude for forgiveness, with general personal commitment in the thanksgiving section at
the end of the service—a prayer “to strengthen our faith in thee and to increase our love toward one another.”34
Today’s Protestant tendency is toward this less structured worship. The dilemma of the Reformation is how to end
reform. Roman Catholic “liturgical renewal” nds a current parallel in Protestant revisionism in worship. Since
traditional ceremonies are not biblical, modernizing creativity is an active force, as demonstrated by the recent
papal statement asking for control of “outlandish innovations” in the Mass.35
Thus a Protestant historian projected a future of change: “The second half of the 20th century should produce a
new and exciting chapter in the history of liturgies.”36 But the danger is variety for the sake of variety. Protestant
reforms tended to bring back personal promises into the Communion service, but recent revision tends to delete
speci c commitments of personal righteousness and obedience and make the believer’s response to Christ very
general. For instance, private handbooks give ceremonial options for less formal Protestant churches. A recent
one presents well-written “traditional and contemporary approaches.”37 A dozen invitations to Communion are
given, and just half suggest obligations of Christian obedience. Eight consecration prayers are given, and half
include any commitment to keep the commandments. The essence of one is the request: “hear us as each in his
own way seeks personal communion with Thee through Jesus Christ.”38
Formal Protestant worship has generally been rewritten in recent decades. Besides simpli ed Christian loyalty,
typically there is increased social awareness but less de nite language on commandment-keeping and personal
moral standards. An example of this interfaith trend is the revised Presbyterian service, printed in 1972, to “serve
a new age in the church.”39 The old invitation to the table was for those “who do truly and earnestly repent of your
sins, and are in love and charity with your neighbors, and intend to lead a new life, following the commandments of
God, and walking from henceforth in His holy ways.”40 In the new summons, the Savior simply “invites those who
trust him.”41 The old group confession was for “sins . . . by thought, word, and deed.”42 The current revision
stresses human failings in sel shness and indifference—basically a failure to show love.43 The older offering of self
before blessing the elements is retained; the current language is: “we give ourselves to you.”44 But the older
standard of biblical commandments is heavily shifted to community ethics. Thus the sacrament services re ect
humanistic trends: “Among United Methodists, for example, the proportion of laity who regarded individual
salvation as the chief goal for the church to pursue dropped from 63 percent in 1958 to 55 percent in 1975 to 31
percent in 1983.”45 Social action is not irrelevant to biblical covenants, but they included much more. Christ
founded the sacrament above all as a commitment of living for eternal exaltation.
Loss, Restoration, and the Book of Mormon
Recent developments in Christian worship are one more validation of the Book of Mormon. Liturgical reform has
concerned all major faiths since midcentury. Tradition-oriented churches have tried to correct unauthorized
additions to the ceremony that Christ intended. Such formal worship has been simpli ed, and a deeper personal
commitment has been sought through the sacrament. On the other hand, less formal groups have reduced the
sacrament ceremony to little more than remembrance and human fellowship. In America the Savior twice
identi ed the twin dangers of either more or less than he intended (3 Nephi 11 and 27)—and historic Communion
services continually illustrate both trends. The Book of Mormon gives blunt prophetic criticisms that churches will
add ritual without authority and produce ceremony that does not promote Christlike lives. The many Book of
Mormon prophecies concerning worship continue to be dramatically ful lled.

Christ spoke of Satan sowing tares to spoil the wheat after his ministry, and Nephi saw that process in vision as the
spoiling of the sacred biblical revelations. Nephi foresaw a Jewish record which contained the Old and New
Testaments, since he saw that book carried to the New World by Gentile immigrants. That book contained “the
covenants of the Lord” from the prophets and Christ’s Apostles (1 Nephi 13:23-24). Next the book passed
through the hands of a “church,” which in context would include western and eastern churches. Indeed, Eastern
Christianity breaks down into many national churches. The plainness of the Bible was lost after it passed through
this worldly “church,” and afterward that book went to “all the nations of the Gentiles,” including those “across the
many waters.” This sequence reaches the time period of Western Catholicism, Eastern Catholicism, and major
Protestant groups, since New World nations and major Bible distribution are post-Reformation developments.
At rst glance it seems that scribes mutilated the book, since “many plain and precious things” were “taken away
from the book, which is the book of the Lamb of God” (1 Nephi 13:28). Yet a second process is at work. For
decades I have included New Testament manuscripts in my studies. Though they contain thousands of minor
changes in spelling, synonyms, transpositions, and accidental omissions, major additions or deletions are more
rarely in evidence. Known lost letters of Apostles might well have been suppressed, but what survives is generally
authenticated by a broad range of manuscripts, many of them relatively early. This picture exactly ts what Nephi
saw, for the “records of the twelve apostles of the Lamb” would stand side by side with other revealed records in
latter days (1 Nephi 13:41). These “last records”—which include the Book of Mormon—would “establish the truth
of the rst, which are of the twelve apostles of the Lamb.” Clearly the latter-day Bible would have a great degree of
historical accuracy, though doctrinal confusion would still reign.
We have much to learn about Nephi’s prophecy, if Book of Mormon commentaries are any indication. These
generally focus on the two times that the Book of Mormon prophet indicated subtractions from the Bible (1 Nephi
13:28-29). But in many more verses in this chapter Nephi notes subtractions from the “gospel of the Lamb.” In
recent centuries, rationalism has subtracted Christ’s divinity from the Bible by selective interpretation, not
physical destruction of manuscripts. Various Christian theologies have regularly ignored major parts of the
scriptures. Nephi’s prophecy contains broader concepts of change than biblical text alone. Lost writings are
overshadowed by lost principles— those overlooked or explained away, though still mentioned in the biblical
records. Nephi’s prophecy really emphasizes deletions of doctrine, and there is a special component: “They have
taken away from the gospel of the Lamb many parts which are plain and most precious; and also many covenants
of the Lord have they taken away” (1 Nephi 13:26). So there were changes in documents, in the gospel itself, and in
ceremonies; for removing “many covenants” includes changing essential church ordinances. And this prophecy is
impressive because history so clearly reveals constant modi cations of Christian rites. Since ceremonies teach
lessons by physical actions, their survival is virtually assured by repetition and imitation. But their meanings are far
more fragile.
We have examined two changed covenants. One is the baptismal commitment to Christ for those old enough to
have faith, repent, and make the promise to keep the commandments. This has been radically modi ed by the legal
ction of a stand-in for an unaware baby. Catholics and most major Protestant churches have perpetuated infant
baptism by rationalizing it instead of correcting it. In addition, the sacrament covenant of remembrance and
recommitment was expanded with elaborate practices that tended to produce awed onlookers, forcing individual
repentance into nonscriptural channels like scheduled penance and the last rites. Here the biblical accounts were
a standard for Protestant reemphasis on the personal promises of the sacrament stressed by Christ and by Paul.
But the Bible gives general principles and only incidental details about early Christian ordinances. Thus the full
sacrament covenant could not be restored until the ancient American consecration prayer came to light through

the Book of Mormon. The Latter-day Saint sacrament prayer is in the founding revelation on Church government,
Section 20 of the Doctrine and Covenants. Why is that full blessing (D&C 20:77) identical to the Nephite blessing
(Moroni 4:3)? The apparent answer is suggested in a manuscript in the LDS Historical Department in the
handwriting of Oliver Cowdery, dated June 1829, which copies the basic Book of Mormon ceremonies for the
bene t of the rst members of the Restored Church. He labeled his inspired compilation “The Articles of the
Church of Christ,” a title then commonly used for a list of formal church beliefs.46 In his old age David Whitmer
remembered either this or a similar collection, reviewing the year 1829: “The Book of Mormon was still in the
hands of the printer, but my brother, Christian Whitmer, had copied from the manuscript the teachings and
doctrine of Christ, being the things which we were commanded to preach.”47
Here is a parallel process to the early history of the Doctrine and Covenants. Important revelations through
Joseph Smith circulated in manuscript form to instruct the Church before the tedious process of collection and
printing was completed. Similarly, as soon as the Book of Mormon appeared in manuscript, key portions were hand
copied to aid the rst baptisms and meetings of late 1829 and early 1830. Oliver’s copy might precede or even
incorporate Book of Mormon passages that David Whitmer said his brother transcribed. But clearly the Cowdery
document was seen as modern instruction, for its preface indicates a divine direction to “write the words which I
shall command you concerning my Church, my gospel, my rock, and my salvation.”48 This rst known priesthood
“handbook” ful lls the promise to the Second Elder of using his “gift” to bring to light “those parts of my scriptures
which have been hidden because of iniquity” (D&C 6:27). His document included Christ’s instructions on baptism
and the sacrament from 3 Nephi 11 and 18, the sacrament prayers from Moroni 4 and 5, and many quotationparaphrases about the Church from Christ’s instructions to the Nephites and from the great doctrinal revelations
of June 1829 (D&C 17 and 18).
The Cowdery version was apparently used during 1829 but was superseded by the fuller revelation on doctrine
that Joseph Smith described writing in his History at a point just before the organization of the Church. Now
known as Section 20, it followed the model of the inspired Cowdery summary of Nephite ordinances for the use of
the Restored Church. Thus the Nephite sacrament prayer went from Moroni’s compilation of ancient Church
ordinances, to the Book of Mormon manuscript, to the Cowdery ceremony summary, to Joseph Smith’s fuller
statement of doctrine and practice in the Doctrine and Covenants. The conditions for baptism there have the
same genealogy. Thus the Book of Mormon was instrumental in restoring the ancient covenant forms of gospel
ordinances. It is “Another Testament of Christ,” both in the intended sense of a second witness—and in the biblical
sense of containing Christ’s personal covenants in their original forms.49
The sacrament prayer was restored as given “according to the commandments of Christ” in ancient America
(Moroni 4:1). Although derived independently of the Bible, every purpose stated in it corresponds to Christ’s
words in instituting the sacrament or to Christ’s commentary immediately afterward. Two New Testament
accounts stress Jesus’ command of remembrance in establishing the sacrament, but the full record is broader than
the summaries in the Synoptics. “Remembrance” and “communion” are common denominators of Christian rites,
and traditional Christian ceremonies have well over nine parts appreciation to one part determination to live the
gospel. Yet Christ evenly balanced these purposes. After the rst sacrament he fully explained communion or
fellowship with him. The Apostles’ relationship of branch to stem of the vine would be maintained “if ye keep my
commandments” (John 15:10). Their divine friendship had a rm condition: “if ye do whatsoever I command you”
(John 15:14). These words were spoken right after the invitation to leave the upper room, and they repeat the
same challenges reiterated right after the sacrament (John 14:15, 21, 23). Thus the Book of Mormon prayer
contains Christ’s full purposes in that founding hour. He gave bread and cup while commanding remembrance, but

while the taste lingered he explained that loyalty must be coupled with righteous living. This is the same ratio of
Christ’s fullest biblical statement of discipleship, the Sermon on the Mount. There he unfolded the meaning of
righteousness, closing with the challenge that hearing must be followed by doing (Matthew 7:24, 26). The Savior
also closed his ministry with this double thrust in the sacrament covenant. While still in the upper room (John
14:31), he explained mutual promises: “If ye love me, keep my commandments. And I will pray the Father, and he
shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever” (John 14:15-16).
The sacrament prayer of the Book of Mormon has religious validity because it repeats the above essentials given
by Jesus: “always remember him, and keep his commandments . . . that they may always have his Spirit to be with
them” (Moroni 4:3). Human eloquence and devotional creativity cannot add signi cantly to these basics. They are
stated in balance. “Much speaking” (Matthew 6:7) will muddy these central promises. Christ’s own principles
establish historical validity, so the correlation of the Book of Mormon prayer with the full Last Supper teachings
shows its divinity. The American prayer states the Lord’s views simply; it contains no more. A current slogan insists
that the person with more than three goals has no goals. The Son of God never overexplained, and the Book of
Mormon sacrament prayers bear his stamp. The baptized believer, in partaking of the sacrament, retakes the
Lord’s name with the double purpose of remembrance and resolve—of loving the Lord and living his teachings.
Thus Christ’s words on both hemispheres illuminate each other. With all my soul I know that both the Bible and
Book of Mormon are true, that both contain the Savior’s ancient words. And I know that as I live in my heart and in
my life the covenant of the sacrament—to remember Christ and be faithful—the sweet spirit of the Lord attends
me, a companionship that is beyond all price and beyond all purchase. That is the ultimate religious validity.
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The Lamanite View of Book of Mormon History
Richard L. Bushman
History is one of the spoils of war. In great con icts, the victors almost always write the history; the losers’ story is
forgotten. We remember the patriots’ version of the American Revolution, not the loyalists’; the Northern account
of the Civil War, not the Southern story of the War between the States. Ordinarily the winners’ account of events
commands our memories as completely as their armies controlled the battle eld. The reverse is true of the Book
of Mormon. The Lamanites vanquished the Nephites and survived; yet by virtue of a record that went into the
earth with them, the Nephites’ version of the history is the one we now read. We think of the Nephites as the
superior nation because they wrote the history, even though in the end the Lamanites won on the battle eld. How
would the story go if the Lamanites had kept the records, and their view were in our hands today? We cannot say
in any detail of course, but there are enough clues scattered through the Nephite record to offer a few conjectures
about a Lamanite history of Lehi’s descendants. Since the way we write history is tied closely to fundamental
cultural values, in recovering the Lamanite perspective, we obtain a clearer view of the two cultures, and, as it
turns out, a deeper understanding of Nephite religion.
One fact would surely gure as prominently in the Lamanite record as the Nephite: the frequent wars between
the two peoples. Especially in their rst six hundred years, the Lamanites or those leading them exerted relentless
pressure on the Nephites, driving or causing them to move farther and farther north, to the lands of Nephi,
Zarahemla, and Bountiful, and at last the land northward. That being true for both nations, in order to write a
Lamanite account of these events, we must know why the Lamanites fought. Though the Lamanites ultimately
triumphed (for other reasons), more often than not in the rst six hundred years of their stormy relationship, they
lost the wars with the Nephites. They sent vast armies into Nephite territory, won a battle or two, and then were
defeated with a huge loss of life and driven back to their own lands. For hundreds of years these attacks and
defeats succeeded one another with no apparent gain. What brought the Lamanites back during this time year
after year to be outmaneuvered and outfought by the Nephites?
The Nephite record says little more than “they delighted in wars and bloodshed, and they had an eternal hatred
against us, their brethren” (Jacob 7:24). Without questioning the essential truth of that judgment, as moderns we
wish to know more. Were not the Lamanites seeking more substantive gains for themselves than mere vengeance?
We could understand the wars if the Lamanites suffered from a land shortage and wished to capture new
territory. While that was possibly the case, there is no mention of a land shortage, and there is evidence of a
plentitude of land. The Lamanite king welcomed the people of Zeniff when they migrated into Lamanite territory
as if there were enough land to go around. Why would a Lamanite king clear out his people from a broad valley to
make room for Nephites if he lacked land? The king did bene t from Zeniff’s presence in one respect: he exacted
tribute. Traditionally that has been a powerful motive for imperial expansion, and whenever a Nephite people
came under Lamanite control the Nephites paid heavy tribute. But the Lamanite armies failed so consistently for
eight hundred years, never actually conquering a Nephite people for more than a few years at any one time so far
as can be known, that it is dif cult to believe that the expectation of tribute sustained the Lamanites through all
their losses.
The Nephite record gives a further explanation for those wars, in words directly quoted from Lamanite
documents. In 63 B.C., Ammoron the Lamanite king wrote to Moroni about a prisoner exchange and explained why
they fought: “For behold, your fathers did wrong their brethren, insomuch that they did rob them of their right to
the government when it rightly belonged unto them” (Alma 54:17). The war would stop, Ammoron said to Moroni,

if you “lay down your arms, and subject yourselves to be governed by those to whom the government doth rightly
belong” (Alma 54:18). Ammoron referred, of course, to Laman’s complaint that Nephi “thinks to rule over us,” when
Laman himself claimed the right of rulership. “We will not have him to be our ruler; for it belongs unto us, who are
the elder brethren, to rule over this people” (2 Nephi 5:3). Ammoron represents the war as a continuation of an
ancient feud between the two sets of brothers in Lehi’s family. That hardly makes sense to us. Would countless
thousands of men hundreds of years later throw themselves into battle simply to reclaim an ancient right? It is all
the more puzzling because after the landing in America, Nephi and his descendants made no claims that we know
of to rule the Lamanites. Quite to the contrary, Nephi withdrew from the site of the rst landing by command of
the Lord, leaving the area to his brothers (2 Nephi 5:5-7). The rst King Mosiah also withdrew by command of the
Lord (cf. Omni 1:12-13), pulling back from the Lamanites and not forcing his rule on them. Until near the end, the
Nephites never fought aggressive wars. The Lamanites were the ones to attack, not the Nephites. How could such
an abstraction as this ancient hurt motivate people over so many centuries? We have to credit the Book of
Mormon explanation for the wars, coming as it does from both sides, but the source of its power remains a puzzle.
Why should Nephi’s one-time claim to rule arouse the wrath of the Lamanites generation after generation for
hundreds of years?
In attacking this puzzle, we are best advised, I believe, to begin where the evidence points, with the story of the
brothers in the opening pages. In summing up Lamanite animus against the Nephites, Ammoron attributed it to the
original contest between Laman and Nephi, and that is probably reason enough for recognizing its primal
importance to Lamanite culture. But there is another reason for taking these stories seriously. The Book of
Mormon, like other ancient narratives, blends family history and national history. The story of a whole people
grows out of the story of a single family, as the history of Israel begins with the family of Abraham. Israel thought of
itself as the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and what the patriarchs did to a large extent determined
what Israel was for thousands of years. In our day, a revolution and the work of a convention in the Philadelphia
state house determine our national identity. In ancient times, family events founded nations and determined their
character ever after. That is why the story of the competing brothers requires close analysis.
The most powerful impression we get from the family story is of Laman’s and Lemuel’s complaining natures. They
were forever raising objections to Lehi or Nephi, becoming rst sullen, then angry, and nally violent. We have to
allow for Nephi’s stern, exacting estimation of his brothers, but there is no reason to question the reality of their
complaints. We too may have objected to the sacri ce of a comfortable life in Jerusalem for an arduous trek in the
desert toward an unknown destination. Nor is there reason to question Laman’s and Lemuel’s resort to violence.
At least ve times they physically punished Nephi or threatened his life. After the second visit to Laban, when they
left all their property behind as they ed, Laman and Lemuel took out their anger on their younger brothers,
smiting them with a rod (1 Nephi 3:29). A little later, on the way back from Jerusalem with Ishmael’s family, Laman
and Lemuel and a few of Ishmael’s children grew so angry with Nephi’s preaching that they bound him with cords
and planned to kill him (1 Nephi 7:16). After the broken bow incident and Ishmael’s death, Laman and Lemuel
planned to kill both Lehi and Nephi (1 Nephi 16:37). When they arrived at the sea and Nephi proposed to build a
ship, his brothers’ patience wore thin again, and they tried to throw him “into the depths of the sea” (1 Nephi
17:48). Finally, aboard ship on the way to the promised land, Nephi reproached them for their merrymaking, and
Laman and Lemuel bound him with cords and treated him with “much harshness” (1 Nephi 18:11). By that time,
Nephi’s reproaches, the brothers’ murmuring, and the violence had fallen into a pattern that characterized their
relationship, establishing the recurring subplot of First Nephi.
On the other hand, a frequent result of the brothers’ assaults on Nephi was a rebuke from the Lord. Once an angel
appeared to chastise them, and on another occasion they heard the voice of the Lord. They gave way in the face of

these rebukes, but on one occasion they did more than relent. When Nephi was about to construct a ship and the
brothers in anger tried to throw him into the sea, Nephi was given the power to shock them physically with a
touch. This show of power so overwhelmed Laman and Lemuel that they swung to the opposite extreme. Nephi
says they “fell down before me, and were about to worship me,” and he had to reassure them he was still only their
brother (1 Nephi 17:53-55). This reaction, combined with the brothers’ repeated violent assaults on Nephi,
suggests that force was their characteristic reaction to crisis, the only language they understood in such
situations. It seemed to be a matter of smite or be smitten.
There is another element in the founding story along with the complaints and the violence, namely deprivation.
That theme is most evident on the ship. Laman and Lemuel, the sons of Ishmael, and their wives made themselves
merry—dancing, singing, and speaking with much rudeness. Nephi, ever fearing the Lord would be displeased,
spoke to them soberly, and they grew angry. Immediately his brothers came forth with the classic complaint: “We
will not that our younger brother shall be a ruler over us,” and bound him with cords (1 Nephi 18:9-10). In this case
it seems that the denial of pleasure and the objections to Nephi’s rule are closely linked. The attempt to stop the
merrymaking aroused the thought of his unfounded claims to govern. The connection is most clear on the ship, but
it has a place throughout the narrative. The brothers’ complaint from the beginning is that Lehi and Nephi cause
them needless physical suffering. Laman and Lemuel did not want to leave their home and leave behind “their gold,
and their silver, and their precious things, to perish in the wilderness” (1 Nephi 2:11). That basic deprivation
underlay their truculence throughout. Then it was the loss of their precious things to Laban that set off the rst
physical attack—they beat Nephi with a rod (1 Nephi 3:24-28). Once on their way in the desert, suffering and
deprivation become their common lot. The loss of the steel bow brought the problem to a head when “they did
suffer much for the want of food,” causing the brothers to “murmur exceedingly” (1 Nephi 16:19-20). The death of
Ishmael made things worse, his daughters complaining that “we have suffered much af iction, hunger, thirst, and
fatigue; and after all these sufferings we must perish in the wilderness with hunger” (1 Nephi 16:35). Even amidst
the abundance of Bountiful by the sea, the brothers held a grudge against Nephi for the eight years of wandering
with their ofttimes pregnant wives, suffering in the desert when all along they might “have enjoyed [their]
possessions and the land of [their] inheritance” (1 Nephi 17:20-21). Nephi’s intervention to stop the shipboard
merrymaking was the straw that broke the camel’s back. They had undergone untold af ictions in the wilderness—
hunger, thirst, raw food—and now when they sought a little pleasure for themselves, he wanted to prevent them
once more. To Laman and Lemuel, all the deprivations they suffered could be blamed on Nephi. It was not merely
that he claimed rulership unjustly. His governance became unbearable when it was driven home that he used his
power to cause them suffering. Nephi was the cause of their deprivation. Deep down they may have believed
Nephi sought his own pleasure at their expense. They said once that they suspected him of leading them away to
make himself king “that he may do with us according to his will and pleasure” (1 Nephi 16:38).
Combining these clues, then, we can reconstruct events as the Lamanites probably understood them. Initially they
were living a pleasurable life amidst their treasures and precious things in the land of Jerusalem. Their father’s
vision and subsequently Nephi’s God-given claim to rule and teach them, tore them away from these pleasures
and subjected them to danger, af iction, and hunger. They grew angry time after time whenever events brought
their fundamental grievance to the surface: that they were made to suffer deprivations because of Nephi’s
attempts to rule them. It is noticeable in this reconstructed plot that force plays a large part. The brothers feel that
Nephi and Lehi are compelling them; they use force to stop their intervention; and it is divine force that breaks
their will and compels submission. The Freudians would say that Laman and Lemuel had archaic superegos—that
is, the internal monitors that controlled their egos used terror rather than persuasion.

With this plot before us, we can begin to understand the dilemma of existence as Laman and Lemuel understood
the world. They felt compelled to choose between two unfortunate alternatives. On the one hand, they could
enjoy pleasure and comfort by refusing submission to their father and brother, and since these two spoke for the
Lord, refusing submission to God, too. Or on the other hand, they could yield abjectly to the superior power of the
two prophets and their God, giving up all claims to pleasure and even to honor. Judging from the stories, Laman
and Lemuel felt driven by events to choose between rebellious pleasure and fearful self-denial and submission.
They could not envision a middle ground where obedience was joined with love and pleasure, and where a
ourishing of their egos was in a happy harmony with God’s will.
Nephi tried to cope with Laman’s and Lemuel’s legitimate complaints. There is no reason to believe that he was
dedicated to a puritanical repression of the desire for pleasure. He was the one, when the steel bow broke, to
make another from a straight stick and slay game for the group. He came into the camp with the beasts, and “when
they beheld that I had obtained food, how great was their joy!” That was an understandable reaction, of course,
but Nephi goes on to say, “they did humble themselves before the Lord, and did give thanks unto him” (1 Nephi
16:32). One catches a brief, pitiful glimpse of boys deprived of simple pleasure and eager to be compliant when for
the moment they felt provided for. But the humility did not last. At the next trouble, their hearts hardened again
and they were plotting once more to slay Nephi. They acted as if force alone could be relied on. When Nephi said
the party must leave Bountiful, the mysterious haven by the sea with its “much fruit and also wild honey” (1 Nephi
17:5), the brothers were at his throat immediately. With every call for a sacri ce they fell into the familiar pattern
of murmuring and violence. Hovering in the distance was the promised land, enough to sustain Nephi and the
faithful members of the party through the af ictions of the journey, but this was thin gruel for the suspicious and
perhaps constitutionally deprived brothers.
Nephi’s and Lehi’s theology offered more enduring sustenance to Laman and Lemuel as a way to resolve the
con ict between submission and pleasure. In the brothers’ characteristic plot, submission meant deprivation, and
pleasures came only through rebellion and violence. In their view of events, God’s superior power forced them to
submit and drove them into the sufferings of the wilderness. The family’s theology and faith in Christ, by contrast,
offered supreme pleasure and happiness, not through rebellion but through submission to God. Lehi’s vision made
the point most graphically with the tree “whose fruit was desirable to make one happy.” When Lehi partook, he
“beheld that it was most sweet, above all that I ever before tasted” (1 Nephi 8:10-11). Christ was presented as the
resolution of the troubling con ict. The image of divine love in the form of luscious fruit should have appealed
directly to Laman’s and Lemuel’s most fundamental need. But an understanding of Christ’s love was beyond them.
They were too rmly xed in another pattern. Lehi regretfully reported that in the dream Laman and Lemuel did
not take the fruit (1 Nephi 8:35).
In the ensuing centuries, the saga of the founding family formed the framework for the descendants of Laman and
Lemuel to interpret events. Judging from the Lamanites’ frequent references to the story, it remained as vivid in
their national memory as the Revolution and Declaration of Independence do in ours. The relationship between
the two peoples paralleled the relationship between Nephi and his brothers. Nephites were accused of unjust rule
and suspected of schemes to deprive the Lamanites of their possessions just as Laman and Lemuel believed Nephi
deprived them of their rightful pleasures. Zeniff’s people, who came into bondage to the Lamanites around 160
B.C., learned that the Lamanites still taught their children that Nephi robbed their fathers, that all Lamanites
should hate the Nephites, “and that they should murder them, and that they should rob and plunder them” (Mosiah
10:16-17). The immediate reaction of the father of Lamoni when he discovered his son fraternizing with Nephites
was to suspect them of robbery. They are sons of a liar, he charged, who “robbed our fathers; and now his children
are also come amongst us that they may, by their cunning and their lyings, deceive us, that they again may rob us of

our property” (Alma 20:13). The Lamanites seemed to believe that the old story of deprivation would be played
out whenever Nephites appeared on the scene.
And by the same token, the Lamanite response followed the line of the ancient story. How were the Nephites to be
stopped from their habitual robbery of their brethren? Bind them, smite them, kill them. The father of Lamoni
turned on Ammon with a sword, and that was always the way. Nephi said his brothers’ hearts were like int, and
the most common Nephite characterization of the Lamanites described them as ferocious. They were a “wild and a
hardened and a ferocious people; a people who delighted in murdering the Nephites, and robbing and plundering
them” (Alma 17:14). It was nearly impossible for many of the Nephites to see anything gentle or loving in Lamanite
life, because the boundary between the two peoples was de ned by the founding saga as one of perpetual war. To
his credit, Jacob recognized that national traditions distorted the Nephite view. He told the Nephites in his sermon
on chastity that Lamanite “husbands love their wives, and their wives love their husbands; and their husbands and
their wives love their children.” They were not implacably ferocious in every relationship. Lamanite violence
toward the Nephites grew out of tradition, not innate viciousness. “Their hatred towards you is because of the
iniquity of their fathers,” Jacob said (Jacob 3:7). And yet that hatred was so unrelenting, and the resulting violence
so intense, that Jacob himself could only think that Lamanites “delighted in wars and bloodshed, and they had an
eternal hatred against us, their brethren” (Jacob 7:24).
One of the most troubling occurrences in the Book of Mormon, for some modern readers, is the cursing of the
Lamanites. It took place after the separation of the peoples when the cultural divide widened. Nephi apparently
ruled over all the brothers when they rst landed in America, but, cha ng under his government, the Lamanites
made an attempt on his life, forcing Nephi to ee with his people into the wilderness. The Lord explained that, in
consequence of the brothers’ refusal to follow Nephi, they would be cut off. The curse of blackness came because
the Lamanites “hardened their hearts against him, that they had become like unto a int” (2 Nephi 5:21). The
purpose of the sign accompanying the curse, the dark skin, was to prevent the Nephites from mixing with the
Lamanites; under the curse they would not be enticing. That idea troubles us because it makes skin color divisive in
a way that we today dislike. But in a later incident, we learn more about the inner meaning of the curse. In the time
of Alma a group of dissident Nephites called Amlicites joined the Lamanites in an attack on the Nephites. The
Amlicites marked their foreheads with red paint to distinguish friends from enemies in battle. The marking led
Mormon (presumably the editor of Alma’s records) to comment on the curse. Mormon explained the reason why
the Lord did not wish the Lamanites and Nephites to mix. It was not because of their contrasting skin colors. The
curse was pronounced “that they might not mix and believe in incorrect traditions which would prove their
destruction” (Alma 3:8). At issue was the story of their founding, deeply embedded as it was in Lamanite culture.
The danger was not a mixture of races or skin colors but a mixture of false traditions with true ones. Mormon said
the very identity of the Nephites lay in their acceptance of the true history of origins.
Whosoever would not believe in the tradition of the Lamanites, but believed those records which were
brought out of the land of Jerusalem, and also in the tradition of their fathers, which were correct, who
believed in the commandments of God and kept them, were called the Nephites (Alma 3:11).
The two peoples were de ned by their contrasting explanations of the enmity between Nephi and Laman, and the
crucial issue was how to keep the true version intact. We may object to the selection of skin color as a means of
separating the people and call these passages racist, but we should understand that in God’s mind, and in the
minds of his people, correct traditions, not skins, were the issue. The people of God would have objected just as
heartily to a Nephite marriage with an Amlicite as to one with a Lamanite, when the only Amlicite mark was a
painted forehead. The important thing was the Amlicite false belief and enmity to the Nephites. By accepting the

false tradition, the curse fell on them as surely as upon the Lamanites. Mormon says the Amlicites ful lled the wish
of Providence in painting their foreheads, for in rebelling against God “it was expedient that the curse should fall
upon them” (Alma 3:18). They were cursed, without receiving a dark skin, because they rebelled against God and
embraced a false tradition. Presumably a dark skin on a person who embraced the true tradition would have no
signi cance. Skin color was only skin deep; what mattered was the history one believed, and the hatred or love
that went with each version.
It may be that the hatred against the Nephites polluted Lamanite society more than they desired themselves. The
Nephites thought the Lamanites were idle. Instead of working for riches, “they sought to obtain these things by
murdering and plundering, that they might not labor for them with their own hands” (Alma 17:14-15). The
customary violence against the Nephites spilled over into the treatment of each other; they fought for goods
rather than working for them. We have to treat the charge of indolence with a little skepticism, considering that
the Nephites mainly saw the Lamanites from a distance or up close in a murdering and plundering mode. But it is
also true that King Lamoni suffered from a band of rustlers who drove off the king’s herds from the watering place.
These were not a hostile group of outsiders, but some of his own subjects. Rather than work to assemble their
herds, they used force (Alma 17:26-27). The use of violence against the Nephites may have legitimized plundering
within Lamanite society, just as veterans returning from wars in some instances settle personal quarrels with guns.
National myths and practices can affect the limits of personal behavior, and, in Lamanite history, force was made a
virtue.
However much the founding saga in uenced individual Lamanites, there is no question that it de nitively
established Lamanite policy toward the Nephites. “Their hatred was xed,” Enos said (Enos 1:20). Even when
circumstances acted to moderate the hatred, it only subsided; it was never wholly extinguished. In a sense it was a
great national resource, a source of energy and resolve that malicious rulers could call upon to serve their sel sh
interests. One of the common phrases in the Book of Mormon is “stir up to anger.” With mostly primitive
governmental mechanisms at their disposal, Lamanite rulers commonly relied on oratory to govern. The people
had to be aroused in order to mobilize them for the massive war efforts against the Nephites. In such instances,
the tradition of the fathers was a resource like money or food. Zerahemnah, an especially vicious king, made a
special effort among his people “to preserve their hatred towards the Nephites, that he might bring them into
subjection to the accomplishment of his designs” (Alma 43:7). A national heritage, whether benign or malign, can
fade from time to time, and must be revived if leaders are to use it to their advantage. After an especially
disastrous defeat, a large group of Lamanites refused to go into battle again, exhausted and fearful for their lives
(Alma 47:2). The response of the king was to undertake a campaign to “inspire the hearts of the Lamanites against
the people of Nephi.” And how did he accomplish that? “He did appoint men to speak unto the Lamanites from their
towers, against the Nephites” (Alma 48:1). We can easily guess at the message spoken from the towers, and the
results were predictable. He “hardened the hearts of the Lamanites and blinded their minds, and stirred them up
to anger” (Alma 48:3).
Lamanite resolve presented the Nephites with a nearly insoluble problem. There was seemingly no way to stop the
Lamanite attacks permanently. If the problem had been a land shortage or the imbalance of wealth in the two
societies, an agreement might have been worked out. But Lamanite hatred of the Nephites was far more profound
than that. It was ingrained in their national identity. Their founding story depicted them as a people who had been
robbed and therefore whose destiny it was to destroy those who had wronged them. Wars against the Nephites
were to the Lamanites like ghting for freedom and equality is to us. Fighting wars maintained fundamental values
of the society that were rooted in the mythic account of their national beginnings and were essential to their
identity as a people. One could not expect them to stop the wars any more than we can be expected to renounce

the idea of equality enunciated in the Declaration of Independence. They would not be Lamanites, nor we
Americans, if this occurred.1
Because war was part of the Lamanite identity, there was no resolution of the con ict—unless the Lamanites could
be persuaded to forgo their own tradition. It seemed like a hopeless undertaking, like persuading the United States
to return to monarchy and its attendant arbitrariness. But one valiant attempt was made. We think of the sons of
Mosiah as giving up statecraft when they unitedly yielded their rights to the throne. Their abdication in advance of
Mosiah’s death compelled the king to introduce a major constitutional change in Nephite government, altering it
from a monarchy to a rule by judges. We admire the young men for giving up the throne to preach the gospel, but
we may question their judgment. Was it not irresponsible to refuse the duty that always falls on the sons of the
king? Could not one of them have stayed behind to occupy the throne? But our doubts are quieted when we look
closely at the reasons for the mission, for it appears that they went to the Lamanites for reasons of state as well as
to right themselves with the Lord. The sons of Mosiah had been converted along with Alma and desired to “impart
the word of God to their brethren, the Lamanites.” But besides bringing them to a knowledge of God, they wished
to “convince them of the iniquity of their fathers.” It was not enough to teach Christ. They also had to attack the
story of Laman and Lemuel as the Lamanites understood it—in other words, the tradition of their fathers. The
reason for doing that was simple. The missionaries hoped that “perhaps they might cure them of their hatred
towards the Nephites.” That would permit them all to rejoice in the Lord their God, that they too “might become
friendly to one another, and that there should be no more contentions in all the land” (Mosiah 28:1-2). It was a long
shot, but by 92 B.C., after ve hundred years of warfare, it may have been apparent to the king’s sons that
Lamanite warfare could only be halted by attacking its foundation, the tradition of their fathers.
The marvel is that they succeeded as well as they did. Traveling in the wilderness toward Lamanite lands, the
missionaries prepared themselves by much fasting and prayer, beseeching the Lord to enable them to bring the
Lamanites “to the knowledge of the truth, to the knowledge of the baseness of the traditions of their fathers,
which were not correct” (Alma 17:9). And their prayers were answered. The method by which they achieved their
purpose is inspiring as well as interesting. They did it by simple acts of love and generosity. The ease with which the
Lamanites gave way before the missionaries belies the Nephite images of inty and ferocious Lamanites. Instead,
some of the Lamanites appear remarkably vulnerable. Lamoni’s men bound Ammon when he entered their land, as
they always did with Nephite intruders, but when he announced his wish to live with them, perhaps until the day
he died, Lamoni was so touched he offered Ammon a daughter for a wife (Alma 17:20-24). Lamoni’s tender heart
was deeply moved by Ammon’s faithful service, which prepared the king to be converted soon there- after.
Lamoni’s father reacted like Laman of old in drawing his sword against his son and then Ammon, and when Ammon
overpowered him, the old king cowered before the missionary’s greater power, again as Laman did before Nephi
(Alma 16:20-24). But it was not Ammon’s physical superiority that impressed the king; it was the love for the king’s
son that astonished him exceedingly (Alma 20:26). When another set of missionaries offered to serve Lamoni’s
father, he remembered this love and wanted to listen. Ammon’s generosity, as well as his words, troubled the king,
and he was ready to hear more (Alma 22:3). The willing service and acts of generosity and love, so contrary to the
Lamanite stereotypes of the Nephites, got through the armor and touched the hearts of the two kings.
These stories remind us of the time when Laman and Lemuel pulled back from their plan to slay Nephi as they
returned from Jerusalem with Ishmael and his family. Instead of a show of force halting the attempt, one of
Ishmael’s daughters, along with her mother and a son, pleaded for Nephi. We see in the incident the beginning of a
romance, but what may be far more signi cant is that a womanly appeal, from a mother as well as a daughter,
softened the inty hearts of the brothers. They responded as fully to this appeal as to the later shock of power

from Nephi. The record says “they were sorrowful, because of their wickedness, insomuch that they did bow down
before me, and did plead with me that I would forgive them of the thing that they had done against me” (1 Nephi
7:19-20). At the outset, gentleness succeeded where harsh rebukes failed, and in later history kindness and love
again exercised in uence where the Nephites’ militant resistance bred only more warfare. Force may not have
been the only language some of the Lamanites understood.
The conversions ful lled the missionaries’ hopes far more completely than they had any reason to expect. The two
kings and many of the people believed. And it was not just the gospel they accepted. They were convinced that “the
traditions of [their] wicked fathers” were wrong (Alma 24:7). That meant Laman and Lemuel were wrong and
Nephi was right, a deep and profound reversal of their whole identity as a people that required an upending of old
values. Their acceptance of this new tradition went hand in hand with their acceptance of the gospel. When the old
king conferred the kingdom on his son, he gave him a new name, Anti-Nephi-Lehi, as if to recognize that a new set
of founding fathers had to be embraced. The word sounds to us like opposition to Nephi and Lehi, but Hugh Nibley
has told us it probably means the opposite, which the story itself of course strongly suggests. Anti-Nephi-Lehi and
his brother Lamoni seemed to understand that some heroic effort would be required to root out the old tradition
and set their people on a new course. They accomplished this reorientation by asking of their people an incredible
sacri ce that directly attacked the besetting sin of Lamanite culture. The kings asked the people to give up
violence. They agreed to bury their swords in the belief that Christ had removed the blood of many killings; for to
ght again might leave a stain that could not be cleansed. That was the only way, they believed, to repent sincerely
of their “many sins and murders.” When the king had offered this covenant to the people, “they took their swords,
and all the weapons which were used for the shedding of man’s blood, and they did bury them up deep in the
earth” (Alma 24:9-17). An attack of their unbelieving brethren did not cause them to waver. They knelt before the
oncoming warriors and submitted to the slaughter. The reversal of old values was sealed with the converts’ blood.
The missionary effort thus accomplished all that the sons of Mosiah had hoped for. Lamanites were converted to
Christ, they gave up the tradition of their fathers, the spirit softened their hearts, and they “opened a
correspondence with [their] brethren, the Nephites” (Alma 24:8). Having relinquished violence and plundering as
the way to riches, the converts changed their living habits. “Rather than spend their days in idleness they would
labor abundantly with their hands” (Alma 24:18). Peace with this transformed people was now perfectly natural.
The Nephites welcomed the converts into their midst and gave them a land of their own.
These conversions did not permanently end the Lamanite wars by any means. The unconverted, still enmeshed in
the tradition of their fathers, came up against the Nephites year after year bent on their destruction. But the sons
of Mosiah showed how peace was to be achieved—by conversion to Christ and to the correct story of the nation’s
founding (see Alma 25:6). Their work set the pattern for later conversions by Nephi and Lehi, the sons of Helaman.
The converts from this later proselyting effort also “did lay down their weapons of war, and also their hatred and
the tradition of their fathers” (Helaman 5:51). With the false tradition out of the way, once more peace came to the
two nations, commerce opened between them, and they enjoyed greater prosperity than at any time in their
history to that point. This second missionary episode strengthens the implication that conversion to the gospel
and repudiation of false traditions was the only workable basis for permanent peace.
Having reviewed this evidence, are we now in a position to rewrite the Book of Mormon from the Lamanite
perspective? Perhaps we could sketch in some basic themes and a bare outline. But even in skeletal form, the
history we might piece together would not be all we would like it to be. Our rst impulse would be, perhaps, to
vindicate the Lamanites, to lift them up and justify them. We may think that Nephi in all his grandeur is so hard on
his brothers, so pitiless in his reproaches, and so sure of his mission that we should right the balance and nd good

in his rebellious brothers and their descendants, making a place for weaker souls in the annals of God’s people. We
cannot go as far in that direction as we would like. Lamanite history would be a bitter story, of a people obsessed
with a perpetual sense of deprivation, wronged at the beginning, so they thought, and wronged ever after, living
for vengeance, with blood on their swords. Lamanite history would honor valor and resolution in the face of
repeated defeats but in a cause we can hardly admire.
On the other hand, we would gravely err to consider the Lamanites hopelessly benighted and persistently
ferocious, hardened, and indolent in nature. Jacob warned against that error when he told his own people,
speaking of the Lamanites, to “revile no more against them because of the darkness of their skins; neither shall ye
revile against them because of their lthiness” (Jacob 3:9). The Lamanites who turned to Christ are among the
most faithful and self-sacri cing in the Book of Mormon, giving themselves to be slaughtered rather than return to
their sins. Even before conversion, they were faithful to each other in their families, at a time when the Nephites
had taken up concubinage. Building on that foundation, the rst Lamanite converts raised a generation of
righteous offspring unmatched in the Book of Mormon. The source of Lamanite failings was not their natures but
their tradition. Alma said it was “the traditions of their fathers that caused them to remain in their state of
ignorance” (Alma 9:16). The Lamanites understood their national past erroneously, and so misconstrued their
national purpose. Their history taught them that they had been wronged and that it was their destiny to right that
wrong through relentless war on the Nephites. The incorrect tradition of their fathers was the cause of the
misspent effort, the untold suffering, and the rivers of blood. The moral of the Lamanite story has nothing to do
with their depravity but with the terrible consequences of misunderstanding the past.
There may be a moral for later generations of Book of Mormon readers, too. The story speaks to all who face
implacable enemies, ones who are committed to aggressive incursions on peaceful peoples. The Book of Mormon
tells us we may indeed have to defend ourselves with force in the face of an enemy onslaught, but it just as clearly
states that militant defense will not ultimately end wars. Aggressive people, when meeting resistance, will come
back generation after generation, century after century, even though soundly defeated time after time. Force,
however benevolently intended, will not stop force permanently. As Christ said, he who lives by the sword dies by
the sword; violence begets violence. In national as in personal affairs, kindness, truth, and service are the only
avenues to lasting peace.
Notes
1. For a similar perspective on Lamanite traditions, see Noel B. Reynolds, “The Political Dimensions in
Nephi’s Small Plates,” BYU Studies 27 (1984): 15-37.

External Evidences of the Book of Mormon
Paul R. Cheesman
According to some scholars,1 Palenque and the northern part of Guatemala were the cradle of the great Mayan
culture (A.D. 250-850). The ancestors of the Maya, the Olmecs (1200-100 B.C.), built an impressive civilization
even before the time of Christ. In Central and South America, we nd the remains of this early Mayan culture
which in some respects was equal to that of ancient Rome. The Mayan civilization persisted, under various ruling
peoples2 until 1500, when it and the neighboring Aztecs (A.D. 1400-1500)3 were conquered by the Spanish.
Research has shown that all these people—Olmecs, Maya, and Aztecs—were deeply religious, and among their
most persistent beliefs was one concerning the Great Spirit called Quetzalcoatl, represented in numerous
paintings and carvings. A great leader, he is believed to have once visited the American continent, teaching them
about religion, agriculture, and government.
As we try to visualize these ancient people, we are intrigued by a comparison with their descendants—the simple,
unspoiled, friendly people who still make their homes nearby. One striking similarity is that the knowledge of
Quetzalcoatl, handed down through centuries, persists even today.
The legend of the Bearded White God appears almost everywhere in this hemisphere. And though he is given
various names,4 the allusion is always the same—a fair, bearded person with brown hair, blue eyes, and wearing a
light robe.5 He counseled the people, taught them, and left with the promise that he would someday return.6
In letters that Columbus sent back to Spain, he vividly described his reception upon arrival in the New World.
The people of this land believed very rmly that I, with these ships and crew, came from the sky; and in
such opinion, they received me at every place where I landed, after they had lost their terror.
And to this day many of them are still of the opinion that I came from heaven. And they were the rst to
proclaim it wherever I arrived; and the others went running from house to house . . . with loud cries of
‘Come! Come to see the people from heaven!’7
When they landed in Mexico, Cortez and his conquerors also experienced a lavish welcome from the great
Montezuma and his people, the Aztecs.8
To the simple natives, both Columbus and Cortez represented the promised return of Quetzalcoatl, and they were
received with great joy. The crafty Cortez, taking advantage of the legend, told the chiefs he was indeed sent by
Quetzalcoatl, and their belief in the Great White God was so strong it is recorded that with this news they “wept
so that for a long space of time they could make no reply.”9 The persistent belief in this white god is harmonious
with the appearance of Christ in 3 Nephi 11-26.10 On the other hand, Ruth and Hyatt Verrill argue for a merely
legendary source for the white god myth from early Sumer.11 This, too, in its way, supports the Book of Mormon in
pre-Columbian Old-New World contact.
Other evidence also argues for Old-New World communication. Cortez wrote back to Spain describing an
advanced civilization with forts so large that a city of fteen thousand inhabitants could live within its walls. He

mentioned forts containing forty or more towers of heavy construction built better, in fact, than the cathedrals in
Spain.12 He described aqueducts and water systems of great size and ef ciency.13 King Montezuma indicated to
Cortez that his ancestors were not native to the New World.14 Some scholars believe these seafarers brought
with them a culture comparable to that of the Phoenicians, Egyptians, and Greeks.15 Teotihuacan, the ruin just
outside Mexico City, exempli es the high degree of civilization attained by these ancient peoples. Traveling further
south, there are the pyramids of Tikal in Guatemala which served a vast population dating back before the time of
Christ. In Copan, Honduras, is found what is thought to have been a great seat of learning. All of these great cities
stretching from Mexico on the north down through the Yucatan Peninsula to Copan give mute evidence to the fact
that an extremely high culture existed centuries before Columbus.
Francisco Pizarro, a later explorer, made conquests still farther south. He landed in Peru, and was amazed to nd
millions of people scattered from Ecuador to Chile. He discovered complex irrigation systems, including
sluiceways and reservoirs,16 which suggest in uence from already advanced cultures. The coastal plains thus
watered by mountain streams produced many staple products, including cotton of such unique content that
botanists conclude it to be a hybrid combination of the Old and the New World, and was likely brought to the
Americas by ship or raft.17
The craftsmanship in New World pottery-making was high in quality. Some styles of pottery were Mediterranean,
while others resembled the ceramics of the Orient.18 In Cuzco, Peru, an ancient capital, Pizarro found the city
surrounded by a massive wall built centuries before. The enormous, beautifully cut and tted stones were
assembled without the aid of mortar. In fact, they are so perfectly tted and laid that a knife blade cannot be
forced into the joints. Some of these gigantic stones weigh more than a hundred tons. Placing them atop one
another was a remarkable engineering feat in itself.19 The only analogous structures in the world are the Egyptian
pyramids.
Another astonishing engineering wonder is Machu Picchu, situated high in the Peruvian Andes, atop a peak with a
sheer precipice on one side and a high peak on the other. It is believed to be a fortress city built in pre-Incan times
to protect its citizens from invasion. The advanced technological expertise in this city’s construction seems to have
sprung up in Peru with no archaeological evidence of developmental or intermediate stages.20 This may suggest
infusion from already advanced cultures.
Furthermore, a number of ancient American skills were noteworthy, such as metal working and medicine. That the
ancients on the American continent were exceptional goldsmiths is well known. Pizarro records that it took “sixty
Incan goldsmiths working steadily day and night for one month” to reduce all of the stolen artifacts down into
bullion for transportation to Spain.21 Gold was so common, in fact, that some gold objects were painted other
colors to break the monotony. Gold alloy was formed into breastplates, and even at, thin plates have been found
much like the aluminum foil in use today. The ancients also worked with copper, silver, and some bronze in a way
similar to their Near Eastern counterparts.
In addition to being outstanding metalsmiths, artisans, and builders, these ancient Americans were skilled in other
areas as well. They were gifted in the art of medicine to an astonishing degree. They were familiar with the use of
narcotics, treated abnormal pregnancies, and even performed successful skull operations.22 They were also
accomplished musicians with a musical scale similar to that found in the Mediterranean area. They were highly
skilled in astronomy and mathematics, using the zero even before the Old World.23 And over a thousand years

before the Old World had today’s calendar, New World mathematicians were using a more accurate system. The
Aztec calendar, while not as accurate as the Mayan, is still quite ef cient.24
This people also showed a great interest in religion. According to many interesting discoveries that have been
made, religion was the center of their lives. Some of these early Americans possessed a story of the creation of the
world, of a great ood, a closed ark, the building of a high tower, and a confusion of languages. Scholars obtained
this knowledge from the works of a royal Indian prince, Ixtlilxochitl, who was taught the Spanish language by
padres, who followed the conquistadors. This prince inherited ancient Aztec records from his royal grandfather
and translated them into Spanish, working all his life on the project. This history tells of how the Toltecs came to
this continent many years after the ood, and their dating begins with the time “when Christ suffered.”25
Later, some early Spanish scholars learned the native language and translated the ancient histories and traditions
into Spanish. These translations are very interesting, and one of these Spanish scholars, Sahagun, wrote of preChristian and Christian Aztec beliefs, among which were similarities to such basic Christian doctrines as the
afterlife and the kingdom of heaven, fasting, repentance, and a kind of eucharist in which an imitation body of the
god was made of Amaranth dough and eaten.26 There is some evidence that the natives practiced circumcision
and some form of baptism.27 These suggest that there may have been pre-Columbian in uences from the Old
World.
The use of incense28 in the ceremonies of the Indians is another tie to the Old World. The marriage covenant was
sacred, indicating a high degree of morality among these people.29 In fact, the Spanish padres were surprised at
the great number of parallels between the religion and practices of the ancient Indians and those of the Catholics
of the Old World—such things as sacri cial altars,30 the burying of honored deceased individuals inside the
temples or pyramids,31 and the manner of burial that indicated belief in immortality.32 The Aztec Pyramid of the
Sun at Teotihuacan bears great similarity in size and structure to those found in Egypt.33 Most scholars today
believe that the American Indian is a mixture of many races and blood types.34 Recent studies and discoveries also
link the Americas with Mediterranean cultures.35
So, there are a number of possible links between the Americas and the ancient world: belief in a white god,
advanced building and engineering feats, metallurgy, and artisanship. An additional link with the Book of Mormon
is the practice in the ancient world of writing on metal plates and their burying them in stone boxes.
In 1830, some ancient writing on plates was found in Palmyra, New York, by a young man named Joseph Smith,
who described them as follows:
These records were engraven on plates which had the appearance of gold, each plate was six inches wide
and eight inches long, and not quite so thick as common tin. They were lled with engravings, in Egyptian
characters, and bound together in a volume as the leaves of a book, with three rings running through the
whole. The volume was something near six inches in thickness, a part of which was sealed.36
At that time, in 1830, Joseph Smith’s discovery was new. But was it unique? Was writing on metal plates
completely unknown? The answer is no.

In the 1400s in the medieval city of Gubbio, Italy, seven large bronze tablets, called the Iguvine Tablets,37 which
contained instructions for religious ceremonies, were discovered. Since then, lead plates containing commercial
records of Italian families have been found in Bologna and Venice38—a common practice until the sixteenth
century. Early Greek and Latin writings tell of metal plates used for treaty tablets and temple prayers.39 These
writings were translated and read widely in Europe and America. Therefore, anyone familiar with these texts in
1830 would not have been surprised at the idea of writing on metal.
Writing on metal took a variety of forms. When Sir Francis Drake sailed into San Francisco Bay in the 1500s, he
claimed the territory and erected a bronze plaque to document his claim.40 The Tookabatcha Indians of
Mississippi and Alabama refer to ve copper plates and two brass plates that their tribe has preserved for
generations. The plates contain symbols resembling those of early Rome and Greece. Several authors, including
James Adair, described these plates.41
All of these examples of writing on metal were found before Moroni’s rst visit to Joseph Smith in 1823.
Nevertheless, his discovery created much excitement—and some skepticism—because it involved gold plates.
Ancient writing on gold plates was not thought in 1823 to have been as historically commonplace, but many have
been found worldwide since that time.
In Korea in 1965, nineteen gold plates dating back to the tenth century A.D. were found buried in a bronze box at
the base of a pagoda. They were hinged together in accordion style and measured 14 x 15 inches.42 In the
Rockefeller Museum in Jerusalem there is a plaque of thin gold foil from the Roman period. On this plate, used to
cover the lips of the dead, is inscribed, “Take Courage Gosmos.”43 In 1920, at the headwaters of the Tigris River,
explorers found a gold tablet of King Shalmaneser in the land now known as Iraq. Though the tablet is undated, we
know Shalmaneser lived about eight hundred years before Christ.44
In 1938, while excavating the palace of King Darius I, who reigned over Persia in the sixth century before Christ, a
team from the University of Chicago discovered the closest and most spectacular parallel to the Book of Mormon
plates: King Darius, in commemoration of the completion of his palace at Persepolis, placed eight metal tablets
(four gold and four silver) in four stone boxes45 at the corners of the structure. Translations of the tablets reveal
that they gave thanks to God and asked for protection of the royal household.
One of the oldest examples of writing on gold plates is found in the Louvre in Paris. It is the gold plate of Djokha
Umma, and was discovered in the foundation of a sacred building in Iraq.46 It measures less than 2 x 3 inches. Also
in the Louvre are the six plates of Sargon II from King Khorsabad’s palace in Assyria (ca. 700 B.C.).47 Encased in a
box were several plates, one of which was gold. The others were silver, lead, tin, and copper.
In Rome, prominently displayed in a famous archaeological museum, are three magni cent gold plates of Pyrgi (ca.
500 B.C.),48 written in the language of the Phoenicians and Etruscans. The plates are about 5 x 7 inches. You can
still see the holes where they were originally fastened with nails to the door of the temple of the goddess, Astarte.
These plates were very nearly the size of those described by Joseph Smith.49 In the British Museum in London are
found two beautiful Maunggun gold plates, each measuring 1 x 14 inches, containing Buddhist scriptures50 and
dating back to the rst century A.D. They each have three lines of writing in the Pali language.

Writing on gold plates was indeed a common practice anciently. When gold was not plentiful, other metals were
used. Lead and bronze plates were found with inscriptions; an inscribed bronze scoop dating back to 2000 B.C.,
along with writing on mirrors and even on metal moulded animals were found; also, bronze statue pedestals
bearing inscriptions have been found. An outstanding example of writing on silver comes from Bethany. This scroll,
dated A.D. 400, was found rolled up in a copper tube. It can be seen at the Information Center on Temple Square in
Salt Lake City, Utah.51 It is very small (7-1/4 x 2-1/8 inches) and had to be photographed and magni ed in order
for the ancient Greek writing to be read. It lists religious beings who could ward off evil in uences. A scroll similar
to the Bethany scroll is on display in the archaeological museum in Jerusalem.
One of the famous Dead Sea copper scrolls from the Qumran community near Jerusalem, which existed before
Christ, is proudly displayed in the National Archaeological Museum in Jordan.52 This scroll, written in Hebrew,
told of a buried treasure which has never been found. It told of tithing and temple receipts from the Qumran
community.
In Rome, in addition to the gold plates of Pyrgi and the bronze tablets of Gubbio, there are two ancient books from
America called codices. They were written on the pounded bark of trees and folded like an accordion. They contain
beautiful colorful drawings and hieroglyphs which were made A.D. 1400 and are now being translated. These
Mayan books are renowned for their perfect preservation and are housed in the Vatican Library.53 Not only did
ancient peoples write on metal plates, but they also wrote on metal columns,54 such as the giant pillar from the
Near East dating back to 1100 B.C., now housed in the Louvre.
When Joseph Smith reported that his ancient gold plates were bound with metal rings, once again the idea
seemed novel. Actually, though, the ancient Sanskrit and Tamil plates from India dating to A.D. 769 are bound
together with a copper ring. They are in the British Museum along with other copper, silver, bronze, and gold
plates from India written in ancient Pali.55 Some of these plates were a base metal covered with gold, with
enameled black writing.
Joseph Smith is no longer alone in declaring that ancient American inhabitants in the New World could not only
write, but that they preserved their writings in much the same manner as was previously done in the Old World.
Archaeologist Rivero and historian Tschudi mention possible instances of the ancient Peruvians writing on
metal.56 The well-known Hugo Cohen Museum in Lima, Peru, houses an intriguing gold plate found in a Peruvian
area called Lambayeque.57 It measures 4 x 8 inches and contains possible writing symbols. Several plates of
copper, bronze, and gold have been found by modern natives digging in the ruins of Cuenca, Ecuador. Scientists
are now studying the plates to determine their authenticity and relationship to the ancient languages of the Old
World.
One of the best-known examples of ancient writing on metal in the New World comes from the sacri cial well, or
cenote, in Chichen Itza on the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico. When the Peabody Museum crew from Harvard
University began dredging this well, they found embossed gold discs, among which was one with Mayan
inscriptions.58 This well predates Columbus, and the gold disc is now in the Peabody Museum. J. Eric S. Thompson,
the Maya hieroglyph expert, says that inscriptions have been found (though rarely) on metal in postclassic
Mesoamerica.59 Juan de Torquemada, in discussing the ancient Toltec of Mexico, noted that they wrote in two
columns—one of metal, and the other of stone.60 A native Mexican writer of Colonial times wrote: “It is certain
that there were this kind of Artisans in Oaxaca, . . . for [probably before 1880] the Mixtecs sold to some European

antiquarians some very thin gold plates, evidently worked by hammering that their ancestors had been able to
preserve, and which were engraved with ancient hieroglyphs.”61
Six bell-shaped brass plates were found in Kinderhook, Illinois, in 1843, in a mound with a skeleton.62 The date and
origin are questionable and unknown. The writing is being studied, but no translation has been made. The Museum
of the American Indian in New York City displays a gold disc thought to be a calendar. Inscriptions may have been
placed on this metal about 800 B.C. somewhere in the Chavin area of Peru.63
Scholars and adventurers have been in awe as they have viewed the magni cent temples and carvings of ancient
American cultures. They have marveled at their advanced society which revealed a knowledge of engineering,
architecture, highway construction, astronomy, mathematics, religion, government, and art—evidences on every
hand of a highly civilized people. Is it unreasonable to expect, then, that some of these ancient peoples were skilled
communicators in the manner of their ancestors? I think not.
When Joseph Smith reported that he had found inscribed gold plates buried in a stone box, the idea seemed novel.
Yet, prominently on display in the Louvre is a stone box64 containing copper plates with writing from the
foundation of the temple of Dagan at Mari.65 These date back to 3000 B.C. The British Museum also houses two
ancient boxes—one is from Balawat and contains two stone tablets;66 the other is of clay and was found in
Babylonia, dated 600 B.C.
Joseph Smith said that the history written on his gold plates was of a people whose roots began in the Middle East
and who brought with them to the New World the traditions and customs of their land. These customs included
writing on metal plates and burying them in stone boxes. Although stone boxes were used commonly in the Old
World to bury and preserve histories and other treasures, only recently have ancient stone boxes been discovered
in America in signi cant numbers. Many of these are now on display in the archaeological museum in Mexico.
Stone boxes have been found in the Old World as well as the New. These boxes usually contained gold, jewelry,
tools, or other valuables. A stone box found in Persepolis, Iran, contained two thin metal plates—one of gold and
the other of silver—upon which was an engraved record of King Darius.67 Several hundred different histories
engraved on gold, silver, and copper plates have been discovered in the Old World. In the year 1823, a stone box,
much like those discovered later in Latin America, was shown to Joseph Smith in the side of a hill near Palmyra,
New York. The stone box contained ancient golden plates with strange engravings upon them much like those
found in Iran.
This record, when translated, was found to be God’s dealings with some of the early inhabitants of the American
continent, and was destined to change the course of history. It told of three groups of people migrating here by
ship from the Old World. It described the rise and fall of two glorious civilizations that prospered under the hands
of the Lord when they kept his commandments and were destroyed when they did not.
Eleven reputable men besides Joseph Smith were privileged to see these gold records. Eight of them signed the
following statement:
Be it known unto all nations, kindred, tongues, and people unto whom this work shall come: That Joseph
Smith, Jun., the translator of this work, has shown unto us the plates of which hath been spoken, which
have the appearance of gold; and as many of the leaves as the said Smith has translated we did handle with

our hands; and we also saw the engravings thereon, all of which has the appearance of ancient work, and
of curious workmanship. And this we bear record with words of soberness, that the said Smith has shown
unto us, for we have seen and hefted, and know of a surety that the said Smith has got the plates of which
we have spoken. And we give our names unto the world, to witness unto the world that which we have
seen. And we lie not, God bearing witness of it.68
Running throughout the Book of Mormon narrative is the story of two groups of people—one light-skinned and
the other dark. We see possible evidence of this in murals at Bonampak, Mexico, as well as in murals at Chichen
Itza. Legends still exist among these Indians about a dark people and a light people who lived there anciently.
The Book of Mormon also speaks of frequent warfare in this civilization. The actuality of this is borne out by the
numerous forti cations and weapons found in Mexico and in Central and South America—weapons similar to
those used in the Old World.
One of the most unforgettable stories in the Book of Mormon is Lehi’s “tree of life” vision. References to the tree
of life continue to crop up in such diverse places as Egypt, Mesoamerica, and in Paracas, Peru. Carved centuries
ago in a mountain in Paracas, a representation is still called the tree of life by local natives. And in Izapa, Mexico, is
one of the most detailed tree of life carvings to be found anywhere. One modern scholar who has made a thorough
study of this stela has suggested 110 similarities between this sculpture and the dream of Lehi and Nephi in the
Book of Mormon.69
Perhaps the most beautiful and memorable segment of the Book of Mormon is the portion that tells of the story of
a visit of Jesus Christ. He taught the people, blessed the children, and, upon leaving, promised to return someday.
His teachings were very similar to those of the Bearded White God who taught all goodness and virtue, and then
promised to return. So great was the impact of Christ’s visit to this continent that his story was repeated and
handed down by word of mouth for centuries. Is it any wonder that the natives bowed down and worshiped
Columbus, Cortez, and Pizarro upon their arrival here?
And this brings us full circle to the question of the Bearded White God, the most widely held legend in this part of
the world. The story of the Bearded White God in these great civilizations of the past is no longer a complete
mystery. We still have much to learn about them, but we have many clues.
There are the history of Ixtlilxochitl, the Mayan prince; the translated histories of the Spanish chronicles; and the
Book of Mormon, which contains the most lengthy and detailed history of these people and emerges as the most
valuable record known concerning this pre-Columbian civilization.
The Book of Mormon was not intended to be read as an archaeological document. Certain mundane activities
were only mentioned to provide cohesion to the narrative. Discussing these factors, however, can raise, for some
people, interest in the record itself. Evidence of their mathematics, astronomy, agricultural practices, mastery of
weaving textiles, and so forth, helps document their greatness. The main purpose of the Book of Mormon is
spiritual. The book contains God’s dealings with three groups of immigrants to the American continent and is a
second witness and testament of the mission and plan of Jesus Christ.
After the age of forty-two, I attended Brigham Young University for graduate studies and became a student of
Hugh Nibley, admiring him as a scholar and friend. Dr. Nibley accompanied Dr. LaMar Garrard and me on a trip
through the Navajo and Hopi Indian country, and later he and I accompanied a group on a tour through the

Mexican pre-Columbian ruins. These experiences, along with the inspiration I have received from reading his many
works, have endeared him to me immeasurably.
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A Second Witness for the Logos:
The Book of Mormon and Contemporary Literary Criticism
Eugene England
Until recently, attempts to vindicate the central claim of the Book of Mormon about itself—that it is a divinely
inspired book based on the history of an ancient culture— have focused mainly on external evidences. Such
attempts examine parallels in the geographies, cultures, and literatures of the Middle East and ancient America
(especially parallels to knowledge that have become available only since Joseph Smith’s time). These parallels are
used to prove that the Book of Mormon is consistent with ancient knowledge and forms which Joseph Smith could
have known only through an ancient manuscript and revelation. This essay takes a different approach, based
essentially on internal evidence provided by the book itself. My re ections, stimulated by the work of Mormon
scholars such as John Welch, Noel Reynolds, and Bruce Jorgensen, examine techniques developed by nonMormon literary critics Northrop Frye and René Girard in their work on the Bible.
Frye, by analyzing the Bible’s unique typological literary structure and its kinds and qualities of language, and
Girard, by examining its uniquely revealing and healing response to human violence, have each concluded that the
Bible not only has literary qualities superior to those in all other books but is also uniquely divine. I concur with
Frye and Girard—except in their claim for the Bible’s uniqueness. One other book, the Book of Mormon, attains
similar qualities of form and content and thus stands as a second witness not only for Christ, but for the Logos, the
redeeming Word.
In 1985, while on tour in France with Brigham Young University students, I listened to Malcolm Miller “read” the
windows at Chartres Cathedral. For nearly thirty years he has been learning to read the “book,” actually the library,
miraculously preserved in the stained glass of one—and only one—of the medieval cathedrals and now available to
a nearly uncomprehending modern world. His one-hour lecture could only open the rst few pages of the rst
book there at Chartres, but what a fascinating, strange, yet satisfying vision unfolded. He read the third window
from the right along the north wall of the transept—the story of Joseph, projecting him as a “type,” a pattern for the
future Christ. Then he read the three great western windows, quite recently cleaned, whose brilliance and clarity
suggest how the whole cathedral looked inside when it was young (and might again when funds for cleaning the
other windows can be found). The central window on the west gives the greatest story in human history: God
becoming like us in order to save us. On the right is the pattern of preparation for that event, Christ’s descent
through the loins of Jesse, and on the left are the details of Christ’s life and death after the incarnation.
We went to the nave to read the great rose windows— the north one part of the pattern of Old Testament
preparations; the south one focused on Mary, continuing the story of patterns in Christ’s life that corresponded to
the typological preparations. Everywhere I saw an obsession with order, pattern, types, parallels, prophecies, and
ful llments in literal but meaningfully similar structures: the “soldiers” coming before Christ—the Old Testament
prophets who foretold him—marshaled on the north; Christ and his “soldiers” that followed him, the martyrs and
confessors, along the south; the four major prophets of the Old Testament with the New Testament evangelists
literally standing on their shoulders; the Garden of Eden as Old Salem, the “lost peace,” to be completed in the New
Jerusalem; and, giving a shock of recognition to careful readers of the Book of Mormon, a deep green cross for
Christ, based on the medieval legend that the “tree” he was hung upon was made from Eden’s tree of life.
The Book of Mormon? Yes, because that most typologically structured book—the only one that uses biblical
patterns with even greater frequency and consistency and ultimate signi cance than the Bible—has as its central

pattern what Bruce Jorgensen has called “The Dark Way to the Tree,” an archetypal journey to a tree which is
multiple in form. With that image the Book of Mormon unites, to create greater understanding and power, four
patterns of the human pilgrimage: (1) Adam and Eve as Everyman and Everywoman nd their dark but necessary
way to the tree of life through partaking of the tree of knowledge. (2) Christ provides the essential means for all
men and women from Adam and Eve onward to make that dark journey, by personally taking his life’s journey and
ending upon a tree—death on a cross that makes possible eternal life. (3) Lehi’s dream of personal search
establishes the pattern in our souls through the powerful, patterning drama of the journey through darkness to
partake of the fruit of a tree that represents God’s love through Christ (1 Nephi 8 and 11). This dream begins the
Book of Mormon narrative and, as Jorgensen has shown, becomes the type for its main stories. For instance, the
conversions of Enos and Alma the Younger are told in ways that highlight their similarities to Lehi’s dream
pilgrimage, and even the overall structure of the book appears to be shaped as a version of such a journey for
humankind. This typological structuring invites us all to participate in an individual journey of salvation, even as
God is leading the whole earth (and human history) through such a journey in order to make our own journeys
possible.1 (4) Alma gives universal intellectual power to the pattern with his explication, uniquely appropriate for
modern, science-oriented skeptics, of the central crux of the pilgrimage—how to know the truth and act upon it,
which is best symbolized as planting a seed, growing a tree, and partaking of the fruit (Alma 32:28-43).
Patterns, and the process of patterning, are clearly central to both the Bible and the Book of Mormon. They seem
to be central to basic human interests and needs. But mere pattern is not enough. We seem to yearn not only for
pattern, but for meaningful, saving patterns, involving what Lehi in the Book of Mormon (2 Nephi 2:13) called
“things . . . to act”—living agents, mortals and gods— rather than things “to be acted upon.” Patterns obsess us
because they emphasize what is most fundamental in the universe, what is repeated, necessary, irresistible, nal.
But there is a deep-set pattern, the source and goal of all our searching for pattern, what Northrop Frye in his
book of the same title calls “The Great Code.” It is the great scriptural pattern which, beyond what the universe is
and has been, also images for us what the life of acting agents can be at its most satisfying, ful lling, and enduring.
That is the pattern Frye nds uniquely in the Bible. He traces the way that pattern has ultimately shaped our
mythology, our metaphoric patterns, and our rhetoric itself—in other words, all our literature, not just that which
directly alludes to the Bible. I believe that Frye’s most important claims for the Bible can also be demonstrated for
the Book of Mormon.
Actually, the Book of Mormon seems to me even more amenable than the Bible to Frye’s analysis. It is mainly
patterned by a single mind, that of Mormon, and the resulting unity is remarkably similar to the patterns only now
being explicated in the Bible by critics such as Frye. Mormon and the other Book of Mormon writers had a
remarkably full understanding of the role of Christ in human salvation and thus in history, perhaps fuller than that
of biblical writers and thus more responsive to typological patterns in Israelite history as well as their own history.
I believe that, given adequate attention by sympathetic critics, the Book of Mormon will provide an even deeper,
more intellectually consistent, and powerful witness than the Bible for the Logos—both for Jesus Christ as our
divine and only Savior and also for the Word, for language imbued with divine power.
Frye has long been intrigued by the Bible’s unusual potential for “polysemous” interpretation; that is, for being
understood and having enormous in uence not only at the literal, historical level but even more so at various
metaphorical levels. He has examined particularly the typological level, which connects events and people
throughout history in a cohesive pattern of images and imitations of the process of salvation through Christ. He
has also pointed to the success of medieval and subsequent commentators with the “moral” and “anagogical” levels
of interpretation (at the moral level each passage is understood as teaching us, in addition to the literal story, how

to imitate Christ’s life in the practical world, at the anagogical level how to see our lives in the context of life in
eternity with him).
Frye has nally concluded, and sets out in The Great Code to demonstrate, that “polysemous meaning is a feature of
all deeply serious writing, and the Bible is the model for serious writing.”2 He argues that the biblical achievement
with language is unique and its in uence so powerful on all other uses of language that it alone has guaranteed the
very possibility of retaining polysemous meaning in our modern culture, despite powerful in uences to the
contrary.
Such claims, of course, imply a particular history of language, which Frye provides. First he makes a crucial
distinction, not provided in the single English word “language,” between the structures of sound that make up a
language, which of course cannot be adequately translated, and the essential sense and typological patterns of the
language, which can. This latter is the French langage, as opposed to langue. Langage is “a sequence of modes of
more or less translatable structures in words, cutting across the variety of langues employed, affected and
conditioned but not wholly determined by them.”3 This is a valuable distinction; it turns us from exclusive attention
to the formal elements of literature, such relationships of sound, multiple meanings, prose rhythms, concision,
texture, and puns, that have preoccupied much literary criticism in this century. Such preoccupation has diverted
us from other, perhaps weightier, matters, such as the large patterns of stories and repeated events that reveal the
nature of sin and salvation. In the process we have been kept from full appreciation of the literary merit of the
Bible—and almost any appreciation of the literary merit of the Book of Mormon. With few exceptions, such as
Steven Walker’s defense of the quality of language in the Book of Mormon,4 its writing has been criticized as dull,
at, even awkward (overuse of phrases such as “And it came to pass”), and the extraordinary beauty of its concepts
has been neglected (the remarkable philosophical sophistication of 2 Nephi 2 and Alma 32, the uniquely full and
moving understanding of the atonement in Mosiah 3-5 and Alma 7, 34, and 42). Thus we have focused on langue
(which might have been extraordinarily beautiful in the original but which—except for chiasmus, which we are
learning to appreciate more fully—is untranslatable), rather than Frye’s langage, the meanings that survive
translation, such as the typologies of the tree of life.
According to Frye, the Bible is unique in its consistent power to preserve and to re-create in each new reader the
reality of metaphorical language and typological patterns, because of the force with which it brings those two
elements of langage into the modern world. It does this because, surprisingly, myth and metaphor provide the
answer to the question: What is the “literal” meaning of the Bible? Frye also argues that the Bible invokes “a
historical presence ‘behind’ [its language], as [French literary critic Jacques] Derrida would say, and that the
background presence gradually shifts to a foreground, the re-creation of that reality in the reader’s mind.”5 That
historical reality is, of course, the typological keystone—Christ’s involvement with the world, and it is a reality that
I think Frye senses, though he never quite admits, is uniquely saving.
Frye is essentially right about the nature and importance of the Bible’s contribution, by sustaining into the modern
world the power of metaphorical language for all our literature. He is certainly wrong in his claim for the
uniqueness of the Bible.6 For there is one other book that preserves the full power of metaphorical language,
typological structure, and Christ-centered moral and eschatological meaning for our secular, literalistic world.
There is a second witness to Christ not only as the Savior of each individual and all the world but also to him as the
Logos, the Word. Like the Bible, it witnesses that Christ is the one who used language, both as God and as a man, in
ways that provide the most important clues to our nature and potential as his children, and it reminds us that we
are inheritors of that same crucial gift of language. That second witness is the Book of Mormon.

Bruce Jorgensen has already cut a deep swath into the rich harvest of typological interpretation awaiting us in the
Book of Mormon. In “The Dark Way to the Tree,” he has demonstrated the book’s potential with de nitive
examples and a persuasive overall typological reading and at the same time has developed a theory of the value of
such a reading. The following passages give an example, summarize the theory, and suggest the quality of
Jorgensen’s contributions and the value of reading his entire essay:
The narratives of the two Almas replicate a second movement of Lehi’s dream that pre gures a large
proportion of the Book of Mormon narrative. Having eaten the fruit and rejoiced, Lehi immediately
“began to be desirous that [his] family should partake of it also” (1 Nephi 8:12); similarly, the forgiven Enos
immediately “began to feel a desire for the welfare of [his estranged] brethren, the Lamanites” (Enos 1:911). As later with the two Almas, the converted man is moved centrifugally outward from private
partaking of grace to communal sharing—from conversion to covenant or, if you will, from the sacrament
of baptism to the sacrament of the Lord’s supper. What drives the larger and more inclusive narrative of
the Book of Mormon is a hunger for sancti ed community. . . .
For [the Book of Mormon prophets], typing or guring or likening, guided by revelation, is simply the one
way to make sense of the universe, time, and all the dimensions of individual and communal human
experience. [Their work] may suggest a theology of the Word, which in turn might suggest a philosophy of
history and of language.
History may well be . . . a sequence without story. Yet to write history is to compose it, . . . to gure it, to
order it by concept and metaphor. The minds that made the Book of Mormon clearly believed that this
was not only possible but essential, even crucial, if humanity was to continue. Further, those minds
believed that the master- gures [in the typology] were both immanent and transcendent: that God could
and would reveal them to human minds, and that once received, [they] would be seen (and could be used)
to order all experience. . . . Likening, then, . . . might be seen as the root-act of language itself, logically prior
to the utterance of any word even if temporally simultaneous with it. . . . The dynamics of the Word in the
Book of Mormon entail a view of language deeply at variance with the post-modernist view that we dwell
amid in nitely self-referential and nontranscendent signs. . . . The Book of Mormon seems . . . to say that
signs point beyond themselves not nally to other signs but ultimately toward God. Our trouble . . . is to
read them.7
Besides Jorgensen, Richard Rust and George Tate8 made important initial contributions to the typological analysis
of the Book of Mormon.9 Steven Sondrup and Noel Reynolds10 have built on John Welch’s discovery of the use of
the Hebraic poetic pattern, chiasmus, in the Book of Mormon.11 What is needed is for one of these perceptive
analysts to explore the relation between chiasmus and typology.12 Chiasmus is the small-scale use of repetition,
with inversion, of words, concepts, and other language units, focused on a central turning point (such as abc-cba);
typology, however, is the large-scale repetition of events, persons, images, etc., all focused on the central event of
Christ’s mortal life, such as Lehi’s dream and the Enos and Alma conversions or the tree-of-life images. Both these
formal devices seem to have developed as natural expressions of a way of thinking and experiencing that we need
to understand and recover in order to approach the formal beauty and powerful message of the Book of Mormon
and to understand and experience how the beauty and message are integrated.
I hope that both scholars and ordinary readers will follow Jorgensen’s lead into typological analysis and will also
explore the Book of Mormon text more fully on the basis of other leads by Frye. One of the most intriguing

avenues, I think, might be an examination, using the Book of Mormon, of some of the cruxes and problems Frye
nds in his analysis of the Bible. Because the Book of Mormon is more uni ed and has had fewer problems of
transmission and translation, it might provide better answers to some questions than the Bible.
In addition, I am convinced from my own study and teaching that a typological focus on the Book of Mormon can
help us to understand the Bible itself in new ways. Such analysis and re ection will help us to see, much better
than we do now, I believe, that both books provide, in their unique langage, the most powerful way to do the most
important thing words can do—that is, in the Book of Mormon prophet Jacob’s words, to “persuade all men not to
rebel against God, . . . but that all men would believe in Christ, and view his death, and suffer his cross and bear the
shame of the world” (Jacob 1:8). That possibility for language, as a direct access to both the meaning and the
saving personal experience of Christ’s atoning sacri ce, brings us directly to René Girard.
Frye’s work on the Bible has provided us with new insights to help us appreciate the formal elements of the Book
of Mormon, its metaphorical language and typological structure that are of a force and quality to rival that of the
Bible. Girard, another ground-breaking and in uential contemporary literary critic, has given us new theoretical
tools by which we can explore the unique power of the Christ-centered content of the Book of Mormon, content
which I believe is comparable, even in some ways superior, to that of the Bible. Girard did not begin with the Bible,
but his work in anthropology led him to appreciate the close similarities between various mythologies and the
Bible that have led modern scholars and many others into a dogmatic religious relativism—but that study also
helped him see crucial differences that powerfully “make manifest the uniqueness and truthfulness of biblical
perspective.”13
In Deceit, Desire, and the Novel and in Violence and the Sacred, Girard rst presented convincing evidence, from his
thorough study of anthropology and of classical mythology and literature, as well as more modern writers like
Shakespeare and Dostoevski, that a mechanism we all recognize from common experience is indeed the central
mechanism of human con ict.14 We are motivated largely by desire. Like most human activity and feeling, desire
tends to be imitative; that is, we often desire the things others desire, especially the things desired by those we
admire, our models, largely because they desire them. Such competing desires, focused on the same objects,
inevitably lead to envy, rivalry, to blaming others and making them scapegoats even as we imitate them, and to
various forms of cruelty and violence. Girard has demonstrated with numerous examples from mythology and
literature that societies develop a particular mechanism in order to survive this terrible process of imitative desire
and violence, which tends to spread like a plague as people naturally respond to hurt by hurting others and to
opposition to their desires with revenge: Groups of people, sensing the threat of expanding imitative violence,
collectively choose scapegoats on which to focus blame and violence rather than acknowledging that their own
imitative desire and revenge are the true sources of the plague. Masking the scapegoating process in ritual and
rationalization, even using their religious and literary forms to authenticate this mechanism, people justify their
violence against the innocent scapegoats.
In Girard’s most recent book, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World,15 he argues that there is one
effective alternative to the plague of imitative desire and violence that spiritually destroys both individuals and
nations, despite their elaborate mechanism for controlling the plague through scapegoating and then hiding it
through self-deception and ritual. Imitative desire and violence always break out in new cycles until they are faced
and overcome, and Girard claims that the ideas and power necessary to do that are found uniquely in the central
Judeo-Christian theology and ethics recorded in the Bible and epitomized and given ultimate, divine sanction and
victory in the life and death of Christ. He reads Hebrew history and scriptures as a progressive effort to reveal the
violence mechanism and to renounce its basis in scapegoating by taking the side of the victim. He nds in Christ’s

clear and persistent identi cation of the violence mechanism and his clear refusal to participate in it or to allow
others to conscript him into it the superhuman victory over violence that creates the potential redemption of all
humans and all human history.
Christ’s unique answer is to renounce false desires and to eliminate the category of enemy—thus removing rivalry,
blame, jealousy, revenge, and scapegoating. For Girard, the Bible is our greatest and truest book because it refuses
to participate in the illusory suppression of violence through scapegoating. Instead it reveals the innocence of the
scapegoat victims and offers examples, notably in the stories of Joseph in Egypt and Christ, of how to stop the
cycle of imitative and self-perpetuating violence permanently by totally refusing to participate in it. The Bible,
particularly in the Gospels, offers forgiveness and love— in imitation of, and empowered by, Christ’s pure love
expressed in the atonement—as the only solutions to hatred, scapegoating, and violence and thus the only source
of ultimate human salvation.
A growing body of impressive evidence demonstrates the power of Girard’s ideas to stimulate new thinking about
the great myths, classic literature, and the scriptures. For instance, a Girardian reading of Oedipus Rex by Sandor
Goodhart offers good internal evidence that Sophocles does not, as most have assumed, simply agree with the
traditional Oedipus myth’s tendency to obscure the mechanism by which scapegoats are selected and unjustly
victimized. Rather, Sophocles provides powerful hints that the Theban community conspires, and gets Oedipus
himself to submit, in a kind of ritual sacri ce—thus scapegoating a man who had in fact not been guilty of
parricide.16 Gordon Thomasson has done a detailed reading of the Genesis account of Joseph and his brothers,
building on Girard’s insights, that reveals in even more detail the processes of scapegoating and mimetic violence
there; he relates that story to the version of Joseph’s story recalled in the Book of Mormon and to the striking
parallel there between the stories of Joseph and of Nephi and his brothers. Thomasson traces the ways
commentaries on the Joseph story from ancient rabbinic to post-Holocaust times display “an amazing willingness
to explain away or modify crucial details” so that Joseph “becomes less admirable, less of a threat to our own
consciences, and consequently a more justi able victim.” In particular, the commentaries “neuter the Joseph story
as it might apply to us, and undermine the signi cance of his refusing to retaliate against his truly guilty
brothers.”17
In much modern Mormon commentary (including, I regret, some of my own teaching), there has been a similar
tendency to see Nephi, like Joseph, as a favored son who somewhat insensitively and self-righteously intrudes
upon his brothers’ feelings. I have often heard people say of Nephi, as they do of Joseph, “With a younger brother
like that, no wonder the older ones got mad.” We thus conspire in the process Girard has illuminated as common in
most mythology and much literature—that of justifying victimization and even the violence of the older brothers
and clouding the ethical issues of sacri cial violence versus self- sacri cing reconciliation. Girard’s perspective
thus can help us better appreciate Nephi’s remarkable efforts to stay out of the cycle of rivalry, reciprocal violence,
and victimization with his brothers. But Girard can also perhaps help us penetrate one of the most troubling
cruxes in Nephi’s account, his killing of Laban.
Thomasson reminds us of the interesting parallels between events in 1 Nephi and details of the scapegoat
tradition from Leviticus 16. Girard claims that the Leviticus account is a product of the violence mechanism
operating in Hebrew society as well as a description of a religious ritual. Part of that ethically questionable Hebrew
tradition was the choosing of two scapegoats by lot—one to be sent away and one to be killed. In the Book of
Mormon, precisely as predicted by the age-old violence mechanism Girard describes, Lehi and his family are made
scapegoats for Jerusalem’s troubles, which Lehi has prophetically warned them about. Rather than face those
troubles and repent, the community focuses its growing anger on Lehi, “even as with the prophets of old, whom

they had cast out, and stoned, and slain” (1 Nephi 1:20). They thus force Lehi, who has been warned by the Lord, to
take his family and ee for their lives. When Lehi’s sons return for the brass plates, Laman, chosen by lot to
approach Laban, the plates’ keeper, is scapegoated by Laban in classic Girardian terms (that is, accused of a crime,
robbery, to justify Laban in his envious desire to obtain his treasure) and is cast out and nearly killed. But then
Laban himself is made into a second scapegoat, and the punishment of death he had decreed for Laman is meted
out to him by Nephi.
The problem with this interesting parallel to the Leviticus tradition of two scapegoats lies in the justi cation
offered for killing Laban, “It is better that one man should perish than that a nation should dwindle and perish in
unbelief” (1 Nephi 4:13). This is a classic statement of the scapegoating rationale, and Girard claims that that
rationale is the foundation of human violence and is absolutely repudiated by Christ—a repudiation Girard argues
is the chief evidence that the Gospels and Christ are divine.18 But Nephi tells us that that rationale is here
expressed by the Spirit of the Lord—and he claims that Spirit also makes the ethically troubling claim that God not
only uses his divine ends to justify violence by himself but also as the rationale for a demand that one of his
children, Nephi, also use such violent means: “The Lord slayeth the wicked to bring forth his righteous purposes” (1
Nephi 4:13).
Girard goes to great lengths to show that the Old Testament passages seeming to implicate God himself in
violence are records of a people gradually working their way beyond an inferior understanding of God that all
other cultures retained: Though “in the Old Testament we never arrive at a conception of the deity that is entirely
foreign to violence,” in the later prophetic books, Girard claims, God is “increasingly divested of the violence
characteristic of primitive deities.”19 Girard’s analysis is persuasive, focused on a close look at the “suffering
servant” passages of Isaiah, where we humans, not God himself, are clearly identi ed as the ones who (wrongly)
ascribe responsibility for violence to God (Isaiah 53:4). Girard also points out explicit rejections of violence of any
kind (even God’s “righteous” vengeance) that emerge in the Old Testament: “I have no pleasure in the death of the
wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live” (Ezekiel 33:11). Girard claims that such rejections become
completely clear in the Gospels, where Christ explicitly describes the change from the Old Testament patience for
“justi ed” violence to absolute New Testament rejection of all hatred and violence: “Ye have heard that it hath
been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, . . . and pray
for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; That ye may be the children of your Father which is in
heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good” (Matthew 5:43-45).
Girard does not ignore the few passages in the New Testament that seem to contradict this demand by Christ,
such as the cleansing of the temple and Christ’s claim that he came not to send peace but a sword (Matthew
10:34). As with the similarly troubling passages in the Old Testament, he deals with each in detail, persuasively
showing that some passages can be seen best as not prescriptive but merely descriptive of what was then still a
violence-prone culture (rather than an expression of what Christ himself wants) and some as interpretations we
impose from our own still violence-prone culture. In a few cases Girard claims a passage or its translation must
simply be rejected as inconsistent with Christ’s overwhelmingly central and oft-repeated nonviolence.
It is important to recognize that Nephi, probably recounting the killing of Laban many years after it happened,
quotes the Spirit as using almost exactly the same words as the Jewish priest Caiaphas used in an ends-justi esmeans argument to the Sanhedrin to condemn Christ: “It is expedient for us, that one man should die for the
people, and that the whole nation perish not” (John 11:50). John, the recording evangelist, shows the dramatic
shift from the Old Testament to the Gospel perspective when he writes that Caiaphas thus accurately, though
unknowingly, “prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation” and also for all “the children of God” (John 11:51-

52)—but would not be sacri ced or scapegoated in the usual manner. This raises the interesting, but rather
troubling, image of Laban as a type for Christ, since the deaths of both gures are described as bringing the
salvation of whole nations: Laban’s death made possible the obtaining of the brass plates, the literal “word” that
brought salvation to the Nephites, and Christ’s death ful lled his full mission as Logos, the “Word” that saves all
peoples, including the Jews.
But even more troubling is the evidence, not only from the Bible but from the Book of Mormon itself, that Nephi’s
account directly contradicts the full revelation of God’s nature as the One revealed in Christ who utterly rejects
violence—and who demands that we do the same. Fred Essig and Dan Fuller have written an exhaustive but
inconclusive study of the legal status, in the religious and moral code of the Israelites, of Nephi’s rationalizations
for killing the unconscious, drunk Laban with his own sword. They remind us, “Few passages of the Book of
Mormon have inspired more criticism. . . . Many point to this episode as evidence against the Book of Mormon
being an inspired document.”20 Though Essig and Fuller clearly wish to counter that criticism and offer several
reasons for legally exonerating Nephi, they nally admit, “Until we more thoroughly understand the role of Deity in
the daily affairs of ancient Israel and how that role was perceived by the Israelites, we may neither condemn nor
extol the acts of Nephi.”21 It is very dif cult to wait for such understanding, which may be completely beyond
scholarship, when this passage from the Book of Mormon is used by anti-Mormons to attack the book and by
investigators to reject it. Some Mormons themselves continue to use the passage to justify troubling, violent
rhetoric and even violent action—by assuming that the Spirit does indeed teach that the end justi es the means.
(The fundamentalist Laffertys even used the passage in court to defend their “inspired” slaying of their sister-inlaw and her baby in American Fork, Utah, in 1984.) For those of us terribly troubled by such rhetoric and actions,
no other passage has seemed more contradictory to New Testament, as well as other Book of Mormon, teachings
about the impartiality and absolute goodness of the Lord—and about the central role the rejection of violence
plays in Christ’s mission.
This is not the place for a full analysis of the Laban story, but I offer some questions and re ections, based on
Girard’s insights, to illustrate how his work can help us approach the Book of Mormon: First, is it possible that
Nephi’s decision—or at least his rationalization—was simply wrong and that he had deluded himself about God’s
approval? This very young man, already a victim of scapegoating and life-threatening violence by his own brothers,
knew of Laban’s murderous scapegoating of Laman. He had now found Laban temporarily vulnerable but still a
threat to himself and his goals, which he was convinced were divinely inspired. He may have very naturally been
tempted into revenge. Then, years of re ection may have genuinely convinced him that the Lord would have
directed him to kill Laban to obtain the plates in this extreme circumstance—and thus had made possible the
preservation of his people, which he had subsequently witnessed.
The text lends some support to this possibility: Nephi is still, much later, quite troubled by the experience and its
moral meaning. His account contains a remarkable combination of unsparing completeness and honesty with what
seems like rationalization, even obsessive focusing on what might be unnecessary but psychologically revealing
details (see 1 Nephi 4, especially verse 9, where Nephi notices the sword before anything else and examines its hilt
and blade in detail, and verse 18, where, after lengthy rationalization, he confesses, in what seem to be unneeded
speci cs, “[I] took Laban by the hair of the head, and I smote off his head with his own sword”). It seems, as one
might expect of a highly religious and moral young man, that he had frequently re ected on his killing of Laban and
with some ambivalence. Perhaps as a result of Nephi’s obsessive re ection, the sword of Laban took on a powerful
symbolic importance in the racial memory of the Nephites. It became a prominent heirloom, used literally to
preserve the people and also preserved with sacred objects into modern times. Nephi used it as a model for the
rst swords his people made in America (2 Nephi 5:14) and himself “wielded” it in his people’s defense (Jacob

1:10). Four hundred years later, King Benjamin also used the sword of Laban in battle (Words of Mormon 1:13,
17) and formally passed it on to his son with the sacred plates of Nephi and Lehi’s spiritual compass, the Liahona
(Mosiah 1:16). It was preserved in such company to our own day, when it was among the sacred artifacts that were
to be shown to the Three Witnesses (D&C 17:1) and was present in the room full of ancient records and relics
shown to Joseph Smith.22
Bruce Jorgensen, English professor at BYU, in a paper given at the Rocky Mountain Modern Language Association
meetings in October 1988 on “Violence in the Book of Mormon,” points out that the sword of Laban, archetype of
all Nephite swords, hangs over all Nephite history to its violent conclusion. And Richard D. Rust, professor of
English at the University of North Carolina, who has written a book on “The Book of Mormon as Literature,” which
is being considered for publication, examines the Nephites’ xation on the sword of Laban and their continual
connection of sword imagery to word imagery: The power to divide asunder of the sword is transferred to the
word, and the persuasive force of the word is continually able to have “more powerful effect upon the minds of the
people than the sword, or anything else” (Alma 31:5; see also Christ’s witness in 3 Nephi 12, his version of the
Sermon on the Mount to the Nephites, that they must love their enemies because “old things are done away, and
all things have become new,” 3 Nephi 12:47).
Both of these developments from Nephi’s killing of Laban can be explored with Girardian paradigms: the imitative
violence and masking of violence descending directly, even ritualistically, from Laban’s sword, and also the
concerted efforts to transform the malign cycle under the sword into a benign cycle through the redemptive Logos
or word of Christ.
To return to a strictly personal level, there is some indication that throughout his life Nephi continued to be deeply
troubled by something that may have consisted of— or included—this killing of Laban: In his remarkable psalm of
self-re ection, Nephi asks, in obvious continuing pain, “Why should I give way to temptations, that the evil one
have place in my heart to destroy my peace and af ict my soul? Why am I angry because of mine enemy?” (2 Nephi
4:27). There is no explicit evidence that he was that angry with Laman and Lemuel or even the Lamanites as a
whole. Was he angry enough with Laban to kill him and then feel continuing remorse, which led to eventual selfjusti cation?
On the other hand, Nephi’s psalm speaks of his enemies “quaking” (2 Nephi 4:22), which seems to refer to Laman
and Lemuel quaking before him in 1 Nephi 17. In addition, the very details Nephi is careful to include, though to us
they seem strangely irrelevant—such as that he entered the city not knowing where he would go and his insistence
that the Lord delivered Laban into his hand— are the details that would establish that the killing was not
premeditated and thus not murder (these conditions are stated in Exodus 21:12-14 and Numbers 35:22).
Any reading that sees Nephi as making a mistake certainly challenges our conventional ideas. We think that a
prophet of God, even before he is called, should be above such self-delusion and that the word of God is generally
above merely describing, without explicit condemnation, such human mistakes. We tend to assume unconsciously
that the Book of Mormon tells us only what is best to do rather than what actually was done. We do this despite
the book’s own warning on its title page that “if there are faults they are the mistakes of men.” Whatever the case,
even an interpretation such as I have postulated, one that nds a fault in Nephi or a mistake in his account, actually
increases my own conviction that the account has a psychological richness and sophistication, particularly given
Girard’s insights, that is extremely hard to imagine Joseph Smith—or anyone else—concocting. Even a reading that
blames Nephi provides interesting and unusual evidence that the Book of Mormon is what it claims to be, an
account of real experiences by a real person from the Israelite world.

However, there is another possible reading of this event that I believe is the best. Yet, though it avoids the
problems I have just reviewed, it raises what I nd to be even more profoundly troubling questions, questions that
Girard has also been troubled by in his work with the Bible and has clearly not yet resolved. What if God truly did
command Nephi to slay Laban, but not for the very questionable reasons most often offered by Latter-day Saints—
reasons that God himself has denied often in other scriptures? What if it was an Abrahamic test, like the command
to Abraham to kill Isaac? What if it was designed to push Nephi to the limits of the human dilemma of obedience
versus integrity and to teach him and all readers of the Book of Mormon something very troubling but still very
true about the universe and the natural requirements of establishing a saving relationship with God? What if it is
to teach us that genuine faith ultimately requires us to go beyond the rationally moral—even as it has been de ned
by God, when God himself requires it directly of us?
This was the position taken by Elder Jeffrey R. Holland of the First Quorum of the Seventy, then president of BYU,
in his devotional address to the BYU student body, 17 January 1989, “The Will of the Father in All Things.” He
suggests that the story of Nephi killing Laban is given so prominently and in such personal detail at the very
beginning of the Book of Mormon to force all readers to deal with it and to focus “on the absolutely fundamental
gospel issue of obedience and submission to the communicated will of the Lord. If Nephi cannot yield to this
terribly painful command, if he cannot bring himself to obey, then it is entirely probable that he can never succeed
or survive in the tasks that lie just ahead.”23 I think Elder Holland is right, but most of us need a little more help
with the implied question: Why does God test our obedience, not only by asking us to give up our inferior desires
and habits and holdings, not even by demanding at most our lives, but by asking us to turn directly against our
greatest values, the very commands he has given us?
Here is the paradox: Nephi is asked by God to violate directly Christ’s demand that we reject all violence, even
against those who “deserve” it, and also his insistence that we never again try to justify our violence by projecting it
onto God (“If ye do good to them which do good to you, what thank have ye? for sinners also do even the same. . . .
But love ye your enemies, and do good, . . . and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind unto the
unthankful and to the evil,” Luke 6:33, 35).
Girard recognizes, with seeming anguish, that much of the Bible, especially the Old Testament, describes a natural
order in human affairs with which God seems to have to compromise in order to bring about ultimate change.
Perhaps we can come to Girard’s aid a bit here. The evidence of Joseph Smith’s inspired revision of the Bible, and
the clear statement in Doctrine and Covenants 1:24 that God’s revelations are given to prophets “in their
weakness, after the manner of their language” (which must include their worldview), indicate that the Bible and
the Book of Mormon are at least partly limited to the perspectives of the writers, not simply to that of God himself.
It is natural that those writers, though prophets, would be limited in their perceptions of reciprocal violence and
scapegoating in some of the ways Girard has documented as occurring in the mythology and literature of all
societies. They could also be inspired to describe real human dilemmas of the kind Nephi experienced in ways that
open up, with rich and educational moral complexity, the challenge of human violence.
Girardian analysis of Shakespeare helps us see how the great dramatist pushes the scapegoat mechanism to tragic
extremes—not because he accepts it but in order to reveal it more fully and make us abhor it. Thus Shakespeare
becomes a kind of therapist, creating ctive dramas that imitate and thus reveal the mechanisms of violence and
the ways we try to hide them. Shakespeare’s plays also demonstrate how such therapy must sometimes be
achieved through dramatic shock—even the telling of half-truths, as used by such healing gures as Prospero and
Cordelia. Could it be that God, having similarly to deal with the limitations placed upon him by human agency,
could create a dramatic action for Nephi, as both a test and a therapy, that reveals to him in extremis—and also to us

—that anyone can become a scapegoater capable of imitative violence? Or could it be (and this is what, nally, I
believe myself) that, as Holland and others have suggested, God was both teaching and helping Nephi to develop,
through this Abrahamic test, into a servant and leader who could be obedient—but that God was also teaching
Nephi (and us) the costs and limits of such obedience? Transgression of God’s commandments against violence is
only excusable in the extreme case of certain knowledge that God is directly commanding the transgression. Even
then it will properly exact a toll of reluctance and continuing anguish in the true servant of God, such as Nephi, and
it must never be used as a general rule to excuse anyone else’s violence.
Certainly the experience with Laban taught Nephi something he never forgot, as is evidenced, perhaps, by his
psalm of repentance—and is certainly shown in his harrowing, complex memory of the event many years later. The
experience, of course, profoundly changed him and prepared him—perhaps through the softening of deep moral
re ections—for additional teachings from God: soon afterwards he had the privilege to be the rst among the
Nephites to receive a full vision of the life and mission of the still far-future Christ and to understand Christ’s
atonement, symbolized in the tree of Lehi’s dream (“It is the love of God, which sheddeth itself abroad in the hearts
of the children of men,” 1 Nephi 11:22). Based on that understanding, he later states unequivocally the true nature
of God as revealed in Christ, the absolute opponent of all imitative desire, all violence, all scapegoating, in a way
that seems to contradict directly his own earlier report of what an angel had told him about God:
The Lord God hath commanded that men should not murder; that they should not lie; . . . that they should
not envy; that they should not have malice; that they should not contend one with another; . . . and that
they should do none of these things; for whoso doeth them shall perish. For none of these iniquities come
of the Lord; for he doeth that which is good among the children of men . . . and all are alike unto God (2
Nephi 26:32-33).
While in London ve years ago, just before the trip to Chartres, I saw, at the National Theatre, a version (based on
the York cycle) of the medieval “Mystery Plays.” These are the cycles of connected dramatic stories, generally
taken from the Bible, that were performed annually at the feast of Corpus Christi (the main celebration of Christ’s
atonement), each segment performed by one of the town’s guilds of workers. Much like the great cathedral
windows, the plays taught the scriptural story of salvation to a mainly illiterate populace. In addition, much like the
Mormon temple endowment ceremony, they served remarkably well to involve actors and audience in a
recon rming understanding of their own literal place in the ongoing divine drama, in patterns of grace that would
save each of them, as well as Adam and Eve; Noah; Mary and Joseph; and Peter, James, and John.
The somewhat modernized script enacted by sympathetic and skilled actors in this production involved many in
the audience in a surprisingly moving recon rmation of our own faith in and understanding of salvation through
Christ. One of the most powerful scenes was the sacri ce of Isaac, prolonged by an imagined dialogue between
the son on the altar and his father with his knife, that stretched out our pain, shared with them, at this potential
violence by God upon his own children and upon his own teachings. This, of course, heightened both our relief at
God’s saving intervention and our awareness of the medieval authors’ genius (which has been con rmed by Frye
and Girard) in cutting immediately from this scene to the annunciation of the birth of the Savior, Jesus Christ. The
signi cance and force of this connection is intensi ed in the text by Abraham’s cry as he sees Isaac’s increasing
anguish and knows he must now act: “Jesu, on me thou have pity / That I have most in mind.” This anguish is echoed
in God’s words to Abraham, after his intervention, that make the connection to Christ explicit:
Like thine Isaac, my loved lad Shall do full heartily his Father’s will, But not be spared strokes sore and sad,
But done to death upon a hill.24

In the London production, the effect was heightened even more when a group of actors representing the butchers’
guild, traditionally assigned (with macabre appropriateness) to play the sacri ce of Isaac, came forward. After a
complex, ritual dance of controlled violence at the completion of the scene, they ended by interweaving their long
sword-like butcher knives into a Star of David and carried it up to the balcony, where it became the star of
annunciation of Christ’s birth.
The typology is certainly clear and has been recognized by many, including, of course, Jacob in the Book of
Mormon (Jacob 4:5), but the connections between God’s apparent endorsements of violence, such as in various
Abrahamic tests, and the violent victimization of his own Son, which saves us, have not been very adequately
explored. I think the Book of Mormon can help here, mainly because it provides the basis for an understanding of
the at-one-ment of Christ that can complement, but also go beyond, Girard’s fruitful ideas. The Book of Mormon
provides as yet unexplored hints, suggesting connections between such things as Nephi’s killing of Laban and his
remarkable visions soon after of Christ as the “condescension of God” (the one who does not look down in
judgment upon us from a physical and moral distance but who literally descends with us into mortal pain and
suffering and sickness; 1 Nephi 11:26). Many subsequent Book of Mormon scriptures explore the idea that God
accomplishes the atonement by transcending the paradox of justice and mercy, and in doing so these scriptures
use the same image of condescension, of descending with us: He is the “Lord Omnipotent” who gives us the law
and will ultimately judge us, but he is also the suffering servant who will “come down from heaven . . . and shall
dwell in a tabernacle of clay” (Mosiah 3:5) and thus will learn how to save us by literally taking upon himself our
“pains and . . . sicknesses” and “in rmities, that his bowels may be lled with mercy” (Alma 7:11-12).
The Book of Mormon is quite consistent, I believe, with Girard’s very helpful focus on the atonement as achieved
through love rather than through traditional sacri ce, through reconciliation rather than through payment. It
makes much clearer than the surviving New Testament account that the center of Christ’s at-one-ment was in the
Garden of Gethsemane, not on the cross. As King Benjamin teaches and as Doctrine and Covenants 19 powerfully
recon rms in Christ’s own words, it was in the Garden, when Christ momentarily shrank from what he knew was
necessary and then fully joined all humankind as he experienced the worst sense of alienation and pain we can
know—in fact, descended below all and the worst of our experience in order to raise us to accept our acceptance
by him—it was there that “blood [came] from every pore, so great [was] his anguish for . . . his people” (Mosiah 3:7;
D&C 19:18).
Perhaps most startling is the unique Book of Mormon witness that many people, such as King Benjamin’s
audience, who lived 125 years before Christ, were able to experience the atonement fully and were saved and
completely changed into new creatures long before the atonement actually occurred in history. According to this
witness, the atonement was not a sacri cial event that saved people from that moment on but an expression of
unconditional love from God that freed them to repent and become like God simply by knowing about it, by hearing
the prophetic witness, whether expressed before Christ lived or after.
In addition, the Book of Mormon gives perhaps the most direct af rmation in scripture of Girard’s claim that
Christ’s atonement put an end to all claims for the legitimacy of sacri ce and scapegoating:
[Christ’s atonement will not be] a sacri ce of man, neither of beast, neither of any manner of fowl; for it
shall not be a human sacri ce. . . . [But] then shall there be, or it is expedient there should be, a stop to the
shedding of blood; then shall the law of Moses be ful lled. . . . And thus he shall bring salvation to all those
who shall believe on his name; this being the intent of this last sacri ce, to bring about the bowels of

mercy, which overpowereth justice, and bringeth about means unto men that they may have faith unto
repentance (Alma 34:10, 13, 15).
Besides con rming some of Girard’s insights, the Book of Mormon also can help us go beyond Girardian analysis
to see the proper role of justice, of punishment, even of God’s own participation in processes that involve or
threaten violence. Amulek’s discourse on the atonement in Alma 34 and Alma’s in Alma 42 make much clearer
than anything available to Girard in the Bible the crucial part justice plays in God’s plan for our redemption.
The Bible’s well-known accounts of what seems like divinely directed or justi ed violence and its tendency,
especially in the Old Testament, to obscure the violence mechanism Girard identi es, may result from imperfect
attempts to express the principle of God’s justice. The Book of Mormon more clearly shows why God must use the
ideal of justice to establish conscience in us before his forgiving love, which ends the cycle of violence, can
effectively operate. For instance, Alma teaches his son Corianton that God af xed laws and punishments, “which
brought remorse of conscience unto man”; if he had not done so, “men would not be afraid to sin . . . [and] the
works of justice would be destroyed, and God would cease to be God” (Alma 42:18, 20, 22). He also teaches
Corianton that such a necessary condition brings the inevitable, unfortunate result of placing man “in the grasp of
justice.” It is therefore necessary, in order to counter that result, that “God himself [atone] for the sins of the world,
to bring about the plan of mercy, to appease the demands of justice, that God might be a perfect, just God, and a
merciful God also” (Alma 42:14-15).
A major problem for many of Girard’s readers is his explanation of how original violence lies at the foundation of
society and religion and then how that original violence is continually obscured over time, even in God-directed
biblical cultures. The Book of Mormon may be able to help us understand how the constraints of human nature
and agency require God, in working out a possible plan of salvation for us, to cooperate in—or at least allow—that
natural obscuring process. Perhaps it is only in such a way, in which the processes of quid-pro-quo justice and thus
imitative violence work with full force for a while, that our consciences can be adequately formed by justice. Then,
as the Book of Mormon uniquely explains, such demands of justice in our own minds can be appeased by our
knowing certainly, through prophetic witness, the plan of God’s mercy (Alma 42:15). Thus our consciences, which
remain too self-critical to accept Christ’s forgiveness and acceptance of us, can be overpowered by the bowels of
his mercy (Alma 34:15). Our dif culty with apparently contradictory scriptures may be a matter of understanding
how God’s justice and his mercy work together to bring us to self-knowledge and guilt, but also to self-acceptance
and repentance.25
In addition to all this, the Book of Mormon provides the only example I can nd anywhere of a group actually
practicing Girard’s implied unique solution to imitative violence—and with precisely the results he predicts. The
people of Anti-Nephi-Lehi, a group of Lamanites converted to the Christian gospel, whose ancestors had
continually used the Nephites as scapegoats for their own troubles, make a covenant with God “that rather than
shed the blood of their brethren they would give up their own lives” (Alma 24:18). In keeping with that covenant,
they ritually bury their weapons. When attacked by vengeful Lamanites, they respond with astonishing and
effective courage but in a way directly contrary to the universal tendency to reciprocal violence Girard has
revealed: They “would not ee from the sword, neither would they turn aside to the right hand or to the left, but . . .
would lie down and perish, and praised God even in the very act of perishing under the sword” (Alma 24:23). When
the Lamanites see this, the reverse pattern, what Girard calls the “benign reciprocity of love,” takes over: “There
were many whose hearts had swollen in them for those of their brethren who had fallen,” and they too “threw
down their weapons of war, and they would not take them again” (Alma 24:24-25). According to Mormon, the
recording prophet, over a thousand were killed, but they were saved in the kingdom of God—and a greater

number than that were converted. Most important, the violence was stopped in a way that actually ended it, rather
than setting up continuing cycles of revenge—as the winning of battles, no matter how justi ed, always does.
Speaking from the perspective of four hundred years later in Nephite history, Mormon draws a pointed lesson for
his modern-day readers:
And thus we see that, when these Lamanites were brought to believe and to know the truth, they were
rm, and would suffer even unto death rather than commit sin. . . . They had rather sacri ce their lives than
even to take the life of their enemy; and they have buried their weapons of war deep in the earth, because
of their love towards their brethren. And now behold I say unto you, has there been so great love in all the
land? Behold, I say unto you, Nay, there has not, even among the Nephites (Alma 24:19; 26:32-33).
It would be hard to imagine a better complement to Girard’s analysis of the end of the Joseph story. In that
episode Judah is being tested by Joseph, who has had an incriminating cup placed in Benjamin’s sack and threatens
to keep him in Egypt as a thief and let the others go. But Judah, archetypal head of the Jews, the race most made a
scapegoat in our world—and the race which produced Jesus—this Judah, in an exact reversal of what had occurred
when Joseph was originally scapegoated by his brothers, now offers to take Benjamin’s place, to sacri ce self
rather than make another a scapegoat. He thus moves Joseph to tears and to the forgiveness that ends the cycle of
violence and reconciles him with his brothers. As Girard writes, “This dedication of Judah stands in symmetrical
opposition to the original deed of collective violence which it cancels out and reveals.”26 In exactly the same way,
the dedication of the people of Anti-Nephi-Lehi stands in symmetrical opposition to the original deeds of collective
violence by Laman and Lemuel and their descendants, which produced the ongoing spiral of reciprocal
scapegoating central to the Book of Mormon narrative—and for a time it cancels out, as well as reveals, that cycle
of violence.
But I nd in the Book of Mormon an even more powerful support for, and extension of, Girard’s work. The central
question still remains how to cope with the desire that leads to envy and rivalry and sets in motion all the problems
that produce violence and our consciences’ demands for reciprocal justice. For Christians, including Girard, the
question is how Christ’s atonement makes it possible for us to stop the cycle even before it starts—or at least to
make repentance and forgiveness possible so it can end.
The Book of Mormon provides the best answer. King Benjamin teaches precisely how the redemptive process
works and can be maintained. First he proclaims the essential and primary reality of the atonement, by which
Christ extends unconditional love to us, even in our sins. Consistent with Amulek and Alma, he teaches that we can
be moved by Christ’s unconditional love to overcome the demands within ourselves, placed there by our Godgiven consciences, to punish ourselves and others. This breaking the bands of justice, he claims, enables us to
accept Christ’s mercy and forgiveness and become new creatures. Intensely moved by learning of Christ’s love,
the group of Nephites being taught by King Benjamin actually go through that saving process and begin to rejoice
that they are indeed changed, that they “have no more disposition to do evil, but to do good continually” (Mosiah
5:2). King Benjamin also reveals the only way to maintain change, to retain “a remission of your sins from day to
day” (Mosiah 4:26). The key is humility, the abdication of imitative desire through recognizing that we are “all
beggars” (Mosiah 4:19). Just as God does not reject us for our sins, does not refuse to love us or to extend his
healing grace and continual blessings because we sin, so we must respond to those who beg help from us though
they do not “deserve” it. We must never judge their desires or condition; we must never think that “the man has
brought upon himself his misery; therefore . . . his punishments are just” (Mosiah 4:17). If we do so we have “great
cause to repent,” and if we fail to repent we have “no interest in the kingdom of God” (Mosiah 4:18). Instead, we
must constantly recognize our own weakness and our own position of dependence on God, judging no one else

but engaging constantly in speci c acts of sacri cial love: “feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, visiting the sick
and administering to their relief, both spiritually and temporally, according to their wants” (Mosiah 4:26).
The point the Book of Mormon makes much more clearly than I nd made in the Bible is this: To continue
experiencing the atonement of Christ after we have received his grace, we must extend grace to others. Christ
makes us into new creatures, into persons strong enough not to act contrary to what we know—that is, not to sin—
if we will merely accept Christ’s merciful, undeserved love; he gives us power to repent, the “means” by which we
can “have faith unto repentance” (Alma 34:15). But if we then continue judging others, we will unconsciously judge
ourselves. We must constantly give mercy to be able to accept it. We must never exact revenge, even in the name
of perfect justice. We must not take vengeance, even upon ourselves, the sinners whom we inwardly know most
certainly deserve it.
These two passages from the Book of Mormon, the account of the people of Anti-Nephi-Lehi and King Benjamin’s
address, provide a basis for meeting one of the main criticisms made of Girard’s work. Even those who nd that his
hypotheses t the available facts better than any others are troubled that despite the claim that his work can help
us cope with violence in our lives and in relations between nations, neither he nor his disciples have offered
concrete, practical steps toward that goal.27 Active, self-sacri cing love, even of our enemies, and nonjudgmental,
merciful feeding of the hungry are seldom recommended and even less seldom practiced in our world. The Book of
Mormon provides powerful evidence, in theory and example, that they could work—and in fact are essential for
our salvation.28
What do these re ections on some exciting recent literary criticism—and a reconsideration of Nephi’s killing of
Laban—suggest about the truth and value of the Book of Mormon? That none of us can dismiss it. No one has
mastered or explained or exhausted it. It not only stands up to the most sophisticated modern thought about
literature, but it continues to challenge our most sophisticated ethical, theological, and political concepts. I am
encouraged by my study so far to nd that what Frye and Girard have claimed for the Bible can also be claimed,
point by point and often more clearly and usefully, for the Book of Mormon. But more important, their insights
deepen my understanding and appreciation of a book I already believe is both as historically true and as spiritually
valuable as the Bible. As I approach dif cult parts of the book, such as the Laban story, with these new tools, I nd
the book responding with truth and richness.
Girard has focused on content, Frye on form. Girard has reminded us of the central ethic to look for at the heart of
the Logos, mercy transcending justice; Frye has reminded us of the best way to get to that heart, pattern
transcending reason. The Book of Mormon, if we will work—and open ourselves—to nd it so, is a restored second
witness to both the ethic and the pattern, to Christ as Redeemer and to Christ as the Logos.
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An Introduction to the Relevance of and a Methodology for a Study
of the Proper Names of the Book of Mormon
Paul Y. Hoskisson
Since the appearance of the Book of Mormon in 1830, its proper names have been discussed in diverse articles
and books.1 Most of the statements proffer etymologies, while a few suggest the signi cance of various names.
Because of the uneven quality of these statements this paper proposes an apposite methodology. First, though, a
few words need to be said about the relevance of name studies to our understanding of the Book of Mormon.
Relevance
With the exception of a few modern proper names coined for their composite sounds,2 all names have meanings in
their language of origin. People are often not aware of these meanings because the name has a private
interpretation, or the name has been borrowed into a language in which the original meaning is no longer evident,
or the name is very old and the meaning has not been transmitted. For example, the English personal name Wayne
is an old form of the more modern English word wain, meaning a “wagon” or “cart,” hence the surname Wainwright,
“builder/repairer of “3 However, to our contemporary ears Wayne no longer has a meaning; it is simply a personal
name.
With training and experience, it is often possible to de ne the language of origin, the meaning, and, when
applicable, the grammatical form of a name. Names like Karen, Tony, and Sasha (also written Sacha from the French
spelling) have been borrowed into English from Danish,4 Italian,5 and Russian6 respectively. The latter is
particularly instructive because it represents a rather complicated transference of names. Sasha is a Russian
diminutive (nickname) for Aleksandr (English Alexander), which in turn was borrowed from Greek alexandros,
“defending men.” To most speakers of English, Sasha conveys neither the diminutive nature of the Russian nor any
trace of the Russian form it was derived from, let alone the Greek origin and meaning of the name.
Names can preserve phonemes and lexemes of the language of origin. Thus, English Alexander retains a semblance
of the original phonemes plus the initial and nal lexemes alex and andr, but not the case ending -os of the Greek. In
English the name “Wayne” was frozen in a state of the English language when y represented the sound later
spelled i.7 When we realize that the phonemes represented by y, i, and g can under certain conditions represent
each other at different stages and in various dialects of written English, it is easy to see that wayne = wain =
wagon.8
Even when the source language has been lost to memory, i.e., has become a nonspoken language, names often
retain in their adopted language many of the sounds and therefore phonemes of the original, despite several
transmigrations involving intermediate languages. For example, the English name Esther can be traced ultimately
to the Babylonian name for the goddess of love and war, Istar. However, the English form of the name is derived
undoubtedly from the English Bible translations that go back to the Greek form in the Septuagint or to the
Hebrew, Esther, both of which ultimately derive from the Babylonian Istar.
For the above two reasons,9 the onomasticon10 of the Book of Mormon can preserve lexemes of the languages
used to compose the book. Through a careful study of these names we can draw conclusions about their possible
language origin and meaning. In this respect, the proper names in the Book of Mormon form a unique and useful

tool for the study of the languages of the peoples of that book and make possible new insights for understanding
the cultures of the Book of Mormon.
Such conclusions are valuable for two reasons. First, names can be employed to convey content. Giving a name in
antiquity usually involved more than supplying a label. Names had meanings, and though not all names necessarily
were consciously based on meaning,11 some were. For instance, Isaiah gave his two sons long and, for most
English speakers, unpronounceable names. These names were not given for any intrinsic quality of the two
children but as a testimony to Isaiah’s contemporaries. The names contained a message, and understanding that
message gives insight into the literary work of a great prophet.12
Second, names can supply information about the milieu of the author or redactor. Names in the ancient world
were subject to literary treatment or mistreatment. For example, one of Saul’s sons must have been less than
appreciated by his contemporaries. This is re ected not only in the biblical information concerning him (he was
murdered), but also in the treatment of his name. His proper name, Eshbaal, which means “man of the lord,”13 is
preserved in the late account found in 1 Chronicles 8:33 and 1 Chronicles 9:39. However, in the earlier, more
contemporary account found in 2 Samuel 2-4, his name was changed by the compilers of the book to Ishbosheth,
meaning “man of shame.” Changing a respectable word to a disreputable word is called a dysphemism, the opposite
of a euphemism. This play on the name of Saul’s son probably expresses an opinion of the author of 2 Samuel about
that person. The redactor or author of 1 Chronicles used the original name, perhaps out of respect for the person
since Saul’s son was removed temporally and personally from the time of the composition of 1 Chronicles, or
perhaps because any name containing Baal in those days was by itself suf cient shame.
A careful scrutiny of names can also lead to information about the times in which a work was composed. The
relatively unknown play on words between the names of a famous Babylonian king, Nebuchadnezzar, in Kings (e.g.,
2 Kings 24:1) and Nebuchadrezzar in Jeremiah (e.g., Jeremiah 37:1), could only have been made by someone
familiar with the times these passages portray. The latter can be translated from Babylonian as “Nabu, protect the
crown prince,” while the former means “Nabu, protect the mule.”14 Only someone writing from an anti-Babylonian
perspective would have used the dysphemism. The correct form of the name would have been used by proBabylonian, neutral, or politically removed writers. This corroborates the general anti-Babylonian tenor of Kings
and the pro-Babylonian stance of Jeremiah. However, unlike Ishbosheth mentioned above, this dysphemism cannot
be Hebrew in origin, but must have been borrowed from a current Mesopotamian wordplay on the Babylonian
king’s name.15
If a Semitic Vorlage is posited for the Book of Mormon, then the Semitic propensity to play with names should be
evident in it, and it is. For instance, in the book of Alma the people of Ammon are given a land called Jershon. The
etymology of this toponym can be traced to a Hebrew root meaning “to inherit.”16 Alma 27:22 states that “this
land Jershon [that is, inheritance] is the land which we will give unto our brethren for an inheritance.” This is an
excellent example of wordplay in the Book of Mormon and also makes a statement about the Nephite action of
giving the land to the converted Lamanites.17
An exacting study of the names can also reveal otherwise unknown in uences on Nephite society. One of the
better known apostates of the Book of Mormon carried a Jaredite name, Korihor.18 Likewise, one of the most
infamous apostate movements in the Book of Mormon also carried a Jaredite name, order of Nehors, named after
the Nephite, Nehor.19 This name, however, is a Jaredite toponym,20 appearing as a proper name in the book of

Ether. These two examples suggest that some Nephite apostate movements might have been inspired by Jaredite
history, either through the twenty-four gold plates found by Limhi’s people and translated by Mosiah or through
contact with survivors of the Jaredite culture.
Methodology
Requisite to any study of the Book of Mormon onomasticon is primary and accurate control of philologic
possibilities. In the example Jershon given above, a recently discontinued manual of the Church, quoting a Book of
Mormon commentary, states that the name means “land of the exiled, or of the strangers.” This false etymology is
probably based on the assumption that the root in Hebrew for the Nephite Jershon is to be derived from the
Hebrew word for stranger, gr. This root begins with a gimel (/g/), which normally is transliterated in the King James
Bible with a g and not a j. As discussed below, the j in the Hebrew names of the King James Bible usually represents
the Hebrew yod (/y/). Therefore, if it can be assumed that the normal transliteration techniques employed in the
King James Version apply to the Book of Mormon, the meaning “exile” or “stranger” for the word Jershon is not
possible. In addition, “exile” or “stranger” is unlikely because the sound /s/ in Jershon would remain unexplained.21
Inseparable from a control of the primary languages is a knowledge of which languages apply to the Book of
Mormon onomasticon and to what extent they apply. When considering possible language Vorlagen for the Book of
Mormon, Hebrew of the biblical period is the rst choice. Nearly equal in consideration to Hebrew is Egyptian,
followed by the other Semitic languages in use at or before the time of Lehi, including Akkadian, Aramaic, Ugaritic,
Phoenician, Moabite, and Ammonite. Semitic languages rst attested after the time of Lehi, such as Classical
Arabic, the later Aramaic dialects, and Ethiopic dialects, are not as relevant as the earlier languages, but may be
used with extreme caution. Other non-Semitic languages with which the Hebrews could have had contact before
Lehi’s departure, such as Hittite, Greek, Hurrian, and Sumerian, should be a last resort.
Even with these precautions, problems cannot be avoided. A name can have several etymologies based not only on
several roots in one language, but it may also be traceable to more than one language. For example, one author has
seen in the word Alma an Arabic name,22 while in Hebrew there are at least six theoretical roots: ‘lm, clm, glm, lm’,
lmc, lmg, though not all of these are necessarily attached to an etymon in West Semitic.
The use of an edition of the received text that also renders all the possible English variants of the names is
absolutely necessary for any study of the proper names of the Book of Mormon.23 For instance, any etymology of
the toponym Cumorah must be based on an acceptable reading of the received text. The present editions of the
Book of Mormon are unanimous in reading Cumorah. However, this place name is spelled three different ways in
the Printer’s Manuscript. Thus, Mormon 6 contains the spelling Camorah and Cumorah in verse 2, while verse 5 has
Comorah. In the 1830 edition Camorah is standard throughout the Book of Mormon. Cumorah appears in all
subsequent editions.24
In addition, some variations of the spellings of names have possibly slipped into the present editions seemingly
without justi cation, e.g., shiblum. In Alma 11:15-19 shiblum is juxtaposed with shiblon. In the Printer’s Manuscript
the b is not there, i.e., shilum. The b could have been inserted inadvertently because of the b in shiblon.
Second only to the need for a critical edition is the need to posit a theoretical model for the possible transliteration
into English of the names as they might have been on the Vorlage. Thus, does a j in a name in the Book of Mormon
represent the phoneme /j/, /y/, /g/, or /h/? The j in the transliterated Hebrew names in the King James Bible usually

stands for a /y/, the Hebrew letter yod. It is notable, however, that the King James renderings are not consistent.
The initial Hebrew phonemes of Jeremiah, Isaiah and Job are /y/, /y/, and /h/ respectively. Extrapolating from this
example, we might expect relative but not absolute consistency in the transliterations of the Book of Mormon
onomasticon.
A further complication involves the commingling of Jaredite and Nephite names. Unless and until it can be
determined from which cultural background the Jaredites departed,25 it will be impossible to do anything but
guess about etymologies for Jaredite names. It also appears that Jaredite names surface rather early in the
Nephite record26 and should not be considered together with Lehite and Mulekite language names when
etymologies are proposed.
Conclusion
An understanding of the proper names in the language of the Vorlage of the Book of Mormon can reveal, via
literary nuance, aspects of Nephite/Lamanite culture that remain unrecognized by the reader who is limited to
modern languages. However, such results are valid only to the extent that the conclusions are based on sound
methodology. This study has proposed an apposite methodology, i.e., control of the posited primary languages,
discretion in determining the primary languages, thorough and rigorous examination of all the philological
possibilities in the various target languages, and the use of a critical edition that indicates all variations in the
various manuscripts and editions.
Needless to say, as the title of this paper indicates, this is only an incipient attempt at de ning the relevance of and
establishing a methodology for a study of the proper names of the Book of Mormon. Much work still begs
attention.
This paper would not be complete without a caveat. Extreme caution both in the tools used and the ways in which
they are used must always be the standard. Less is better and conservatism is a virtue. Yet the study of the
onomasticon of the Book of Mormon is a must if we are to understand the world of the Nephites and Jaredites. I
hope this introductory statement on relevance and methodology will lead to even more signi cant progress in the
study of the proper names of the Book of Mormon.
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The Brass Plates Version of Genesis
Noel B. Reynolds
When Lehi and his followers left Jerusalem, they took with them an unnamed book of scripture (known simply by
its description—”the plates of brass”), which provided their cultural and religious groundings over a thousand-year
period. Many Book of Mormon references to this record indicate that it was most likely a Josephite version of the
Old Testament (e.g., 1 Nephi 5:10-16). It contained the writings of Isaiah substantially as they have come down in
our textual tradition, and it reports many experiences of Moses and Israel as we know them from the Bible. But
several intriguing references indicate that it contained materials that are not familiar to students of the Bible:
Joseph of Egypt is cited at some length, and on subjects not mentioned in Genesis; otherwise unknown prophets,
such as Zenos and Zenock, are important to Lehi’s descendants; and David seems to play little or no role in the
Book of Mormon understanding of the covenant between Israel and God.1 The question raised in this paper is
whether there are indirect evidences of further distinctive contents of the plates of brass. Can we learn anything
else about those plates and their contents through an examination of indirect textual evidence in the Book of
Mormon?
The Logic of This Inquiry
This paper reports a simple exercise in which a number of key phrases and concepts occurring in Joseph Smith’s
book of Moses in the Pearl of Great Price and in the Joseph Smith Translation of the Bible are checked against
both the Book of Mormon and the King James Bible.2 My original impression that a number of these which show
up prominently in the Nephite record are absent from the Bible was dramatically vindicated. Whereas most
previous comparisons of the Book of Mormon with the Old Testament have emphasized their similarities, I wish
here to call attention to some instructive differences. My hypothesis is that the brass plates version of Genesis
used by generations of Nephite prophets may have been much more like the version we have received from
Joseph Smith as a result of his inspired revision of the Bible published as the book of Moses in the Pearl of Great
Price than the Genesis version handed down in our traditional Bible.3 This in turn has other possible implications,
some of which will be discussed. For reasons that will be spelled out below, it is not plausible to conclude that the
Book of Mormon is the source for the book of Moses, or that Joseph Smith is the source of both, as some of his
critics might want to believe.
It seemed most appropriate to compare the Book of Mormon text with the Old Testament since these two are
roughly contemporary in their initial composition and because those who wrote the Book of Mormon saw
themselves as belonging to that culture which we would identify with the Old Testament. The Hebrew scriptures
available to the Nephites were all in existence by 600 B.C. All the examples presented below are correlations
between Moses and Book of Mormon language that do not occur in the Old Testament. My approach is built on an
initial list of terms, phrases, and concepts common to both the Book of Mormon and the book of Moses. This list
was then checked against the Old Testament, and any elements clearly present in that text were eliminated. For a
variety of reasons, other sets of parallel references were found unconvincing and were also dropped. The nal list
contained thirty-three key book of Moses references that show up notably in 145 Book of Mormon passages (see
the table in the appendix).
The second stage of my study was to assess the evidence for and against the hypothesis that these texts are
independent of one another. The seven criteria of dependence used are listed brie y below and in more detail
(along with their assessments) in the appendix:

1. The greater the number of signi cant terms repeated in parallel phrasings in two texts, the less likely
they are to be independent. (F)
2. The more precise the similarities between parallel phrasings in two texts, the less likely they are to be
independent. (G)
3. The more deliberately shaped the repetition in parallel phrasings in two texts, the less likely they are to
be independent. (H)
4. The more similar the contexts in which parallel phrasings occur, the less likely they are to be
independent. (I)
5. Author awareness of a brass plates source reduces the likelihood of independence. (J)
6. The more distinctive the terminology repeated in parallel phrasings in two texts, the less likely they are
to be independent. (K)
7. Presence of weak or strong versions of the parallel terminology in the New Testament, and even more
so, in the Old Testament, increases the possibility that the book of Moses and Book of Mormon passages
are independent. Although clear Old Testament parallels do not prove independence, their existence was
considered suf cient reason to drop the occurrence altogether as evidence of dependence. (L)
For each of these seven criteria, two or more levels of persuasiveness are suggested and linked to features of the
particular occurrence (see the appendix for these explanations). In all cases, the issue is the likelihood that the
particular textual parallel listed could occur independently of any connection between the two texts. The listing in
the table of the appendix also includes a linearized calculation performed as a rough means of combining the
relative values of the seven categories into a common score to indicate approproximate importance for showing
dependency between the two texts. The result indicates greater or lesser probability of dependence, but is not
intended as a rigorous measure of distances between probabilities or of con dence levels.
By selecting the highest scores for dependence, I was able to identify a group of parallels between these two texts,
each of which is highly persuasive on the basis of criteria ordinarily used by scholars evaluating possible sources of
texts. Given the uniqueness of some of these individual parallels and the brevity of the source text, the hypothesis
that the texts are independent should be rejected. This conclusion is further illuminated and substantiated by
reference to a second and larger group of passages that also t the pattern, but with less persuasiveness. Textual
dependence between the two texts could logically run in either direction. Examination of this question reveals the
implausibility of the view that the book of Moses could be derived from the Book of Mormon, even though the
latter was published rst by Joseph Smith.
Correlations of Words, Phrases, and Concepts
Newcomers to studies of textual sources are often surprised at the small amount of shared material that must
generally be demonstrated before scholars will agree that there is some connection between two culturally
associated texts. I will rst discuss a group of twenty Book of Mormon passages (Group 1 in the table) that present
strong parallels with book of Moses materials. This rst group is distinguished from the second in that none of
these parallels nds expression in the Bible (with the noted exception of Moses 6:52 being found in Acts 4:12).

Moses records “by reason of transgression cometh the fall, which fall bringeth death” (Moses 6:59). This source
cannot be missed in Jacob’s sermon which, emphasizing resurrection as the answer to death, explains: “resurrection
must needs come unto man by reason of the fall; and the fall came by reason of transgression” (2 Nephi 9:6). Here we
have double intensi cation of an implicit reference to the source— rst by substituting “resurrection” for “death,”
and second by reversing the order of the four terms. This reversing is a technique of biblical writers noticed by M.
Zeidel. It is referred to as Zeidel’s law or as “inverted quotation,” and is particularly characteristic of quotations.4
Jacob also emphasizes his own adaptation of the distinctive verbal construction “to come by reason of” by doubling
it.
The book of Moses account of Adam’s baptism is followed by the bestowal of the priesthood on Adam with the
following words: “And thou art after the order of him who was without beginning of days or end of years, from all
eternity to all eternity” (Moses 6:67). This phrasing is reproduced in whole by Alma in his discourse on the
priesthood when he said, “This high priesthood being after the order of his Son, which order was from the foundation
of the world; or in other words, being without beginning of days or end of years, being prepared from eternity to all
eternity” (Alma 13:7; cf. Alma 13:9). In slightly altered contexts, both Enoch and two additional Book of Mormon
writers use the latter half of this expression to describe the Lord, saying of him that he “is from all eternity to all
eternity.”5 Although a version of the rst half of the larger formula appears in the New Testament (Hebrews 7:3),
the second half, and therefore the combination, are both unique to book of Moses and Book of Mormon passages.
John W. Welch has identi ed seven or eight other similarities between Alma 13 and JST Genesis 14, further
indicating that Alma possessed an expanded text of the early history of the patriarchs similar to that now found in
Joseph Smith’s works.6
Some of the best examples of connections between these two texts are more complex, involving teachings and
ways of thinking about something without exact replication of words or phrases. The doctrine of divinely given
free agency is implicit in all of scripture, but is only taught explicitly as a fundamental concept in the book of Moses
and the Book of Mormon. In Moses we learn that “Satan . . . sought to destroy the agency of man” (Moses 4:3), that
God “gave unto man his agency” (Moses 7:32; 4:3), and that men are therefore “agents unto themselves” (Moses
6:56). Lehi picks up these same themes in a major discourse on freedom of choice or agency and teaches that “God
gave unto man that he should act for himself” (2 Nephi 2:16); that by the redemption “they have become free
forever, knowing good from evil; to act for themselves and not to be acted upon” (2 Nephi 2:26); and that men “are
free to choose liberty and eternal life, . . . or to choose captivity and death, according to the captivity and power of
the devil” (2 Nephi 2:27).
Moses points out to Satan that because the Lord’s “spirit hath not altogether withdrawn” from him he can distinguish
between God and Satan (Moses 1:15). The Book of Mormon writers frequently used this same language when
warning people not to sin lest the Lord’s Spirit be withdrawn from them, too. Alma speci cally cites this
explanation to show why the devil has successfully gained power over certain people (Alma 34:35). Mormon
borrows Alma’s language several times to explain the weakness of the Nephites, saying that “the Spirit of the Lord
did no more preserve them; yea, it had withdrawn from them because the Spirit of the Lord doth not dwell in unholy
temples” (Helaman 5:24).7 Here we see a string of passages in which the Book of Mormon writers follow one
another in a particular application of a phrase from Moses’ account, using it to explain a withdrawal of the Lord’s
Spirit and a corresponding expansion of Satan’s power (which Moses had successfully resisted). There is some
complexity introduced in this variation, but the concept remains the same and takes on an independent life in the
tradition of the Nephites.

Centuries of Christian theology testify to the lack of direct biblical teaching on the salvation of little children. But
the book of Moses states simply that because of the atonement, “children . . . are whole from the foundation of the
world” (Moses 6:54). Two Book of Mormon prophets provide a clear and ringing statement of the doctrine that
little children are saved by the atonement of Christ. King Benjamin stated this clearly in his famous discourse (cf.
Mosiah 3:16, 21), and Mormon wrote a long epistle on the subject at the end of Nephite history. In particular,
Mormon said that “little children are whole,” and that they are “alive in Christ, even from the foundation of the world”
(Moroni 8:8, 12). An additional persuasive link between these two texts is that both King Benjamin’s and Moses’
teachings are in the immediate context of a statement that beside the name of Christ there will be “no other name
given nor any other way nor means whereby salvation can come” (Mosiah 3:17).8
One sentence from Moses seems to have spawned a whole family of formulaic references in the Book of Mormon:
“And he became Satan, yea, even the devil, the father of all lies, to deceive and to blind men, and to lead them captive
at his will, even as many as would not hearken unto my voice” (Moses 4:4). This language is echoed precisely by
both Lehi and Moroni, who, when mentioning the devil, add the stock quali cation: “who is the father of all lies” (cf. 2
Nephi 2:18; Ether 8:25), while Jacob says the same thing in similar terms (2 Nephi 9:9). Incidentally, the
descriptive term devil,which is used frequently to refer to Satan in both Moses and the Book of Mormon, does not
occur at all in the Old Testament. New Testament occurrences do not re ect this context.
The Book of Mormon sometimes separates and sometimes combines the elements of this description of the devil
from Moses and portrays Satan as one deliberately engaged in “deceiving the hearts of the people” and in “blinding
their eyes” that he might “lead them away” (3 Nephi 2:2).9 Particularly striking is the repeated statement that the
devil will lead those who do not hearken to the Lord’s voice “captive at his will” (Moses 4:4). In Alma we nd that
those who harden their hearts will receive “the lesser portion of the word until they know nothing concerning his
mysteries; and then they are taken captive by the devil, and led by his will down to destruction” (Alma 12:11). Much
later, Alma invokes the same phrasing to warn his son Corianton of the plight of the wicked who, “because of their
own iniquity,” are “led captive by the will of the devil” (Alma 40:13). In the passage discussed above, Lehi taught his
son Jacob that men “are free to choose liberty and eternal life, . . . or to choose captivity and death, according to the
captivity and power of the devil; for he seeketh that men might be miserable” (2 Nephi 2:27).
A remarkable passage in the rst part of the Book of Mormon pulls all these book of Moses themes about Satan
together—to describe someone else. The implication is unmistakable when Laman characterizes his brother Nephi
as one who lies and who deceives our eyes, thinking to lead us away for the purpose of making himself “a king and a
ruler over us, that he may do with us according to his will and pleasure” (1 Nephi 16:38). Laman insinuates that Nephi,
who chastises his wayward brothers, is himself like the devil. And resistance against him is not only righteous, but
required. This account has the added complexity that it is a speech of Laman, who is quoted here in a record
written by the very brother he attacks. If we accept the possibility that this text is dependent on a passage in the
ancient book of Moses, we then recognize a major new dimension of meaning, not only in Laman’s speech, but in
Nephi’s decision to preserve the speech, thus showing his descendants, and any other readers familiar with the
Moses text, the full nature of the confrontation between the brothers, as well as the injustice of the attacks he
suffered. The full irony is revealed when we re ect on the facts reported in Nephi’s record and realize that
Laman’s false accusation against Nephi is an accurate self-description.
Tracing the Direction of Dependence
The foregoing discussion of Book of Mormon parallels to a number of book of Moses passages constitutes
substantial evidence that the two texts are in some way dependent on one another or some common source. The

question that follows next concerns the direction of in uence. The rst of the two major possibilities is that the
book of Moses (received by Joseph Smith in June and December of 1830) was based on the Book of Mormon
(translated mainly from April to June of 1829), which theory, of course, will be most attractive to those who
believe Joseph Smith invented both. Several reasons showing why such a view does not explain the connections
between these two texts are advanced below. This leaves only the other hypothesis as the leading explanation—
namely, that the writers of the Book of Mormon had access to the book of Moses text.
The Book of Mormon authors explicitly identify their version of the Hebrew scriptures as a lineage history handed
down through the descendants of Joseph (1 Nephi 5:10-16). The fact that there are some differences between
the record on the brass plates and the Old Testament we have today is evident in the Book of Mormon text. The
argument of this essay is that the brass plates account of the creation and the founding generations of the human
race might include the material restored in Joseph Smith’s book of Moses. This suggests the possibility that by
checking the Book of Mormon text against other noncanonical manuscripts we might identify further texts that
seem to have been available to the Nephite prophets through the brass plates. That such other manuscripts were
once in existence seems clear from some of the New Testament parallels, and particularly the concentration of
such usages in the writings of John and Paul.
The idea that the brass plates contained a different Moses account than now survives in Genesis or the Jewish
tradition may be consistent with David Noel Freedman’s theory that our present Genesis through Kings is a
relatively recent edition or compilation designed to shift the emphasis from history to law.10 The Book of Mormon
itself reports a prophecy to the effect that the Bible which would come down to us in the latter days would have
had many “plain and precious truths” removed from the original texts (see 1 Nephi 13:26-29, 32, 34-40; 14:23).
These observations jointly suggest that the brass plates could contain earlier versions of several books. We might
also want to test the hypothesis that our Old Testament version was rewritten for political reasons, as Freedman
suggests.11 Does it justify one particular competing tradition of Jewish origins? If so, it might constitute an early
example of the textual corruptions described in the Book of Mormon.
Some people may be tempted to use these ndings to argue that Joseph Smith was the common author of Moses
and the Book of Mormon. But carefully considered, the evidence runs the other way. First, there is the matter of
chronology. We can historically document the fact that Joseph began the Moses translation after the Book of
Mormon was published. But it is clearly Moses that provides the unity and coherence to a host of scattered Book
of Mormon references. It is the story of creation and subsequent events that supplies meaning to Book of
Mormon language connecting (1) the transgression, fall, and death; (2) explaining the origins of human agency; (3)
describing the character and modus operandi of Satan; (4) explaining the origins and character of secret
combinations and the works of darkness—to mention only a few of the most obvious examples. The Book of
Mormon is the derivative document. It shows a number of different authors borrowing from a common source as
suited their particular needs—Lehi, Nephi, Benjamin, and Alma all used it frequently, drawing on its context to give
added meaning to their own writings.
Perhaps most signi cantly, we have at hand a control document against which to check this hypothesis. A few
years after receiving Moses, Joseph Smith translated an Abrahamic text. In spite of the fact that this new
document contained versions of some of the same chapters of Genesis that are paralleled in the book of Moses,
and in spite of the fact that the Book of Mormon has a large number of direct references to the Abraham, the
person, detailed textual comparison demonstrates that this second document does not feature any of the phrases
and concepts that have been reported above linking Moses to the Book of Mormon textual tradition. Nor does the
distinctive, non-Old Testament phraseology of the book of Abraham show up in the Book of Mormon. The logic

that would lead skeptics to conclude that these common concepts and expressions provide evidence that Joseph
Smith wrote the Book of Mormon and the book of Moses runs aground on Abraham, as the skeptical hypothesis
would seem to require a similar pattern there. But such a pattern is not even faintly detectable.
It is also impressive that most of the in uence from the book of Moses in the Book of Mormon shows up early in
the small plates and the writings of the rst generation of Book of Mormon prophets—signi cantly, those who had
custody and long-term, rsthand access to the brass plates. Many of the later passages that use book of Moses
terminology and concepts tend to repeat earlier Nephite adaptations of the original materials.
When there is evidence of interdependence between two texts, and one of these contains passages which play on
parallel passages in the other in ways that assume the reader’s familiarity with the other, the rst one can be
considered to be dependent on the second. The parallel passages discussed above, and some that will be discussed
below, contain several examples, in all of which the Book of Mormon writer appears to leave unarticulated much of
the meaning he wants to convey, assuming the reader will make the connection with the book of Moses material in
his own mind, make a comparison, and draw inferences from both the changes and the similarities that he nds.
This is trivially true of inverted quotations (1 Nephi 19:12; 2 Nephi 9:6). But in this latter passage, Jacob
substitutes a word to make a point about death and resurrection, depending on our knowledge of the original to
help us see his point. Similarly, and perhaps most dramatically, Laman’s speech discussed above is signi cantly
more meaningful once we see how it draws on the book of Moses descriptions of the devil to identify Nephi
implicitly with the devil. Seeing the dependence of Laman’s speech on the book of Moses text transforms a rather
routine complaint into the most aggressive indictment possible, and helps explain the life-and-death struggle that
eventually grew out of it. However, I could not identify any passages in Moses which depended on the Book of
Mormon’s context for meaning. These are not the kinds of subtle dependence that could reasonably have been
reconstructed by Joseph Smith in 1830 as he produced the book of Moses. There is no reason to believe they are
the kinds of things he would ever have noticed himself under any circumstances. His interests, knowledge, and
background did not extend to this kind of textual analysis.
Other Book of Mormon Parallels
The above two sections of this paper set out and support the hypothesis that the Book of Mormon writers had
access in the brass plates to a document substantially the same as the book of Moses given to Joseph Smith by
inspiration in 1830. That hypothesis in turn illuminates a large number of additional parallel passages, which in and
of themselves may not constitute the strong kind of evidence given above for dependence of one text on the other.
However, this second group of passages corroborates the hypothesis in a cumulative way. These additional
passages are treated in groupings below. There are quite a number of less powerful correlations which in and of
themselves would not compel us to accept a historical connection between the book of Moses and the Book of
Mormon. Some of these may have occurred by chance, and others have recognizable New Testament parallels, but
read in light of the much stronger examples listed above, they too seem to add some additional weight to my
thesis.
Both the book of Moses and the Book of Mormon are remarkable for their claims to a full revelation of Christ to
ancient prophets before New Testament times. While the presence of New Testament teachings and phraseology
in these books might be made to t the view that these books are Joseph Smith’s nineteenth-century creations,
that approach ignores a number of other signi cant factors, as indicated in the preceding section of this paper. For
those who accept or are even willing to consider the ancient origins of the texts produced by Joseph Smith,

correlations between them that include New Testament terminology will be of interest, and will contribute
additional evidence for the evaluation of the thesis of dependence between these texts.
The rst example shows how a statement from the book of Moses account can permeate the Book of Mormon,
providing the stock terminology that will be used at widely separated times to describe the same prophesied
event. As reported in Joseph Smith’s Moses, Enoch the prophet is shown in vision the future cruci xion of the
Lord, at which point he reports that “the earth groaned; and the rocks were rent” (Moses 7:56). Nephi chose nearly
the same language to report what he saw in his great vision of what occurred immediately after the cruci xion, for
he heard “thunderings and earthquakes, and all manner of tumultuous noises,” and he saw “the earth and the rocks,
that they rent” (1 Nephi 12:4). This passage is recognizably derived from the Moses passage, especially given that
it is used as a description of the same future event. But later, Nephi quotes Zenos’s description of the same events,
saying “the rocks of the earth must rend; and because of the groanings of the earth, many of the kings of the isles of
the sea shall be wrought upon by the Spirit of God to exclaim: The God of nature suffers” (1 Nephi 19:12). Not only
does this passage report the exact four terms of the Moses cluster and in the same context, but it nearly reverses
them, again following Zeidel’s law.
Here we have a complex but exact parallel in a context which indicates the author is consciously quoting, that he
has reformulated the material to play on his readers’ awareness of the original source, and a stated claim that the
brass plates provide the source. We cannot tell whether it is Nephi who reverses the order of terms from the
Zenos version (presumably quoted from Moses), or whether Nephi reports straight the reversal written by Zenos.
Hundreds of years later the Nephite record described the actual events using the same language of the prophecy,
again referring to Zenos: “The earth did cease to tremble, and the rocks did cease to rend, and the dreadful
groanings did cease, and all the tumultuous noises did pass away” (3 Nephi 10:9; cf. also 3 Nephi 10:16; Helaman
14:21; 3 Nephi 8:18-19).
Although the Old Testament does not contain any version of these descriptions, the case for dependence is
weakened by the occurrence of a relatively close parallel in one New Testament account of these events where it is
reported that “the earth did quake, and the rocks rent” (Matthew 27:51).12 Still, the character of the parallels
outlined above would suggest direct Book of Mormon dependence on the book of Moses source, and a possible
distant connection of Matthew with a similar text.
Several examples of idiosyncratic phrases from Moses which are simply repeated by Book of Mormon writers (but
not by any biblical authors) seem to indicate a special relationship between these texts. The Moses account
introduces a novel phrase to describe the redemptive mission of the Savior of mankind. According to Enoch, the
Lord told Adam: “This is the plan of salvation unto all men” (Moses 6:62). In his brief writings, Jarom reminds his
people of “the plan of salvation,” which has been revealed (Jarom 1:2). Alma also speaks of angels making “the plan
of salvation” known to men (Alma 24:14; cf. also Alma 42:5).13
One of these recurring phrases in Joseph Smith’s Moses is “eternal life.” In a sweeping verse, now familiar to all
Latter-day Saints, the Lord explains to Moses that his work and glory is “to bring to pass the immortality and
eternal life of man” (Moses 1:39). In other Moses passages the same concept is restated in the same terms (Moses
5:11; 6:59; 7:45). Although this language does not occur in Old Testament texts, the Book of Mormon, like the
New Testament, is full of it from beginning to end. It begins in 2 Nephi 2, the chapter that reminds us most strongly
of the Moses texts, and is echoed thirty times by Nephi and every major writer of the book.14 The companion
concept of immortality or immortal glory shows up three times in Moses, twice in conjunction with “eternal life”

(Moses 1:39; 6:59, 61). It is not clearly present in the Old Testament, but occurs in similarly clear passages
throughout the Book of Mormon.15
Enoch appealed to the language of Adam to show that “no unclean thing can dwell there, or dwell in his presence”
(Moses 6:57). Nephi made exactly the same point in urging people to repent because “no unclean thing can dwell
with God” (1 Nephi 10:21; cf. also 1 Nephi 15:33; Alma 7:21; Mormon 9:4). This one also shows up in the New
Testament (Ephesians 5:5), and even faintly in the Old Testament (cf. Leviticus 22:3; Psalm 140:13).
In this same vein, Enoch records that Adam and his sons, as preachers of righteousness, “called upon all men,
everywhere, to repent” (Moses 6:23, 5:14, and 6:57 all use similar phrasing). This universal call to repentance is
duplicated in key sermons of Lehi and Alma (2 Nephi 2:21; Alma 12:33; see also how the Savior used it at 3 Nephi
11:32). And the concept is used twice by Moroni (Moroni 7:31; 8:8) and occurs in the New Testament (Acts
17:30).
These same passages are sometimes characterized by the additional stipulation that unless men do repent, they
“can in nowise inherit the kingdom of God” (Moses 6:57). According to Enoch, Adam was commanded to teach this to
his children (Moses 6:58). The exact phrase is used in similar contexts in ve Book of Mormon speeches (cf. Mosiah
27:26; Alma 5:51; 9:12; 39:9; 3 Nephi 11:38). There are a handful of similar statements in the New Testament,
with Galatians 5:21 being the closest.
In the Enoch passages the Lord draws a distinction between “things which are temporal and things which are spiritual”
(Moses 6:63). The Book of Mormon invokes the same distinction in precisely the same words on several occasions.
In the small plates Nephi twice explicates visions or scriptures by saying that they refer to “things both temporal
and spiritual” (1 Nephi 15:32; 22:3). King Benjamin reminded his people that those who keep the commandments
“are blessed in all things, both temporal and spiritual” (Mosiah 2:41). Alma encouraged people to pray for
whatsoever things they needed, “both spiritual and temporal” (Alma 7:23). And he also distinguished between the
spiritual death and the temporal death (Alma 12:16), and between the temporal and spiritual things the Lord provides
for our bene t (Alma 37:43).16 This concept of spiritual things shows up in the New Testament, but not paired
with references to temporal things (1 Corinthians 2:10-14). Other New Testament passages vary even more as
the equation of things temporal and eternal with things seen and not seen (2 Corinthians 4:18; cf. Romans 15:27;
1 Corinthians 9:11).
Speaking rst of the city of Enoch, and later of the millennial period, the Moses text says that the Lord’s people will
“dwell in righteousness” (Moses 7:16, 65). Nephi also used the phrase in the same context to describe what would
happen in the Millennium. Nephi’s usage illuminates the meaning of the phrase even more by suggesting that it is
because the people “dwell in righteousness” that Satan will be bound and have no power over their hearts during
this period (1 Nephi 22:26). A somewhat similar phrase does occur in the New Testament where it also refers to
the Millennium. Peter looked forward to “a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness” (2 Peter 3:13).
The Moses account also differs sharply from the Old Testament versions in its clear references to the Savior.
Moses reports that God instructed Adam to be baptized “in the name of mine Only Begotten Son” (Moses 6:52), and
informed him that he would receive the Holy Ghost. Numerous other passages in Moses refer to “mine only
begotten.”17 Whereas this phrase occurs six times in the New Testament (John 1:14, 18; 3:16, 18; Hebrews 11:17;
1 John 4:9), it occurs even more frequently in the teachings of the Book of Mormon prophets. Jacob explains the
point in some detail (cf. Jacob 4:5, 11), and Alma raises it again in his preaching (Alma 12:33-34). This is all in
addition to the multitude of direct references to Jesus Christ which distinguish both of these texts.

Describing the infernal conspiracies hatched by Cain and his associates, Enoch said that “their works were in the
dark, and they knew every man his brother” (Moses 5:51). From that time, he observed that “the works of darkness
began to prevail among all the sons of men” (Moses 5:55). Nephi spoke repeatedly of those whose works were
“works of darkness,” using the precise phrasing of the Moses text.18 His younger brother Jacob and a later Nephi
also complained of the “secret works of darkness” (2 Nephi 9:9; 10:15; Helaman 8:4; 10:3). Enoch also refers to
these conspiracies as “secret works” (Moses 6:15). This phrase is also used repeatedly in the Book of Mormon to
refer to the same kind of conspiracies19 and has New Testament parallels (Romans 13:12; Ephesians 5:11).
The other phrase used in Moses to refer to these conspiracies is “secret combinations,” for “from the days of Cain,
there was a secret combination” (Moses 5:51). The phrase occurs throughout the Book of Mormon20 in exactly the
same contexts as “secret works” and always carries the much richer and fuller connotations of Enoch’s
descriptions than do the Old Testament accounts of murderous conspiracies.
Enoch’s history twice indicates that the wickedness of men invariably produces “wars and bloodshed” (Moses 6:15;
7:16). This is the general term used throughout the Book of Mormon as well,21 with some occasional variations
which reinforce the prominence of the stereotype. Mormon described the opposite condition as “peace . . . [and] no
bloodshed” (Mormon 1:12).
Moses reports that for their sins Adam and Eve (and later Cain) were “shut out from [the Lord’s] presence” (Moses
5:4, 41). Enoch later reports that as men are tempted by Satan, they “become carnal, sensual, and devilish, and are
shut out from the presence of God” (Moses 6:49). In this same general context Jacob taught the early Nephites that
without an atonement “our spirits must have become like unto [the devil], and we become devils, angels to a devil,
to be shut out from the presence of our God” (2 Nephi 9:9).
Joseph Smith’s Moses reports the sins of Cain and his descendants in much greater detail than the biblical
account. Of particular interest is the evil conspiracy hatched by Cain to murder for gain: “And Cain said: Truly I am
Mahan, the master of this great secret, that I may murder and get gain” (Moses 5:31). The Book of Mormon
describes several similar conspiracies. Helaman reports the nefarious band led by Kishkumen and how “it was the
object of all those who belonged to his band to murder, and to rob, and to gain power” (Helaman 2:8). From a much
earlier period, Moroni reports a group that also administered secret oaths “to keep them in darkness, to help such
as sought to gain power, and to murder, and to plunder, and to lie, and to commit all manner of wickedness and
whoredoms” (Ether 8:16).
It is characteristic of the Book of Mormon account of evil conspiracies that they are “seeking for power.” When the
lower judges became corrupted, and when the kingmen revolted, they were all “seeking for power” (Alma 46:4;
60:17). Alma reports an interesting variation where the wicked were “seeking to put down all power and authority
which cometh from God” (Moroni 8:28). Enoch uses the same phrase in the Moses account to describe horrible
conspiracies of earlier times in which men fought against their own brothers “seeking for power” (Moses 6:15).
Many commentators on the Book of Mormon have noted the unique phrase describing the condition of fallen men
as “carnal, sensual, and devilish.” The phrase is not known in the Bible,22 but occurs twice in the Book of Mormon,
both times in this precise formulaic way. Synonyms are never used, and the three words always occur in the same
order (Mosiah 16:3; Alma 42:10; cf. Alma 41:13).

Such usage demands a source in a prominent text or ritual. The book of Moses provides both. For it is here in this
key ritual text that we learn how Satan came among the children of Adam and Eve and commanded them not to
believe the teachings of their parents. “And they believed it not, and they loved Satan more than God. And men
began from that time forth to be carnal, sensual, and devilish” (Moses 5:13). The point is exactly restated later when
it says “Satan hath come among the children of men, and tempteth them to worship him; and men have become
carnal, sensual, and devilish, and are shut out from the presence of God” (Moses 6:49).
One phrase that occurs only once in each text still seems quite distinctive. Speaking of an apostate group, the
Moses text reports simply that “their hearts have waxed hard” (Moses 6:27). When Alma saw “that the hearts of the
people began to wax hard, . . . his heart was exceedingly sorrowful” (Alma 35:15).23 This text expands on the phrase
by illustrating its opposite in Alma’s righteous response.
In a similar vein, the Moses account characterizes the wicked of Noah’s day, who defended their ways, as “lifted up
in the imagination of the thoughts of [their] heart” (Moses 8:22). This is invoked holistically as an implicit comparison
when Alma reports the defensive speech of the apostate Nehor who was “lifted up in the pride of his heart” (Alma
1:6).24 This is another case similar to 1 Nephi 16:38, where much of the meaning of the parallel is signalled more
by the similarity of context than by the words that are repeated.
The Book of Mormon is notable for what would appear as a unique invention, the cursing of half of Lehi’s family
and their descendants, and the marking of the cursed group with a dark skin that produced a social isolation
between them and their relatives who did not have the curse. But in Moses we see the same thing happening to
Cain and his descendants (Moses 5:25; 40-41; 7:22). These passages go far beyond the information available in
Genesis, particularly concerning the effect of the skin color upon Cain’s descendants (Genesis 4:11, 15).
Describing his encounters with Deity and with the devil, Moses remarks that he was able to look upon Satan “in the
natural man” (Moses 1:14). The Book of Mormon prophets picked up this same term to distinguish men who did
and did not have the Spirit of God upon them. Benjamin explained that “the natural man is an enemy to God” and
that men can become Saints only by “[putting] off the natural man” (Mosiah 3:19). Alma carries the theme forward
by inquiring “what natural man is there that knoweth these things?” (Alma 26:21). A similar usage crops up in the
New Testament once (1 Corinthians 2:14).25
In addition to phrase correlations, we have one unique name correlation between Moses and the Book of
Mormon. Omner was a name of one of the four sons of Mosiah.26 But in Moses it is the name of a city, and in the
Book of Mormon the name of a land (Moses 7:9; Alma 51:26). (The term shum also occurs uniquely in these two
sources, though it is a name in Moses and a unit of measure for gold in the Book of Mormon.)27
Finally, an important form of linguistic punctuation which is used by several Book of Mormon writers and which
does not obviously appear in the Old Testament, is used in Moses in the same way. Moses ends an important
segment of text with the statement: “And thus it is. Amen.”28 It can be shown that Nephi used this same phrase to
mark signi cant structural junctures in the text.29 Allusions to nal judgment and testimony of the gospel provide
additional contextual parallels for some of these passages.
Conclusion

Some nal caveats are in order. Any project like this is unavoidably handicapped by the fact that none of the texts
being compared is available in the original languages. For those who do not believe that Joseph Smith was a
prophet, this point alone would make this entire exercise quite uninteresting. But those of us who do recognize
Joseph as an inspired restorer of ancient texts need not be precluded from thoughtful investigation of this matter.
It should be suf cient for us to see that neither Joseph’s language, nor the language of the Old Testament that was
familiar to him, accounts for the correlations we have observed in the foregoing comparisons. New Testament
in uence is also largely excluded for the primary cases of the rst group on which the conclusions of this study
rest. Furthermore, there has been no effort made to identify appearances of the key phrases in this study in either
the Doctrine and Covenants or Joseph Smith’s own writings. Their presence or absence in those texts is equally
compatible with the hypothesis developed in this paper. A casual survey suggests that some show up there, and
others do not.
Reliance on computerized text comparisons has both advantages and dangers. Many phrases were included only
because the computer picked up what was otherwise unnoticed. On the other hand, the computer cannot make
judgments of relevance or signi cance. Computer analyses must always be supplemented by a careful reading and
rereading of the text, as the machine cannot pick up more subtle parallels of meaning and context. And because the
King James Version is the only biblical text used, there remains a signi cant likelihood that some of the parallels
assembled in this study will eventually be found to have some kind of Old Testament counterparts, thus reducing
their contribution to the conclusions drawn here. Unless, however, such future discoveries include most of what is
identi ed here, the textual evidence will continue to favor the thesis that the brass plates version of Genesis had
contents similar to the book of Moses and that phrases found in the book of Moses/brass plates would also
appropriately be found in the Book of Mormon.
Appendix: Analytical Chart of Book of Moses References That Appear in the Book of Mormon
I am grateful to John W. Welch for giving me the extra encouragement I needed to undertake the following
exercise. The point of the chart provided below is twofold. The rst purpose is merely to list the passages included
in the paper. The second is to attempt a crude computation of statistical probability of dependence between the
texts. This is not the kind of thing that scholars have done much with. I offer this analysis only because I think it
does produce some useful information, if not clear and precise measures of probability. A key to the chart
precedes the speci c data, and following the table is a discussion of the assumptions that underlie it.

Column
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Description
Cluster number (1-33)
List of key terms in cluster in original order
Book of Moses key reference (multiple references
not listed)
Book of Mormon reference

Cluster type (a, b, c) a. single word b. phrase c. synonymous term or phrase
F.
Number of significant repeated terms

G.

Precision of reference (same terms, same order) 1. possible variant, recognizable similarities 2. variant, but
recognizably the same 3. minor variation only 4. no variation
H.

Deliberate reshaping or manipulation of source 1. casual or even accidental reference 2. paraphrase or other loose
reference 3. adaptation of source to context 4. exact repetition 5. play on original terms or word order such that
present formulation requires knowledge of original to convey full meaning (including inverted quotations)
I.

Similarity of context 1. Weak similarity of context 2. De ne similarity of context 3. Exact context evident or evoked
by repetition of contextual language
J.

Author’s awareness of a brass plates source 1. consciousness of source not implied or meaning not precisely the
same and access to brass plates unclear 2. aware of either book of Moses or intermediary Book of Mormon

sources and meaning close to source 3. stated use or awareness of brass plates as source
K.

Distinctiveness of the concept or the terms (in American discourse) 1. English terminology common to nineteenthcentury Americans 2. somewhat distinctive terminology 3. unique or distinctive terminology
L.

Other occurrences (clear Old Testament reference disqualify items from this study) 1. strong New Testament
parallel and/or weak Old Testament parallel 2. weak New Testament parallel and no Old Testament 3. no biblical
parallels found, strong or weak
M.

Score. This number is calculated in the following manner: The seven criteria (G through L) are weighted modestly
to ensure that the more important ones have a larger effect. The values in columns G, H, I, and K are doubled, and
the values in L are tripled. All seven values are then multiplied in a linearized calculation that combines them
roughly into a common score designed to indicate relative degrees of dependence between the two texts. For
convenience, the score is reduced by a factor of .001 and rounded to the nearest whole number to arrive at the
score listed in column M.30 The only object in presenting the results of these calculations is to emphasize
differences and not to claim any numerical or quanti able relationship or to ascribe any particular meaning to the
distance between scores.

Table
Group 1

A
1
2
3
3
4
5
5
5
5
5
6
7
8
8
8
9
9
9
10
11

B
transgression-fall, fall-death
order-days-years-eternity
Lord-from all eternity-to
Lord-from all eternity-to
God-gave-man-agency
Lord’s Spirit-withdraws-fromman
Lord’s Spirit-withdraws-fromman
Lord’s Spirit-withdraws-fromman
Lord’s Spirit-withdraws-fromman
Lord’s Spirit-withdraws-fromman
children-whole-from foundation
only name-given-salvation*
devil-father-of all lies
devil-father-of all lies
devil-father-of all lies
devil-lead-captive-his will
devil-lead-captive-his will
devil-lead-captive-his will
devil-deceive-blind-lead
lies-lead-well-deceive-eyes

C

D

E F G H I

K

L

M

Moses 6:59
Moses 6:67
Moses 7:29
Moses 7:29
Moses 7:32

2 Nephi 9:6
Alma 13:7
Mosiah 3:5
Moroni 8:18
2 Nephi 2:16

b
b
b
b
d

4
6
3
3
4

4
3
4
3
3

5
3
4
4
5

3
3
2
2
3

2
3
3
3
3

3
2
3
3
3

207
140
83
62
233

Moses 1:15

Alma 34:35

b 3

4

3 2 2

3

3

62

Moses 1:15

Helaman 4:24

b 3

4

5 2 2

3

3

104

Moses 1:15

Helaman 6:35

b 3

3

5 2 2

3

3

78

Moses 1:15

Helaman 13:8

b 3

3

5 2 2

3

3

78

Moses 1:15

Mosiah 2:36

b 3

3

3 2 2

3

3

47

Moses 6:54
Moses 6:52
Moses 4:4
Moses 4:4
Moses 4:4
Moses 4:4
Moses 4:4
Moses 4:4
Moses 4:4
Moses 4:4

Moroni 8:8, 12
Mosiah 3:17
2 Nephi 2:18
Ether 8:25
2 Nephi 9:9
Alma 12:11
Alma 40:13
2 Nephi 2:27
3 Nephi 2:2
1 Nephi 16:38

b
b
b
b
b
c
c
c
c
c

4
3
3
3
3
4
3
2
4
3

3
5
5
4
3
3
3
3
3
5

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

3
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
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140
39
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93
105
124
93
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83
65

3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5

3
3
2
2
3

J

3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
2
1

3
2
3
2
3
3
2
3
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*This Group 2 item is listed here because it is linked to the preceding item in the text.
Group 2

A
12
12
12
13
13
13
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14

B
earth-groans; rocks-rend
earth-groans; rocks-rend
earth-groans; rocks-rend
plan of salvation
plan of salvation
plan of salvation
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life

C
Moses 7:56
Moses 7:56
Moses 7:56
Moses 6:62
Moses 6:62
Moses 6:62
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39

D
1 Nephi 12:4
1 Nephi 19:12
3 Nephi 10:9
Jarom 1:2
Alma 24:14
Alma 42:5
2 Nephi 2:27
2 Nephi 2:28
2 Nephi 10:23
2 Nephi 31:18
2 Nephi 31:20
Jacob 6:11
Enos 1:3
Mosiah 5:15
Mosiah 15:23
Mosiah 15:24
Mosiah 15:25
Mosiah 18:9
Mosiah 18:13
Mosiah 26:20
Mosiah 28:7

E F G H I
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
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4
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4
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4
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2
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3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

L
1
1
1
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

M
31
83
47
28
55
124
18
18
18
12
12
12
6
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12

14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
15
15
15
16
16
16
16
17
17
17
17
17
18
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18
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21
21
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21
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21
22
22
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22
22
22
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22
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eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
eternal life
unclean-dwell-presence-God
unclean-dwell-presence-God
unclean-dwell-presence-God
call on-all men-to repent
call on-all men-to repent
call on-all men-to repent
call on-all men-to repent
nowise-inherit-kingdom of God
nowise-inherit-kingdom of God
nowise-inherit-kingdom of God
nowise-inherit-kingdom of God
nowise-inherit-kingdom of God
things-temporal-spiritual
things-temporal-spiritual
things-temporal-spiritual
things-temporal-spiritual
things-temporal-spiritual
things-temporal-spiritual
things-temporal-spiritual
people-dwell-in righteousness
mine Only Begotten Son
mine Only Begotten Son
mine Only Begotten Son
works of darkness
works of darkness
works of darkness
works of darkness
works of darkness
works of darkness
works of darkness
works of darkness
works of darkness
works of darkness
works of darkness
works of darkness
works of darkness
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
secret combination(s)
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Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
Moses 1:39
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Moses 1:39
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Moses 1:39
Moses 6:57
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Moses 6:23
Moses 6:23
Moses 6:23
Moses 6:23
Moses 6:57
Moses 6:57
Moses 6:57
Moses 6:57
Moses 6:57
Moses 6:63
Moses 6:63
Moses 6:63
Moses 6:63
Moses 6:63
Moses 6:63
Moses 6:63
Moses 7:16
Moses 6:52
Moses 6:52
Moses 6:52
Moses 5:55
Moses 5:55
Moses 5:55
Moses 5:55
Moses 5:55
Moses 5:55
Moses 5:55
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Moses 5:51
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Moses 5:51
Moses 5:51
Moses 5:51

Alma 1:4
Alma 5:28
Alma 7:16
Alma 11:40
Alma 13:29
Alma 22:15
Helaman 5:8
3 Nephi 9:14
3 Nephi 15:9
Moroni 9:25
1 Nephi 10:21
1 Nephi 15:34
Alma 7:21
2 Nephi 2:21
Alma 12:33
3 Nephi 11:32
Moroni 7:31
Mosiah 27:26
Alma 5:51
Alma 9:12
Alma 39:9
3 Nephi 11:38
1 Nephi 15:32
1 Nephi 22:3
Mosiah 2:41
Alma 7:23
Alma 12:16
Alma 37:43
Helaman 14:16
1 Nephi 22:26
Jacob 4:5
Jacob 4:11
Alma 12:33
2 Nephi 25:2
2 Nephi 26:10
2 Nephi 26:22
2 Nephi 9:9
2 Nephi 10:15
Alma 37:21
Alma 37:23
Alma 45:12
Helaman 6:28
Helaman 6:30
Helaman 8:4
Helaman 10:3
Mormon 8:27
2 Nephi 26:22
Alma 37:30
Alma 37:31
Helaman 2:8
Helaman 3:23
Helaman 6:38
3 Nephi 4:29
3 Nephi 5:6
3 Nephi 7:6
3 Nephi 7:9
3 Nephi 9:9
4 Nephi 1:42
Mormon 8:27
Ether 8:18
Ether 8:19
Ether 8:22
Ether 8:24
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22 secret combination(s)
22 secret combination(s)
22 secret combination(s)
22 secret combination(s)
22 secret combination(s)
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23 wars and bloodshed
23 war(s) and bloodshed
23 wars and bloodshed
23 wars and bloodshed
23 wars and bloodshed
23 wars and bloodshed
23 wars and bloodshed
23 wars and bloodshed
23 wars and bloodshed
23 wars and bloodshed
23 wars and bloodshed
23 wars and bloodshed
23 wars and bloodshed
24 shut out-from presence-God
25 murder-get gain
25 murder-get gain
25 murder-get gain
26 seeking for power
26 seeking for power
26 seeking for power
27 carnal, sensual, devilish
27 carnal, sensual, devilish
27 carnal, sensual, devilish
28 hearts-wax-hard
29 lifted up-imagination-his heart
30 natural man
30 natural man
30 natural man
31 Omner
32 shum
33 and thus-it was (is)-Amen
33 and thus-it was (is)-Amen
33 and thus-it was (is)-Amen
33 and thus-it was (is)-Amen
33 and thus-it was (is)-Amen
Assumptions of This Model
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1. The model assumes a linear relationship between the seven items used in each score calculation. This assumes
that each of the seven criteria adds plausibility independently of each of the others. This assumption would be
compromised to the extent that any of the seven criteria were interdependent.
2. The model mainly attempts to give greater value to intuitively less likely features of references. A rough effort is
made to weight actual differences used to calculate probabilities. Scores indicate greater or lesser probability but
not magnitudes.
3. Probability assumptions for categories F through L:
F. Number of Terms. The greater the number of signi cant terms repeated in parallel phrasings in two texts, the less
likely they are to be independent.
G. Precision of reference. The more precise the similarities between parallel phrasings in two texts, the less likely
they are to be independent.

H. Deliberate reshaping or manipulation of source. The more deliberately shaped the repetition in parallel phrasings
in two texts, the less likely they are to be independent. Intentionality is inferred from contextual adaptation, exact
repetition, or intentional manipulation (including inverted quotations) that creates additional meaning for those
who recognize the intended reference to the source text. The latter category is deemed least likely to be
independent because the intended meaning of the passage is only communicable to a reader who shares the
author’s awareness of the source. The author not only is in uenced by the source, he uses it in new ways to
communicate his intentions.
I. Context. The more similar the contexts in which parallel phrasings occur, the less likely they are to be
independent. The evidence for dependence between two passages where the same concepts or terms occur is
stronger when there are additional similarities in the two contexts. Context similarity can take different forms. For
example, the two passages might refer to similar situations, feature the same accompanying statement, or be
located in similar doctrinal discourses or historical explanations.
J. Author’s awareness of a brass plates source. Author awareness of a brass plates source reduces the likelihood of
independence. This awareness must be inferred contextually with explicit references to brass plates writings as
the strongest evidence.
K. Distinctiveness of the concept or the terms (in American discourse). The more distinctive the terminology repeated
in parallel phrasings in two texts, the less likely they are to be independent.
L. Other occurrences (biblical). Presence of weak or strong versions of the parallel terminology in the New
Testament, and even more so, in the Old Testament, increases the possibility that the book of Moses and Book of
Mormon passages are independent. But if these parallel expressions are not found in the Bible, this readily
available text is removed as a possible source for Joseph Smith’s translation language, thus increasing the
probability that Book of Mormon writers are re ecting a source known to them from the brass plates. As already
explained, clear Old Testament parallels were considered suf cient reason to drop the occurrence altogether as
evidence of dependence.
Notes
1. See John L. Sorenson, “The ‘Brass Plates’ and Biblical Scholarship,” Dialogue 10 (Autumn 1977): 35-36.
2. This study is limited to the translation in the King James Version. I assume that checking the following study
against original texts may lead to some modi cation of my list of correlations.
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The Composition of Lehi's Family
John L. Sorenson
A characteristic of Hugh Nibley’s study of the Book of Mormon, which he has urged others to emulate, is close
study of the scriptural text to reveal information which myopia had previously led readers to ignore. In that spirit,
this article reports my microanthropological examination of what the text reveals regarding the composition and
demography of Lehi’s party from the beginning of their sojourn in the Arabian wilderness to their arrival in the
promised land.
The family members most often referred to were the father Lehi and three sons—Nephi, Laman, and Lemuel. In
most discussions of the events reported in 1 Nephi, Latter-day Saints have generally acted as though these four
men were the only signi cant actors. Others speci cally mentioned as being in the traveling party—but apparently
of little consequence to the history—were the mother Sariah; sons Sam, Jacob, and Joseph; Zoram; Ishmael and his
unnamed family members (at least a wife, two sons, and ve daughters); and Nephi’s belatedly mentioned “sisters”
(1 Nephi 7:6; 16:7, 2 Nephi 5:6). We shall see, however, that others surely were along.
A rst order of priority must be to establish the ages of the dramatis personae. The oldest four sons of Lehi were,
from eldest to youngest, Laman, Lemuel, Sam, and Nephi (see heading to 1 Nephi). The four were with their
parents when they departed Jerusalem. Jacob and Joseph were later born in the Arabian wilderness. The four
oldest sons were of marriageable age at the time of departure, for each “took . . . to wife” a daughter of Ishmael
soon after the latter arrived at Lehi’s camp (1 Nephi 16:7). Furthermore, Ishmael’s two sons evidently married
daughters of Lehi. Nephi’s cryptic mention of his sisters going with him when the colonists split into two factions in
the land of promise (2 Nephi 5:6) implied to Sidney B. Sperry that they had left their husbands, sons of Ishmael.1 I
agree. Professor Sperry supported this idea by citing a statement made by Erastus Snow in an address printed in
the Journal of Discourses.2 Apostle Snow said, “The Prophet Joseph Smith informed us that the record of Lehi was
contained on the 116 pages that were rst translated and subsequently stolen . . . [and] that Ishmael[‘s] sons
married into Lehi’s family, and Lehi’s sons married Ishmael’s daughters.”
The composition of the party begins to look complex. Rather than to pursue it discursively, I shall sort out the
tangled strands of social relationships and ages by initially considering all the personnel more or less in an order
determined by the amount of information given about them.
1. Nephi
Nephi describes himself as being “exceeding young, nevertheless . . . large in stature” (1 Nephi 2:16). In 1 Nephi
4:31 he says again that he was “a man large in stature,” in the context of seizing a much older Zoram to keep him
from eeing. Both his use of the expression “a man” and his ability to act like one in handling Zoram allow us to
suppose that he was already taller than most men of his society and probably as heavy as the average person
despite his chronological youth. Again, when he donned Laban’s gear (1 Nephi 4:19) and successfully
impersonated him, we get a picture of a fully grown male. In manner too, he was socially and linguistically
sophisticated enough that he could act in Jerusalem with con dence. Taking into account his own characterization
(“exceeding young”), a reasonable guess is that he was coming up on his seventeenth birthday when his account
starts.
2. Lehi

The indicators of Lehi’s age are paradoxical. By the time the story begins he already has had what we might term a
“successful career” managing the “land of his inheritance” (1 Nephi 2:4, 3:16, 22-25). It has been suggested that he
was a merchant,3 and indeed he may have been engaged as such at times, trading on his capital. Others think he
was a metalsmith.4 However, the linkage Nephi makes between his father’s wealth and the “land of his inheritance”
suggests that his primary economic activity probably was husbandry, chie y in the sense of being a landlord. As for
metalworking, it would be highly unlikely that a man who had inherited land and was considered very wealthy (1
Nephi 3:25) would have been a metalworker, for the men in that role tended to be of lower social status and were
usually landless.5
With a son aged twenty-two or twenty-three at the time he departed from Jerusalem in 597 B.C., he would have
married Sariah around 621 B.C. As we shall see, the sequence of her births requires that she was young—perhaps
still sixteen—at her marriage. Lehi probably was a little older, though coming from a family of substance, Lehi
would not have had to delay his marriage for economic reasons. I would guess that he was eighteen. If so, then he
was born around 639 B.C., although he could have been a few years more. Thus, at the beginning of the Book of
Mormon record, Lehi was approximately forty-two or perhaps a bit older.6 (Latter-day Saint illustrators who
depict him only as an aged patriarch should, rather, show him in the early chapters of 1 Nephi at mature middle
age.)
He would still sire two sons, plausibly born around his ages forty- ve and forty-seven (1 Nephi 18:7; see the
discussion below about Sariah’s births). On board ship, he, at age fty-four, and Sariah are both characterized by
Nephi as “stricken in years,” having “grey hairs,” and about to enter a “watery grave.” Still Nephi indicates that this
was because of grief brought upon them by their children more than because of age per se (1 Nephi 18:17-18).
Lehi survived the voyage, of course. First Nephi 18:23-19:2 reports the group’s initial pioneering in the new land,
which need not have consumed more than a single year (the activities are less comprehensive and time-extensive
than those reported by Nephi when his party settled in the land of Nephi—2 Nephi 5:11, 13). Second Nephi opens
with Lehi teaching his family. His historical resumé in 2 Nephi 1:1-5 sounds like only a short time had passed since
the landing, for he speaks entirely about what had transpired en route. His valedictory continues through chapter
3. In 2 Nephi 4:12, the record abruptly states that after Lehi had spoken those things to his household, “he waxed
old” and died. My impression is that Lehi lived no more than a couple of years in America and perhaps less than
one. In that case his age at death could have been as early as fty-seven. Considering the arduous circumstances
he faced in the last dozen years of his life and especially the intimation in 1 Nephi 18:17-18 that he was viewed as
being somewhat sickly, this seemingly premature death is not really surprising.
3. Laman
We may ponder why this eldest son was not married. Being a number of years older than Nephi, he would normally
have had a wife by the time they left Jerusalem. Lehi was a man of wealth, so the family’s socioeconomic position
should not have hindered his obtaining a wife but likely enhanced the options. One wonders why, if Ishmael and his
family became willing to marry into Lehi’s family under the dif cult circumstances they did, no marriage had been
contracted between members of the two families before their departure.
But perhaps Laman had been married, the wife having died (the death rate was relatively high, after all, in the
ancient world). If so, the deceased spouse could have been a daughter of Ishmael (sororatic marriage, in which a
man took as second wife the sister of his rst, was a known practice in Israel). Or, possible disorder(s) in Laman’s

personality, of which there is considerable evidence in Nephi’s descriptions of his older brother’s behavior, had
made it impossible for the family to persuade any father to give him a daughter for his wife.
Nothing is said directly about Laman’s physical characteristics, but the fact that the two eldest brothers could
“smite [Nephi and Sam] . . . with a rod” and that later they “did lay their hands upon [Nephi]” and “bind [him] with
cords” (1 Nephi 3:28, 7:16) could suggest that the older pair were of about the same stature as Nephi. As the
eldest son, and a proud and self-centered one at that, Laman comes through in the record as being somewhat
haughty and probably pushy among his lessers but, as in dealing with Laban, lacking con dence, being frustrated
and unstable in the face of determined opposition (cf. 1 Nephi 2:9; 17:55).
Inasmuch as Nephi appears to have been near seventeen, his eldest brother very likely was not younger than
twenty-two. I should think twenty-three more likely. It might be suggested that he was considerably older, but that
would only make more dif cult accounting for the already long period of fertility of his mother, so that seems
highly unlikely.
4. Lemuel
Lemuel seems to have been thoroughly dominated by Laman while possessing many of the same personality
characteristics (see their pairing in Lehi’s lament, 1 Nephi 2:9-14). Little is said about him as an individual, and
never is there an indication that he stood up to or disagreed with Laman (cf. 1 Nephi 3:28, “for he hearkened unto
the words of Laman”). His age must have been about twenty-one.
5. Sariah
In the sixth century B.C. (as throughout most of human history), the timing of births was considerably different
than what prevails today. Philip Houghton has conveniently summarized scienti c ndings on fertility and survival
as a result of many studies of both skeletons and living humans in Pre-Modern societies.7 For one thing, diet was
usually less nutritional and a good deal less consistent than we enjoy. Both minor and major illnesses were
common. As one result of such conditions, women typically did not become fertile until around age nineteen, even
though they might marry younger than that. The same biological problems decreased the likelihood that a wife
would become pregnant. Miscarriages and stillbirths were not uncommon, and even after a successful birth,
infants had much smaller chances of survival in their rst few years. Obviously most women nursed their babies,
and lack of alternative foods meant that each child would (must) be nursed for two years or more, which further
limited fertility. Houghton suggests that women in “tribal societies” (which would surely cover at least the eight
years in the wilderness for Lehi’s women) “bore children at perhaps four-year intervals.” And of those, probably
every mother in her lifetime had lost one or more to early death.8
In the case of Sariah, numerous questions arise about her birth history. This is so because two sets of facts press
credibility toward its limit when they are compared: (1) on the one hand, the oldest four sons were all of
marriageable age at the time of the family’s departure from Jerusalem, which means that the eldest, Laman, could
not plausibly be less than twenty-two or twenty-three; yet, (2) Jacob and Joseph were born “in the wilderness,”
and the probable timing would make Joseph approximately twenty-four to twenty-eight years younger than
Laman. For one woman to have had such a long birth career is suf ciently unlikely that we should examine whether
Sariah was the sole mother of all Lehi’s mentioned offspring.

Hypothetically some of the four brothers might have been born to an earlier, deceased wife. But there is really no
question that Sariah was the mother of all four. The heading to 1 Nephi begins “An account of Lehi and his wife
Sariah, and his four sons, being called, (beginning at the eldest) Laman, Lemuel, Sam, and Nephi.” (We may think it
odd that Nephi did not write this statement as “and their four sons,” but in an Israelite cultural context, the
reference is not strange.) The mention of “his wife” as well as the continuity in the naming of parents and sons
strongly imply that Sariah was the only mother. The words of 1 Nephi 5:2, 8, pretty much put the issue to rest, as
Sariah expresses fear that Lehi’s visionary notions have caused the deaths of “my sons” who had gone up to
Jerusalem; and when they return safely, she rejoices that the Lord has protected “my sons.”
We cannot be immediately certain that Sariah was the mother of Jacob and Joseph. Nephi says that “my father had
begat two sons in the wilderness” (1 Nephi 18:7) but does not mention the mother. Ten verses later, Nephi, during
his brothers’ rebellion on board ship, refers to “my parents being stricken in years” and down on their sickbeds; 1
Nephi 18:19 then mentions that young Jacob and Joseph were “grieved because of the af ictions of their mother.”
This phrasing removes almost all doubt that Sariah was the mother of the last two of Lehi’s sons and also assures
us that she lived until they were on the boat (she likely died before Nephi left his brothers, for 2 Nephi 5:6 makes
no mention of her going with him). Any uncertainty remaining seems to me eliminated at Jacob 2:23-34 where
Jacob makes clear that Lehi was opposed in principle to plural marriage, except under very exceptional
circumstances, thus the possibility of his having a second wife seems nil.
So we can be con dent that Sariah bore six sons. Then, as mentioned above, she also had at least two daughters,
based upon Nephi’s reference in 2 Nephi 5:6 to “my sisters,” although there is no other mention of them. While
Sperry held out the possibility of as many as four daughters, there were at least two, to account for Nephi’s plural
reference. Thus we can be quite certain that Sariah was the mother of at least eight children who survived to
adulthood. In addition, it would be likely that she had unmentioned, unsuccessful pregnancies. While this may not
be an unprecedented record of fertility and survival in the ancient world, it is highly unusual. (In the Old
Testament, a notable fertility record drawing particular mention is that of Leah, wife of Jacob, who bore six sons
and one daughter in less than twenty years—Genesis 30:19-20; 31:41.)
It is not the number of these births as much as their spacing that poses the problem under discussion. We are
faced here with a suf ciently improbable situation that we should consider whether Sariah’s record is reasonable
in terms of nature and culture or whether divine intervention must be appealed to.
The dire picture of childbirth and survival in simpler societies that Houghton has painted should alert us to the fact
that, unlike in modern times, anciently it was not birth prevention that occupied couples’ minds but anxiety for the
bearing and rearing of children. Statistically, conception, pregnancy, birth, and the nurturing of children were all
fraught with uncertainty and danger, and a large surviving posterity was exceptional. Still, statistics do not tell us
about individuals. In the rst place, the Israelites might not have been “typical” of the peoples Houghton was
talking about. We do not have enough speci c demographic information on them in ancient times to know for sure
how they might compare. And then I suppose that the Lord could have picked out of Israel a particular family
(Lehi’s) to take to the promised land who had biological and spiritual qualities substantially different than
“average.” So in Sariah’s case Houghton’s “typical” age of nineteen for the beginning of fertility might not be
correct.
The text implies that Sariah lived her rst quarter century of married life in circumstances of wealth (1 Nephi 3:2425) and that she was also likely to have been born into a social situation considerably better than average. She thus
could have enjoyed a more favorable dietary and health regime than in “tribal societies.” Certainly she held up well

physically in the wilderness, all things considered (1 Nephi 17:2), although eventually the hardships and stress
caught up with her, seemingly before she was chronologically “old” (1 Nephi 18:17). Finally, the relatively
advantaged circumstances under which Lehi’s family lived in the land of Jerusalem likely reduced the mortality
dangers to the children once they were born.
Divine intervention could have extended her period of fertility, but nothing in Nephi’s record supports that idea.
Nephi credits the Lord with strengthening “our women” in the dif cult wilderness years through unusual
metabolism, but not in regard to fertility (cf. 1 Nephi 17:1-3). Still, in Lehi’s record, the translation of which was lost
by Martin Harris, perhaps there was an indication that Lehi and Sariah considered something miraculous about
her nal births. Her name, Sariah, hints of a possible typological linkage to Abraham’s wife, Sarai/Sarah, who bore
Isaac at age ninety. A number of studies have recently shown that Nephi construed his family’s life-saving “exodus”
to a “promised land” as symbolically parallel to the original exodus of Israel from Egypt. Other studies have shown
that the meaning of names of certain Book of Mormon characters seem to tie to events in their lives or to their
characteristics.9 That Lehi and Sariah named their last two sons after their ancestral patriarchs Jacob and Joseph
may tell us that they had patriarchal parallels in mind and may have considered Sariah’s late pregnancies somehow
comparable to Sarai’s exceptional bearing of Isaac.
Let us suppose for now that Sariah’s rst birth occurred when she was seventeen. This seems not likely but
possible. Is it plausible for her to have had eight births10 in an interval of under thirty years? The answer is yes. A
tabulation will be presented later that demonstrates that possibility. But rst, relevant facts about other family
members need to be laid out.
6. Jacob and Joseph
Earlier discussion established with high probability that Sariah, not another wife, was the mother of Jacob and
Joseph, and I assume that here. The only substantive clue about when these two sons were born comes from 1
Nephi 18:19. On board ship, when Laman and those who sided with him rebelled against Nephi’s leadership, the
statement is made that Jacob and Joseph, “being young, having need of much nourishment, were grieved because
of the af ictions of their mother.” What ages for the boys may we infer from this way of speaking?
What is said about “nourishment” might be thought to refer to being nursed by their mother, but that makes no
sense when the expression is applied equally to both, as it is. But the boys were likely far from infancy, so the
“nourishment” may refer primarily to xing appropriate food (no doubt a dif cult task at best on the ship). Their
aunts or sisters might have taken up the slack for their mother/mother-in-law, but life probably was hard for all of
them. (Particularly if there were pregnant women on board the tossing ship, which is likely, there could have been a
considerable sharing of child care quite apart from the case of Sariah.) But “nourishment” refers to more than
food. While on forty-three occasions in the Book of Mormon “nourish” or a variant term primarily denotes a
physical process, two other uses are metaphorical. Probably two senses were intertwined in Nephi’s usage—a
combination of providing food and emotional nurturance. The boys may have been “delicate” as a result of
wilderness malnutrition, or they may have been seasick prone. They may have been particularly dependent
psychologically on their mother and distressed by her evident weakness. We do not know of any of those matters.
But regardless of what the boys felt about their mother as an individual, a child’s life on a smallish, probably
crowded, ship with little room to move about and a host of other youngsters always present would have been
stressful and demanding of a mother’s direct attention. Given the many possibilities, we cannot determine the
ages of Jacob and Joseph from the statement on nourishment.

From another angle, however, we note that the younger brothers were born “in the wilderness” (1 Nephi 18:7; cf.
17:1), which presumably means prior to their arrival at Bountiful. That tells us a bit, but the biggest piece of
information in this particular puzzle has to be Sariah’s age. Her two births make most sense coming early in the
trek, when she was in her best health. I can imagine that Jacob’s birth came within two years of the departure from
Jerusalem and Joseph’s two years thereafter. In that case they would have been respectively eight and six on
boarding ship. The “nourishment” statement need not contradict those ages.
That the late-born sons married and had offspring after their arrival in the promised land is established by a later
reference to Jacobites and Josephites as tribes af liated with the Nephites (e.g., Jacob 1:13). Whom the men
might have wed is not indicated, but the close relations of Nephi with Jacob and Joseph—the older brother no
doubt became a foster father to the two boys after the death of Lehi (2 Nephi 5:26; Jacob 1:18)—suggest that they
married daughters of Nephi, or perhaps of Sam. (They could not have married Lamanite, Lemuelite, or Ishmaelite
cousins because the boys would have separated from them before reaching marriageable age, as a result of
moving to the land of Nephi.)
7. Ishmael and His Wife
Ishmael was the rst of the trekking party to die, according to the record. Presumably he was older than Lehi. That
is supported by the fact that his eldest daughter was too old to marry any of Lehi’s sons (she ended up marrying
Zoram, the former servant, 1 Nephi 16:7; this was de nitely a second-class marriage, though better than none).
Ishmael also had four younger daughters, none of whom was married. No hint is given that the father had
mentionable wealth, only a “house” (1 Nephi 7:4). Nibley suggested that Ishmael was “connected with the
desert.”11 But a desert man settled into a “house” was usually of somewhat marginal social status in the Near East.
In the course of normal events, the prospects for a man of modest means and well along in life to arrange
marriages for so many daughters would have been limited. So the appearance of four known young suitors at the
door, even if they had not previously made any courtship moves, must have stirred interest in the family even
before “the Lord did soften the heart of Ishmael, and also his household” (1 Nephi 7:5). Had the family been
prosperous, likely they would not have been so willing to head off into the desert; as it was, they could see
advantages.
Still, we must recognize Ishmael as a man of considerable courage and faith to agree to go off into the wilderness
when his own chance for arriving at and enjoying the “land of promise” in the esh was questionable. Surely it was
blessing his posterity that concerned him the most. Once he had made the commitment, he held to it. Only a few
days from home (the distance was not great; cf. 1 Nephi 2:4, 6), his resolve was tested by the rst rebellion of his
two sons and two of his daughters (1 Nephi 7:6), but Ishmael and his wife supported Nephi and were willing to
press ahead.
Nibley observed that Lehi and Ishmael were probably related, “since it has ever been the custom among the desert
people for a man to marry the daughter of his paternal uncle.”12 That Lehi and Ishmael were somehow kin indeed
seems likely, but what that relationship was is not clear. Had they been brothers, as would have been the case for
the cited custom to prevail, something might well have been said about that fact. Furthermore, had the brotherbrother (“parallel cousin”) relationship been as obvious and patterned as Nibley supposed, we would be hard put
to explain why marriages had not previously been contracted under normal instead of these urgent conditions. In
any case, socioeconomic distinctions between the families probably played a part.

Age differences could also have been a hindrance to contracting marriages under pre ight conditions, for it is
evident that the eldest daughter was too old to marry any of Lehi’s sons, and perhaps it was still customary for the
eldest to be married before the younger ones could be betrothed (cf. Genesis 29:26). With Zoram on the scene,
however, the matchup may have made more sense.
If, as I suspect, Ishmael’s daughters were not quite good enough a catch to interest Lehi’s menfolk while they were
at home, in extremity the fact that the numbers of Ishmael’s daughters and the eligible men in Lehi’s party worked
out exactly right perhaps made the alliance suddenly both feasible and desirable. We have no warrant, however,
for supposing that “love” played much of a role in the arrangements; the relationships were practical, at least in the
beginning.
When we consider the interrelations between Ishmael’s and Lehi’s families, the age distribution of the former’s
offspring probably was about like this:

Child
Daughter 1 (married Zoram)
Son 1
Son 2
Daughter 2 (married Laman)
Daughter 3 (married
Lemuel)
Daughter 4 (married Sam)
Daughter 5 (married Nephi)

Age on Leaving
Jerusalem
31
29
26
24
21
19
16

(The order and ages of Daughter 1 and Son 1 might be reversed.)
In the absence of any evidence that Ishmael had inherited social and economic advantages, we may
suppose that his own marriage had been at a later age than for Lehi, say about age twenty-one, when his
wife was about nineteen. Ishmael might then have been fifty-three or fifty-four when his family departed from
the Jerusalem area; his wife would have been between fifty-one and fifty-three. In the absence of definite
statements about how long it took the party to move down the Red Sea margin to Shazer and then to
Nahom, we cannot be sure of Ishmael’s age at the time of his death in Nahom (1 Nephi 16:33-36), but it
could have been some five years into the journey. If he died under sixty years of age, this would explain
some of the anger of his daughters about what they considered his early demise caused by following Lehi’s
difficult wilderness agenda. (Incidentally, did the “daughters” who “did mourn exceedingly” include the wives
of Nephi, Sam, and Zoram, or only those married to Laman and Lemuel? And since there is no mention of
his wife’s mourning, was she already dead?)
8. The Sons of Ishmael

These two were probably older than Lehi’s sons. Yet their willingness to be led by Laman and Lemuel in rebellion
indicates that they were still on the younger side of adulthood, for married men of, say, more than thirty would be
unlikely to follow readily much younger single men of twenty-three and twenty-one as Laman and Lemuel were.
Both Ishmael’s sons had “families” (1 Nephi 7:6) who accompanied them. The term “families” implies a wife and at
least one child each, but there likely were more children, considering the fathers’ ages. (Had one or both of the
wives been childless, the expression “and their wives/his wife” would likely have been used instead of “and their
families.”) As noted above, it may be that at some point the daughters of Lehi became wives of the sons of Ishmael
(see also below).
In later Book of Mormon history, the descendants of both men were incorporated into a single tribe (Jacob 1:13)
for reasons not apparent now. Since Lamoni, local king over “the land of Ishmael” in Lamanite country in the
second century B.C. was a descendant of Ishmael (Alma 17:21), his father, who was king over all the Lamanite
lands, presumably also counted his lineage to Ishmael. Thus the Ishmaelite tribe came to play a prominent part
among “the Lamanites.”
9. Sam
Sam was the shy and retiring one of the four brothers, it appears. Though older than Nephi, he followed him
consistently (1 Nephi 2:17). He may not have been very assertive; at least one would have thought that when
Laman and Lemuel “did smite us [two] even with a rod” (1 Nephi 3:28-29) that he could have combined efforts with
Nephi (who was “large in stature”) to prevent the beating. Furthermore, Sam was as frightened as Laman and
Lemuel when Nephi, dressed in Laban’s clothes and accompanied by Zoram, approached them at night (1 Nephi
4:28). Perhaps his retiring if not passive nature is why his father in his nal blessing (2 Nephi 4:11), while saluting
Sam’s good heart and behavior, could see that his descendants would not survive as a distinct entity but would be
incorporated into Nephi’s tribe.
10. Zoram
Zoram had been Laban’s servant. At the time when he promised to accompany the party and be granted nominal
equal status with the brothers, he must have weighed in his instantaneous calculation of the costs and bene ts the
fact that as a servant of Laban in Jerusalem, he would always be a third-class citizen and bound to an unadmirable
master. (Of course, had he not agreed to go with them, they would have killed him, a rather decisive determinant in
his decision!) A man as trusted as he was, with access to Laban’s treasury, would have been of some maturity, for
he would have had to prove faithful to Laban over a period of years before being given such trust by his master.
That he was in his thirties would be reasonable, and such an age agrees with his marrying the daughter whom
Ishmael’s family may have considered by then their “old maid.” Later he had his own tribal descendants (1 Nephi
18:6; Jacob 1:13), so his wife apparently had fertile years remaining after their marriage.
We learn nothing about his nature, physique, or bearing, although he was probably a thorough-going city fellow.
Since Laban seems to have played some military role at Jerusalem (1 Nephi 3:31), Zoram likely was also part of the
Jewish military apparatus, which may in part account for the military role his descendants later played (Alma 48:5).
He aligned himself with the Nephi faction in subsequent disputes (2 Nephi 1:30; 5:6), and a generation or more
later his descendants formed one of the small tribes within the broad Nephite category (Jacob 1:13). (Still, a
tradition among part of his descendants centuries later [Alma 54:23] suggests that he had been “pressed and
brought out of Jerusalem” against his will by Nephi. Perhaps in weak moments, he confessed privately to his
children that, like the Mormon pioneers from Nauvoo, he “went willingly, because he had to.”) Nothing is said about

Zoram’s ancestry, but it seems statistically likely, given his bureaucratic/military role in Jerusalem, that he was a
Jew, while both Lehi and Ishmael counted descent from Joseph.
11. Others
As we have seen, there were minor characters in the drama who were considered by Nephi insigni cant enough
not to mention by name. Let us consider each in turn, presenting what we know and can infer about their ages and
social positions.
“My sisters.” The two (or more) daughters of Lehi and Sariah I presume, on the basis of Erastus Snow’s statement, to
have become wives of Ishmael’s sons. They were minors at the beginning of the account, otherwise there would be
no way to place them in Sariah’s birth history. I suppose that one was around twelve and the other around nine.
When they arrived in Bountiful they would have been twenty and seventeen.
It is logical that in the intimate circumstances of the camp, youths approaching sexual maturity would be in a
socially awkward position. Likely, the adult role of wife would be arranged for the two daughters as soon as
feasible, say around age sixteen for each in turn, but whom would they marry? The sons of Ishmael alone seem of
an age to be possible husbands. Lehi’s rst daughter may then have become the second wife of Ishmael’s rst son
at about the time they were in Nahom. The second daughter could have become the second wife to Ishmael’s
second son no later than the time the party reached Bountiful.
This scenario takes the Erastus Snow statement at face value. I realize that to suppose that the daughters became
second wives appears to contradict Jacob 2:34; 3:5, where it is said that Lehi was commanded that there should
be no plural wives. But perhaps Lehi received that commandment only in the promised land after, and partially
because of, bitter experience with the second wifehood of his two daughters, which had led to their separation
from Ishmael’s sons. Or, these cases may have been covered under the “escape clause” of Jacob 2:30 (“For if I will . .
. raise up seed unto me, I will command my people” to make polygamous unions), the daughters having no other
prospect of marriage within their party.
Still another possibility is that the arduous wilderness experience had caused the (unmentioned) death of the
original wives of the sons of Ishmael, whereupon Lehi’s daughters were taken as replacement spouses. A nal
possibility is that the Snow statement was in error in the recollection of the detail about the daughters and that
they never married at all due to lack of partners of a suitable age. Obviously, we cannot settle these details on the
basis of so few bits of information given us by Nephi in his record. We may wonder about such matters but ought
to restrict our guesses to those with some basis in the text, not simply out-of-the-blue speculations.
Wives of Ishmael’s sons. Our recognition of the existence of these wives depends completely on the phrasing of 1
Nephi 7:6: “the two sons of Ishmael and their families.” No clue is provided about the age or origin of the women.
Given patterns of marriage in preexilic Israel, it would be likely that they were kin to their husbands through their
fathers, but that was only an Israelite preference, not an absolute rule. As to their ages, we can only suppose that
they were slightly younger than their respective husbands, that is, about twenty-eight and twenty- ve at the one
time when their existence is implied (1 Nephi 7:6).
Original children of Ishmael’s sons. As noted earlier, since both sons had “families,” we must suppose that children
were involved. Given the probable ages of the parents, two or three each would be plausible, for a total of ve
Ishmaelite grandchildren as the story opens.

Children born during the trip through the wilderness. Nephi says in 1 Nephi 17:1, “our women did bear children in the
wilderness.” No numbers are included, nor are any exclusions mentioned. (Two of these births, Jacob and Joseph,
have already been discussed.) If we presume that all the younger married women bore children during the eight
years, the median number would likely be two, given the rigors of the circumstances—some may have had but one,
others three. During the two or more years in Bountiful while they were building the boat, there could have been
an additional three born within the group. A distribution like this would be reasonable:

Sariah (Jacob and Joseph)
Laman’s wife
Lemuel’s wife
Sam’s wife
Nephi’s wife
Zoram’s wife
Wife of Son 1 of Ishmael
Wife of Son 2 of Ishmael
Total of those born in the wilderness
Plus those born in Bountiful

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
16
3

Were there servants? No mention is made of male or female servants, yet it is possible that there were some. At rst
glance, 1 Nephi 2:4 would seem to rule that out, since reference is made only to Lehi’s taking “his family.” Yet Near
Eastern usage would not rule out including servants under that heading without speci cally distinguishing them.
Lehi’s “great wealth” would seem to have called for at least female servants in the household. Nephi’s hesitancy
about even adding Zoram to their party would not apply in the case of family retainers, who would have known no
other life than service to Lehi and Sariah and had no alternative place in society in the land of Jerusalem even if
they dreamed of defecting. I do not consider it likely that there were such people along, but the door should not be
shut on the possibility, for they might account for some genetic variety in the colony as well as providing additional
hands for the construction of the ship when they reached Bountiful.
Finally, I note that Lynn M. Hilton has proposed in an unpublished paper that Laman and Lemuel took dark-skinned
South Arabian women as second wives during the sojourn in Bountiful, thus accounting for the skin color
attributed to the Lamanites in the promised land in America. This is an interesting idea, however, I am not
persuaded by his arguments. That the party had social interaction with local inhabitants in Bountiful on the south
Arabian coast does seem likely, in fact inevitable. Among other things, Nephi claims “neither did I build the ship
after the manner of men” (1 Nephi 18:2), strongly implying that he had knowledge of other ships which almost
certainly would have existed on that coast and had been examined by him. However, Jacob 3:5, which credits the
Lamanites with a tradition of strict monogamy, goes against the Hilton suggestion.
Summary
Now that we have recapped the possible personnel, let us see how Sariah’s birth history plausibly went. It does
seem possible, barely, to accommodate all her children in an atypical but feasible birth sequence.
Child
Age on Leaving Jerusalem
Sariah’s Age at the Birth

Laman
Lemuel
Sam
Nephi
Daughter 1
Daughter 2

23*

17

21

(early) 20

19

22

(late) 16

25

12

29

9

32
(41)

(Departure from Jerusalem
Jacob
Joseph

–

43*

–

45*
(49)

(Arrival in Bountiful)

*By supposing Laman was twenty-two instead of twenty-three and that Jacob was eight and Joseph six at the time
of the shipboard need for “nourishment”— and these are the believable extremes—Sariah’s age at Joseph’s birth
could have been forty-four.
One Implication of the Composition of the Group
Assuming the correctness of these calculations, there would have been some seven vigorous adult males, perhaps
supplemented by three of the adult females on any given workday, available for the tasks of gathering materials,
constructing the ship, and out tting and testing it. Assume further that other necessary tasks such as obtaining
food and camp maintenance consumed a third of the working days of those eleven souls. If the ship took about two
years to build and get ready to sail, then a maximum of around 5,000 person-days of (inexperienced) labor were
available. Half that much labor might today construct a house of moderate size, but of limited quality, in perhaps a
year. Since, however, Nephi’s crew had no lumberyard nor hardware store to draw on, about as much time would
be consumed in preparing materials as in actual construction of the vessel. Obviously the only ship they could
construct within these constraints would be quite small. Perhaps some servants were available as a supplement to
the labor force, or perhaps some local inhabitants might have been used (which raises the question of how they
might have been paid).
Recasting the demographic information, we see that the group who boarded the vessel would have been
distributed something like this (excluding any possible servants).

Age Group

Male
Female
Total

Aged adults
Vigorous adults
Children
Totals

1

2?*

3?

8**

7

15

12

13

25

21

22?

43?

*We have no idea how long Ishmael’s wife lived.

**One of the children of Ishmael’s rst son may have been as ols as eighteen by now so is arbitrarily counted here.
These observations may strike some readers as trivial, but I disagree. We have two choices in regard to
context or setting as we read the scriptures (or any ancient document): (1) We can impose our own historical
and cultural preconceptions on the text (there is no such thing as simply reading a text “literally,” in a cultural
vacuum); or (2) we we can read it in the best light available to us about the actual, realistic setting. If we do
the first, we run the risk of misconstruing the words and subverting the intent of possessing written scripture
at all. Truth-lovers will take the latter course every time, in my opinion.
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King Benjamin and the Feast of Tabernacles
John A. Tvedtnes
A portion of the brass plates brought by Lehi to the New World contained the books of Moses (1 Nephi 5:10-13).
Nephi and other Book of Mormon writers stressed that they obeyed the laws given therein: “And we did observe
to keep the judgments, and the statutes, and the commandments of the Lord in all things according to the law of
Moses” (2 Nephi 5:10).
But aside from sacri ce2 and the Ten Commandments,3 we have few explicit details regarding the Nephite
observance of the Mosaic code. One would expect, for example, some mention of the festivals which played such
an important role in the religious observances of ancient Israel. Though the Book of Mormon mentions no
religious festivals by name, it does detail many signi cant Nephite assemblies.
One of the more noteworthy of the Nephite ceremonies was the coronation of the second Mosiah by his father,
Benjamin.4 Some years ago, Professor Hugh Nibley outlined the similarities between this Book of Mormon
account and ancient Middle Eastern coronation rites.5 He pointed out that these rites took place at the annual
New Year festival, when the people were placed under covenant of obedience to the monarch. My own research
further explores the Israelite coronation/New Year rites, and aims to complement other scholarly studies of the
ceremonial context of Benjamin’s speech.
THE SABBATICAL FEASTS
In the sacred calendar, the Israelite new year began with the month of Abib (later called Nisan), in the spring
(end March/beginning April).6 This month encompassed the feasts of Passover (beginning at sundown on
the fourteenth day) and Unleavened Bread (fourteenth through twenty-first days), and included “holy
convocations,” analogous to the Latter-day Saint April general conference (Leviticus 23:4-8). In the Holy
Land, this is the early harvest following the rainy season, and hence is associated with joy and thanksgiving
to God. It also commemorates the Exodus from Egypt.7
The other festivals in the sacred year also followed the sabbatical system.8 Every seventh day was a Sabbath, or
day of rest, commemorative of the creation and perhaps also the Exodus from Egypt.9 From the gathering of the
rst fruits at Passover, the Israelites counted a “sabbath of weeks” to the ftieth day, called Shavucot (“weeks”) in
the Old Testament10 and Pentecost (“count of fty”) in Acts 2:1.
The most sacred month was the seventh, Ethanim (1 Kings 8:2), later called Tishri, which fell at the end of
September/beginning of October.11 The rst day of the month, now called Rosh ha-Shanah (“beginning of the
year”), was marked by the blowing of trumpets.12 The tenth day, Yom Kippur (“day of atonement”), was the most
sacred of all days, devoted to fasting, repentance, prayer, and sacri ce.13 Finally, the week of the fteenth to the
twenty- second of the seventh month was the Feast of Ingathering, or of Sukkot (“booths” or “tabernacles”).14 At
this time, the Israelites were to construct rough temporary living quarters, called sukkôt (singular sukkah), or
“booths,” in order “that your generations may know that I made the children of Israel to dwell in booths, when I
brought them out of the land of Egypt” (Leviticus 23:43).
In addition to these annual feasts, every seventh year was a sabbatical year, during which time it was forbidden to
engage in agricultural pursuits.15 At the end of seven sabbatical years came the ftieth year, called the jubilee,16 a

year of renewal wherein Hebrew slaves were freed and ownership of the land was returned to the families
originally in possession thereof.17 Both the sabbatical year and the jubilee were proclaimed in the seventh month,
rather than the rst,18 since the seventh month begins a new agricultural cycle with the rst rainfall, which usually
occurs within a month after the Feast of Tabernacles.19
SUKKOT
The Feast of Tabernacles (Sukkot), like the Feast of Unleavened Bread/Passover, began and ended with a
day of rest, including a “holy convocation” (Heb. miqra’ qôdes, “holy reading,” or “holy calling”) and a
“solemn assembly” (Heb. caseret, “council”).20 During the week of the feast, the Israelites would gather
together and build for each family a booth or tabernacle.21 Special sacrifices were also ordained (Numbers
29:12-38).
According to Jewish tradition, the rst Sukkot was celebrated at the foot of Mount Sinai, six months after the
Exodus from Egypt.22 The last day of the feast has come to be known as Simhat Torah (“joy of the Torah”), in
commemoration of the revelation of the Pentateuch or Law (Heb. Tôrah, lit., “teaching”) at Sinai.23 In a sense,
Sukkot symbolizes the creation of the world. As God made a covenant with Adam, renewed with Noah after the
ood,24 so, too, he covenanted with Israel at Sinai.
Because they reappear in connection with other known Sukkot assemblies, we shall examine the elements of the
rst Sukkot, found in Exodus 24:
1. Moses recited God’s commandments, which he wrote in a book (vss. 3-4).
2. “All the people answered with one voice, and said, All the words which the Lord hath said will we do” (vs.
3).25
3. An altar was constructed, along with “twelve pillars,” in token of the covenant (vs. 4).26
4. Sacri ces of burnt and peace offerings followed (vs. 5).
5. The blood of the sacri cial animals was sprinkled on the altar (vs. 6).
6. Moses read to the people from the book of the covenant (vs. 7).
7. The people repeated their covenant of obedience (vs. 7).
8. The blood of the covenant was sprinkled on the people, sealing the bargain (vs. 8).
9. The Israelite leaders went up on the mount, where they saw God, ate and drank (vss. 9-11).
10. The Lord called Moses up to give him the law and the commandments, written on stone tables (vss. 1213).
11. A cloud and the glory of the Lord (described as re) covered Mount Sinai for six days (vss. 15-17).
12. On the seventh day, the Lord called to Moses from the cloud (vs. 16).

About forty years later, as the Israelites were preparing to enter the land of Canaan,
Moses wrote this law, and delivered it unto the priests . . . and unto all the elders of Israel. And Moses
commanded them, saying, At the end of every seven years, in the solemnity of the year of release, in the
feast of tabernacles, When all Israel is come to appear before the Lord thy God in the place which he shall
choose [i.e., the temple in Jerusalem], thou shalt read this law before all Israel in their hearing. Gather the
people together, men, and women, and children, and thy stranger that is within thy gates, that they may
hear, and that they may learn, and fear the Lord your God, and observe to do all the words of this law: And
that their children, which have not known any thing, may hear, and learn to fear the Lord your God
(Deuteronomy
The book of Deuteronomy was evidently used anciently as the basis for the liturgy of the Feast of Tabernacles, as
we shall see below.
The gathering together of the people at the Feast of Tabernacles provided the backdrop for several special
ceremonies in ancient Israel, including (a) thanksgiving for the fall harvest, (b) prayers for rain to begin the new
agricultural year, (c) a rehearsal of the law of God and a public commitment to obey his commandments, (d)
coronation of a new king or a renewal of the kingship, (e) celebration of the end of the season of war (due to rainy
weather) and the establishment of peace, and (f) dedication of the temple. In the third year, tithes of farm produce
were collected for the Levites and the poor (Deuteronomy 14:27-29; 26:11-14; Amos 4:4), with a call for special
help to the poor during the seventh year (Deuteronomy 15:7-11).
DEDICATION OF THE TEMPLE
Perhaps the most notable celebration of Sukkot was when Solomon assembled the people at the dedication
of the newly completed temple (1 Kings 8:1-3; 2 Chronicles 5:2-4). The ark of the covenant was brought by
the priests and placed in the temple, along with sacred vessels borne by the Levites (1 Kings 8:1, 3-9; 2
Chronicles 5:2, 4-10; 6:11). Sacrifices and burnt offerings were then made by the priests (1 Kings 8:5; 2
Chronicles 5:6), while some of the Levites played music, praised the Lord, and spoke of his mercy (2
Chronicles 5:12-13). When the priests left the holy place, a cloud filled the temple (1 Kings 8:10-11; 2
Chronicles 5:11, 13-14; cf. 6:1). The presence of the cloud may have been the symbol of God’s promise of
rain.27
Solomon, standing atop a brazen scaffold (2 Chronicles 6:13), then blessed the congregation, who stood to receive
him (1 Kings 8:14-21; 2 Chronicles 6:3-11). He spoke of the Exodus from Egypt (1 Kings 8:16, 21; 2 Chronicles
6:5) and emphasized that both he and his father David had been chosen by the Lord (1 Kings 8:15-20; 2
Chronicles 6:4-10). The king then knelt at the altar, spread forth his hands, and offered the dedicatory prayer (1
Kings 8:22-54; 2 Chronicles 6:12-42). The elements of his prayer are found in other Sukkot observances:
Addressing God, he mentioned the covenant and God’s mercy toward the obedient (1 Kings 8:23; 2
Chronicles 6:14).
He spoke of God’s promise of kingship to David’s posterity (1 Kings 8:24-26; 2 Chronicles 6:15-17). God
had told David that his children should “take heed to their way, that they walk before me as thou hast
walked before me” (1 Kings 8:25; cf. 2 Chronicles 6:16).
He asked God to answer the prayers of the faithful addressed toward the temple (1 Kings 8:28-30, 33-39;
2 Chronicles 6:19-21, 24-30, 37-40) and mentioned that oaths were to be offered at the temple altar (1
Kings 8:31-32; 2 Chronicles 6:22-23).

He asked the Lord to help the people in their wars (1 Kings 8:33, 37, 44-50; 2 Chronicles 6:24, 28, 34-35)
and, should they be removed from their land by the enemy, to bring them back to their land (1 Kings 8:34;
2 Chronicles 6:25).
He asked the Lord to answer prayers for rain (1 Kings 8:35-36; 2 Chronicles 6:26-27) and to save the
people from famine, pestilence, and insect infestations (1 Kings 8:37-39; 2 Chronicles 6:28-30).
He noted that the people were to fear God (1 Kings 8:40; 2 Chronicles 6:31), that strangers were to be
blessed (1 Kings 8:41-43; 2 Chronicles 6:32-33), and that repentant sinners would be forgiven (1 Kings
8:33-36, 39, 46-48, 50; 2 Chronicles 6:24-27, 30, 36-39).
The Exodus from Egypt was again mentioned brie y (1 Kings 8:53).
Several Sukkot elements were combined in references to priestly clothing, salvation, and rejoicing: “Let
thy priests, O Lord God, be clothed with salvation, and let thy saints rejoice in goodness” (2 Chronicles
6:41).
He asked the Lord to remember the king, “thine anointed” (2 Chronicles
Following the prayer, Solomon again blessed the congregation (1 Kings 8:55), expressing the hope that the Lord
would deal with Israel as with their fathers (1 Kings 8:56-57) and that the people would be obedient to his
commandments (1 Kings 8:58, 61). This was followed by more burnt offerings and peace offerings (1 Kings 8:6264; 2 Chronicles 7:4-5, 7), to musical accompaniment by the Levites, who praised the Lord and spoke of his mercy,
while priests sounded trumpets (2 Chronicles 7:6). Fire fell from heaven and consumed the sacri ce and the glory
of the Lord lled the house (2 Chronicles 7:1-2). Upon seeing this, the people bowed down with their faces to the
ground and praised the Lord, saying, “He is good; for his mercy endureth for ever” (2 Chronicles 7:3).
There is no mention that a covenant was made, and the Law was not written as a testimony, probably because the
two tables of the Law were already present in the ark (1 Kings 8:9; 2 Chronicles 5:10). Solomon had been seven
years in building his temple (1 Kings 6:37-38), which may mean that it was begun and dedicated in sabbatical
years. The temple dedication took place during seven or fourteen days,28 with a solemn assembly on the eighth (1
Kings 8:65-66; 2 Chronicles 7:8-9).29 On the eighth day of the festival (1 Kings 8:66), the twenty-third day of the
month (2 Chronicles 7:10), the people were sent away to their tents, after blessing the king. Shortly thereafter, the
Lord appeared to Solomon in a dream and charged him to keep the commandments, lest there come curses and no
rain (1 Kings 9:2-9; 2 Chronicles 7:12-22).
David’s Role
It was David, Solomon’s father, who had laid the plans for the Jerusalem temple (2 Samuel 7:1-17; 1 Chronicles
17:1-15). He gathered together the building materials (1 Chronicles 22). He also organized the priests and Levites
for temple service (1 Chronicles 6:31; 9:22; 16:1-7) and wrote some of its liturgy in the form of psalms.
Even before the temple site had been revealed to him,30 David had brought the ark of the covenant to Jerusalem,
in what may have been the renewal of the kingdom at Sukkot. His rst attempt was unsuccessful, and the ark was
left in the care of villagers not far from the Holy City (2 Samuel 6:1-11). On the second attempt, David and the
Israelites brought the ark with great joy to Jerusalem, accompanied by singing, dancing, shouting, and the sound of

trumpets.31 There were also sacri ces along the way (2 Samuel 6:13; 1 Chronicles 15:26), and burnt and peace
offerings in Jerusalem (2 Samuel 6:17-18; 1 Chronicles 16:2). The king then blessed the people and distributed
food for the feast (2 Samuel 6:18-19; 1 Chronicles 16:2-3). David’s divine kingship is mentioned explicitly, thus
giving reason to believe this may have been a renewal ceremony (2 Samuel 6:21). In his speech to the assembly,
David cited a number of psalms dealing with God’s covenant.32 “And all the people said, Amen, and praised the
Lord” (1 Chronicles 16:36). After the people departed for home (1 Chronicles 16:43), the Lord commanded David
to build him a house (1 Chronicles 17). The activities described in connection with this celebration suggest that
the events occurred at Sukkot.
A ROYAL FESTIVAL
Of special significance is the fact that it was the king, Solomon, who dedicated the temple, and not the high
priest or one of the prophets. Indeed, the site had been purchased by his father, David, and it was David
who had organized the priests and Levites and who laid plans for building the temple. It is therefore not
surprising that, in ancient Israel, it was the king who presided at the Feast of Tabernacles.33
The Sukkot assembly of the seventh year was a renewal of the Law given at Sinai. It was, in another sense, the
reenactment of Yahweh’s enthronement as king of the universe and controller of the elements, with the people
entering into a covenant to obey him.34 In later years, it was the king who stood in the place of God to accept the
homage of the people.35 Various points of the Law were read publicly in the Temple court. The rite as practiced by
the exiled Jews in Babylon in the tenth century A.D. was described by Rabbi Nathan the Babylonian, in a letter
which was appended to the Seder Olam.36
In the days of Rabbi Nathan, the Jewish community of Babylon was led by a descendant of David, the exilarch.
During the Feast of Tabernacles, he performed the functions formerly assigned to the kings of Israel, then Judah.
On one occasion described by Rabbi Nathan, a new exilarch had just been approved by the Jewish community. A
ceremonial procession set out on the Sabbath from the house of one of the prominent Babylonian Jews, a court
banker, and made its way to the synagogue in Baghdad. Every detail of the ceremony which followed had been laid
out in advance. A choir was concealed beneath a wooden tower, with a multicolored cover. The exilarch hid
beneath the tower, from which he made his entrance during the recitation of a prayer.
When the exilarch made his appearance, all the people rose to their feet. The exilarch sat in a seat placed in the
middle atop the tower. Then the heads of the Sura Yeshiva and the Pumbedita Yeshiva followed behind and took
their seats on his right and left hands, respectively, after bowing to the ruler, who acknowledged them by the same
token. The people then took their seats and the reading from the Torah or Law of Moses began. The cantor then
chanted the blessings for the exilarch in a low voice, so that they could be heard only by those seated around the
tower and the youths concealed beneath it. The youths responded by shouting “Amen.”
In the Mishnah, we have a partial description of the Sukkot celebration of Second Temple times:
After what manner was the paragraph of the king? After the close of the rst Festival-day of the Feast [of
Tabernacles], in the eighth year, after the going forth of the Seventh Year,37 they used to prepare for him
in the Temple Court a wooden platform on which he sat, for it is written, At the end of every seven years in
the set time. . . . 38 The minister of the synagogue used to take a scroll of the Law and give it to the chief of
the synagogue, and the chief of the synagogue gave it to the Prefect, and the Prefect gave it to the High
Priest, and the High Priest gave it to the king, and the king received it standing and read it sitting. King

Agrippa received it standing and read it standing, and for this the Sages praised him. And when he reached
Thou mayest not put a foreigner over thee which is not thy brother,39 his eyes owed with tears; but they
called to him, ‘Our brother art thou! our brother art thou! our brother art thou!’ He read from the
beginning of Deuteronomy to Hear, [O Israel]; and the paragraphs Hear, [O Israel] . . .40 and And it shall come
to pass if ye shall hearken . . .41 . . . and Thou shalt surely tithe42 . . . and When thou hast made an end of tithing43
and the paragraph of the king,44 and the Blessings and the Cursings,45 until the end. With the same
blessings with which the High Priest blesses them, the king blesses them, save that he pronounces the
blessing for the Feasts instead of the blessing for the forgiveness of sin.46
Royal Sukkot Liturgy
The choice of the Deuteronomic passages for the liturgy of the festival was most deliberate. The book of
Deuteronomy is a unitary reiteration of the Law. It has the uency and eloquence of a ceremonial speech and, as
such, is appropriate for recitation by the king during the festival. The king would rst read Deuteronomy 1:1-6:10.
Some of the principal elements of this passage are:
1. A recital of God’s dealings with Israel during the Exodus (Deuteronomy 1:6-3:29; 5:6).
2. Reading from the Law (Deuteronomy 4:1-9, 11-25; 5:6-21).
3. An exhortation to teach the Law to subsequent generations (Deuteronomy 4:9-10).
4. Recalling the covenant and assembly at Sinai (Deuteronomy 4:10-13, 36; 5:1-5, 22-31), including (a) a
recitation of the law (Deuteronomy 4:14-19), (b) a reminder of the Exodus from Egypt (Deuteronomy 4:20,
34, 37-38), (c) a threat that if the people break the covenant, they will be driven from the promised land
(Deuteronomy 4:25-27), while if they keep the commandments their days will be prolonged therein
(Deuteronomy 4:40; 5:31-33), and (d) mention of the law being written on tablets of stone (Deuteronomy
5:22). Many of these features are repeated in Moses’ exhortation.
5. Heaven and earth called to witness the pronouncing of curses for disobedience (Deuteronomy 4:26-39).
6. A promise of prosperity and long life for obedience to the Law (Deuteronomy 4:40; 5:32-6:3).
7. The people being sent back to their tents (Deuteronomy 5:30).
8. The conclusion, or Shemac (Deuteronomy 6:4-10), which teaches that (a) God must be loved and honored
(Deuteronomy 6:5), (b) children should be taught the Law (6:7), (c) the law should be written down, and (d)
that God will reward obedience by prosperity (Deuteronomy 6:10-11).47
In the subsequent verses, which were not included in the ritual reading according to the Mishnah, further mention
is made of oaths (Deuteronomy 6:13), obedience (Deuteronomy 6:17), God’s promise of assistance against Israel’s
enemies (Deuteronomy 6:17-18), the Exodus from Egypt (Deuteronomy 6:20-22), and the promise of life through
obedience (Deuteronomy 6:24-25). These elements are found in other examples of Sukkot assemblies.

Next, the king would read from the eleventh chapter of Deuteronomy, which begins with a transitional exhortation
to love and obey God (Deuteronomy 11:1) and notes that the speech is directed to the adults, not the children
(Deuteronomy 11:2).48 The text then proceeds: one must love and serve God (Deuteronomy 11:13), after which he
will send rain and prosperity (Deuteronomy 11:14-15, 17). The Law must be taught to the children who are too
young to understand (Deuteronomy 11:19), and, for this purpose, it must be written down (Deuteronomy 11:20).
God will give long life to the covenanters (Deuteronomy 11:21), and by obedience they will defeat their enemies
(Deuteronomy 11:22-25). Finally, the king placed before them a blessing and a curse, to be effective upon renewal
of the covenant (Deuteronomy 11:26-32). Deuteronomy 27:15-26, also cited by the king, gives instructions for
the covenant. Deuteronomy 17:14-20, the “Paragraph of the King,” outlined the monarch’s responsibilities:
When thou art come unto the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt
dwell therein, and shalt say, I will set a king over me, like as all the nations that are about me; Thou shalt in
any wise set him king over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose: one from among thy brethren shalt
thou set king over thee: thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, which is not thy brother.49 But he shall
not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to Egypt, to the end that he should multiply
horses: forasmuch as the Lord hath said unto you, Ye shall henceforth return no more that way. Neither
shall he multiply wives to himself, that his heart turn not away: neither shall he greatly multiply to himself
silver and gold. And it shall be, when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy
of this law in a book out of that which is before the priests the Levites: And it shall be with him, and he shall
read therein all the days of his life: that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this law
and these statutes, to do them: That his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, and that he turn not aside
from the commandment, to the right hand, or to the left: to the end that he may prolong his days in his
kingdom, he, and his children, in the midst of Israel (Deuteronomy
The remaining passages cited by the king (Deuteronomy 14:22-29; 26:12-19) deal with tithing, collected in the
third and seventh years at the time of the harvest in order to provide for the Levites and the poor. In his concluding
remarks, the king would bless the people, just as Moses had blessed each of the tribes prior to the ordination of
Joshua, as recorded in Deuteronomy 33.
BIBLICAL CORONATION CEREMONIES
In ancient Israel, Sukkot was an occasion for anointing a new king or for renewing the covenant between
God, the king, and the people. And while it may be that not all biblical coronations took place at this festival,
it is instructive to examine the various accounts for Sukkot imagery.
Saul
In 1 Samuel 10, we read of Saul’s ascension to the throne of Israel. He was designated by the prophet Samuel,
upon the insistent petition of the Israelite community for a king. Samuel and the Lord opposed this move, because
it detracted from God as the true King of Israel (1 Samuel 8:7; 10:19; 12:12). Saul was rst met privately by
Samuel, who anointed him (1 Samuel 10:1) and then gave him certain instructions, which included a forthcoming
meeting at Gilgal after Saul’s waiting period of seven days, at the end of which Samuel would sacri ce burnt and
peace offerings (1 Samuel 10:2-9). Saul followed most of the prophet’s instructions, but impatiently offered
sacri ce before Samuel arrived (1 Samuel 10:10-16). Finally, Samuel assembled the tribes at Mizpeh before the
Lord (1 Samuel 10:17), where he recited God’s dealings with Israel (1 Samuel 10:18-19) and designated Saul as
king, amidst cries of “God save the king” (1 Samuel 10:20-24, KJV wording; Hebrew means “may the king live”).

The “manner of the kingdom” (1 Samuel 10:25), likely a covenant of some sort (cf. 1 Samuel 8:9), was then written
in a book, and the people were sent home (1 Samuel 10:25-26).
A short time later, Samuel convened an assembly to “renew the kingdom” before the Lord, at Gilgal (1 Samuel
11:14-15), a cultic center where Joshua had erected twelve large stones after crossing the Jordan (Joshua 4:9,
17-22). The event took place at the wheat harvest, prior to the onset of the rains (1 Samuel 12:16-19); this would
ordinarily place the event in early summer, between April and June, and hence may have taken place at Shavucot.
Samuel, in asking God for rain as a sign that the people had sinned in asking for a king, re ects the close tie
between the coronation of the king and the prayers for rain which usually took place at Sukkot.50
Peace offerings were sacri ced with great rejoicing (1 Samuel 11:15), after which Samuel arose to speak in a
manner quite reminiscent of King Benjamin’s speech when proclaiming his successor. Samuel was now old, and the
king was to replace him (1 Samuel 12:1-2). He wanted to remind the people (as did Benjamin, apparently in
keeping with the Paragraph of the King) that he had not taken from them anything which was not his due, and
called them to witness (again, like Benjamin) on this point (1 Samuel 12:3-5). He then recited God’s dealings with
Israel (1 Samuel 12:6-12) and stressed that, while Saul had been chosen by both God and the people (1 Samuel
12:13), nevertheless, it was God who was the true king (1 Samuel 12:12). Finally, he exhorted obedience to the
Lord and to the king (cf. Mosiah 2:31), pronouncing the blessings and curses found in the Law (1 Samuel 12:14-15,
20-25).
David
The coronation ceremony took on new meaning with the rise of the Davidic line to replace Saul. David’s rst
anointing as king was performed by Samuel in a small assembly at Bethlehem, accompanied by sacri ces (1 Samuel
16:1-13). At the death of Saul, the elders of Judah anointed David king of their tribe at Hebron (2 Samuel 2:4).
After reigning seven years at Hebron,51 David was anointed king of all Israel by an assembly representing all the
tribes (2 Samuel 5:1-5; 1 Chronicles 11:1-3). We cannot know for certain that this took place at Sukkot, but it is
interesting that it was seven years after his earlier anointing at Hebron, which suggests that these ceremonies
may have occurred during sabbatical years. David soon moved his capital to Jerusalem, which he took from the
Jebusites, and began a series of moves which would make it the cultic center of all Israel, complete with temple and
priesthood. On the threshing oor of a certain Ornan or Araunah ( tting for a harvest festival), he built an altar
and offered burnt and peace offerings (2 Samuel 24:16-25; 1 Chronicles 21:15-28). If this seventh year of David’s
reign was the sabbatical year, the threshing- oor incident may have been a ritual marking the rst harvest of the
following season.
Solomon
In his old age, David seems to have lost control of affairs. His son Adonijah enlisted the help of David’s cousin Joab
and the priest Abiathar to help Adonijah become king (1 Kings 1:5-7). The party repaired to a nearby spring, EnRogel, where they offered sacri ces and feasted amid cries of “God save king Adonijah” (1 Kings 1:9, 19, 25). When
word of the coronation ceremony reached the prophet Nathan, the priest Zadok, and the chief captain Benaiah,
they went to David in company with the king’s wife, Bathsheba, to express their concerns and to remind David that
he had promised that Solomon would succeed him (1 Kings 1:10-32).
David instructed the company to have Solomon ride on the king’s mule to the spring Gihon, where Nathan and
Zadok were to anoint him amid sounding trumpets and cries of “God save king Solomon” (1 Kings 1:32-37). Oil

was brought from the nearby tabernacle, and the ceremony proceeded. After following these instructions, the
multitude who had followed Solomon celebrated with music from pipes (1 Kings 1:38-46). With this turn of events,
Adonijah had to renounce his claims to the throne (1 Kings 1:50-52).
In all this, we note that it was King David who was expected to name his successor (1 Kings 1:20, 30, 35).
Nevertheless, after Solomon’s coronation, David expressed joy that the Lord had made Solomon king (1 Kings
1:48).
Like Saul, Solomon was renewed in the kingdom. The account is found in 1 Chronicles 28-29. We read that David
assembled the of cers and stood to speak to them (1 Chronicles 28:1-2). He reminded them that God had chosen
him to be king of Israel (1 Chronicles 28:4), and noted that Solomon, too, had been chosen by God (1 Chronicles
28:5-6; 29:1). He then gave a charge that Solomon and all Israel should keep the Lord’s commandments,
whereupon they would be blessed to possess the land (1 Chronicles 28:7-8; 29:23-24). But disobedience would
bring curses (1 Chronicles 28:9). The old king then instructed Solomon to build the temple he had planned (1
Chronicles 28:6, 10-21). The temple was to be a palace for God, who is the true king of Israel (1 Chronicles 29:1011) and the source of all possessions (1 Chronicles 29:12).
Following David’s speech, the congregation “worshipped the Lord, and the king” (1 Chronicles 29:20). The
following day, burnt offerings were made (1 Chronicles 29:21), and a meal was consumed (1 Chronicles 29:22).
Solomon was then anointed (1 Chronicles 29:22). As in other accounts of Sukkot celebrations, we read that
Solomon and all those who obeyed him prospered (1 Chronicles 29:23-24).
This account is evidently an expanded version of the one given in 1 Kings 2, where we read that David, about to go
the way of the earth, gave a charge to Solomon (1 Kings 2:2). He promised his son that if he obeyed God’s
commandments, he would prosper (1 Kings 2:3-4).
The Divided Kingdom
After Solomon’s death, his son Rehoboam went to Shechem for all Israel to make him king (1 Kings 12:1; 2
Chronicles 10:1). He was rejected, however, by the northern tribes, whose representatives returned to their tents
(1 Kings 12:16; 2 Chronicles 10:16). As a consequence, Rehoboam became king of Judah, while Jeroboam, of the
tribe of Ephraim, became king of Israel.52 In order to differentiate between the two royal houses, Jeroboam
substituted the eighth month for the celebration of Sukkot (1 Kings 12:32-33).
About a century after the split in the kingdom, Omri became king of Israel. He made political marriages for his
children. Ahab, his son and successor, married Jezebel, daughter of the Phoenician (Canaanite) king Ethbaal.
Athaliah, Omri’s daughter, married Jehoram (Joram), king of Judah (2 Kings 8:26-27). When another Jehoram
(Joram), Ahab’s son, became king, he waged war against the Syrians and was wounded at Ramoth-gilead.
Returning to Jezreel to recover, he was visited by his cousin, Ahaziah, son of Jehoram, king of Judah (2 Kings 8:2829).
It was at this time that the prophet Elisha sent one of the other prophets to Ramoth-gilead with oil to anoint Jehu,
captain of the host, as new king of Israel, and to give him a commission to destroy the house of Ahab (2 Kings 9:110). After the anointing, Jehu’s men put their garments “under him on the top of the stairs, and blew with trumpets,
saying, Jehu is king” (2 Kings 9:11-13). Jehu proceeded to Jezreel, where he slew Jehoram, Ahaziah, and Jezebel (2
Kings 9:14-37). Shortly thereafter, he slew the rest of Ahab’s sons (2 Kings 10:1-17). He then called for sacri ce

and a “solemn assembly for Baal,” during which he provided Baal’s priests with new clothing, then slew them (2 Kings
10:18-25).
Meanwhile, in Judah, Athaliah took advantage of her son’s death by slaying “all of the seed royal” and usurping the
throne. It may be that both Jehu and Athaliah took advantage of the forthcoming renewal rite of Sukkot in the
sabbatical year to usurp their respective thrones. This is evidenced by the various acts of Jehu which resemble
later Sukkot practices. Further evidence may be adduced from the fact that Athaliah herself was overthrown and
replaced by Joash, the rightful king of Judah, seven years later, perhaps indicating that we are dealing with
sabbatical years.
Jehosheba, daughter of Jehoram and sister of the slain king Ahaziah, had hidden Joash (Jehoash), the king’s infant
son, in the temple for six years, thus preserving his life (2 Kings 11:2-3). His coronation as king of Judah in the
seventh year is one of the more striking examples of a royal festival. The wicked queen Athaliah had slain all the
males of the royal family except the newborn Joash, who was preserved by his brother-in-law, the high priest
Jehoiada, and hidden away for seven years (2 Kings 11:11; 2 Chronicles 23:1). Joash’s coronation corresponded
with the seventh year of the reign of Jehu, king of Israel (2 Kings 12:1), when Joash was seven years old (2 Kings
11:21). If, as we have suggested, Jehu overthrew the house of Ahab in a sabbatical year, then Joash’s coronation
also took place in a sabbatical year.
The high priest Jehoiada assembled the rulers of Judah at the temple, where they made a covenant (2 Kings 11:4;
2 Chronicles 23:1-3). The king was crowned and anointed, and the “testimony” of the Law placed in his hands,
while the people clapped their hands (2 Kings 11:12; 2 Chronicles 23:11). Joash stood by a “pillar” (covenant altar)
as trumpets sounded and music played, amidst rejoicing (2 Kings 11:14; 2 Chronicles 23:13). A covenant was
concluded between the Lord and the king and the people.53
In a similar ceremony, King Josiah later gathered the leaders of Judah to the temple (2 Kings 23:1-2; 2 Chronicles
34:29), where they read from the book of the covenant (2 Kings 23:2; 2 Chronicles 34:30). The king stood by a
“pillar” as he covenanted to obey the law, and the people likewise made a covenant (2 Kings 23:3; 2 Chronicles
34:31-32).
The Hasmoneans
When next the Jews had rulers with authority equal to kings, they were under a dynasty quite foreign to David—
the Hasmoneans or Maccabees, a priestly clan. The earlier Hasmoneans did not claim royal prerogatives.54
However, as early as 153 B.C., the Hasmonean high priest, Jonathan, presided at the Feast of Tabernacles, clad in a
purple robe and wearing a gold crown (1 Maccabees 10:20-21). The description of an assembly conducted by the
Hasmonean Simon (who reforti ed the Temple) is revealing. We read, in part:
And nishing the service at the altar, that he might adorn the offering of the most high Almighty, he
stretched out his hand to the cup, and poured of the blood of the grape, he poured out at the foot of the
altar a sweet-smelling savour unto the most high King of all.55 Then shouted the sons of Aaron, and
sounded the silver trumpets, and made a great noise to be heard, for a remembrance before the most High.
Then all the people together hasted, and fell down to the earth upon their faces to worship their Lord God
Almighty, the most High. The singers also sang praises with their voices, with great variety of sounds was
there made sweet melody. And the people besought the Lord, the most High, by prayer before him that is
merciful, till the solemnity of the Lord was ended, and they had nished his service. Then he [Simon] went

down, and lifted up his hands over the whole congregation of the children of Israel, to give the blessing of
the Lord with his lips, and to rejoice in his name. And they bowed themselves down to worship the second
time, that they might receive a blessing from the most High [Wisdom of Ben Sira (Ecclesiasticus) 50:14-21;
cf. 3 Nephi 19:16-17; 20:1-7].
PRIESTLY ORDINATIONS
Two of the ordination ceremonies described in the Bible resemble the coronation ceremonies and may have
taken place during the Feast of Tabernacles.
Ordination of Aaron
The ordination of Aaron and his sons to the priesthood is described in Leviticus 8-9. The ordination is, in a very
real sense, like a coronation, complete with anointing, investiture, sacri ces, exhortations, and, in the case of Aaron
himself, crowning. Moses gathered the congregation to the door of the tabernacle (Leviticus 8:3-4), where he
washed Aaron and his sons (8:5-6). Aaron was then dressed like a priestly king, including a miter or crown
(Leviticus 8:7-9). The tabernacle, its altar and vessels, were then anointed (Leviticus 8:10-11), as was Aaron
(Leviticus 8:12).
Aaron’s sons were then dressed, with bonnets replacing the miters (Leviticus 8:13). This was followed by the
sacri ce of several animals, whose blood was put on the altar (Leviticus 8:14-21). A special “ram of consecration”
was then sacri ced and its blood sprinkled on Aaron and his sons (Leviticus 8:22-29). Moses then sprinkled oil on
them (Leviticus 8:30-31). The newly consecrated priests were to remain in the tabernacle for seven days (Leviticus
8:33-36), which is the period of time allotted to the Feast of Tabernacles and to the Feast of Unleavened Bread,
associated with Passover.
On the eighth day, Moses assembled the new priests and the elders of Israel (Leviticus 9:1), and several more
sacri ces were offered and the blood placed on the altar (Leviticus 9:2-21). Moses and Aaron then blessed the
people (Leviticus 9:22-23), after which re came down on the altar and consumed the sacri ces (Leviticus 9:24).
This was followed by instructions similar to those repeated at Sukkot. Aaron was to teach the Israelites the
statutes of the Lord (Leviticus 10:11), and various commandments were given by the Lord to Moses and Aaron
(Leviticus 11-15).56
Among the items discussed in subsequent chapters that are also found in the Sukkot observance are: (1)
Atonement is available through the shedding of blood (Leviticus 17:11). (2) Israel should not do as Egyptians did
(Leviticus 18:1-3), for the Lord had brought them out from Egypt (Leviticus 26:13). (3) God ordained the
observance of various festivals (Leviticus 23), the sabbatical year and the jubilee (Leviticus 25). (4) The Lord
promised that obedience would bring rain and the defeat of Israel’s enemies (Leviticus 26:2-12). On the other
hand, if they disobeyed, their enemies would reign over them, and the land would not yield (Leviticus 26:14-20).
Ordination of Joshua
In Deuteronomy 33, we read that Moses blessed the tribes of Israel, then ordained Joshua to be his successor. The
details of Joshua’s ordination are given in Numbers 22. It may be that Moses’ nal speech and the ordination of
Joshua as his successor occurred simultaneously at the Feast of Tabernacles. Indeed, this “priestly coronation”57
has some resemblance to subsequent coronation ceremonies in Israel. It began with God designating, through the
prophet, Joshua to succeed Moses (Numbers 27:15-18). Joshua was then brought before the high priest and the

congregation for approval (Numbers 27:19, 21-22). Moses gave him a charge and ordained him (Numbers 27:1820, 23). Other details are lacking, but it is noteworthy that the ordination of the successor appears in the midst of
texts commanding the observance of sacri ces, Passover, and Pentecost (Numbers 28), and the sacri ces of the
seventh month (Numbers 28-29), and, nally, of vows and oaths made before God during the sacred month
(Numbers 30).
Subsequent to the invasion of Canaan, and following instructions from Moses (Deuteronomy 27), Joshua
gathered the tribes to Shechem (where God had covenanted with Abraham, Genesis 12:6-7) to renew the
covenant of the Law. A stone altar was constructed on Mt. Ebal, and the Law written upon it (Joshua 8:30-32;
Deuteronomy 27:2-8). On this, burnt and peace offerings were made (Joshua 8:31; Deuteronomy 27:6-7). The
people were divided into two companies, one on Mount Gerizim, one on the adjacent Mount Ebal (Joshua 8:33;
Deuteronomy 27:11-13), perhaps symbolic of the separation of righteous and wicked onto the right and left hands
of God, as alluded to in Mosiah 5:9-12. That this was intended is evidenced by the fact that the mount of blessing
(Gerizim) is on the south and the mount of cursing (Ebal) on the north, and that the Hebrew words yamîn (“right
hand”) and smô’l (“left hand”) also mean “south” and “north,” respectively. The blessings and curses of the Law were
then read, while the people placed themselves under covenant of obedience by saying, “Amen” (Joshua 8:34-35;
Deuteronomy 27:14-26). The assembly included all Israel plus strangers (Joshua 8:35). It took place after Israel’s
rst major battles, at Jericho and Ai, which may be evidence that it took place in the fall, when warfare typically
ceased because of the rains.
In the forty- fth year following the Exodus (Joshua 13:1; 14:7, 10), Joshua again assembled the tribes at Shiloh,
where the Tabernacle was erected (Joshua 18:1; 19:51). The land was divided by lot at this time. He praised those
of the trans-Jordanian tribes who kept the commandments, promising them divine rewards for continuance,
promising them prosperity and victory over their enemies, then sent them “unto their tents” (Joshua 22:1-8). Soon
thereafter these tribes constructed a special covenant altar (Joshua 22:10, 16, 19, 22-24, 26-29).
As Joshua’s death neared (he was “going the way of all the earth” [Joshua 23:14], as was also the case with
Benjamin in Mosiah 1:9), he assembled the elders (Joshua 24:1-2) to make arrangements for the continuation of
the covenant (Joshua 23:1). He exhorted them to love and obey God (Joshua 23:6-8, 11), who would then assist
them against their enemies (Joshua 23:3-5, 9-10). He also spoke of the curses which followed disobedience to the
Law (Joshua 23:12-13, 15-16). Following these preliminary arrangements, the tribes of Israel were assembled
together before God at Shechem (Joshua 24:1), where Joshua recounted to them the history of God’s dealings
with their forefathers (Joshua 24:2-13). He admonished them to fear God and serve Him (Joshua 24:14-15), and
the people promised obedience (Joshua 24:16-18, 21). Joshua again recalled the curses which would come upon
the ungodly (Joshua 24:19-20). He added, “Ye are witnesses” (cf. Mosiah 2:14), to which the people assented
(Joshua 24:22). A covenant was made and written on a great stone at the sanctuary (Joshua 24:24-27), after
which the people were dismissed (Joshua 24:28).
THE SUKKOT ASSEMBLY
From the descriptions we have reviewed, we may reconstruct the celebration of the Feast of Tabernacles as
observed in the sabbatical and jubilee years, as follows:
1. The people were (a) assembled, most often at the cult site (“before God”), where (b) they were
sometimes divided into two companies. (c) Strangers were also invited to attend. (d) At the conclusion of
the festival, the assembly was formally dismissed and sent home.

2. The leader (king, where applicable) delivered an address in which (a) he read from the Law of Moses
and cited the blessings and curses contained therein, (b) exhorted the people to love and fear God and
serve him, (c) recounted God’s dealings with the fathers (especially the Exodus from Egypt), (d)
designated God as creator and the source of all we have, (e) called upon the people to assist the needy,58
(f) read (where appropriate) the “Paragraph of the King,” (g) blessed the people, and (h) added such other
items as necessary (notably, comments on the plan of salvation).
3. God covenanted with his people that, if they would obey his commandments, he would (a) give them
prosperity in the land and longevity, (b) defeat their enemies (through the king, who was commander-inchief),59 and (c) send rain for the crops.60
4. The people (a) covenanted with God to be his servants and to obey his Law. (b) To this they were called
to witness. (c) The covenant (or, sometimes, the Law or the ruler’s speech) was written down. (d) A “pillar”
was erected as a symbol of the covenant.61
5. For purposes of sacri ce (a) an altar was constructed and (b) burnt and peace offerings were made
upon it.
6. The joy of the people was expressed by praising God, music, and sometimes dance.62
7. Trumpets were blown, as was usual for the seventh month.63
8. The coronation ceremony stressed (a) that God was the real King of Israel, (b) that it was God who
chose the earthly king—his viceroy—through a prophet,64 with (c) the approval of the people (who use the
formula “God save the king” in KJV) and the previous king. The king was then (d) anointed and (e) given a
charge.
9. There were sometimes other elements, such as a communal meal. In addition, there were the features
already discussed above (e.g., the presence of tents or booths, the building of a wooden platform, and the
presence of strangers or foreigners).
SUKKOT IN ZARAHEMLA
The biblical Sukkot celebration is closely paralleled by the account of King Benjamin’s assembly recorded in
Mosiah 1:1-6:6. Benjamin began by calling his son Mosiah to discuss with him an assembly that he wished
to convene “on the morrow,”65 and to give him a charge (Mosiah 1:2-17; 6:3).66 The purpose of the
assembly is given in these words: “I shall proclaim unto this my people . . . that thou art a king and a ruler
over this people” (Mosiah 1:10-11). But it is evident, from the actual text of Benjamin’s discourse, that
religious instruction far outweighed the coronation ceremony itself.67 In fact, only three verses of his speech
(Mosiah 2:29-31) are devoted to the succession of the new king, and only a portion of a single verse
(Mosiah 6:3) is given to Mosiah’s consecration. The account begins:
And it came to pass that after Mosiah had done as his father had commanded him, and had made a
proclamation throughout all the land, that the people gathered themselves together throughout all the
land, that they might go up to the temple to hear the words which king Benjamin should speak unto them.
And there were a great number, even so many that they did not number them; for they had multiplied
exceedingly and waxed great in the land. And they also took of the rstlings of their ocks, that they might
offer sacri ce and burnt offerings according to the law of Moses (Mosiah

Several elements here are characteristic of Sukkot. The gathering of the Nephites “up to the temple”68 indicates
the sanctity of the occasion. Regarding their sacri ces “according to the law of Moses,” it is signi cant to note that
there are more sacri ces prescribed for Sukkot than for any of the other festivals. Likewise, the tower which King
Benjamin caused to be erected corresponds to the wooden pulpit traditionally constructed for the king on the
occasion of the Feast of Tabernacles. Another Sukkot feature is the mention of the blood of Christ (Mosiah 3:11),
reminiscent of the blood of the covenant sprinkled on the people by Moses at the rst Sukkot (Exodus 24:8).
Furthermore, the Nephite assembly parallels the assembly of the Jews conducted in Jerusalem by Ezra upon the
return from Babylon.69 The temple had been rebuilt, and the Jews sought to recommit themselves to the Law of
Moses. For this purpose, they sancti ed the seventh month.70 On the rst day of that month, Ezra began reading
the Law to the congregation at the Water Gate (Nehemiah 8:1-3, 5). The following day, “they found written in the
law which the Lord had commanded by Moses, that the children of Israel should dwell in booths in the feast of the
seventh month” (Nehemiah 8:13-14). They therefore set about to construct the booths and kept the feast of
Sukkot.
Benjamin’s people, too, engaged in a renewal of their observance of Sukkot. Benjamin had studied the scriptures
with renewed emphasis on language and, as with Ezra, Benjamin may have felt that this observance of the feast
was the rst proper one which had been held for some time in the Nephite culture. The Nephites also set up their
“tents round about the temple, every man having his tent with the door thereof towards the temple, that thereby
they might remain in their tents and hear the words which king Benjamin should speak unto them.”71 These
“booths” represented the temporary dwellings used by the Israelites after leaving Egypt,72 and the practice of
pitching tents “with the door thereof towards the temple” nds its antecedent in the camp of Israel (Exodus 33:810).
The parallel extends further. As King Benjamin had spoken from a tower, so too Ezra “stood upon a pulpit of wood,
which they had made for the purpose.”73 Both Benjamin and Ezra spoke of God as Creator,74 King Benjamin
adding that since God gave us all we have (Mosiah 2:21, 23; 4:19-20), we have a moral obligation to be liberal
toward others (Mosiah 2:16-19; 4:15-19, 22-26). Most of Benjamin’s address was concerned with exhorting his
people to obey the commandments of God (Mosiah 2:22). He spoke of the curses and blessings of the Law,75 and
called upon the testimony of the written word against the people at the last day.76 In addition, he discussed the
atonement as it relates to the Law of Moses.77 Ezra, too, read to his people from the Law of Moses, exhorting
them to repentance (Nehemiah 8:1-3, 5-9, 13, 18; 9:3). Finally, Ezra’s words were addressed to “those that could
understand” (Nehemiah 8:3), and “every one having knowledge, and having understanding” took the oath
(Nehemiah 10:28-29). King Benjamin likewise spoke only to those “who [could] understand [his] words.”78
King Benjamin’s people, hearing his words, and feeling the spirit of the occasion, fell to the ground, repented of
their sins, and asked that the atonement be applied to them (Mosiah 4:1-2, 6-7), as all Israelites were expected to
do for the Day of Atonement in the seventh month.79 They then declared their willingness “to enter into a
covenant with our God to do his will, and to be obedient to his commandments in all things” (Mosiah 5:5; see vss.
2-6). Following this, King Benjamin recorded “the names of all those who had entered into a covenant with God to
keep his commandments” (Mosiah 6:1-3), as he had recorded the text of his speech.
The Jews in Jerusalem, similarly moved by the words of Ezra, “were assembled with fasting, and with sackclothes,
and earth upon them. . . . And they stood up in their place, and read in the book of the law of the Lord their God one

fourth part of the day; and another fourth part they confessed, and worshipped the Lord their God” (Nehemiah
9:1, 3). They “entered into a curse, and into an oath, to walk in God’s law, which was given by Moses the servant of
God, and to observe and do all the commandments of the Lord our Lord, and his judgments and his statutes”
(Nehemiah 10:29; compare JST). Here, also, they fell to the ground (Nehemiah 8:6), and names were recorded:
“because of all this we make a sure covenant, and write it; and our princes, Levites, and priests, seal unto it”
(Nehemiah 9:38). Ezra’s congregation also committed their new covenant to writing (Nehemiah 9:34-38).
There are, of course, some points regarding the seventh month celebration under Ezra that cannot be fully
demonstrated in the Nephite record. For example, the Jerusalem assembly also participated in a meal (Nehemiah
8:10, 12), and there were strangers present (Nehemiah 9:2). Foreigners among the Mulekites may also have been
present in Zarahemla. There are some indications that the Nephite assembly may have taken place in the
sabbatical or jubilee year. The sabbatical year is mentioned in Nehemiah 10:31, but there is no direct evidence that
the assembly in Jerusalem took place in such a year.
As previously discussed, the Jewish Sukkot liturgy was comprised of readings from Deuteronomy and the Psalms.
There are a number of parallels between the Jewish Sukkot liturgy and the speech given by King Benjamin.
Paragraph of the King
One of the primary passages read by the Israelite king at the autumn feast was the “paragraph of the King”
(Deuteronomy 17:14-20), that portion of the Mosaic code relating to the king’s duties. The ideas contained in this
biblical passage were fundamental to King Benjamin’s thoughts. Regarding kingship, where Deuteronomy 17:15
requires that only “one from among thy brethren” may become king, Benjamin addressed his Nephite audience as
“my brethren” (Mosiah 2:9, 15, 20, 31, 36; 3:1; 4:4). He also stressed, “I have been chosen by this people, and
consecrated by my father, and was suffered by the hand of the Lord that I should be a ruler and a king over this
people,”80 in conformity with Deuteronomy 17:15. He further ascribed to God the choice of Mosiah as his
successor (Mosiah 2:29-30).
Concerning the abuse of of ce, Deuteronomy 17:16-17 warned of the tendency of monarchs to use their power
to gain wealth and satisfy their own lusts.81 King Benjamin, in like manner, stressed that he had not “sought gold
nor silver nor any manner of riches” (Mosiah 2:12) nor had he permitted slavery (Mosiah 2:13).82 It is possible that
the commandment regarding “multiplying” horses and wives also lies behind his statements that one should not
keep his neighbor’s ass (Mosiah 5:14) and that one should not commit adultery (Mosiah 1:13; 2:13).83
The king was also humble. Deuteronomy 17:20 requires “that his heart be not lifted up above his brethren.”
Benjamin said: “I have not commanded you to come up hither that ye should fear me, or that ye should think that I
of myself am more than a mortal man. But I am like as yourselves.”84
Deuteronomy 17:18-19 speci es that the king should keep a copy of the Law with him, that he might always
remember the commandments of God. Accordingly, King Benjamin kept the brass plates of Laban, on which was
written the Law of Moses.85 The importance of the Law is reaf rmed in Deuteronomy 17:20: “that he turn not
aside from the commandment, to the right hand, or to the left: to the end that he may prolong his days in his
kingdom.” This is the central theme of the book of Deuteronomy: obedience to God’s law will bring prosperity in
the land and long life.86 This is also a main point of King Benjamin’s speech.87 Benjamin’s summary of this principle

(Mosiah 2:22) seems to have been directly inspired by Deuteronomy 6:2 or Deuteronomy 17:20.88 A secondary
theme found in both texts, and a feature associated with Sukkot is the exhortation to assist the needy.89
Benjamin and Jubilee
A comparative study by John W. Welch90 has related certain sections of Benjamin’s speech to Leviticus 25-26,
suggesting the possibility that the coronation of Mosiah occurred during a jubilee year.91 Parallels between the
passages in Leviticus and Mosiah are outlined as follows:92

Return possessions
Not to injure one another
Render according to due
Prosperity in the land follows obedience
Aid the poor
Use of riches
Peace in the land
Covenant with God
Lord’s dwelling
Lord to be with his people
Curses for disobedience, including burning
“Walk/go contrary . . . “

Leviticus
25:10
25:14, 17
25:15-16, 50
25:18-19
25:35
25:35-37
26:6
26:9
26:11
26:11-12
26:14-33
26:21, 27

Mosiah
4:28
4:13
4:13, 28
2:22
4:16, 26
4:21
2:31
5:5-6
2:37
2:36
2:38; 3:25-27
2:33, 36

We consistently nd that Sukkot and the beginning of the jubilee year (which is announced in the same seventh
month) go hand in hand. Nothing in either the attempt to identify sections in the speech that manifest af nity to
jubilee, in the thesis of this article regarding tabernacles, or in Hugh Nibley’s study of Benjamin’s speech as a royal
coronation for that matter is exclusive of the other. While some passages in Leviticus 25-26 are similar to
Deuteronomic passages already considered (for example, the promise that rain will be sent if Israel keeps God’s
commandments [Leviticus 26:3-5], and that God will defeat the nation’s enemies and establish peace [26:6-8]), the
parallels between the passages in Leviticus and Mosiah have independent signi cance: The fact that the jubilee
references are largely concentrated in two portions of the speech makes it very attractive to conclude that
Benjamin chose not only Sukkot as the time for the coronation of his son but a jubilee or sabbatical year as well.
CONCLUSION
This study is not intended to be conclusive. Rather, it is just one more probe into the Old World origins of the
Book of Mormon civilization and culture. While a few questions have been at least partially answered here,
many more still present themselves. How would the Nephites have coped with a new climate in the
celebration of a prepluvial festival? (The word “rain” does not occur in King Benjamin’s speech, though he
speaks of prosperity.) Were all of the elements of the Nephite assembly based on Israelite counterparts, or
did some stem from other Middle Eastern civilizations, as suggested by Dr. Nibley? Was there a Nephite
Sukkot liturgy? Did Laban’s brass plates contain all of the Psalms? Can we use the Book of Mormon
material to date the beginnings of the Jewish Sukkot liturgy of the Second Temple period? Although these
and other questions must remain unanswered, we can now respond to the question which prompted this
study: To what extent did the Nephites keep the rites of the Law of Moses? The preponderance of our
evidence certainly verifies the words of Nephi: “And we did observe to keep the judgments, and the statutes,
and the commandments of the Lord in all things, according to the law of Moses” (2 Nephi 5:10).
Notes

The first draft of the major portion of this article was prepared in Jerusalem in March 1973. This essay
originally appeared in a slightly different form under the title “The Nephite Feast of Tabernacles” in the
unpublished “Tinkling Cymbals: Essays in Honor of Hugh Nibley,” John W. Welch, ed., 1978, and was later
issued as F.A.R.M.S. Preliminary Report TVE-78 in 1983.
1. My original article sparked considerable interest among Latter-day Saint scholars, several of whom began to
search for further evidences of the observance of Jewish feasts in the Book of Mormon text. Several workshops
on Nephite religious festivals were held by F.A.R.M.S., and some preliminary reports resulted. Some additional
information is included here. However, a more exhaustive study is under way. Italics are my own unless otherwise
noted.
2. For example, 1 Nephi 5:9; 7:22; Mosiah 2:3; Alma 34:13-14; 3 Nephi 9:17-20; 15:2-10.
3. For example, Sabbath observance in Jarom 1:5; Mosiah 13:16-19; 18:23.
4. Mosiah 1-6. Other Nephite assemblies—some perhaps of the same nature—are found in Jacob 1:17-6:13;
Mosiah 7:17; 22:1-9; 25:1-18; Alma 2:5-9; 18:9; 20:9-12; 3 Nephi 3:13-14; 4:4. Note also Nephi’s speech from
the tower in Helaman 7, where he outlines God’s dealings with men. Further, compare the comments on the
justice of kings in Mosiah 23:8 and especially in Mosiah 29:12-14, where Mosiah is seeking a successor from
among his sons.
5. Hugh Nibley, An Approach to the Book of Mormon, vol. 6, The Collected Works of Hugh Nibley (Salt Lake City:
Deseret Book and F.A.R.M.S., 1988), 295-310; and Since Cumorah, vol. 7, The Collected Works of Hugh Nibley (Salt
Lake City: Deseret Book and F.A.R.M.S., 1988), 247-51. See also Hugh Nibley, “The Arrow, the Hunter, and the
State,” Western Political Quarterly 2/3 (1949): 328-44; and “The Hierocentric State,” Western Political Quarterly 4/2
(1951): 225-53.
6. The Israelite calendar was lunar, with each month beginning at the new moon. The year comprised twelve
months of alternating twenty-nine or thirty days. This gave 354 days, or eleven days short of the solar year.
Periodically, an intercalary month (“Second Adar”) was added to bring the calendar into line with the seasons. In
this manner, the month of Abib always encompassed the spring equinox. The system is still followed in today’s
sacred Jewish calendar. It is re ected in the dating of Easter in the Western churches, which is de ned by the
Catholic Church as the Sunday closest to the full moon nearest the spring equinox. Passover, of course, falls on the
full moon closest to the spring equinox, since it is halfway through the month of Abib.
7. Exodus 12-13. The Prophet Joseph Smith connected the date of April 6 with the birth and death of Christ,
Passover, the Creation, and the Restoration of the Church (HC 1:337). The rst of Abib is the day on which Noah
saw that the face of the land was dry (Genesis 8:13), and Moses set up the Tabernacle (Exodus 40:2, 17). There is
an obvious symbolism in beginning the year with the spring equinox, when the ground is again alive with greenery.
8. The notable exception was the New Moon, which marked the beginning of each new month (Numbers 10:10;
Psalm 81:3).
9. Genesis 2:2-3; Exodus 16:26-30; 20:10-11; 31:13-17; 34:21; 35:2-3; Leviticus 23:3; Deuteronomy 5:12-15.
Regarding seven-day periods, note also the cleansing rites for those touching dead bodies (Numbers 19:11-22;
31:19-24), Nazarites (Numbers 6:6-12), and lepers (Leviticus 13; 14:1-9), as also for plagues (Leviticus 14:33-42).

10. Exodus 34:22; Leviticus 23:15-21; Deuteronomy 16:9-10. According to Jewish tradition, the Law was
received at Sinai on cot; see A. Chill, The Mitzvot (Jerusalem: Keter, 1974), 281.
11. Just as the rst month includes the spring equinox, the seventh includes the autumn equinox. The Feast of
Weeks falls just short of the summer solstice, however, and the winter solstice had no known signi cance in Old
Testament Israel.
12. Leviticus 23:23-25; Numbers 29:1-6. Traditionally Adam’s creation; Chill, The Mitzvot, 285.
13. Leviticus 16:29-34; 23:26-32; Numbers 29:7-11. According to tradition, this day is the anniversary of Adam’s
repentance of his sin, of Abraham’s circumcision, and of Moses’ second descent from the Mount, with the new
tablets of the Law; Chill, The Mitzvot, 288.
14. Exodus 23:16; Leviticus 23:33-43; Numbers 29:12-39; Deuteronomy 16:13-15; Ezekiel 45:25.
15. Exodus 23:10-11 (note the weekly Sabbath in vs. 12); Leviticus 25:1-7, 18-22; 26:34-35; 2 Chronicles 36:21.
Note Deuteronomy 15:1-8, where we nd a release of debts to Hebrews, a release of Hebrew slaves, and
assistance rendered to the needy.
16. From Hebrew yôbel, “ram’s horn,” used as a trumpet.
17. Exodus 21:2; Leviticus 25:8-17, 23-34; Deuteronomy 15:1-18. For Leviticus 25:23, cf. the response of Naboth
to Ahab in 1 Kings 21:1-3.
18. The jubilee was announced by the blowing of trumpets on Yom Kippur (Leviticus 25:9).
19. In fact, the original purpose of the feast was probably to pray for rain (Deuteronomy 28:12). Once, during the
author’s eight-year stay in Israel, there was a rainstorm before Sukkot. The chief rabbis issued an of cial
declaration that it was “not rain,” since rain cannot come before the prayers are offered. (With the same reasoning,
just prior to the Feast of Unleavened Bread, after ridding the house of yeast and searching under the furniture
with a candle, an Orthodox Jew will declare that “if there remains any leaven in this house, it is not my leaven!”)
20. The eighth day, with its special assembly, was originally not counted with the seven. A sukkah was not required
for this last day. In 1972, I mentioned to President and Sister Harold B. Lee (then on visit to Jerusalem) that our
April and October conferences corresponded with the timing of the ancient festivals of Passover and Tabernacles.
Sister Lee noted that she recalled, as a little girl, that the Salt Lake Tabernacle was always decorated with tree
branches during October Conference. I have been yet unable to con rm this from other sources.
21. These temporary dwellings have long-standing use in the harvest season of the Middle East, when families
spend several days at a time in the elds, rather than commuting daily from the villages. In addition to providing
shade for the workers during mealtime, the rough shelters keep the harvested produce out of direct sunlight.
22. The Bible does not provide this information. The Israelites arrived in the wilderness of Sinai during the third
month (Exodus 19:1), and the Tabernacle was completed and set up on the rst day of the rst month of the
second year (Exodus 40:1, 17). The law was revealed some time between these two xed dates. Josephus noted
that when Moses ascended the mount to receive the Law, the Israelites pitched their tents about the mountain
and were caught in a rain storm; Antiquities of the Jews III, 5, 1-2.

23. Today, the annual reading cycle of the Torah ends (and begins anew) at Simhat Torah. This practice of reading
assigned portions of the Law each week during each year is traditionally dated to the time of Ezra the Scribe, who
renewed the celebration of Sukkot after the Babylonian Captivity (discussed below).
24. The ark landed atop the mountain on the seventeenth day of the seventh month, during Sukkot (Genesis 8:4).
Note the covenant in Genesis 8:20-9:17, containing the Sukkot elements of burnt offerings and a promise of
“seedtime and harvest” and the rainbow, in addition to a covenant of peace. Professor Nibley has previously
intimated that the great autumnal festivals, representing renewal of the earth, were perhaps patterned after the
heavenly council convened to plan the creation of the earth; An Approach to the Book of Mormon, 309.
25. It is, of course, unlikely (unless unitedly moved upon by the Spirit) that the people all said the same thing
simultaneously without a script. Regarding this ritual choral recitation, see Nibley, An Approach to the Book of
Mormon, 303, 305.
26. The Hebrew altar (mizbeah, “place of slaughter/sacri ce”) was used for cooking and burning of sacri cial meat.
The word is also used for incense altars, which are likewise used for offerings to God. The word generally
translated “pillar” in KJV is the Hebrew massebah (lit., “something erected”). It is always constructed as the sign of a
covenant (e.g., Genesis 28:10-22; 31:44-52), and hence could be termed a “covenant altar.”
27. 1 Kings 8:10-12; 2 Chronicles 5:13-14. Compare the cloud at Sinai (Exodus 24:16-18) and during the
wanderings in the wilderness (Exodus 13:21-22; 40:34-38), as also the cloud on the Mount of Trans guration
(Matthew 17:1-6), and at Jesus’ ascension (Acts 1:8-9). Regarding the Trans guration, note the presence of Moses
(who instituted Sukkot), of Elijah (or Elias, who had power over the rains), and of other elements (e.g., the desire of
the three Apostles to build “tabernacles”). Cf. the Trans guration and D&C 110.
28. 1 Kings 8:65 says “seven days and seven days, even fourteen days,” though the text notes that on the eighth day
Solomon sent the people away.
29. Note the mention of tents (1 Kings 8:66; 2 Chronicles 7:10) and of strangers (1 Kings 8:41-43; 2 Chronicles
6:32-33), as also of the brazen scaffold (kiyyôr nhôset) on which Solomon stood (2 Chronicles 6:13).
30. 2 Samuel 24:18-25; 1 Chronicles 21:18-22:1; cf. 2 Chronicles 3:1.
31. 2 Samuel 6:12, 14-16; 1 Chronicles 15:25, 27-29; 16:1.
32. 1 Chronicles 16:7-36. The Psalms cited by David on this occasion were 105:1-15, speaking of God’s covenant
and his dealings with the people; 96:1-13 (96:13 = 1 Chronicles 16:33), that the Lord is to judge the earth (cf.
Mosiah 3:10); and 106:47-48, which is similar to Psalm 118, which later became part of the Sukkot liturgy. Some of
the Sukkot elements found in David’s recitation in 1 Chronicles 16 include: (a) an exhortation to remember the
Lord’s dealings with Israel (vss. 8, 12, 24), (b) to praise the Lord (vss. 9-11, 25), (c) to “be ye mindful of his covenant”
(vs. 15), (d) sacri ce (vs. 29), (e) the Lord’s role as King (vs. 31), and (f) recitation of the Sukkot formula, “Save us, O
God of our salvation” (vs. 35, cf. 23). After David’s recitation, “all the people said, Amen, and praised the Lord” (vs.
36).
33. In Ezekiel’s vision of the future, it is the prince of Israel (i.e., the king) who supervised the activities of both
Passover and Sukkot (Ezekiel 45: 22-25).

34. For example, H. L. Jansen, “The Consecration in the Eighth Chapter of Testamentum Levi,” in The Sacral
Worship, Contributions to the Central Theme of the VIIIth International Congress for the History of Religions,
Rome, April 1955 (Leiden: Brill, 1959), 361-62.
35. See Hugh Nibley, An Approach to the Book of Mormon, 300-306. Though Sukkot was the main royal festival, note
also the royal covenant of the third month in 2 Chronicles 15:10-15 (cf. vss. 12-13 with Mosiah 6:2). Note also the
Passovers celebrated by Hezekiah (2 Chronicles 30) and Josiah (2 Kings 23:21-23; 2 Chronicles 35). M Bikkurim
3:4 informs us that it was the King who led the rstfruits procession (Deuteronomy 26), which, like Sukkot,
featured the playing of pipes ( utes).
36. Seder Olam Zuta Chronicle, in A. Neubauer, ed., Mediaeval Jewish Chronicles and Chronicle Notes, 2 vols. (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1887-95), 2:83; cited by H. H. Ben-Sasson, A History of the Jewish People (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1976), 422.
37. By the days of King Agrippa (d. 44 A.D.), the seventh month was counted as the rst, as today.
38. Deuteronomy 31:10-12.
39. Deuteronomy 17:15. Agrippa’s ancestors were Idumeans (Edomites), descendants of Esau. By religion, he was
Jewish, by citizenship a Roman.
40. Deuteronomy 6:4-10. This is the Shemac (imperative “Hear!”), most important of the Jewish prayers. It is cited
by Jesus in Mark 12:29.
41. Deuteronomy 11:13-22.
42. Deuteronomy 14:22-28.
43. Deuteronomy 26:12-19.
44. Deuteronomy 17:14-20.
45. Deuteronomy 27:15-28:68.
46. M Sotah 7:8.
47. One of the principal themes of the Book of Mormon is the Lord’s promise that if the people keep his
commandments, they shall prosper in the land, while if they disobey him, they shall not prosper (1 Nephi 2:20;
4:14; 2 Nephi 1:9, 20; 4:4; Jarom 1:9; Omni 1:6; Alma 9:13; 36:1, 30; 37:13; 38:1; 48:15, 25; 50:20; Helaman
3:20; 3 Nephi 5:22). The promise was mentioned by King Benjamin in his speech (Mosiah 1:7; 2:22, 31). The
promise had also been made to such Israelite leaders as Joshua (Joshua 1:7) and Solomon (1 Kings 2:3; 1
Chronicles 29:23), and is repeated elsewhere in the Old Testament (2 Chronicles 24:20; 31:21; Ezra 6:14; Job
36:11; Jeremiah 22:21) and in our day (D&C 9:13).
48. Compare Mosiah 2:34, 40; 3:21; 6:2.

49. The double emphasis is perhaps because strangers were invited to attend the Sukkot festivities (in the hopes
they would be converted, hearing the Law read).
50. In ancient Egypt, it was believed that the king was responsible for the onset of the Nile oods so necessary to
that country’s agricultural economy. Just prior to the coming of the waters (in September), the king would offer
prayers to Hapi, the river god. In actual fact, of course, the king had advance information of the Nile’s rising, based
on special measuring marks cut into the limestone cataracts upstream.
51. 2 Chronicles 29:27. Seven and a half years according to 2 Samuel 2:11; 5:5; 1 Chronicles 3:4.
52. 1 Kings 12:19-24. Already in the time of Solomon, Jeroboam had been told by the prophet Ahijah that if he
kept the commandments, Israel would be his (1 Kings 11:38).
53. 2 Kings 11:17; 2 Chronicles 23:16. The repetition of the words “and between the king also and the people” in 2
Kings 11:17 is a dittographic error committed by a later scribe.
54. In 1 Maccabees 14:41 we read: “Also that the Jews and priests were well pleased that Simon should be their
governor and high priest for ever, until there should arise a faithful priest,” evidently to reestablish (in proper
order), the Davidic line.
55. In later times, it was water from the Spring of Gihon (site of Solomon’s coronation) the high priest poured out
upon the altar during Sukkot. Water, representing expected rains, was appropriate for the festival. However, wine
is also appropriate to Sukkot, which takes place just after the grape harvest.
56. Leviticus 16:1 has reference to 10:1-2 and shows that all of these chapters refer to events which occurred
during the consecration ceremony. The rest of chapter 16 speaks of how Aaron was to offer the sacri ce of the
day of atonement (vs. 29).
57. The true anointing is to be both a king and a priest to God. In the Bible, both the king and the high priest were
called by the title Messiah (Heb. masîah, “anointed one”). See also Jansen, “The Consecration in the Eighth Chapter
of Testamentum Levi,” 356-65, where he compares Levi’s priestly anointing, washing, investiture, and ordination
with the enthronement of God as King. He speaks both of the new name (cf. Mosiah 1:11-12; 5:7-13; D&C
130:111; 133:18; Revelation 2:17, 3:12) and notes the implications of Testament of Levi 19:2-3 in comparison with
biblical Sukkot and coronation rites. The relevant verses read: “And his sons replied, ‘Before the Lord we will live
according to his Law.’ And their father said to them, ‘The Lord is my witness and his angels are witnesses, and you
are witnesses, and I am witness concerning the word from your mouth.’ And his sons said, ‘(We are) witnesses.’ ”
James H. Charlesworth, The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983-85), 1:795.
58. Based on Deuteronomy 16:14. The produce of the sabbatical year was left to the poor among the people
(Exodus 23:11; Leviticus 25:6).
59. Saul, Israel’s rst universally acknowledged king, is called, in the earlier parts of Samuel, by the term nâgîd,
“commander” (KJV “captain”), indicating his role as leader of the army (1 Samuel 10:1; cf. 1 Samuel 11). David’s
troubles began when he neglected personally to lead the army of Israel in battle (2 Samuel 11, esp. vs. 1). From
Egyptian, Assyrian, and Babylonian records, we learn that it was typical for kings to accompany their armies into
the eld. In the Book of Mormon, Nephi personally wielded the sword of Laban in the defense of his people (Jacob
1:10), as did his successors on the throne (Jarom 1:7, 14; Omni 1:24; Words of Mormon 1:13).

60. To symbolize this, each day of the festival a priest would bring water from the Spring of Gihon and pour it in a
basin on the altar, mixing some of it with wine (in the Mishnah, see Shekalim 6:30; Sukkah 4:1, 9; Zebahim 6:2;
Middot 2:6.)
61. See n. 26.
62. Regarding the “pipes” (KJV) or utes played at Sukkot, see M Sukkah 5:1. The dancing before the Tabernacle at
Shiloh (Judges 21:19-23) apparently is for Sukkot. Compare also the Lamanite girls in Mosiah 20:1-5.
63. Probably reminiscent of the “voice of the trumpet” which announced God’s appearance on Mt. Sinai (Exodus
19:16-20). Trumpets also announced each New Moon (Numbers 10:10; Psalm 81:3), and were used to assemble
the congregation in the wilderness (Numbers 10:7-8).
64. Compare Saul’s rejection as king by God. See also 2 Chronicles 24:20-21; cf. Mosiah 2:18-19.
65. Mosiah 1:10. One wonders how King Benjamin could have assembled all of his people “on the morrow.” While
it is possible that the Nephites lived in a very small area, over which messages could be sent one day and an
assembly held the next, it is likewise possible that the assembly was calendared by the annual clock and that the
people were already planning to come to Zarahemla from whatever distance to participate in the Feast of
Tabernacles. The “proclamation” need not imply that it was an unscheduled event. In ancient Israel, the King also
issued a proclamation for the Passover, though it was a set festival (2 Chronicles 30:1-11; cf. Exodus 32:5).
66. Compare David’s charge to Solomon in 1 Kings 2:1-9. Several ancient Egyptian documents comprise
admonitions to kings and princes.
67. The royal nature of the Sukkot celebration makes it unnecessary to minimize Mosiah’s coronation. The
Mishnaic reference to Sukkot as a royal festival, and the nature of Israelite assemblies generally, substantiates the
heavily religious nature of coronation rites in Israel.
68. See Mosiah 1:10, 18; 2:1-3, 5.
69. Nehemiah 8-10; see esp. 7:73-8:1, 13. Regular provision for sacri ce was also made at that time (10:34-36).
70. This assembly was represented as the rst proper observance of the festival since Joshua (Nehemiah 8:17).
Actually, the rst company of Jews returning from Babylon had celebrated Sukkot by building an altar and making
burnt offerings (Ezra 3:1-6). But enemies hindered the rebuilding of the Temple. About 520 B.C., encouraged by
the prophecies of Haggai and Zechariah, the Jews resumed work on the Temple (Ezra 4:24-5:1). One of Haggai’s
prophecies was given on the rst day of Sukkot (Haggai 2:1-9), evidently in memory of Solomon’s Temple. Much of
the prophecy of Zechariah deals with the future restoration of the monarchy at the time of Sukkot. These are, in
effect, messianic prophecies, some of which were ful lled by Jesus at his rst coming, while others will be ful lled
when he returns to Jerusalem. For example, coming seated on an ass (9:9), the blood of the covenant (9:11), the
blowing of the trumpet (9:14), and the new wine (9:15-16). In Zechariah 9:16, we read that “in that day” the Lord
shall save. There is mention of clouds and of rains (10:1) and a threat to smite horses (9:10; 12:4; 14:15),
reminiscent of the Paragraph of the King. There is also mention of the tents of Judah (12:7; 14:15). Each family is
apart (12:12-14). A new fountain, to accompany the rains, is to come forth from the Temple (13:1; 14:8). A
covenant will be made with the Lord’s people (13:9), and Jerusalem will then be cut in half by the enemy (14:2; the
two bodies of people at Sukkot?—cf. Mosiah 25:1-4). But the Lord will defeat Israel’s enemies (14:3). At the critical

moment, he will appear to reign on earth as King (14:9, 16-17; cf. the crown in 9:16). The Feast of Tabernacles will
be celebrated (14:16, 18-19), along with sacri ces (14:20-21). Those who do not come to celebrate the feast and
make covenant with God will not receive the promised rains (14:17).
Jesus’ hesitation to attend the Sukkot festival in Jerusalem (John 7:1-13) was perhaps because the time for his
coming in glory was not yet (John 7:6). His rst coming in triumph was just before Passover (on what has come to
be known as “Palm Sunday”), and his second will be at Sukkot. When, at length, he did attend the Sukkot festival,
Jesus spoke of the “living water” (John 7:37-38), probably an allusion to the water poured on the altar during the
festival (cf. Zechariah 13:1; 14:8; Ezekiel 47:1-12). There are other allusions to Sukkot in statements made by
Jesus at that time.
71. Mosiah 2:5-6. Each tent contained one family. Israel also pitched tents by families in the wilderness (Numbers
2:34). They dwelt in tents at the time they covenanted with God at Sinai (Deuteronomy 5:27-31).
72. The Hebrew ‘ohel, “tent,” has a semantic range including “dwelling, habitation” (Genesis 9:27; 1 Kings 8:66; Job
8:22; Psalm 84:10; Jeremiah 10:20; 30:18).
73. Nehemiah 8:4. The Hebrew word is migdal, generally translated “tower,” rather than “pulpit” as here in KJV.
Compare the “brazen scaffold” of Solomon and the “stairs” (macaleh, “ascent”) in Nehemiah 9:4, from which, in
Second Temple times, the Levites sang the “Psalms of Degrees” (Hebrew “ascents”) and the priests sounded their
trumpets on the last day of Sukkot. Many aspects of the “Psalms of Degrees” and the “Hallel Psalms” sung during
Sukkot are also re ected in King Benjamin’s speech.
74. Mosiah 2:20-21, 23, 25; 4:9, 21; Nehemiah 9:5-6.
75. Mosiah 1:13-14; 2:22, 24, 33, 36-41; 3:14-15, 25-27; 5:14-15.
76. Mosiah 3:24. Moses, Joshua, and Ezra had likewise made records as testimonies or witnesses, as discussed
below.
77. Mosiah 2:34-35; 3:1-16. Regarding the atoning blood, see Mosiah 4:2.
78. Mosiah 2:40. Compare Mosiah 2:34; 3:21; 6:2. Moses also excluded the children (Deuteronomy 11:2).
79. This is still practiced in Judaism. Indeed, Yom Kippur is the only time when Jews prostrate themselves on the
ground for prayers. The normal practice is to pray standing or sometimes sitting, but not kneeling.
80. Mosiah 2:11; cf. 1:10.
81. Similarly, when prevailed upon by Israel to anoint the rst king, the prophet Samuel was told by the Lord that
the king would use his position to his own advantage, taking from the people their children, their riches, and their
properties (1 Samuel 8:4-22). This did, in fact, come to pass in the days of Solomon and thereafter (e.g., 1 Kings 4:7,
22-23, 26-28; 10:23-29; 11:1-8).
82. He also called the people to witness (Mosiah 2:14), as had Samuel and Joshua. He had a clear conscience
(Mosiah 2:15, 27).

83. In any case, these ideas are part of the Law of Moses. See the jubilee, below.
84. Mosiah 2:10-11. Compare Hugh Nibley, An Approach to the Book of Mormon, 301-3.
85. Mosiah 1:2-7. These plates were passed on to Mosiah at the time of the ceremony, and later to the judges. The
large plates of Nephi had apparently always been in the hands of the kings (Omni 1:11).
86. For example, Deuteronomy 4:1, 5, 26, 40; 5:33; 10:12-13; 11:21-22.
87. For example, Mosiah 1:7; 2:31, 36; 4:15; 6:6.
88. In the former passage, it refers to the people as a whole, while in the latter it refers to the king only. Both
Deuteronomy passages were part of the Sukkot liturgy.
89. Deuteronomy 10:18-19; 14:29; 26:12-13, 17-19; Mosiah 4:16-19. I have cited only passages known to have
been read by the king at Sukkot.
90. John W. Welch, “Benjamin’s Speech (Mosiah 2:9-5:15): A Textual Analysis with Commentary,” unpublished
manuscript, 1 January 1973, 52-53, and John W. Welch, compiler, “King Benjamin’s Speech in the Context of
Ancient Israelite Festivals,” F.A.R.M.S. preliminary report, 1985, 58-63.
91. It is sometimes dif cult to distinguish between the sabbatical and jubilee years. Both are marked by the release
of debts (Deuteronomy 15:1-3; Leviticus 25:33-37) and by the prohibition against agricultural pursuits (Leviticus
25:2-8, 11-12, 20-22). Only in the jubilee does land return to its original owners (Leviticus 25:8-10, 13- 6, 23-34;
27:17-24; Numbers 36:4). The procedure for the release of Hebrew slaves is troublesome. Contrast Exodus 21:111 with Deuteronomy 15:1, 12-18 and Leviticus 25:39-55.
92. I follow Welch here with a few additions.

The Melchizedek Material in Alma 13:
13-19
John W. Welch
Alma’s discourse on how man comes to know and participate in the plan of redemption (Alma 12:9-13:30)
contains a noteworthy use of the material about Melchizedek in Genesis 14:17-24 and in other sources available
to him. For Alma, the story of Melchizedek is a commanding illustration of how a person can obtain knowledge of
the mysteries of the gospel and attain the blessings of sacred priesthood ordinances through faith, repentance,
and righteousness (cf. Alma 12:30; 13:3, 10). Drawing these speci c illustrations and teachings out of the Genesis
and other accounts is unparalleled in a vast array of literature, which treats Melchizedek in a variety of ways.1
Alma found his basic information about Melchizedek in the books of Moses and from the ancient history of the
Jews written on the plates of brass (1 Nephi 5:11-12) that were in his possession (Alma 37:1-3). In exploring his
use of that material, this article approaches Alma’s text from several directions. First, I examine Alma’s discourse,
focusing in particular on his comments about Melchizedek. Second, I consider Alma’s possible sources. He may
have had a text similar to the short and puzzling text of Genesis 14:17-24, yet more than likely his scriptures
contained a longer account similar to JST, Genesis 14:17-40. In conjunction with my discussion of the traditional
biblical material, I also consider the major interpretations which subsequent Jews and Christians have imposed
upon that material through the ages. Those diverse interpretations provide an interesting comparison to the rich
messages of Alma 13:13-19.
The Melchizedek Text in Alma 13
Alma turned to Melchizedek to illustrate the doctrine that all people may obtain knowledge of the mysteries of
God through humility, righteousness, and the ordinances of the priesthood. It is not the historical details about
Melchizedek himself that are important to Alma, but rather the symbolic priesthood ordinances associated with
him. Melchizedek was a man of God and peace because he had obtained the spiritual powers and knowledge
necessary to lead his people into the rest of the Lord through the order of the Son.
Alma’s text is of particular interest for several reasons. First it is unique—sui generis. No other known sermon has
imputed such a practical religious and ceremonial meaning to Melchizedek, although in certain respects the
sacerdotal approach of 2 Enoch and the account in the Joseph Smith Translation (discussed below) come close.
Second, on its face it is one of the earliest extant expositions of the signi cance of Melchizedek. Working in the
early rst century B.C., Alma acknowledged that ancient scriptures stood behind his interpretation (Alma 13:20).
Unless Alma was radically interpolating his sources (which seems unlikely in light of his own warning in Alma 13:20
that readers of the scriptures should not “wrest them” ), his text is based upon a preexilic version of Genesis 14
(and perhaps other sources), known to him from the plates of brass.
Third, it gives us a rare opportunity to see one of the most fertile minds and sensitive spirits among the Book of
Mormon prophets at work on a passage of ancient scripture. Where other Jewish and Christian interpreters have
seen only remote abstractions, precedents, or shadows, Alma brings forth powerful lessons on humility,
repentance, priesthood, ordinances, and revelation.

Alma’s sermon in chapters 12 and 13 teaches the principle that God will provide men access to certain mysteries
of God (Alma 12:9-11). The rst verse of this sermon sets the theme for the entire discourse. Alma says that many
know these mysteries as priests (Alma 13:1), but they are laid under a strict condition of secrecy (Alma 12:9) that
can be lifted only by the diligence and repentance of the children of men (Alma 12:9-11; 13:18; cf. Alma 26:22).
The plan provides all mankind a chance to know the mysteries in full (Alma 12:10), by humility (Alma 12:10-11;
13:13-14) and through the ministrations of properly ordained priests (Alma 13:16; cf. Mosiah 2:9; Alma 26:22).
The substantive portion of the sermon (Alma 12:12-27) describes the judgment of God and tells how man can
avert a second death through obedience to a new set of commandments. According to Alma’s exposition, the fall of
mankind was pre gured by Adam violating a rst set of commandments (Alma 12:22); thus men must die in order
to come to judgment (Alma 12:24). Messengers (i.e., “angels,” Alma 12:29) were then sent, and God conversed
with men, making known the plan of mercy through the Son (Alma 12:29). Man was then given a second set of
commandments (Alma 12:32) accompanied by an oath that whoever broke those commandments should not
enter into the rest or presence of the Lord (Alma 12:35) but would die the ultimate or last death (Alma 12:36).
Following this introductory explanation, Alma expounds upon the Nephite procedure through which the
ordinances of the priesthood were received (see Alma 13:16) and how men might choose between obeying the
Lord’s commandments and thereby “enter[ing] into the rest of the Lord” (Alma 13:16), or rebelliously disobeying
him and suffering death. The Nephite ordination was a symbolic ritual, since it was performed “in a manner that
thereby the people might know in what manner to look forward to his Son for redemption” (Alma 13:2). That
manner is discussed by Alma only in veiled terms.2 Candidates were “called and prepared from the foundation of
the world” (Alma 13:3) with a “holy calling” (Alma 13:3, 5, 8).3 This calling was according to a “preparatory
redemption” from before the creation of the world (Alma 13:3), and it was patterned after, in, and through the
preparation of the Son (Alma 13:5). Then they were “ordained with a holy ordinance” (Alma 13:8), “taking upon
them the high priesthood of the holy order” (Alma 13:6, 8-9). Thereby the candidates became “high priests forever,
after the order of the Son” (Alma 13:9). Following these preparations, and after making a choice to work
righteousness rather than to perish (Alma 13:10), the candidate was sancti ed by the Holy Ghost, his garments
were washed white, and he “entered into the rest of the Lord” (Alma 13:12).
Having thus discussed this ordination procedure, Alma discusses Melchizedek as the archetype of high priests
after this order of the Son. He gives the following account:
The Need for Humility and Signs of Repentance:
And now, my brethren, I would that ye should humble yourselves before God, and bring forth fruit meet
for repentance, that ye may also enter into that rest. Yea, humble yourselves even as the people in the
days of Melchizedek, who was also a high priest after this same order which I have spoken, who also took
upon him the high priesthood forever. And it was this same Melchizedek to whom Abraham paid tithes;
yea even our father Abraham paid tithes of one-tenth part of all he possessed (Alma 13:13-15).
The Need for Symbolic Ordinances:
Now these ordinances were given after this manner, that thereby the people might look forward on the
Son of God, it being a type of his order, or it being his order, and this that they might look forward to him
for a remission of their sins, that they might enter into the rest of the Lord (Alma 13:16).

Melchizedek as a Leader to Peace through Repentance:
Now this Melchizedek was a king over the land of Salem; and his people had waxed strong in iniquity and
abomination; yea, they had all gone astray; they were full of all manner of wickedness. But Melchizedek
having exercised mighty faith, and received the of ce of the high priesthood according to the holy order of
God, did preach repentance unto his people. And behold, they did repent; and Melchizedek did establish
peace in the land in his days; therefore he was called the prince of peace, for he was the king of Salem; and
he did reign under his father (Alma 13:17-18).
The Greatness of Melchizedek among Many:
Now, there were many before him, and also there were many afterwards, but none were greater;
therefore, of him they have more particularly made mention (Alma 13:19).
For Alma, Melchizedek was a great high priest who took upon him the high priesthood forever after the order of
the Son that Alma has described. Melchizedek’s people were wicked, but through repentance, they became
humble and were taught by certain ordinances how to look forward on the Son of God for a remission of sins. In
this way, Melchizedek established peace in the land of Salem, where he ruled under his father.
In order to compare this information about Melchizedek with that in the Bible, I now turn to examine the biblical
narrative and how it has been interpreted.
Genesis 14:17-24 in the Old Testament
Alma’s material is fundamentally related to the text of Genesis 14, which contains some of the most ancient
history in the Old Testament.4 Although any quest for a conclusive picture of the historical Melchizedek may
ultimately be sti ed by our lack of contemporaneous information about the man and his period, an examination of
the ancient literature pertaining to him yields valuable insights into the theological treatment of this religious
gure through the ages.
Genesis 14:17-24 is the fountainhead of many ideas about Melchizedek. This text recounts the following events:
The Meeting:
And the king of Sodom went out to meet him [Abraham] after his return from the slaughter of
Chedorlaomer, and of the kings that were with him, at the valley of Shaveh, which is the king’s dale
(Genesis 14:17).
Melchizedek’s Appearance:
And Melchizedek king of Salem brought forth bread and wine: and he was the priest of the most high God
(El Elyon) (Genesis 14:18).
Melchizedek’s Blessing:
And he blessed him, and said, Blessed be Abram of the most high God, possessor of heaven and earth: And
blessed be the most high God, which hath delivered thine enemies into thy hand (Genesis 14:19-20).

The Payment of Tithes:
And he gave him tithes of all (Genesis 14:20).
Division of the Spoils:
And the king of Sodom said unto Abram, Give me the persons, and take the goods to thyself. And Abram
said to the king of Sodom, I have lift up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of
heaven and earth, That I will not take from a thread even to a shoelatchet, and that I will not take any thing
that is thine, lest thou shouldest say, I have made Abram rich: [I will take] only that which the young men
have eaten, and the portion of the men which went with me, Aner, Eshcol, and Mamre; let them take their
portion (Genesis 14:21-24).
In his brief encounter with Abraham described in this account, Melchizedek appears as a moderator of peace
serving a dual political and religious role, probably in sanctioning Abraham’s disposition of the spoils of war. In the
battle, Abraham had freed his nephew Lot, a resident of Sodom, who had been taken captive when Sodom fell to
Chedorlaomer and his allies. Upon Abraham’s return, the king of Sodom came out to meet him. At this point,
Melchizedek, king of Salem and priest of El the Most High, brought forth bread (or “food”) and wine, and blessed
Abraham with a hymn of beati cation, extolling God’s deliverance of the enemy into Abraham’s hands. Tithes were
then paid, although Abraham refused to accept any spoils of war taken from Sodom, lest it should ever be thought
that the king of Sodom, rather than God, had enriched Abraham.
In general, the organizational dependence of Alma’s words on Genesis 14 is apparent. Similar in length, the lines of
these two passages concerning the payment of tithes (Genesis 14:20; Alma 13:15), Melchizedek’s priesthood
(Genesis 14:19; Alma 13:14), and the designation of Melchizedek as the king over the land of Salem (Genesis
14:18; Alma 13:18) are closely related. Nevertheless, Alma’s text is interpretively independent. His perspective
provides unique meanings: Where Genesis begins by simply describing powerful earthly kings meeting humbly
before this righteous man of God (Genesis 14:17), Alma goes on to draw an express lesson on humility (Alma
13:13-14); where the Genesis text next speaks of Melchizedek blessing Abraham (Genesis 14:19), Alma next
speaks of the ordinances whereby all people might be blessed (Alma 13:16); and where Genesis nally discusses
the division of spoils and Abraham’s forbearance (14:21-24), Alma concludes by expounding upon the wickedness
of the people and their repentance led by Melchizedek’s in uence (Alma 13:17-18).
When we turn to speci cs, however, the Hebrew text leaves many questions unanswered. Out of this account has
arisen a multitude of intractable questions over which scholars have puzzled. Consider the Hebrew name
Malkîsedeq. Does it hold some hidden meaning? It may be translated in many ways, including, “the King is
Righteous,” or “the King is Legitimate,” or perhaps “Righteousness is King,”5 or “My Lord is Sedeq (a Canaanite
deity).”6 The intrinsic meanings in these roots themselves have led some to claim that Melchizedek is not a
personal name in Genesis 14:18 at all. The words may simply refer epithetically to “the just king”7 (the king of
Sodom?),8 or, as Albright suggests, they may be a corruption of a line once reading “the king who was allied with
[Abraham].”9
The questions proliferate. What was Melchizedek’s political position? What city or land did he rule? Was it
Jerusalem, or another town, or is this reference to “Salem” merely gurative?10 What was his lineage and
priesthood, and what was the effect of his blessing upon Abraham? What relations had he previously had with

Abraham? Had a political treaty or a religious covenant regarding the campaign against Chedorlaomer been
entered into between Abraham and Melchizedek before the war? Why would Melchizedek meet Abraham in the
eld outside any city walls, especially if the meeting had religious signi cance? What signi cance did the offering of
bread and wine have?11 Who paid tithes to whom,12 and were the tithes religious contributions or political
tribute?13 Who was Melchizedek’s God, El Elyon, the Most High God?14 My purpose is not to belabor the
obfuscated. The point is simply that the Hebrew text and all archaeological efforts to clarify it offer little in the way
of answers. Aside from the perspectives given by additional scripture or inspiration such as that offered by Alma,
only theology generates avenues for dealing with these uncertainties.
The only other Old Testament passage in which Melchizedek appears is Psalm 110.15 It has been read in two
general ways.16 The standard reading, found in the King James Version, follows the Septuagint, where the theme
of the psalm is political victory over enemies (Psalms 110:1-2) through the strength of the Lord (Psalms 110:5-7),
with a central af rmation of the righteous reign of the Davidic monarch over a willing people Israel (Psalms 110:34): “Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power. . . . Thou art a priest forever after the order of (cal dibratî)
Melchizedek.” A relationship between the political blessing conveyed in this rendition and the literary image of
Melchizedek’s blessing of Abraham’s military victory in Genesis 14 is readily discernible.
A second reading of the Psalm, however, is suggested by Mitchell Dahood, who has recently proposed a
reconstruction of the text in which malkî-sedeq in Psalms 110:4 is not treated as the proper name “Melchizedek,”
but as a construct chain of malk (king) and sedeq (legitimate) with a possessive third-person singular suf x -î (his)
interposed, meaning “his legitimate king.”17 Under this reconstruction, the psalm is understood to emphasize the
king’s legitimate succession to the throne through covenants with God and has nothing to do with the man
Melchizedek, except through a possible play on words: “You are a priest of the Eternal according to his pact: His
legitimate King, my lord, according to your right hand.”18 While Dahood’s translation is novel and subject to
disagreement, both it and the traditional reading of the psalm may be compared favorably with Alma’s text, for
Alma refers both to the willingness of the people of Melchizedek to submit to his righteous reign (as in the
standard translation) and also to the ordinances or pacts associated with Melchizedek’s divine kingship under his
Father (as in Dahood’s rendition).
If one prefers the traditional approach to Psalm 110, one must also deal with the very dif cult Hebrew phrase, cal
dibratî malkî-sedeq, which is loosely rendered in the Greek as kata ten taxin Melchisedek.19 Whether this should be
translated “because of Melchizedek,” “in the manner of Melchizedek,” or “after the order or arrangement or of ce of
Melchizedek,” as conventional renditions have suggested,20 or simply “according to his pact,” as Dahood prefers, is
quite unsettled. One can concur, however, with Joseph Fitzmyer that the phrase cannot be understood in terms of
hereditary succession: “The priesthood of the king is due to something else.”21 Alma’s text certainly agrees.
Subsequent Jewish and Christian Interpretations of Melchizedek
From these traditional biblical texts, there have come about as many interpretations of Melchizedek as there have
been heresies and orthodoxies, for few systematic biblical commentators have passed over this intriguing gure
without accommodating him in one way or another. The importance ascribed to him varies with the system in
which each interpretation stands. In some views he is regarded merely as a political gure who established certain
legal precedents, while in others he becomes a central eschatological gure who will lead the war against Satan in
the nal battle against evil. Elsewhere he is raised to membership in the Godhead by one early Christian sect,

while he is defamed as a bastard by Jewish apologists who found his unpedigreed preeminence in the Pentateuch
disquieting. Gnostics and Christian mystics have ascribed cosmological powers to him, whereas Protestants have
dismissed any notion that he was anything more than a feudal Canaanite king. Exactly what is made of the man
Melchizedek in The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints today is not entirely clear,22 but Alma’s text has
been underutilized in this connection.
There is no evidence that Jewish theology took much cognizance of Melchizedek until between 110 B.C. and A.D.
132, when several Jewish writers undertook to present Judaism in various Hellenistic contexts. To this end,
Melchizedek readily served as a bridge for them to the Gentile world. Around this time, Melchizedek began to
gure importantly in early Christian writings as well.
To the writer of the book of Jubilees,23 who was sympathetic toward the establishment of a Maccabean royal
priesthood over Palestine, Melchizedek provided a convenient precedent for the Maccabean desire to bestow the
of ces of king and priest upon a single person—and a non-Levite at that. In addition, the Maccabean priests
apparently appropriated to themselves for political uses the Melchizedekian epithet, “a priest of the Most High
God,”24 probably because Melchizedek is one of the few non-Levites in the Old Testament acceptably bearing the
title of priest. Furthermore, Melchizedek was used to justify the all-important political right of the Maccabean
king-priests to receive and personally enjoy the tithes of the people as political tribute and as “an ordinance for
ever . . . to [which] law there is no limit of days.”25
Far more inscrutable and intriguing is the Melchizedek legend in 2 Enoch 71-72, whose date and provenance
cannot even be approximated. “All attempts to locate the intellectual background of 2 Enoch have failed. The most
remarkable token of continued puzzlement over this work is the failure of scholars to decide whether it came from
Jewish or Christian circles. It hardly stands in the mainstream of either religion.”26 It appears, however, that “there
was a sect which accepted the Enoch writings as sacred scripture in the highest sense, but who they might have
been we cannot now discern.”27 To such people, Melchizedek was sacerdotal.28 He was miraculously born to the
wife of Noah’s brother out of her corpse after she had died.29 His sacred mission was to be sequestered in
Paradise and preserved from the Flood, so that he could pass the priesthood on to postdiluvian peoples, becoming
“the priest to all holy priests, the head of the priests of the future, and the head of the thirteen priests who existed
before.”30 He will be sancti ed and changed “into a great people who will sanctify [God],”31 serving as “the head of
priests reigning over a royal people who serve you, O Lord.”32 “Afterward there will be a planting from his tribe,
and there will be other people, and there will be another Melkisedek, the head of priests reigning over the people,
and performing the liturgy for the Lord.”33 Ultimately for the people who used this text, this Melchizedek
pre gured another, who was expected to perform greater miracles than ever before: “In the last generation, there
would be another Melkisedek, the rst of 12 priests. And the last will be the head of all, a great archpriest, the
Word and Power of God.”34
For the community at Qumran, whose writings in the rst century B.C. are largely concerned with apocalyptic
events, Melchizedek took on signi cance as a heavenly warlord. He will wage the last war against evil to free the
spirits held captive by Belial and to “restore their captives to them and will proclaim release to them, to set them
free and . . . atone . . . in the year of the last jubilee . . . for all the sons of light and men of the lot of Melchizedek.”35
This interpretation is dependent upon Genesis, where Melchizedek was involved in setting free the captives and
disposing of the spoils of Abraham’s war. Yet the adaptation of this material to an apocalyptic setting is innovative.
Melchizedek was also expected by the people at Qumran to “exact the vengeance of the judgments of God [El] . . .

with the help of all the eternal gods [ele colam],”36 and by means of some heady textual substitutions he was
identi ed with the royal being (elohim) who takes his stand in the solemn assembly of the highest god (El).37 Thus,
in this picture of the end of times, Melchizedek serves both priestly and kingly functions, not in an earthly sense
but by driving away the wicked and bringing the righteous into their inheritance by his atonement while standing
at the side of the magistrate to execute his commands and wage his battles.
For Philo, whose philosophical system intellectualized most of sacred history, Melchizedek was seen as a
particular manifestation of the unseen powers of the realm of pure thought. “He is a priestly manifestation of
reason (hiereus logos) whose possession is reality, for around him circulate high, illustrious and timely thoughts.”38
Like all divine (philosophical) creations for Philo, Melchizedek was created by God with a royal nature “before a
single deed of Melchizedek had been performed.”39 He was the king of intellectuality (basileus nous) whose
peaceful persuasion brought the souls of men into the knowledge of Neoplatonic reality.40 Interestingly, Philo also
latched onto the idea that because Melchizedek was not a product of the patriarchal traditions he, like the
philosopher, must have been without teacher, self-taught (autodidakton), and intuitively perceptive (automathe),
making his thoughts products of higher spheres.41
Roughly contemporary with the Qumran writings and Philo is the New Testament interpretation of Melchizedek.
The author of the epistle to the Hebrews saw in Melchizedek a prototype of Jesus—one without father, without
mother, without genealogy, “having neither beginning of days, nor end of life; but made like unto the Son of God”
(Hebrews 7:3).42 Hebrews 7, arguing on four grounds for the superiority of Jesus the eternal High Priest over the
Levitical priests, uses Melchizedek to substantiate this point. Not all of the arguments are strictly logical. First, the
argument runs, because Abraham paid tithes to Melchizedek, Levi (who was then in the loins of Abraham) was less
than Melchizedek, because Melchizedek must have been greater than Abraham since the greater allegedly always
blesses the lesser (Hebrews 7:4-10). Second, Psalm 110 indicates that a priest in Judah must arise “after the
similitude of Melchizedek,” a priest forever, “not after the law of a carnal commandment, but after the power of an
endless life” (Hebrews 7:11-19). The psalm itself, however, does not literally make such a prophecy. Third, it is
argued that to the Levites no oath was given that their priesthood should remain for ever; but Jesus, like
Melchizedek, makes a “surety of a better testament,” for the Lord has sworn an oath to this type of being in saying,
“Thou art a priest for ever” (Hebrews 7:20-22). This argument presupposes a “likeness” between Jesus and
Melchizedek and in order to make this point bends the phrase “after the order (kata ten taxin) of Melchizedek” to
read “after the similitude (kata ten homoioteta) to Melchizedek” (Hebrews 7:15). Fourth, Levitical priests all die and
so do their sacri ces, which must be constantly renewed for the bene t of themselves, as well as for the bene t of
the people; but in Jesus’ case this is not so, for he lives eternally to make intercession for those who come to God
by him (Hebrews 7:23-28).43 Without diminishing the greatness of Melchizedek, it seems that these polemic
arguments are somewhat tendentious and not rationally compelling.
In the ensuing centuries, Christian Fathers expanded the typology initiated in Hebrews 7 in a manner which
re ected the later Christian liturgy and doctrine. Practically every Father comments on the formulaic ways in
which Melchizedek can be said to have foreshadowed Christ: Both Jesus and Melchizedek were seen as kings of
justice and of peace (salem, shalom).44 Both were seen as true, non-Levitical priests.45 Melchizedek had no biblical
genealogy, while Christ was said to be without father in his human generation and without mother in his divine
generation.46 Melchizedek was perceived as being without beginning of days, without natural beginning, just as
Christ existed in principio (“in the beginning”) and will exist forever.47 Both lived by faith, as Melchizedek was said

to have obtained his knowledge of the sacrament of bread and wine by revelation and not by the letter of law;48
and both offered a sacri ce of bread and wine instead of an animal sacri ce.49 In many ways, particularly in
relationship to the symbols of the eucharist, Melchizedek was simply seen by these Fathers as a Christian before
his time.
For the Gnostics, Melchizedek became a subject for even wider speculation, although it is dif cult to reconstruct
their ideas with con dence. In the spiritual cosmology of certain Gnostics, the “order (taxis) of Melchizedek” is the
ordering arrangement of the cosmos.50 He is the great repossessor, puri er, and preparer of the elements of the
universe.51 He himself is the power of the true mystical universe.52 His powers make men mystics, revealing to
them the all.53 He is the archon of righteousness, of whom Christ is a shadow.54 Under the name Zorokothora in
the Pistis Sophia, he is the Great Receiver of Light who comes mysteriously from the pure light of the fth tree, but
he only appears periodically when his constellation or number comes up.55 When he is gone, darkness prevails; as
he returns, light is victorious.56 “In the place of those of the right hand,” he seals souls to be taken to the Treasury
of Light.57 Melchizedek worship probably reached its zenith in the Gnostic Melchizedekian sect of the third
century A.D. To them, Christ himself was subordinate to Melchizedek, for Christ had been said to be of his order.58
They even went so far as to claim that because Melchizedek had no father, he was the father of all, including the
father of Jesus.59 He was also called the virtue or strength of God (virtutem dei),60 an angel with supernatural
powers,61 the Holy Ghost,62 and sometimes he was given an independent place in the Godhead.63
The Jewish rabbinical response to the Christian, Essene, Gnostic, and philosophical aggrandizement of
Melchizedek was predictable: Where the challengers of Judaism elevated Melchizedek, the rabbis debased him.
Where the innovators cultivated the mysterious or esoteric intrigue of Melchizedek’s supernatural powers and
origins, the Jewish apologists invented down-to-earth explanations to defuse such doctrines.64 The basic Jewish
attitude, not yet reacting to the Christian, can be observed in Josephus, who simply viewed Melchizedek as a
righteous Canaanite, a paragon of hospitality, who gave Jerusalem a noble beginning (as Aeneas had done for
Rome).65 But soon after the time of Josephus, when the Christian challenge to Judaism had become more intense,
the focus of rabbinic writing on Melchizedek shifted from his goodness and sought to explain him away. By writing
the name as two words, malkî sedeq, and identifying sedeq (righteousness) with the city of Jerusalem itself, the
Midrash Rabbah could speak simply of the “king (malkî) of Jerusalem (sedeq)” and thereby removed the proper
name “Melchizedek” from the picture of Genesis 14.66 In time, the Jewish response to the Christian challenges
grew quite pointed. Where the Christians argued against the need to be circumcised on the ground that Abraham
had paid tithes to the uncircumcised Melchizedek,67 the Jews asserted that Melchizedek had been born
circumcised.68 Where it was argued that Melchizedek had a superior priesthood, the Jews retorted that he had
lost his powers, which passed to Abraham, when Melchizedek blundered by blessing Abraham before recognizing
God.69 Where it was asserted that the offering of bread and wine foreshadowed the Christian eucharist, the Jews
either dismissed this as a mere act of hospitality,70 or responded in kind, claiming that Melchizedek was
instructing Abraham in the shewbread and ritual libations of the Torah.71 The absence of genealogy was cured by
giving him a genealogy—and not always a attering one. The easiest solution was to call him Shem,72 but other
theories about his parentage, usually attributed to the Jews, also claimed that he was a descendant of Sidon,73 or
of Sidus an Egyptian,74 Heraklas,75 Melchi or Malakh,76 Ham,77 or a heathen named Melchi.78 His mother was

Astaroth, Astoriane, or Saltiel, or alternatively some argued that his genealogy was not mentioned because he was
the son of a prostitute.79
And so we have run the gamut. Melchizedek is treated both favorably and unfavorably in these texts. This is a
world of diverse theological contrasts.80 From this brief sampling of the literature, it is clear that people have said
of Melchizedek primarily what their theologies required. Whether a text treats him historically, politically,
sacerdotally, apocalyptically, philosophically, polemically, typologically, cosmologically, or defensively, the
orientation is dictated by the theological framework within which each interpretation of the basic Old Testament
texts was made. Such interpretations tend to reveal far more about the interpreters than they do about
Melchizedek.
JST, Genesis 14:17-40
Another text that sheds light on Alma 13:13-19 is found in the Joseph Smith Translation of Genesis 14. It reads as
follows:
The Meeting:
And the king of Sodom went out to meet him [Abraham] after his return from the slaughter of
Chedorlaomer, and of the kings that were with him, at the valley of Shaveh, which is the king’s dale (JST,
Genesis 14:17).
Melchizedek’s Appearance:
And Melchizedek king of Salem brought forth bread and wine: and he brake bread and blest it; and he
blest the wine, he being the priest of the most high God (JST, Genesis 14:18).
Melchizedek’s First Blessing:
And he blessed him, and said: Blessed be Abram of the most high God, possessor of heaven and earth: And
blessed be the most high God, which hath delivered thine enemies into thy hand (JST, Genesis 14:19-20).
The Payment of Tithes:
And he gave him tithes of all (JST, Genesis 14:20).
Division of the Spoils:
And the king of Sodom said unto Abram, Give me the persons, and take the goods to thyself. And Abram
said to the king of Sodom, I have lifted up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of
heaven and earth, That I will not take from a thread even to a shoelatchet, and that I will not take any thing
that is thine, lest thou shouldest say, I have made Abram rich: [I will take] only that which the young men
have eaten, and the portion of the men which went with me, Aner, Eshcol, and Mamre; let them take their
portion (JST, Genesis 14:21-24).
Melchizedek’s Second Blessing:

And Melchizedek lifted up his voice and blessed Abram (JST, Genesis 14:25).
How Melchizedek Obtained His Priesthood:
Now Melchizedek was a man of faith, who wrought righteousness; and when a child he feared God, and
stopped the mouths of lions, and quenched the violence of re. And thus, having been approved of God,
he was ordained an high priest after the order of the covenant which God made with Enoch, It being after
the order of the Son of God; which order came, not by man, nor the will of man; neither by father nor
mother; neither by beginning of days nor end of years; but of God; And it was delivered unto men by the
calling of his own voice, according to his own will, unto as many as believed on his name (JST, Genesis
14:26-29).
The Powers of This Order:
For God having sworn unto Enoch and unto his seed with an oath by himself; that every one being
ordained after this order and calling should have power, by faith, to break mountains, to divide the seas, to
dry up waters, to turn them out of their course; To put at de ance the armies of nations, to divide the
earth, to break every band, to stand in the presence of God; to do all things according to his will, according
to his command, subdue principalities and powers; and this by the will of the Son of God which was from
before the foundation of the world. And men having this faith, coming up unto this order of God, were
translated and taken up into heaven (JST, Genesis 14:30-32).
Melchizedek’s Use of These Powers:
And now, Melchizedek was a priest of this order; therefore he obtained peace in Salem, and was called the
Prince of peace. And his people wrought righteousness, and obtained heaven, and sought for the city of
Enoch which God had before taken, separating it from the earth, having reserved it unto the latter days, or
the end of the world; And hath said, and sworn with an oath, that the heavens and the earth should come
together; and the sons of God should be tried so as by re. And this Melchizedek, having thus established
righteousness, was called the king of heaven by his people, or, in other words, the King of peace (JST,
Genesis 14:33-36).
Melchizedek’s Third Blessing:
And he lifted up his voice, and he blessed Abram (JST, Genesis 14:37).
Melchizedek, Keeper of the Storehouse for the Poor:
Being the high priest, and the keeper of the storehouse of God; Him whom God had appointed to receive
tithes for the poor. Wherefore, Abram paid unto him tithes of all that he had, of all the riches which he
possessed, which God had given him more than that which he had need (JST, Genesis 14:37-39).
God Ful lls Melchizedek’s Blessings:
And it came to pass, that God blessed Abram, and gave unto him riches, and honor, and lands for an
everlasting possession; according to the covenant which he had made, and according to the blessing
wherewith Melchizedek had blessed him (JST, Genesis 14:40).

This text supplies much information about Melchizedek. Some of its details are interestingly consistent with points
re ected in other Jewish and Christian texts discussed above. For example, in the JST, Melchizedek’s bread and
wine is evidently seen as a form of sacrament (JST, Genesis 14:18), and, somewhat like the remarkable paragraphs
in 2 Enoch 71-72, the JST reports miraculous events associated with Melchizedek’s childhood (stopping the
mouths of lions and quenching the violence of re), leading to his receipt of the priesthood and being translated
into heaven, to guide an especially righteous group of followers. Certain aspects of the JST account are also
echoed in Alma’s text. Thus, both report Melchizedek as a man of extraordinary faith, a worker of righteousness
among his people, called and ordained a high priest after the order of the Son of God (JST, Genesis 14:27-30; Alma
13:2-10, 18). Alma, however, indicates no awareness of the idea that such people were translated to heaven, that
the order of Melchizedek was pertinent to the covenant made by God with Enoch, that an oath was connected
with this priesthood (Genesis 14:30, 35), that Melchizedek was called the king of heaven by his people (JST,
Genesis 14:36), or several other such details.
Nevertheless, although one cannot say for certain, several key factors would point toward the conclusion that
Alma’s version of Genesis 14 on the plates of brass was similar to the text in the Joseph Smith Translation of the
Bible.
Synthesis and Conclusion
Having set the stage, we are now prepared to examine more speci cally Alma’s use of his Melchizedek sources. As
the following eight points show, Alma works the Melchizedek material into his sermon with great perceptiveness.
First, in Genesis, Melchizedek is called a priest of the most high God (El Elyon). For Alma, however, he is a high priest
after the order of the Son of God (Alma 13:14). This is rather singular. Besides the book of Alma and the JST, no
other text calls him a high priest (although 2 Enoch 71:29 calls him “the priest to all holy priests”). Perhaps the
word “high” (celyon) has shifted position in the texts between “high God” and “high priest.” The word celyon
generally means exalted, or comparatively high. It is a quite distinctive word, most often used to describe the Lord
as the Most High God (e.g., Numbers 24:16; Deuteronomy 32:8; 2 Samuel 22:14; Isaiah 14:14; and repeatedly in
the Psalms); but sacred things and people can also be called celyon: The temple is called celyon by the Lord (1 Kings
9:8), and his peculiar people are likewise said to be exalted and blessed because of the covenant: “Thy God will set
thee on high (celyon) above all nations” (Deuteronomy 28:1), “to make thee high (celyon) above all” (Deuteronomy
26:18-19; cf. 1 Peter 2:9, “a royal priesthood, a peculiar people”). Thus, the term “high priest” in Alma’s text is
particularly apt and meaningful in describing priests who receive the ordination of which he speaks. Nevertheless,
one should also observe that Alma in no way polemicizes against the Levitical priesthood, as does the author of
Hebrews. Rather, Melchizedek stands as a precedent for a priesthood composed of all the righteous who receive
the ordinances through their faith and good works. Moreover, besides distinguishing Alma’s priests favorably from
the high (gadôl) priest and other priests of the hereditary priesthood at Jerusalem, to which the Nephites (like the
Maccabeans) had no claim, Alma’s application of the word “high” to these priests “after the order of [God’s] Son,”
rather than to God, may re ect the Nephite understanding that their Lord was not the highest God, but a son of
God (e.g., Alma 36:17), who in turn does the will of the Father.
Second, Melchizedek was associated in Alma’s mind with the idea of “priests forever after the order of the Son.” He
could have found such words in Psalm 110, containing the words “priest forever” and the cryptic remark about an
“order” or “pact” (cf. Alma 13:14). In Alma 13:2 and 13:14, however, it is clear that this order is not Melchizedek’s
order (as it is at Qumran, in Psalm 110, in Hebrews 7, and among the Gnostics), but that of the son of God. In this
regard, Alma’s text is close to the Genesis account in the JST, where the order was “after the order of the covenant

which God made with Enoch, it being after the order of the Son of God” (JST, Genesis 14:27-28). The “order” for
Alma, however, in its primary sense was understood as a manner of ordination rather than an order of hierarchy or
structured body of priesthood bearers. This would suggest that the phrase cal dibratî could best be understood
modally,81 yielding the sense of “a priest ordained like Melchizedek was,” i.e., in that manner which looks forward to
the Son for redemption (Alma 13:2). Being a priest after the order of Melchizedek ultimately refers to obtaining
such ordinances (Alma 13:9), something that only Alma makes explicit.
In an additional sense, however, Alma also uses the term “order” to refer to a speci c commission to preach
repentance (Alma 5:49) and to teach certain commandments leading into God’s rest (Alma 13:6). Indeed, one of
the great messages of Melchizedek for Alma (and he is the only commentator to draw such a conclusion) was the
success of Melchizedek as a teacher of righteousness. For Alma, such teaching was the paramount responsibility
and calling of the priesthood (Alma 5:49; cf. Mosiah 6:3). Little signi cance appears to be ascribed by Alma to the
bureaucratic, authoritarian, of cial, or sacri cial powers or functions of the priesthood.
Third, the Book of Mormon text portrays Abraham paying tithes to Melchizedek, but unlike other ancient texts in
which this tithe is either taken to establish the right of some priestly class to collect revenues or in which it is seen
as a religious contribution, a disbursement, or a hospitable gift of the spoils of war,82 it appears that for Alma the
tithe of Abraham illustrates the injunction, “Bring forth fruit meet for repentance” (Alma 13:13), which is a
condition for receiving the priesthood ordinances. For Alma, the tithe of Abraham is not just on the spoils of war
(as it is in Hebrews and many other texts), but is full and complete, on all he possessed, just as the required
repentance would have to be total and complete. This interpretation of Genesis 14:20 commends itself in light of
the fact that Abraham renounced all interest in the spoils; he would have had no reason to pay a tithe on property
in which he claimed no interest, as would be the case if he only tithed on the spoils. It is also consistent with JST,
Genesis 14:39: “Abram paid unto him tithes of all that he had, of all the riches which he possessed, which God had
given him more than that which he had need,” to care for the poor.
Fourth, in the early Christian writings Melchizedek typi es Christ,83 but in Alma the typology is not found in
Melchizedek, his name, his station, or his actions, but in the manner of the priesthood’s ordinance, “it being a type
of God’s order” (Alma 13:16). The most prominent touchstone of the Christian typology (the offering of bread and
wine) is therefore not used by Alma, although it may stand behind part of Alma’s manner of looking forward to the
Son of God for redemption.
Fifth, Melchizedek, king of Salem and priest of the most high God, is understood in most traditions primarily in his
role as a priest, not as a king.84 This is carried so far that he is most often depicted by medieval artists in priestly
vestments of ciating at an altar under a canopy. But in the Book of Mormon, the image of Melchizedek is equally
that of a royal leader and a priest: a king who establishes peace in the land among his people through
righteousness (Alma 13:17-18). The fascinating account in 2 Enoch 71 comes close to Alma in this regard,
reporting that God would change Melchizedek “into a great people who will sanctify [him]” and make him “the
head of priests reigning over a royal people.”85 Likewise the JST reports that Melchizedek ruled over his people as
a priest and king of heaven and of peace, with power to “subdue principalities” and “to put at de ance the armies of
nations” (JST, Genesis 14:31), although in both of these cases the emphasis is more on Melchizedek’s role as priest
than king. Alma’s dual understanding of Melchizedek as king and priest is consistent with local Nephite politics,
since the Nephite ruler (i.e., king or chief judge prior to Alma’s day) shouldered the highest responsibilities for both
church and state.86

Sixth, most commentators have been content to speculate about the sources of Melchizedek’s knowledge of the
priesthood. Some suggest that he received it from Noah, Abraham, the Patriarchs, angels, or philosophical
re ection, as well as from a number of ctitious individuals. One tradition holds that he acquired his priesthood
from Noah when he was bitten and de led by a lion as he was disembarking from the ark.87 It is rare, however, for
writers to dwell on how such knowledge is acquired. In Philo’s thought, the contemplative man was typi ed by
Melchizedek, but even there he does not become actively involved in any religious process. Alma gives the most
information of any text, including the JST, about how such knowledge is acquired from God (Alma 12:29): through
the mysteries (Alma 12:9-10), calling upon God’s name (Alma 12:30), obedience (Alma 12:32), and after exercising
mighty faith, humility, charity, and repentance (Alma 13:14-15, 18).
Seventh, Melchizedek’s genealogy or lack thereof raises questions practically everywhere. Nothing in Alma 13,
however, hints at the churning con ict which divided the Old World over the question of his birth. There is no
inclination toward the later hypothesis that Melchizedek was Shem, and there is no reference to the phrase rst
found in Hebrews 7:3, “without father, without mother, without descent.” In Alma’s text, only God and the
priesthood order are called eternal: “This high priesthood . . . without beginning of days and end of years” (Alma
13:7; cf. also JST, Hebrews 7:1); “the Only Begotten of the Father, who is without beginning of days or end of
years” (Alma 13:9). Alma’s perspective here runs parallel to an extent with that of the JST: “Which order came, not
by man, nor the will of man; neither by father nor mother; neither by beginning of days nor end of years; but of
God” (JST, Genesis 14:28). But if Alma’s statement, “and he did reign under his father” (Alma 13:18), refers to a
political reign under his mortal father (rather than to a spiritual reign under God) or to a combination of the two
(as King Benjamin described his own reign in Mosiah 2:31), we have here a singular and signi cant reference to
Melchizedek’s royal parentage and vassalage.
Eighth, perhaps because of the Nephite conviction of the wickedness of Jerusalem (1 Nephi 7:13-14), Alma also
makes no attempt to equate Salem with Jerusalem. Indeed, for Alma, Melchizedek was not the king of a city, but of
a land of Salem. Alma also feels no need for pendantry over etymologies either regarding the name Salem or the
name Melchizedek.
In conclusion, the Melchizedek text of Alma 13 is quite remarkable. It reveals a profound understanding of
Melchizedek. The text is unique and complex, yet internally coherent and concise. Alma has a clear concept of what
Melchizedek means to him and he relates that meaning powerfully to the message of his sermon.
Alma’s text bears the hallmarks of an early record. In my opinion, Alma’s use of the Melchizedek material from
Genesis is conceptually and textually superior to later interpretations in which the meaning of Melchizedek turns
upon ideological notions and etymological devices. Alma 13:13-19 conveys far more than the usual historical or
etiological interpretations of the puzzling Genesis account; it is conceptually prior to the polarization of Jewish
and Christian thought, and it is free from the apocalyptic, philosophical, and metaphysical tendencies that have
molded much of Western thought since Hellenistic times. For Alma, Melchizedek is not a transcendent or intuitive
being, but an example of the fact that all men can receive the same knowledge and authority that made
Melchizedek great. He is not a priest who will conduct some cosmic atonement for man’s bene t, but was the
teacher of a sacred course that showed men how to bene t from the atonement of Christ and the manner in which
they should look forward to redemption (Alma 13:2). He is not the extension of a preexistent form of royal or
priestly logos, but he epitomizes a practical realization of each individual’s preexistent potential which was
prepared from the foundation of the world (Alma 13:3). He does not typify or epitomize any other reality.

Alma 13:13-19 also bears characteristics of dependence on earlier sources. While one can see how Alma may have
derived its key words and phrases from the traditional Old Testament materials, it appears that his sources were
closer in content to the Genesis text in the JST than to the cryptic statements in the King James Version.
Moreover, this material was relevant to Alma’s own day and age. His text is integrally bound up with Nephite
sacred ritual and practical religion. In addition, many aspects of the traditional Genesis material and the wordings
of Psalm 110 harmonize with Nephite religion and politics in Alma’s day, for example, in placing emphasis on a joint
of ce of a righteous priest and king under his father, in being silent on the victorious military context of Abraham’s
encounter with Melchizedek, and in supporting the nonhereditary posture of the Nephite priesthood.
There is no dearth of commentators who have suspected the signi cance of Melchizedek, but none offers the
insights of Alma 13. This chapter of the Book of Mormon is among the best regarding Melchizedek.
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1. Thorough bibliographies of the sources are accumulated by Gottfried Wuttke, Melchisedech der Priesterkönig von
Salem, Beiheft zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und Kund der älteren Kirche, 5 (Giessen:
Topelmann, 1927), and Paul J. Kobelski, Melchizedek and Melchiresha, Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph
Series, 10 (Washington: Catholic Biblical Assocation of America, 1981). See also Gerald T. Kennedy, St. Paul’s
Conception of the Priesthood of Melchisedech (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1951); and Fred L.
Horton, Melchizedek Tradition through the First Five Centuries C.E., SNTSMS 30 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1976).
2. This is as one would expect, given the accompanying “strict command” of secrecy (Alma 12:9). Although little is
known of the Nephite mysteries, it seems clear that they had certain sacred teachings that were not discussed
publicly.
3. Was the “calling” a new name, a job assignment, or a ritualistic summons? Mosiah 5:10-12 supports the idea that
they were called by a new name in Christ. In Alma’s text, however, the people are not only called with that holy
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Ancient Burials of Metal Documents in Stone Boxes
H. Curtis Wright
This paper is an expanded version of a paper presented earlier at the Library History Seminar VI in March 1980. It
deals with the persistence, for something like three thousand years, of a strange documentary custom of the
Mesopotamian kings, which was distinct and separate from the scribal tradition of clay-tablet writing associated
with Assurbanipal. This custom led to numerous regal burials of metallic documents (often encased in stone boxes
or other special containers), which were concealed in the foundations or other inaccessible recesses of temples
and palaces. The discovery of metal documents beneath the foundations of the Serapis Temple, which housed the
Serapeum Library at Alexandria, has also established an archaeological connection between the building practices
of the Ptolemies and the Mesopotamian kings.
Introduction
A farmer in the western Peloponnesus was digging a well. Twenty feet down he came upon a stone box.
He smashed in its lid. Inside there was a big object “like a bundle,” dark in color and crumbly in texture. He
thought he saw letters written on it. He informed the police, who informed the local director of
antiquities; but for some time they could not get out to the farm.
It was 1944-45, and Communist squads were trying to control the roads. When at last the director was
able to reach the farm, the object was gone. The farmer had thrown it on the dunghill “because it was not a
treasure: it looked like dung and it fell to pieces quite soon.” Others, however, had seen “many letters” on it
and said that, although fragile, it held together on the dunghill for some days. Clearly it was a book roll . . . ;
clearly it was precious to the man who buried it in a stone casket; certainly it would have been precious to
us. But it was of no use to the farmer, and it is gone.1
On the Ancient Preservation of Writing
Throughout antiquity, records of all kinds were intentionally buried for one reason or another. The Qumran
literature, for instance, was not driven underground by the ravages of war. It was deliberately laid to rest in the
“solemn communal interment” of a documentary funeral,2 which served as the “ nal concealment” of a whole
community library.3
This could only have taken place when the community was on the point of dying out. When that happened,
however, we do not know. . . . But we know for certain that . . . when Josephus wrote his Antiquities . . . , the
religious order [of the Essenes] was in a vigorous condition and could have had no reason to store its
books carefully in a hidden and inaccessible place.4
The Qumran documents were apparently “embalmed” before they were buried. “The careful way in which the MSS
were deposited” suggests, more than anything else, “the intention of preserving them as long as possible.”5 There
are some intriguing instructions for preserving library materials in the Assumption of Moses, where the aging
prophet says to Joshua:

Receive thou this writing [about the preservation of documents] that thou mayest know how to preserve
the books [of the Pentateuch] which I shall deliver unto thee: and thou shalt set these [books] in order and
anoint them with oil of cedar and put them away in earthen vessels.6
These instructions, or something similar, were also behind the creation and preservation of written legal deeds for
the transfer of real estate in Jeremiah 32:6-15. The documents, which were duly certi ed by witnesses, had been
drawn up in duplicate (with both a sealed and an open copy) by Jeremiah, who then directed his scribe to “put
them in an earthen vessel, that they may continue many days” (Jeremiah 32:14).7 The documentary methods of
Moses and Jeremiah, furthermore, have been attested all over the ancient world. They occur in the Talmud, to be
sure, but they are also “fully described in Greek sources” and found in the literatures of both Mesopotamia and
Rome.8 Their presence in the West is implicit in a persistent legend about the books of King Numa, the traditional
founder of Roman legal and religious institutions. Refusing cremation, he ordered his followers to make two “stone
cof ns” (lithinas sorous) in order to “bury his books along with his body.” When he died, therefore, they sealed the
cof ns with lead, “the one holding his remains, the other containing the holy books he had written with his own
hand,” and buried them as directed at the foot of Janus Hill on the west bank of the Tiber.9 Four or ve centuries
later,10 the cof ns were accidentally discovered intact.11 When the lids were removed by breaking their leaden
seals, Numa’s body had wasted away to nothing,12 whereas all of his books had been preserved, not merely well,
but “in mint condition.”13 The contrast was impressive: the books, written on papyrus scrolls, had been buried with
their regal author in a hole in the ground,14 but they outlasted him hands down because the West, which learned
to preserve its documents by procedures derived from the embalming and entombment of corpses, never deigned
to mummify its dead.15 Pliny, following Hemina (who deviates somewhat from other accounts of the burial and
retrieval of Numa’s books), describes the process in part:
How these books were able to last so long was amazing to many. But the man who found them had this
explanation: a stone cube placed in the center of the cof n had been bound up with waxed cords running
in every which direction. On [or in] the top of this stone [or stone box?] three books had been placed [or
inserted]; and that probably explains why they had not decayed. Besides, the books themselves had been
treated with citrus oil; and that doubtless explains why the moths [or gnawing worms] had not touched
them.16
Numa’s books (three, twelve, or fourteen) survived for half a millennium, if only to be burned by the Romans who
found them,17 because deliberate measures were taken to ensure their survival. They were chemically treated for
protection against moth and rust, sealed in a special stone container, and buried deep in the bowels of the earth.
Citrus oil, waxed swaddling cords, hewn stone containers, leaden seals—all of this smacks of the cedar oil, waxed
linen wrappings, unique earthenware jars, and tightly sealed lids used for preserving the Dead Sea Scrolls.18 The
parallel is too close to be accidental. If using these things at Qumran “proves that the scrolls were hidden in the
cave for safe preservation,”19 if “everything was done to preserve the scrolls as long as possible,”20 can we say
anything less of Numa’s books? The Dead Sea Scrolls survived for more than 2000 years to be read in our own
day.21 Why, then, couldn’t the scrolls of King Numa survive in good condition for less than one-fourth as long?
Other buried libraries have survived for many centuries in both the Far and Middle East. About A.D. 1035, for
example, the Buddhist monks of Chinese Turkestan, who were “under the threat of invasion,” walled up their entire
collection of books in the cave of Tun-Huang. In A.D. 1900, almost nine centuries later, “the hiding-place was

accidentally discovered by a Tibetan monk.” Orientalists subsequently explored the cave, “where they found
20,000 scrolls preserved, dating from the sixth and seventh centuries, in Chinese, Tibetan, Sanskrit, and other
languages.”22 A second Buddhist library, discovered in the ruins of a tower at Gilgit, “also contained a great
number of manuscripts, some dating perhaps from the fourth century.”23 The Nag Hammadi library, a Gnostic
“Qumran” of Christian documents, was retrieved through an “earthenware ‘time capsule’ discovered in the sands
of Egypt” when peasants, hunting for fertilizer in 1945, dug up “a large jar lled with leaves of papyrus, bound
together like books.”24 The library, “well buried in a tomb very far away from all the monasteries,” was virtually
intact after more than 15 centuries.25 It has been described as “the most remarkable ancient library we
possess.”26 Its early codex-volumes, whose beautiful leather bindings “are among the oldest ever to survive,”27
were preserved by the same techniques employed at Qumran.28 Eusebius even mentions Ksisouthros, better
known as Noah, who was commanded before the Deluge “to bury his books (which discussed the beginnings,
middles, and endings of all things) in the sunlit city of Sippar.” When the ood subsided, therefore, Noah took his
family “back to Babylon as commanded, in order to retrieve the buried documents from Sippar and transmit them
unto men.” Accordingly, they “dug up the documents and began founding cities, setting up temples, and rebuilding
Babylon.”29 These records were preserved temporarily, through extremely hazardous circumstances, by special
techniques unknown to us. The clay tablet libraries have also survived through documentary techniques differing
in signi cant ways from those which preserved their papyrus cousins.30
There are no Qumrans or Nag Hammadis in the West, for classical literature “is like a city which has been bombed
and partially burned”; most of its streets and buildings are in ruins, although many have remained partially (and
some wholly) intact.31 The literature we have is largely from the discard. The tablets from Crete and Mycenae, for
example, “were not even red: they became permanent only when the palaces were burned down.”32 Virtually all
of the Greek and Latin papyri, furthermore, “were found quite literally in rubbish dumps or in the ruins of
abandoned houses.”33 A few manuscripts have nevertheless survived “because they were deliberately buried.”
These include two retrieved from cof ns, one from a stone box found twenty feet below ground, and several from
the wrappings of “cheap mummy cases”;34 some have even come from the “mouths ‘and other cavities’ ” of
embalmed sacred crocodiles!35 But many of the writings buried in the West, as in the East, have been metallic
documents clearly meant “to survive as long as possible.”36 Lillian Jeffery mentions the use of various metals for
writing in the ancient Near East and among the Greeks, who “apparently passed on the practice to the Latin and
Etruscan people,”37 as the Roman use of bronze is rmly established.
The bronze plaque (pinax or deltos) was widely used. . . . The Greeks themselves appear to have had a
tradition that texts of really pre-historic antiquity were (or should be) inscribed on bronze. Thus Agesilaos
of Sparta, on opening a tomb at Haliartos . . . , found there . . . a pinax chalkous [bronze tablet] covered with
barbaric characters which resembled Egyptian. . . . Akousilaos the Argive historian was said to have
compiled his genealogies from deltoi chalkai [bronze tablets] which his father found while digging on his
premises. . . . When Lucian’s Alexandros went to Kalchedon to stage an elaborate piece of deception, he . . .
arranged to excavate deltoi chalkai of incredible age from the old temple of Apollo there, containing
alleged statements by Asklepios and Apollo his father.38
We have no gold tablets from archaic Greece, although “a fth-century inscription at Selinous appears to mention
one.”39 The nine golden plates of Orphism, however, had been carefully interred in cof ns as guidebooks for the

dead; they have helped explain the strange Near Eastern overtones of platonism because “Plato and the buried
plates were drawing on the same eschatological literature.”40 And the metal tablets from Pyrgi, found “some thirty
miles north of Rome” in 1964, were “buried by pious hands” after the smaller of two temples, the sanctuary of
Thefarie Velianas, had been reduced to ruins.41 Rubble from the sanctuary was found “in a rectangular niche
between the two temples, carefully and piously disposed” to protect its most valuable records. “There, between
large blocks of tufa” salvaged from its walls “and three slabs of its terminal tiles,” lying beneath “a heap of terracotta
fragments, three sheets of gold leaf, with inscriptions on the outer face, had been hidden.”
Together with these gold leaves, there was a mysterious fourth inscribed sheet of bronze, in very poor
condition. . . . The inscription on the bronze sheet with the three others on gold sheets suggests that the
niche between the two temples had been made to preserve . . . a part of its archives, which contained
different documents established on various occasions.42
The Pyrgi tablets recall many ancient burials of metal documents, which include: (1) the legal agreements of a town
in Spain with both its guests and its Roman overlords—two bronze tablets, “one placed exactly over the other with
their written sides down,” discovered beneath “two roo ng tiles carefully laid against each other and covered with
debris”;43 and (2) the golden “Torah” of Pali Buddhism found “in the brick chamber of an old mound”44 at Hmawza
—”a manuscript in every way similar to the palmleaf manuscript so common in India and Burma but with [twenty]
leaves of gold” and two gold covers,45 which contains “the Law or Dharma Preached by the Buddha.”46
There is, nally, an interesting burial from the Bertiz Valley near the Turkish province of Maras, where some small
silver plates “completely covered with Semitic characters” were discovered in the late 1940s. They had apparently
been “unearthed in a badly dilapidated Bronzekugel,” a brazen sphere “disregarded by the farmers who emptied it
because of its beat-up condition.”47 Unusual burials like this are often dismissed as one of a kind. But there is
nothing unique in this account: it resembles the Assyrian reburial, probably by Shalmaneser III (858-824 B.C.), of a
small silver plate and two small gold plates from the reigns of Shalmaneser I (1274-1245 B.C.) and Tukulti-Ninurta
I (1244-1208 B.C.).
The three tablets had been imbedded in sand in a small bowl. A second, similar bowl was inverted over the
top and the two were apparently laced together through holes in their rims. This little “capsule” was halfsunk into the ground, a larger bowl was inverted over it, and the whole thing was buried.48
These remarkable burials—of special documents carefully placed in peculiar containers designed speci cally to
preserve them—may actually be related to the long history of incantation bowl inscriptions which were interred
well into the Christian era.49 They introduce quite naturally the ultimate attempt of the ancients to immortalize
their records—the gold and silver plates from Persepolis.50
Before and after Persepolis
Old Persian studies got a new lease on life in 1926, “when an inscription of Darius was found at Hamadan, in
duplicate on gold and silver tablets.”51 The inscription, wrongly thought to be “wholly novel as to its form and
content,” was discovered in an old foundation “between two square hewn stones that had been carefully prepared
to receive it.”52 The nd, which established the exact location of ancient Ecbatana, also elicited Herzfeld’s
prediction that “we may expect with certainty the discovery of similar documents in the excavations at . . .

Persepolis” and elsewhere.53 This prophecy was ful lled in September 1933, when Herzfeld discovered that “two
shallow, neatly made stone boxes with [sealed] lids, each containing two square plates of gold and silver, had been
sunk into the bedrock beneath the walls at the corners of . . . the apadana”54 (the multicolumned audience hall of
the Palace at Persepolis). (See gure 1.) The plates, which bore the same inscription as their counterparts from
Hamadan, “were laid down, probably in the presence of Darius, in 516-515 B.C.”; they were retrieved 2,500 years
later in perfect condition, “the metal shining as the day it was incised.”55 There were now six metallic copies of the
same inscription, three complete sets of duplicates proclaiming the majesty of Darius and the vast extent of his
kingdom.
All these tablets—one gold and one silver from Hamadan, two gold and two silver from Persepolis—were
discovered in situ. . . . The texts of the gold tablets from Hamadan and Persepolis vary only in the line
arrangements imposed by different formats. The Persepolis tablets underlie the issuance of this “edition,”
whose unconventional writing [of a particular word] . . . shows that all of its copies were created from one
and the same Urtext in a central of ce. Darius had undertaken simultaneous building projects in
Persepolis, Susa, and Ecbatana, and the administration of these buildings was a uni ed thing.56
Four more gold tablets found at Hamadan bear inscriptions issued by Ariaramnes, Arsames, Artaxerxes III, and
Darius II.57 Of the six inscriptions from Hamadan, a full two-thirds—the silver tablet and three of the ve gold
tablets—were rescued from looters who had cut them into pieces for the purpose of melting them down.58 One
shudders to think of the many similar documents which have not escaped the cutters and melters. The Persepolis
plates constitute the high point in a long tradition of concealed metallic documents which extend from Sumer to
Alexandria. The stone boxes found in holes cut into rock foundations prove conclusively that the plates were
building deposits. The Darius inscription on gold and silver tablets is therefore “of the same type as the foundation
inscriptions on metal tablets of Warad Sin of Larsa [1843-1823 B.C.], of . . . the wife of Rim Sin [1822-1763 B.C.] . . .
, of Tukulti-Ninurta I [1244-1208 B.C.], and of Sargon II [721-705 B.C.].”59 Metallic foundation texts are older than
that, however, possibly reaching as far back as Early Dynastic II (ca. 2700-2500 B.C.).60 The stone chest may be
older still, if an object dated ca. 2900 B.C. or earlier, which was found in a temple at Tell Brak, is actually an “early
dynastic foundation box.”61 The metallic foundation tradition, though frequently interrupted,62 lived on until the
crash of the Late Assyrian Empire (ca. 626-609 B.C.), when it perished because the Neo-Babylonians instituted
other documentary procedures. It was brie y resurrected from the Late Assyrian period by the Achaemenid
dynasty of Persia (539-331 B.C.),63 only to die once more, at least to all appearances, when Alexander the Great
red the palace at Persepolis. But the metallic foundation inscription surfaced yet again at Alexandria in the
excavations of (1) a granite box for holding the writings of a late Greek author,64 and (2) dozens of small metallic
plates from the foundations of the Serapis Temple, which housed the Serapeum Library.65
The “ ames of Persepolis” symbolize in every way the signi cance of Persia as a major “turning-point in history.”66
She was the mystic counter of Greek naturalism, who created a comprehensive “synthesis of Near Eastern
cultures” by combining all of the in uences from the Fertile Crescent, “including those of Persia itself,
Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, the Syria-Palestine coast, and Egypt.”67 Her material wealth in gold alone was
staggering. Antiochus I minted more than $7,250,000 in coins from the golden roo ng tiles of one Ecbatana
palace;68 and Alexander the Great systematically looted the palace at Persepolis for “a treasure estimated . . . at
over $150,000,000” before putting it to the torch, plus virtually all of the valuable objects “which Persian art had
made or Persian conquest gathered.”69 The gures are revealing, even without correction for in ation. The culture

of ancient Persia, which “reached one of the high peaks of human experience,” also produced the carefully hewn
stone boxes of Darius with their magni cent cargo of gold and silver plates. The Darius inscriptions thus mark the
“culmination of a metal art which had been at least 2000 years maturing, gathering inspiration from a variety of
cultures.”70
It remains, then, only to review the history of metallic foundation inscriptions before and after the Darius plates,
and to summarize its signi cance for library history. Before doing that, however, we must ask an intriguing
question. Only two stone boxes were discovered by Herzfeld, who retrieved them from the northeast and
southeast corners of the apadana. But “the cavity meant to hold a third such box was [also] found at the destroyed
northwest corner.”71 Who destroyed the northwest corner before the excavators got to it? Could it be that
Alexander the Great and his men actually found the missing limestone box with its fabulous treasure of gold and
silver plates?
Before Persepolis
The history of metallic foundation inscriptions provides too many boxes and documents to discuss each one
separately. This paper therefore reviews that history only in relation to (1) three Neo-Sumerian kings, whose peg
deposits probably led to the later burials of metal documents in stone boxes; and (2) nine subsequent rulers,
including one Kassite, one Chaldean, two Amorite, and ve Assyrian kings, who ruled from the nineteenth through
the seventh centuries B.C. The paper thus ignores a mass of material, which includes the numerous metal tablets
from Early Dynastic peg deposits,72 the Akkadian bronze tablet from Samarra,73 four deposits with uninscribed
bronze plates from the Isin Larsa period,74 the mysterious stone and metal tablets from Old and Middle AssyroBabylonian times,75 the vague references to metals deposited in foundations by Shamshi-Adad I (1813-1781 B.C.)
and Esarhaddon (699-680 B.C.),76 the built-up brick boxes from Lagash,77 the many brick boxes from the NeoSumerian and later periods,78 the door pivot boxes,79 and the trinkets (beads, amulets, etc.) found embedded in
bricks.80 Hundreds of documents like the Elamitic inscription on a bronze plate (ca. 600 B.C.) found in the treasury
of the Persepolis palace, are also ignored because they are not associated with building deposits.81
The stone box loaded with metal documents is probably derived from the peg deposits of the Neo-Sumerian
Renaissance at Mari in the Ur III period (ca. 2100-2000 B.C.).82 Parrot uncovered “six foundation deposits” of
Niwar-Mer, which had been embedded in the materials used to construct an ancient building. Four of these
deposits, “placed very precisely at its corners, identi ed the building as the Ninhursag Temple, thanks to the
inscribed bronze plates,”83 which they included.
In each case a bronze plate, about 15 cm. square, was placed directly on the mud bricks. Each plate had a
short inscription in one corner. In the center of each was a round hole through which was thrust vertically
a bronze peg 12 to 14 cm. long. A slab of wood about the same size as the metal plate was put on top, and
a miscellaneous collection of small objects—a spindle whorl, beads, small plaques, a pendant—was placed
beside it.84
Three of the corners in the temple of Dagan have also produced the foundation deposits of Ishtup-Ilum. More
complex than the previous deposits, they de nitely suggest a development toward the stone box of Darius. They

were found “inside the wall a little above the footing at the base of the temple in a rectangular space”85 that had
been carefully prepared to receive them.
In one corner of this rectangle was placed a box made of two square stone slabs. The lower slab had a
square depression in which a bronze plaque about 13 cm. square was placed. A bronze spike about 27.5
cm. long was thrust through holes in the bronze plaque and the stone slab, and into the mud brickwork
beneath. A second stone slab, of the same size as the rst but without the depression or hole, was placed
over the rst. The rest of the . . . rectangle reserved in the brickwork was covered with a layer of round
pebbles, among which were numerous small objects. . . . Next to the stone box, buried among the pebbles,
were a tablet of white limestone and one of schist. The tablets and the bronze plaque bore identical
inscriptions.86
The several deposits of Apil-kin, one of Mari’s early governors, were concealed in the boxlike cavities of false bricks
built directly into or beneath the foundations themselves. The governor had found “a real hiding place” beneath
the inner doors of the sahuru, a small entrance hall leading to the “Lions’ Temple,” which he had built behind the
Temple of Ninhursag. This cachette was “arranged with much more care” than his predecessors had bestowed on
theirs. He had actually “made a box by hollowing out one of the rough bricks in the footings beneath the
foundation.”
In this box a bronze plate had been deposited without being nailed down. It was encased in wood, as the
cavity was larger than the metal plate. A [wooden] plank, cut to the exact dimensions of the cachette,
covered both the plate and its framework. A mat was then placed over the whole thing, the hiding place
with its hollow brick was concealed, the brick foundation was laid atop all this as though nothing had
happened and construction continued.87
The foundation deposits of Niwar-Mer, Ishtup-Ilum and Apil-kin are also related to the elaborate boxes made up of
baked bricks “laid at in bitumen, in courses measuring 3 x 2 1/2 bricks.”88 All of these deposits with their various
containers point to the long development which culminates in the rock holes, stone boxes, and metal documents of
Darius.
Of more than a dozen rulers listed by Oppenheim, Warad-Sin (1834-1823 B.C.) and Rim-Sin (1822-1763 B.C.) are
“the only Larsa kings who used peg deposits”;89 but both of these rulers were involved with either the boxes or the
documents of the metallic foundation deposit. While clearing a small temple site in southeastern Ur of its
superimposed ruins from the Ur III and Isin-Larsa periods, Woolley dug into the remains of an old wall. He quickly
found, in the rubble beside the wall, some “clay foundation cones . . . from its destroyed upper courses.” Then about
six inches below the wall’s highest remaining surface, he uncovered “a box of burnt brick contrived in the mudbrick core of the wall.” The box contained “an intact foundation-deposit consisting of the copper gure of the king”
and a “brick-shaped inscribed steatite tablet.” The cones, the statuette, and the tablet all bore the same inscription,
which stated that “the temple was dedicated to En-ki, the water god of Eridu, . . . by Rim Sin king of Larsa,” in the
ninth year of his reign. The building and its deposit “can therefore be accurately dated to the year 1990 B.C.”90 The
excavation disclosed no metal tablets, however, and none are known from Rim-Sin; but Simat-Inanna, “one of the
wives of Rim-Sin,” did deposit inscribed limestone and copper tablets in the foundations of a Larsa temple, which
she dedicated to the goddess Belit-ekallim “during part of the reign of Hammurabi at Babylon [ca. 1792-1750
B.C.].”91 No deposits actually made by Warad-Sin have ever been recovered, and the same is true of Kurigalzu II
(1345-1324 B.C.). But excavation of the later Ningal Temple, built by “the Assyrian governor of Ur in about 650

B.C.,”92 has produced a pair of steatite and copper tablets from each of those rulers. “The temple had been
restored by Nabonidus [555-539 B.C.],”93 the last Neo-Babylonian king, who also restored its foundation deposits.
This reburial of tablets from the Amorite and Kassite dynasties not only proves that Warad-Sin and Kurigalzu II
deposited foundation inscriptions in their buildings, but also demonstrates the astonishing antiquity and vitality of
this vigorous metallic tradition.
Under the oor [of room three] there was found loose in the soil a [white] limestone foundation-tablet of
Kuri-Galzu and close to this two copper tablets and one of black steatite; one copper tablet was a
duplicate of that in limestone and recorded the restoration of an ancient temple . . . , the other two also
formed a pair and recorded the building by Warad-sin of “a great wall which like a tall mountain cannot be
undermined” . . . ; neither of the two texts can have any reference to the site in which they were found;
they must have been unearthed in the Neo-Babylonian period and given pious reburial under the new
temple that was in course of construction.94
After Kurigalzu II, the Assyrian kings more or less monopolized the metallic foundation deposit until the breakup
of their empire (ca. 600 B.C.) by the Neo-Babylonians. The elaborate reburial by Shalmaneser III of a
Schalenkapsel containing gold and silver plates from Shalmaneser I and Tukulti-Ninurta I has already been
discussed.95 The only other building documents from Shalmanesers I and III are an inscription of the former
stating that he “placed stones, silver, gold, iron, copper, tin, and aromatic plants” in foundations,96 and a lone gold
tablet of unknown provenance from the latter.97 It is nevertheless known that “small tablets of precious metal
were used from the time of Shalmaneser I onwards.”98 The most complicated foundation deposits of
Mesopotamia, on the other hand, come from the later Ishtar Temple of Tukulti-Ninurta I (1244-1208 B.C.), who
dedicated its twin shrines to Ishtar Asshuritu and to Dinitu. The deposits from this temple to Assur constitute “a
very elaborate combination of [inscribed] slabs and tablets, large and small, of various materials,” installed with “a
lavish use of beads and nondescript fragments of stone.”99 The slabs, which include seven made of lead (averaging
about 5″ x 15″ x 30″ in size and 880 pounds in weight) and two of limestone (one almost 9′ x 5′ x 16″, the other
about 4′ x 6′ x 12″), constitute “the most massive [deposits] so far discovered in Mesopotamia.”100 The tablets
include thirteen made of gold or silver and seven each of lead and alabaster.101 The complex arrangements of
these twenty-seven documents defy verbal description, but they were partially disposed as follows:
First three lead blocks were placed upon the mud brick sub-foundation; two small inscribed tablets of
gold and silver and a tiny square of sheet copper were placed on the middle block. A few baked bricks
were laid along the wall face to make a level bed for the stone slab. Glass beads, fragments of stones, and .
. . twigs or bits of wood were strewn over these objects, and the limestone slab was placed over them. . . .
Mats were laid over the block, and . . . [near] its rear edge were placed more valuable tri es, including
beads and . . . bits of ivory. On this “cushion” of beads and mortar went two more gold and silver tablets,
and a square of sheet gold. Then the fourth lead block was laid over the lot and the construction of the
wall continued in mud brick.102
Additional gold and silver tablets were positioned, “together with beads and stone chips, on the cella pavement
beneath the dais.” Another complex deposit of similar foundation inscriptions was also discovered “beneath and
behind the Dinitu shrine.”103

An important pair of gold and silver plaquettes has survived from Assurnasirpal II (883-859 B.C.).104 “The actual
provenance of these two inscriptions is unknown,”105 but they were very probably found at Nineveh in the Temple
of Nabu, the god of learning, writing, scribes, and secretaries.106 The possible linkage of Nabu with the tablets is
interesting for they present Assurnasirpal II as saying explicitly: “I laid the foundation of the palace at the city of X,
the foundations of my royal residence, on tablets of silver and gold.”107 The actual wording of the tablets, as a
matter of fact, means “to establish the foundation on documents.”108 In all of cuneiform literature, Bottéro knows
speci cally of “only one other formula somewhat like this one.” It occurs “in the Prism [text] describing the 30th
year of Assurbanipal,” the librarian-king from Nineveh. In this inscription, which deals with the Temple of Nergal at
Kutha, Assurbanipal says: “In a favorable month, on a propitious day, I established its subfoundation on GULA oil,
that ne oil, and upon tables of silver and gold.” This statement, Bottéro notes, incorporates “the same verb (addi),
the same preposition (ina), and the same mention of gold and silver tablets as in our text.”109 It suggests that
foundation documents are not merely inscriptions discovered in foundations. They are basic documents bearing
witness to the founding of important royal and religious buildings on writing, which was known anciently as “the
King’s Secret”—a mysterious something giving him both the right and the power to rule.110 The regal habit of
building upon inscriptions, furthermore, probably symbolizes the original founding of the temple, the palace, and
the city-state upon the written document,111 and possibly upon the metallic document. At any rate, the practice
was rmly established in ancient Mesopotamia.
Archaeological digs have amply documented this custom, observed by the Mesopotamian kings, of
burying among the substructures of the temples or palaces they built or restored such things as clay nails;
cones, barrel cylinders, and stone or metal tablets, on which they inscribed a permanent record of their
labors.112
The utter seriousness of the kings who made these foundation deposits is exempli ed by the solemn curse of
Assurnasirpal: “If anyone should efface my name which I have written here, or misuse this document for his own
pleasures or purposes, may Assur, the Great Lord, destroy his army, ravage his throne, and cut off from the land his
name and all of his descendants!”113
The inscribed stone box “appeared for the rst time in the reign of Assurnasirpal II [883-859 B.C.],”114 the last of
the Middle Assyrian kings. All previous examples of boxes, including the possible instance from Tell Brak and the
boxlike cachette of Apil-kin,115 were either uninscribed or directly incorporated into the structure of some
building. In 1929, however, “a damaged stone box bearing an inscription” by Assurnasirpal II showed up in
Philadelphia.116 The box came from the ancient city of Apqu, also known as Bumariyah or Tell Abu-Maria, “some
twenty miles west of Mosul, near Telefar,” in Iraq.117 It was pieced together by E. A. Speiser, who “identi ed it as a
foundation box, and deciphered the [long] cuneiform inscription” on its sides and lid.118 It was probably taken from
a foundation hole, although “there is no means of knowing the [actual] conditions under which it was found.”119
Moreover, since the gold and silver tablets of Assurnasirpal II may also have come from Apqu, “it is possible that
they were [originally] enclosed in the foundation box.”120
Another inscribed stone box inscribed by Assurnasirpal II was retrieved from “a mound called Balawat,”
supposedly the ancient Imgur-Bel near Nineveh, “about fteen miles to the east of Mossul.”121 It was found while
Rassam was in Mossul by the local foreman of the dig, who described it as “a stone coffer with a lid, containing two

tablets of stone covered with inscriptions.”122 The foreman, who may or may not have removed the box from its
nd-spot, did rebury it for protection until Rassam returned to the site. It was apparently taken from the entrance
to a burnt-out temple chamber, where Rassam also found, lying on a marble altar, “an inscribed marble tablet of the
same size and shape as the other two.”123 Because the stone box had exactly enough room for this third tablet, he
concluded that it “belonged to the same set” of documents, that it had been removed from the box and placed on
the altar for reading, and “that before the priests had time to deposit it back in the coffer, the temple was burnt
down, either by accident or by an enemy.”124 The cavity of the stone box was something like 8″ x 9″, large enough
to hold three tablets “twelve-and-a-half inches long, eight wide and two-and-a-half thick.”125 As that is less than
half the length and width of the box and perhaps three-fourths its depth, the box itself probably measured about
12″ x 18″ x 28″. It was a massive marble chest, whose great weight, though unspeci ed, was suf cient to tax
Rassam’s ingenuity in transporting it to Mossul.126 There is yet another ninth-century example of this kind from
the son of Assurnasirpal II, the rst Neo-Assyrian king. What little is known of the box, which is engraved on three
sides, has been stated by Ellis.
A similar stone box of Shalmaneser III [858-824 B.C.] was found on the ruins of the west gate of the outer
wall of Assur. Unfortunately it was empty, and it had evidently rolled down from some other position to its
nd-spot. In spite of its evidently secondary position, the box lay on some agate beads, which may have
been inside when it rolled to its nal position.127
These boxes seem to break with the conventional understanding of foundation inscriptions as documents about
buildings. The box from Tell Bumariyah, for example, “does not include a building text” of any kind, and was
probably “used for some other purpose.”128 The gold and silver tablets it may have housed also make it clear that
Assurnasirpal II was founding buildings upon documents, not depositing documents about buildings.129 The
Balawat box, on the other hand, mentions the building or rebuilding of both a city and a temple, but “did not appear
to have been buried,” and “does not seem to have been a building deposit.”130 There is not much to say about the
stone box of Shalmaneser III, as its nd conditions are unknown: the king mentions rebuilding the city wall at Assur
and urges its future rebuilder to “restore its ruins” and “to return my inscription to its place.”131 But where was its
place? It is possible, certainly, that foundation documents served a double purpose, and that at least some copies
“of building inscriptions were kept in the temples, for safekeeping or in order to keep the record . . . permanently
before the god,”132 or even for reading. Marinatos thought a similar marble chest from Mesenia “could have been
a library-box.”133 If such a box “was considered a container suitable for stone tablets” or other documents, as at
Balawat, “it may be that the stone boxes of Assurnasirpal II and Shalmaneser III served a similar purpose, and were
not meant to be deposited in structures.”134 Their inscriptions, which deal mostly with the Great King and his
domains, would seem to bear this out. Excavations at Nimrud and Arslan Tash in northern Syria have also disclosed
six or seven inscribed “Assyrian statues of deities holding square boxes” in their arms.135 Their inscriptions state
explicitly that “they were set up for . . . Nabu,” the learned god of the written word who was also known as “the
perfect scribe.”136 All these statues, and especially those from Nimrud, “are close chronologically to the boxes of
Assurnasirpal II and Shalmaneser III,” and it is dif cult to deny a connection between them. Mallowan, at any rate,
has suggested that the statue boxes “might have been meant to hold tablets, in view of Nabu’s association with
writing and scholarship.137

Sargon II (721-705 B.C.) indicates that he deposited inscribed materials of four to nine different kinds in
foundations.138 The fact is that building deposits from the late Assyro-Babylonian kings (858-539 B.C.) often
include such inscriptions, a documentary custom actually “mentioned in texts from Sargon’s time down to
Nabonidus’s reign [555-539 B.C.].”139 The metallic foundation inscription ourished under the Neo-Assyrian
kings, and it is therefore no surprise that “the depositing of inscribed documents was greatly elaborated in Sargon
II’s palace at Khorsabad.”140 The excavator of this palace, Victor Place, “was intrigued by the unusual thickness
(nearly 26 feet), of one of its dividing walls.” On digging into the wall he found “two inscribed barrel cylinders” and
“an alabaster block which he carefully unearthed.” The block turned out to be “a stone box (whose lid had been
broken by the weight of the wall), which measured about 11 x 15 x 17 inches; and in it he discovered ve
foundation tablets” on which Sargon II had “described the building of Khorsabad” from scratch.141 “These
epigraphical documents have a high value for their texts themselves”; but in addition to that, “the material on
which they were engraved increases, if possible, their extreme rarity,” because “one of the tablets was made of
gold, another of silver, the third of bronze, a fourth of lead, and the last” of a mysterious “white material,” perhaps
alabaster or magnesite, which has proven harder to identify.142 Of the three metallic inscriptions, the bronze
tablet is the largest, the gold tablet the smallest, and the silver tablet somewhere in between.143 The lead tablet
and the inscribed stone box,144 which completed this series of foundation documents from Khorsabad,
disappeared in the infamous naufrage des collections of 23 May 1855, “in which so many of the archaeological
materials gathered by the French were lost.”145 Here again, “the box with its tablets was not actually [discovered]
in the foundations,” but in a wall “above the level of the oor.”146 This proves that foundation inscriptions were not
deposited solely in foundations. It does not prove that the tablets of Sargon II were something other than
foundation inscriptions, for they state repeatedly that he founded the city of Dur-Sharrukin (Khorsabad) and built
its wall, the various shrines for its gods, and its several palaces; and they also say—again repeatedly—that he
inscribed his name on those same tablets and deposited them in the “foundation walls” of the palaces.147 For what
they are worth, there are also some Urartean deposits from the Haldis Temple at Toprakkale near Lake Van in Asia
Minor, which are probably contemporary with Sargon II.148
At each corner of the square shrine a square depression, about 20 cm. on a side and 3-4 cm. deep, had
been sunk into the bedrock. In two of these depressions were found deposits, each consisting of a square
bronze plate and two tiny scraps, one of sheet gold, the other of sheet silver. None of these objects was
inscribed.149
The metallic foundation inscription came to an end with the fall of the Neo-Assyrian Empire ca. 626-609 B.C. “It
was not adopted by the Neo-Babylonian rulers,” who preferred “clay cylinders, the only type of inscribed building
deposit used in their time.”150 A clay box151 and a brick box152 are associated with the rst and the last Chaldean
kings, and there may be others; but there were few if any stone or metal inscriptions. The years between 626-609
B.C. thus mark a chronological datum before which foundation documents were inscribed on metals but not after.
“The custom was brie y revived by the Achaemenids,” who intentionally resurrected it from the Neo-Assyrian or
Urartean past.153 It died for the second time in 331 B.C. when the Persian Empire was toppled by Alexander the
Great, but it also underwent a second resurrection, this time in the great city of Alexandria.
The Alexandrian Echo of Persepolis

Archeology is problematic at Alexandria, where “excavation has yielded, and can yield, but little material for its
reconstruction at any period.”154 There are many reasons for this, but the major causes are two:
The rst is a general subsidence, probably of about four meters, which has taken much of the coastal
region of the ancient city beneath sea level. . . . This subsidence is complicated by a second, man-made
dif culty. . . . Intense building activity [since ca. 1850] has created a new and wholly arti cial coastline, to a
depth of some three hundred meters [900 feet] at its widest extent, in the area . . . where the Corniche
was completed in 1906.155
The stratigraphy and ceramic sequences of Alexandria have thus been largely disrupted, as most of the “ ll” for the
modern city was taken from the ancient city, sherds and all.156 These arti cial conditions of her coastline
unfortunately “exclude any possibility of accurate determination of the contours of the most important part of the
city.”157 Excavators have therefore been forced to concentrate on the east and west sides of Alexandria, the
former containing her ancient cemeteries and the latter her famous Temple of Serapis.158 “The Serapeum,” as a
matter of fact, “is the only excavated temple” in the city; and its foundation deposits “may reasonably be described
as the most important archaeological nd of the Ptolemaic period [ever] made in Alexandria.”159 It is very
disconcerting, therefore, to learn that “not only Parsons, The Alexandrian Library . . . , but also serious works like the
Handbuch der Bibliothekswissenchaft . . . or the Geschichte der Textüberlieferung . . . [have] failed to take notice of the
excavations.”160 The failure is understandable, however, as the archaeological and literary evidence for this temple
is so confusing that virtually nobody can make sense of it.161
The Serapeum has been unfortunate in its principal excavators, Botti and Rowe. In the reports of the
former it is frequently not clear what structures he is discussing, while the latter had little understanding
of the historical problems connected with the site, and was unable to interpret satisfactorily his
discoveries, important though some of these were. . . . Detailed interpretation of their plans and
descriptions is [therefore] a task of considerable uncertainty.162
On 23 August 1943, Alan Rowe discovered “a set of ten foundation plaques bearing bilingual inscriptions in
hieroglyphs and Greek stating that Ptolemy III had built the Temple and the Sacred Enclosure for Serapis.” They
were found in a hole sunk into a rock foundation beneath the southeast corner of the Serapeum at Alexandria. The
set included (1) three metal plates of gold, silver, and bronze; (2) ve opaque glass plates; (3) a tablet made of
faience; and (4) a mud tablet, apparently uninscribed.163 The nd was repeated on 31 December 1944, when a
“similar set of ten plaques of Ptolemy III” were taken from another deposit hole in the foundation trench under the
southwest corner of the same temple.164 The inscriptions, materials, and arrangements of the plaques were
essentially the same as before, as was the actual nd-spot.165 “The holes themselves were lled with sand after

Cultural Pluralism or Assimilation? A Dilemma of Our Times
Genevieve De Hoyos
God . . . hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth (Acts 17:26).
Through the ages, relations between ethnic and racial groups have been at best, fragile, at worst, violent
and devastating. Men have forgotten they are brothers. To deal with their conflict in the world, they have
tried everything from integration, to pluralism, to separatism, even to extermination.
In our own century, we have seen all of these attempts. In the United States, we have witnessed various degrees of
assimilation, Civil Rights, the separatist movement, and the enthusiastic adoption of a popular compromise:
cultural pluralism. Worldwide, we may know of the relatively successful adjustment of a tripartite Switzerland, but
our awareness is drawn more readily to the violent outcomes of attempted separatism: the forced expulsion of
thousands of Asians from Uganda, the periodic violence between Moslems and Hindus in India, and the unending
civil wars between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland, and between Christians and Moslems in Beirut. We have
been horri ed by the genocide of the Armenians by the Turks, of the Jews by Nazi Germany, of the Hutu by the
Tutsi in Burundi,1 and of the Tutsi by the Hutu in Rwanda.2
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the complex problems related to ethnic and racial relations.
Thus, we will rst focus on the United States as a case study, to identify the basic issues involved in the traditional
goal of assimilation. Then we will show that the new policy of cultural pluralism (an obvious compromise brought
about by a sense of failure around assimilation) is not a viable goal, since it does not promote structural
participation. Therefore, it can only realistically be viewed as a means to an end, or as a rather unstable point
between two possible outcomes: assimilation and separatism.
A POLICY OF ASSIMILATION
American society has moved from the policy of Americanization to the melting pot approach, and (as a
reaction to minorities’ demand for power and separatism) to the cultural pluralism approach. Actually, all
three of these approaches represent some degree, some version of assimilation. That is, the American
brand of cultural pluralism does not seek separatism in the economic, political, and educational systems. It
simply allows greater freedom of choice in more intimate aspects of life such as family, religion, and
recreation.3
Yet, assimilation is an extremely problematic process which, in order to be achieved, requires: (1) the complete,
unquali ed acceptance of the minority by the dominant group, as well as (2) the complete, unquali ed desire, on
the part of the minority, to give up their deepest cultural commitments.4 Apparently, in the United States, both
requirements have often failed to materialize.
A. Relative Assimilation of European Immigrants
The integration of Europeans into American institutions has, for a long time, been taken for granted. A closer look,
however, indicates that not all of them have become totally Americanized.
1. Americanization. From the beginning, people from Europe were invited to come to this country and integrate
into the ve existing institutions—family, economy, government, education, and religion—already established in
England. Consequently, a nation of immigrants was to be quickly transformed into a nation of equals, with liberty

for all. In fact, as some writers suggest today, all this really meant was that conformity to Anglo-American norms
would be expected. This is indicated by the following equation:5

American assimilation: A + B + C = A

Most Northwest European and Scandinavian immigrants apparently did not mind very much surrendering their
distinctive cultural characteristics. These Anglo-Saxon Protestant groups had given up on Europe and resolved to
make a future for themselves in America. The frontier was wide open and they were welcomed by the settlers
anxious to develop the nation. They were immediately given the right to vote and encouraged to send their
children to school.6 Soon, their sense of identity was drawn solely from American society, their roots were
forgotten, and they were indistinguishable from those who had come before them.7
This was the quick mutual acceptance that can more easily take place between two groups of equals, with very
similar physique, customs, values, ethos, and so forth, at a time when the in-coming group can be viewed not as a
rival for social rewards, but as a partner to achieve common goals.8
The next settlers, however, were not as amenable to integration. German refugees chose to remain isolated from
their American neighbors in the Midwest, establishing their own schools and maintaining their culture and
language. Then the Irish came, escaping in large numbers from the potato famine. They settled in the eastern
cities, establishing their “Popish” churches and becoming visible as a group.9
When the next wave of Europeans came, at the turn of the century, they were even more different. From Central
and Southern Europe, they brought with them a diversity of languages, religions, manners, and values. They
remained in eastern ghettos. Older Americans felt uneasy about them and invoked thoughts of cultural inferiority
to justify their prejudice, discrimination, and the resulting unrepresentative immigration quota of the 1920s.10
2. The Melting Pot. Interestingly, out of this disillusionment emerged a more lenient and open-minded version of
Americanization: the Melting Pot doctrine, often represented as follows:
Melting Pot: A + B + C = D
This approach theoretically required the fusion of the minority and majority groups, as they combined to form
a new group, a new culture, unlike any of the original groups.11 It reflected (at a time when prejudice was
high) an unexpectedly lenient view of the immigrants, and may have been the unrepresentative product of a
few, because by then the well-entrenched American institutions were not going to be modified just to please
the newcomers. This unrealistic movement enjoyed surprising popularity during the first few decades of this
century. In the end, however, the movement was criticized by both the immigrants and the WASPs. Its death
blow came at the onset of the First World War when it was discovered that millions in the United States
could not communicate in English, had never obtained citizenship, and were influenced by their foreign
governments through newspapers published in their native languages.12 Thus, World War I reintroduced
Americanization as a goal.13
Through the depression, through World War II and later, prejudice against European minorities abated, and these
continued the assimilation process. At that time, however, researchers found that assimilation is always somewhat
selective and perhaps never complete. For example, in the 1950s, a large percentage of Catholics of European

origin were found to have acquired a central aspect of the Protestant Ethic—deferred grati cation—along with
middle-class education and occupations. They had become middle class without becoming WASPs.14 But on the
other hand, social scientists also found that three “religiously de ned melting pots” had developed in the United
States: one within which the Protestants intramarry, one for all Catholics, and one for Jews, with few (but slowly
increasing) intermarriages in between.15 Thus, in spite of the dominant society’s acceptance of European groups,
these have been willing and able to give up some, but not all their expressive culture, their deeper values.16
Additional research has shown that, the more different immigrants are from the dominant group, the more their
assimilation is opposed by the group in power and resisted by the immigrants. More speci cally, differences in
physical appearance tend to bring opposition and discrimination on the part of the dominant group, and become
the greatest obstacle to assimilation. Differences in religion, on the other hand, tend to prevent the minority group
from wanting complete assimilation.17 This is why assimilation is easiest for those who come voluntarily at a time
when they are needed by the host society, who are few in numbers or dispersed, and who tend to be culturally and
physically similar to the dominant group.18
3. Renewed Ethnic Pluralism. More recently, a “new tribalism” seems to have emerged among European ethnic
groups. This renewed identi cation is expressed through a greater interest in native food, dance, and costumes, in
folk culture, and in religious traditions. It is also demonstrated through visits to ancestral homes, through the
increased use of ethnic names, through the establishment of fraternal organizations, museums, and nativelanguage newspapers, and through the current resurgence in the use of hyphenated nationality terms such as
Italian-American or Polish-American.19 All these efforts to preserve one’s heritage appear to con rm one study
which claims that third-generation Irish and Italians are expressing a greater sense of being deprived from their
roots than their migrant grandparents themselves had.20
This rising white ethnic assertiveness is an unexpected and interesting phenomenon occurring among people who
have generally been thought to be well accepted and integrated into American society. It may simply be part of the
national trend championing individualism. Or it may be defensive pluralism, motivated by the competition
presented by other organized groups who are making claims for special treatment.21 But it certainly tells us that
while it is easy to change one’s manners, material culture, and super cial beliefs and attitudes, it is much harder to
abandon one’s identi cation with the values of one’s original culture.22
Yet at this time, there is no doubt that European ethnic groups have generally been integrated into American
society. To the extent that they are not, it has been due more to their resisting complete assimilation than to
rejection by the dominant group.23 On the other hand, the people of color in the United States have had a
different experience.
B. Problematic Adjustment of Racial Groups in the United States
Today, four major groups make up the people of color in this country: the Native Americans who, after the Indian
wars, ended up mostly on reservations; the Afro-Americans, most of whom were brought as slaves two centuries
ago; the Orientals who started immigrating well over a century ago, and a large and varied Hispanic population.
Obviously, each of these groups represent widely different ethnic backgrounds, national origins, reasons for being
in the United States, lengths of stay here, and discriminatory experiences. Yet, for the purpose of this paper, we are
mainly focusing on the Black movement because of their greater involvement in protest.

1. The Nature of Race and Racism. Most scientists agree that the concept of race is extremely unclear: all races
overlap widely, and biologists have been unable to separate one race from another on the basis of relevant and
visible physical characteristics.24 This lack of a concrete de nition, however, has not stopped many from adopting
some social de nition of race which is then related to speci c (and generally negative) behaviors, abilities, and
character traits. These traits often become stereotypes which reinforce prejudice and discrimination, and may
open the way to institutional racism, or the establishment of norms, laws, and legal structures regulating
relationships of the dominant group to given racial groups, i.e., apartheid in South Africa or Jim Crow legislation in
the Southern United States. Then comes segregation, the policy of “separate but equal,” which makes minority
achievement within the dominant group virtually impossible.25
Such developments stand in deep contradiction with the ideals of the American dream, and therefore have been
identi ed as the American dilemma.26 Through the years, social scientists have tried to explain the existence of
racism in the United States in terms of personality maladjustment, economic competition, a desire to exploit, the
need to have a scapegoat, and existing racial norms.27 But the dilemma is complex and resists easy solutions.
2. Racial Militancy and the Emergence of Cultural Pluralism. Since World War II, a number of Black movements have
emerged, making different (and often uncoordinated) demands on the United States government. During the war,
Black leaders obtained both the establishment of the FEPC (the Fair Employment Practices Committee) and the
desegregation of the armed forces. In 1955, Martin Luther King, through his nonviolent movement, made great
gains against arbitrary segregation rules in the South.28 But for some the movement was too slow. Rioting in the
streets of some of our large cities made it clear that the Blacks no longer believed that change could be obtained
through peaceful protest.29 Simultaneously, the Black Muslims organized to demand land for a separate Black
nation,30 while the Black Panther Party threateningly demanded equal treatment.31 These and other militant
groups became part of the Black Power movement which created a great sense of Black pride. Other alienated
groups followed suit, forming Brown Power, Red Power, and Yellow Power organizations.
The problems are not over. People of color keep coming to the United States. Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans,
and a number of Central Americans have come to escape economic and political problems. A contingent of
Haitians unexpectedly came to escape their poverty. The Southeast Asian political refugees are forming one of the
newest racial and ethnic groups. And all along, Samoans, Filipinos, Taiwanese, and people from Hong Kong have
continued coming in. In addition, research tells us that, in spite of many government programs, the Black ghettos
are still extremely depressed,32 the Native American reservations still have a limited economic base,33 and too
few Hispanics attend college.34 In addition, some backlash has occurred, raising the cry of “reverse discrimination.”
Yet, much has been done. It all started with racial militancy which brought pride to minority groups for their racial
and cultural origins. And it continued with the subsequent involvement of the mass media in a campaign to break
down racial and ethnic stereotyping. Now it is no longer considered good form to openly express prejudice and
discrimination against racial and ethnic groups. And Af rmative Action, along with various educational programs,
provided greater chances for upward mobility among all minorities, greatly enlarging the middle class in all
groups.35
Simultaneously, the goal of minority assimilation has fallen into disrepute. It was rst challenged in the l960s and
l970s by minority leaders and by minority people in the streets. More recently its viability is being challenged by
the general public, supported by a few social scientists. The dominant group no longer feels it can insist that Anglo

ways are the best. And minority group members derisively challenge: “What do you want me to do, become a
white man?” All these new attitudes re ect cultural pluralism, the new and more permissive approach to minorities
which has become popular in our country. This new approach is being enthusiastically adopted by politicians and
professionals in their policy statements and is supported by many ethnic groups who express a desire for a
quali ed assimilation.
Notwithstanding the intense popularity of cultural pluralism, the evidence suggests that cultural pluralism, with its
relativistic values and ethics and its enormously attractive appeal for tolerance and normative exibility, actually
may just turn out to be a brand new way of ignoring and isolating minorities.
A RATIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POLICY OF CULTURAL PLURALISM
Most supporters of cultural pluralism appear to interpret this concept as mutual appreciation of cultural
differences, along with a resolve to protect each group’s right to maintain their own way of life.36 As such, it
is difficult to quarrel with it because tolerance of cultural differences immediately sounds like a beautiful,
obvious, and instant solution to intergroup conflict. Yet the notion is rather simplistic and fails to take into
consideration basic principles of human interaction.
In an attempt to identify the core issues in racial and ethnic relations, we will argue, rst, that minorities would
rather participate in American institutions than being “kindly” tolerated, and second, that tolerance, as a goal, may
often interfere with institutional participation. Finally, it will be suggested that institutional participation can only
be achieved through either assimilation or separatism, with the warning that separatism often leads to violence. In
the process, the point will be made that cultural pluralism is not a viable goal, although it is indispensable as a
means to achieving assimilation.
Argument No. 1. Cultural Pluralism or Institutional Participation?
What is it that minority group members really want—tolerance of their differences, that is, cultural pluralism, or
full participation in the mainstream of America? Some writers indicate that they want and need both—tolerance
and participation.37 But could this not be somewhat contradictory?
The central problem in ethnic and racial relations is the fact that minorities are not fully participating in the
mainstream of America and therefore feel deprived economically and socially. In fact, this deprivation is the central
aspect of the most accepted de nition of a minority group which is described as any group which, because of its
members’ ethnic or racial characteristics, has limited access to societal rewards.
Thus, participation in the social structure of the ve basic social institutions is absolutely indispensable to
members of a society, because occupying basic roles in an institution is the only way to receive social rewards. For
example, as family members, we can receive love, acceptance, support, loyalty, security, stability, and roots. As
members of a community, as citizens, as voters, we get some measure of respect, some feeling that we make a
difference, some pride, some security. As students, we get opportunities to gain recognition in scholastic and
extracurricular activities as well as a potential status based on the hope of our future achievement. And as church
members, we may get a sense of moral commitment, a sense of oneness with others, a sense of eternity.
But above all, in the United States, it is through an occupational role that self-validation comes, because it is
through it that clear, immediate, and consistent community and societal rewards are obtained. That is, with a job
we are given space to work in, as well as an opportunity to prove our ability and to gain appreciation and
recognition from those we work for and those we work with. We are given a chance to gain new knowledge and

experience, and we are given some degree of nancial security. More importantly, we are given some title, a social
status, a sense of who we are vis-î-vis our fellowmen.38
Thus, because a job in the United States today is the greatest and most automatic source of social rewards, what is
not needed is the type of tolerance which encourages the very patterns which ensure inequality. What we need, on
the contrary, is tolerance as a means, tolerance which facilitates full social participation and unavoidably brings
cultural assimilation.
Argument No. 2. Structural Participation Demands and Facilitates Cultural Assimilation
Social roles always imply behavioral expectations. Therefore, social roles are always conditionally rewarding. That
is, generally speaking, social rewards are given when members of a group conform to their role expectations, and
rewards are withdrawn when they do not.39 Thus, well-integrated members of our society know that, in most jobs,
they must come to work every day, on time, and work until it is time to go home. And while on the job, they must
clearly show that they are performing to the best of their ability. Some leeway is allowed but if deviations from
expectations are frequent, obvious, and visible, the opportunity to work may be withdrawn.
Because of cultural pluralism, job expectations are not always understood by members of subcultural groups. For
example, a young Native American obtained a university degree. Armed with it, he got a job off the reservation as a
white collar worker in an industry. When asked about his job, he explained that every morning he found on his desk
a pile of papers to process. He typically completed such tasks by noon. In the afternoon, with nothing to do, he
would sit at his desk and read magazines. This lack of awareness of job expectations can be understood if we know
that in his family, his father only worked sporadically as a farm laborer, and that he himself had never before held a
job. Of course it did not take long for him to lose his position. Now he is back on his reservation.
This true story illustrates the fact that, typically, cultural confrontations take place at the structural level. They
occur when an Anglo boss is faced with the problem of compensating for the absence of a Chicano employee who
did not show up because his cousins from El Paso came to visit him that day. They take place when an Indian
student, in the last semester of her training, decides to go home with no degree, rather than tell her divorced sister
(who is visiting with her four children) that she cannot afford to take care of her. They happen when an AngloSaxon employee from Appalachia decides, from one day to the next, to quit his job to avoid being bothered by his
many creditors.
The fact is that cultural de nitions often clash. For instance, in our American society, self-validation comes through
a job, while in many other societies, it does not come that way at all. It may come from having servants and not
having to work, as in Spain. It may come from being a leader within the extended family, from being someone on
whom everyone can depend, as among many Latin Americans; or being a successful hustler in the inner city; or
being a strong ghter and protector among the Mongols; or seeing visions among some Native American tribes of
old; or owning cattle among some tribes of Africa; or giving up one’s money and social position among Hindus.
But if representatives of these diverse cultures come to settle in our industrial society, wanting to share of our
abundance, they will have to act, as a matter of survival, as if they believed that work is their greatest source of
satisfaction. And it is in the process of learning this crucial American pattern that they should be given all the
patience and tolerance their Anglo middle-class employers can give them, until job responsibility becomes second
nature to them. Thus, cultural pluralism may be viable as a means to the end of assimilation, but cannot realistically
be seen as an end in itself.

This is because participation not only demands some level of acculturation, but it inexorably brings further
acculturation. First it brings external acculturation, the adoption of the more super cial aspects of the new culture
(the material things, the language, the manners, the basic norms). Then it introduces the slower process of internal
acculturation, the point when social rewards become so emotionally rewarding that identi cation starts shifting to
the dominant group.40
Thus, cultural pluralism, as a means to an end, allows minority group members to establish some degree of
compartmentalization, that is, working like a dominant group member, but living at home according to minority
expectations. Eventually, however, secure in the acceptance of the dominant group, family members can venture
into other institutions, perhaps rst the PTA, then the banking system, and then into the health facilities. Then they
may decide to seek housing among Anglos and to participate in neighborhood and community affairs. They may
even attend a church attended by their neighbors. And as they participate in all basic institutions, they become
increasingly like their neighbors, increasingly aware of dominant expectations, and share increasingly in dominant
social rewards. Because the dominant group is accepting, they do all this without being pushed into a marginal
position, rejected by both groups.
To summarize, because cultural pluralism tends to lead to structural inequality, it cannot stand as a viable goal. On
the other hand, participation by minorities in dominant social structures eventually brings assimilation,
particularly if the dominant group uses tolerance of differences (or cultural pluralism) as a means to the eventual
goal of assimilation.
Argument No. 3. Assimilation or Separatism?
If full institutional participation (and assimilation) is not facilitated by the dominant group, eventually the
minorities will rebel. When they do, one choice they may demand is separatism, that is, their own land to establish
their own separate basic institutions, their own society.
From the very beginning, as the young country welcomed new immigrants, the United States chose assimilation as
the preferred approach to cross-cultural relations. This accommodating policy is rather rare worldwide, since most
other countries have more typically established some version of separatism. But cases of successful separatism
are rare, and most eventually end up in violence.
About the only existing case of lasting stability seems to be Switzerland, which has been tremendously successful
in maintaining peace between three “separated” cultural groups under one government. For centuries, that
country has existed as a peaceful federation uniting three basic geographical and cultural groups (Germans,
French, and Italians), and four languages (German, French, Italian, and Romansh). To survive as a nation, the Swiss
had to exercise great rationality in organizing a tripartite government, with clearly delineated rules which permit
each group to be fully represented in the central government. To preserve this fragile balance of power, however,
the country had to establish stringent laws, such as prohibitive rules against migration. And in spite of their
impressive record, in the 1970s a violent separatist movement emerged indicating that not even such workable,
rational arrangements can totally eliminate con ict.41
In Canada, the French Canadians have attempted to maintain some degree of separatism which has yielded a
rather fragile coalition, with the status of the French depending entirely on their current political power. Lebanon
established a political arrangement similar to that of the Swiss, but it did not last. When they allowed their tenuous
balance of power to be disturbed by the incoming Palestinian refugees, civil war came. And in Africa, many tribes,

after a repressed but relatively peaceful coexistence under their colonial masters, are now facing one another
sometimes in avoidance, and sometimes in fratricide.
Thus, separatism is not an easy solution. Typically, any type of pluralism brings con ict.42 But separatism, in
addition, carries with it the message that the differences involved are irreconcilable, that assimilation is out, and
that compromise is no longer an option. And with this comes the depersonalization, the dehumanization of the
enemy, which so often leads to violence in confrontation, and occasionally in extermination.43
Such confrontation is well described in a prophecy of war:
After many days, slaves shall rise up against their masters, who shall be marshaled and disciplined for war.
. . . And thus, with the sword and by bloodshed the inhabitants of the earth shall mourn (D&C 87:4, 6).
As a conclusion, it must be admitted that it is not easy to achieve peace amid differences among human beings.
When we compare separatism with assimilation, we can only conclude that separatism is rather risky and that
assimilation probably is, in the long run, a more functional goal. Yet, assimilation is not easily achieved. In the
United States, the policy of assimilation has worked only when the groups involved were relatively similar racially
as well as culturally. And recently, even the assimilation of white Europeans has been questioned. Now, with a
sense of failure, the goal of cultural assimilation has been replaced with a new goal: that of cultural pluralism, a
nonviable goal because it tends to work against the institutional participation of minorities. No nation can afford to
have large segments of its population excluded from occupying conditionally rewarding roles, because only
through roles do we share in the societal rewards. When demands for institutional assimilation are not met,
minorities have only one other alternative: separatism. But the successful cases of separatism are few, and only for
groups who have some land autonomy and similar cultures. Peace, for those who have ambiguous territorial claims
and basic cultural differences, is fragile, tenuous, and often turns to violence.
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Twelve Diatribes of Modern Israel
Avraham Gileadi
This essay serves as a testimony to modern Israel—the Latter-day Saints—that we are beginning to resemble
God’s ancient covenant people in ways that con ict with our high ideals. Some parallels between the two peoples
provide a yardstick by which we can judge ourselves. Unfortunately, these parallels paint a dismal picture of where
we are headed and what is in store.
If the type or pattern we draw from the parallels holds true,1 then by following the parallels through to their
conclusion we will know what to expect in our generation. Next to actual prophecy, scriptural types provide the
most reliable guide to the future, particularly to the last days. Indeed, all true prophets prophesy, more or less,
using types and shadows from Israel’s ancient past to predict the future. By familiarizing ourselves with the
ancient types, we will know both a sickness and its cure; we will recognize our present condition and know what its
outcome must be.
Because biblical parallels do not directly threaten us, we could keep ourselves aloof from their message. Such
aloofness, I would point out, is out of character with the man whom I salute in this essay: Hugh Nibley exempli es
one who comes to terms with hidden errors, who searches out the truth, who speaks the unspeakable. He frankly
criticizes the Saints, warning and admonishing as well as teaching and instructing them. He serves as a perfect
example of the Lord sending “prophets, and wise men, and scribes” to his people (Matthew 23:34; emphasis
added). Many times he has laid his reputation on the line, with strong reactions, both positive and negative, to his
scripturally based arguments. He has served as conscience of his people, a role that has borne much good fruit in
the lives of Latter-day Saints.
In seeking to apply the parallels of biblical history explicitly to ourselves, I have chosen the term diatribe to express
their message. Some may think that in so doing I am even more severe than Brother Nibley. One has but to recall
his “How Firm a Foundation?” and “Forty Variations on an Unpopular Theme,” however, to recognize that this essay
falls rmly within the Nibley tradition. If all is not well in Zion, then what is not well? An answer to this question is
idolatry.
I therefore discuss in these pages twelve kinds of idolatry that have become as prevalent among ourselves as
among so-called Gentiles. (Of course, by adopting the customs of the Gentiles, Israel always jeopardized her status
as a chosen people. When ancient Israel did not repent of the idolatrous practices she learned from the Gentiles,
the Lord cut the people off from his presence and destroyed them. In one instance, he removed the gospel from a
certain group of people and gave it to another.) By choosing these twelve categories of idolatry, I do not mean to
limit the parallels to them. There exist other forms as well as subforms of idol worship, but I point to these twelve
as some of the more obvious or pernicious.
When speaking of idolatry, we often think of people venerating statues, bowing down before “dumb idols,” or
perhaps participating in processions with icons raised on portable pedestals. People still perpetuate these ancient
kinds of idolatry, though not the Latter-day Saints. Idolatry nonetheless assumes many forms besides these, less
tangible than statue worship perhaps, but just as virulent. All idolatry diverts the attention from the true God and
his law to a counterfeit. Much of such idolatry is a corruption of what is sacred. The nal test in the scriptures of
whether a god is true or false is whether he saves his people in the Lord’s day of judgment.2 The ancient prophets
made sport of those who, having rejected the Lord God, clung to false gods for deliverance in the time of trouble.3

The rst of the Ten Commandments acknowledges the existence of other gods by saying, “Thou shalt have none
other gods before me” (Deuteronomy 5:7). It then quali es idolatry as anything less than loving the Lord God “with
all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might” (Deuteronomy 6:5; compare 5:10). Israel’s earliest
history is full of admonitions to refrain from “going after the gods of the peoples round about” (Deuteronomy 6:14;
13:1-18; Joshua 23:6-8). These ground rules let everyone know that true worship exists within an extremely
narrow compass. Idolatry thus becomes identical with the broad way, the way of the world and nations who
surround Israel. God’s covenant people maintain their special status so long as they worship God alone.4 In the
biblical pattern of the conquest of Canaan, God will ultimately destroy and dispossess those who indulge in idol
worship.5
Speaking of Latter-day Saints as idolaters may seem contradictory. Surely, of all peoples on the earth we know best
“how to worship, and . . . what [we] worship” (D&C 93:19). Yet it was necessary for the Lord to restore the pure
knowledge of God in all dispensations of the gospel. And every dispensation entered on its pathway to apostasy
when the people compromised the worship of God with the conventions of men. To love and serve God—to
worship him alone—at all times meant keeping his commandments,6 not in isolation from the world, but in
puritanical contrast to universal and prevailing custom.7 The scriptures from the beginning mark the Gentiles—all
nations except Israel—as idolaters.8 Among the Gentiles, worship of the true God was either nonexistent or
perverted, rendering it ineffectual.9
The practices of the world deceive the heart (Deuteronomy 11:16). The whole heart must be preoccupied with the
things of God and must constantly “remember” his commandments in order to maintain true worship (Numbers
15:39-41). When the Lord’s people experience a change of heart because of idolatry, they alienate themselves
from the Lord so that they will not hear (Deuteronomy 30:17). They allow themselves to believe that the
scriptures, particularly in addressing the wicked deeds of the Lord’s people, do not apply to them (cf. Alma 21:6).
We feel that prophecies having negative connotations must refer to the Jews or to the Gentiles, surely not to us.
In short, idolatry forms an inductive practice: once we get caught up in it, the habit carries its own momentum and
supplies its own rationale.
The Lord gave Israel a special charge, therefore, never to depart from his commandments “to the right hand or to
the left” (Deuteronomy 5:32). In observing these commandments, Israel should “not add thereto, nor diminish
from [them]” (Deuteronomy 12:32). The worship of God must not merely encompass everything, but must retain
its purity to be acceptable. It leaves no gray areas of life unaccounted for by divine law. Worship does not function
when customs alien to the law of God sully it. Every dispensation of the gospel, whether it taught a higher or a
lesser law, demonstrates this kind of apostasy. Israel’s righteousness has ever been synonymous with observing to
“do all these commandments before the Lord our God, as he hath commanded” (Deuteronomy 6:25). Given such a
charge, there is no room for saying, “All is done” (2 Nephi 31:19), “It is enough” (cf. 2 Nephi 28:30), or “All is well” (2
Nephi 28:25).
In pointing to parallels of idolatry between the Lord’s people anciently and today, we must not presume that
people worship false gods exclusively. Among the Lord’s people, worship of the true God is rarely done away with.
Rather, as a rule people worship the true God alongside the false gods. They maintain a careful equilibrium in
order to preserve an identity with the national God, the God of Israel or the fathers. At the same time, the people
follow their own gods as they please. This happy medium enables people to satisfy both their carnal instincts and
their spiritual aspirations. It causes the Lord’s prophets to cry in anguished tones, “Choose you this day whom ye
will serve” (Joshua 24:15), and “How long will ye halt between two opinions?” (1 Kings 18:21).

In some instances of idolatry, worship of the true God and the false becomes fused. Then the concept of the true
God gets distorted, while the false gods assume the authenticity and endorsement that belong to the true God. Of
all idolatry, the Lord nds such syncretism or fusion most intolerable. It epitomizes the idea of “philosophies of
men mingled with scripture.” Things incongruous with true worship thereby acquire an aura of sanctity. For the
Lord’s people, syncretism lies but one step away from severing spiritual roots. It forms the nal stage of apostasy
before the Lord brings on judgment.
Ironically, appearances of true worship persist in every stage of apostasy. A symptom of all phases of alienation is
the stress that people lay on outward observance. Since false gods are the order of the day, people must
scrupulously nurture the exterior of true worship, or all is lost. When people reach this point, they confuse
righteousness with actively congregating and religiously performing ecclesiastical duties. In such worship,
institutional convention soon becomes the enemy of spontaneity, resulting in dead, stereotypical devotion.
The writings of Isaiah, pertinent to our day,10 commence with his indictment of those who actively attend religious
meetings, who multiply sacri ces at the temple.11 Because the outward form of worship remained strong in
Jerusalem, Laman and Lemuel, in the hour of Judah’s exile, asserted, “We know that the people who were in the
land of Jerusalem were a righteous people; for they kept the statutes and judgments of the Lord, and all his
commandments” (1 Nephi 17:22). Laban was an elder of the church (1 Nephi 4:22, 26), but his heart lusted after
riches (1 Nephi 3:25). In actuality, the people of Jerusalem had “changed their gods” (Jeremiah 2:11). Their land
was desolated because they were committing abominations, whoring after their idols (Ezekiel 6:9).
In biblical history, each experience of idol worship precedes a divine judgment, such as cataclysm, plague, famine,
war, destitution, and desolation. In the last days, therefore, when all biblical types repeat themselves,12 we may
expect “the great day of the Lord” (D&C 43:17-22)—a period of judgment upon all nations of the earth—to
commence when these ancient forms of idolatry reappear among the Lord’s people. There exists no biblical type or
precedent of the Lord bringing on a universal judgment until his own people wallow in apostasy. Their
righteousness can stay such a judgment from the earth, but their wickedness constitutes its catalyst when the
balance tips in favor of wickedness.13 Hence the scripture, “upon my house shall it begin” (D&C 112:25).
1. Images
The rst of the Ten Commandments prohibits the Lord’s people from having “other gods before me” (Exodus 20:3).
The expression, “before me” (Hebrew cal panay), however, literally means “before my face” or “in my presence.” It
signi es that idolatry cuts us off from the presence of the Lord; an idolater cannot behold his face.
But the rst commandment speci es a particular kind of idolatry: the making of “graven images” and “likenesses”
(Exodus 20:4). The Hebrew words for these terms (pesel; tmûnah) possess the additional connotations of “statue”
and “picture.” Israel must not make for herself graven images or statues, nor make likenesses or pictures of
anything in the heavens above or on the earth beneath, or in the waters below the earth (Exodus 20:4). The scope
of the prohibited imagery Moses de nes as “any gure . . . male or female,” including the likeness of any beast, bird,
reptile, or sh (Deuteronomy 4:16-18). The purpose of this prohibition is that no one’s heart “turn away” from the
Lord to images (Deuteronomy 29:18), that the Lord’s people do not bend down to them nor serve them (Exodus
20:5; 23:24).

Despite the great miracles of deliverance Israel’s God wrought for his people, they quickly turned to other gods.
The Old Testament is full of examples of the Lord’s people making images for themselves after they inherited the
promised land. They made images of the god Baal and set them up in a house of Baal (1 Kings 16:32; 2 Kings
10:26-27). They set up images in their own houses (Judges 17:4; 18:30) as well as in the houses of their gods
(Nahum 1:14). They made images of men and “committed whoredoms” with them (Ezekiel 16:17). They “doted”
upon images of the elite of Babylonian society, images in color, images of people in splendid attire (Ezekiel 23:1416). In homage, as it were, to a urim and thummim, Gideon made an image of an ephod, and “all Israel went whoring
after it” (Judges 8:27). The worship of cleverly fashioned images became a way of life, preoccupying the craftsman
and patron alike (Hosea 13:2).
Common to all this sort of idol worship was an infatuation with the image of a thing rather than its reality. Images
require time, energy, and materials to conceive and produce. When made, images represent the fruits of men’s
labors, something to admire and “dote” over. Meanwhile, people get distracted from what is real. God no longer
forms the center of their thoughts, and they have taken the thing they emphasize out of context. Even if they
realize their error, however, people still want a return on their investment. They cannot simply discard the idol.
Once they make it, it is hard to get rid of. Throughout this preoccupation, people “bend down” toward their idols—
away from the Most High God. The word “serve” in Hebrew (cabad)14 also means “work.” Whatever people work at
—spend time and resources on, set their hearts upon—that they serve.
In effect, an obsession with unreality of one kind or another forms the crux of idolatry. For those on a low spiritual
plane, something tangible or corporeal, such as an image, possesses more appeal than something intangible and
incorporeal. Even the golden calf supposedly represented the Lord himself.15 Aaron called the orgy that attended
the calf’s dedication a “feast unto the Lord” (Exodus 32:4-5).
When we neither see nor experience God, an image which represents him makes him much more real to us. The
image brings him down to our level, limits him to our notion of him. God becomes something we can comfortably
deal with, something we can sketch, sculpt, or paint, and mass produce. We can thus manipulate him according to
our own image of him, until the idea of God no longer threatens us. Moreover, now that we have created a false
god, our void is lled. Our “minds” or “hearts” (Hebrew lebab) are diverted, and we can the more easily leave off
pursuing the real God.
Those who alienate themselves from the Creator nd a ready diversion in images of the creature. They exchange
the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man, birds, and beasts (Romans 1:23). They change
the truth of God into a lie, worshiping the creature rather than the Creator (Romans 1:25). Such substitution leads
directly to all kinds of lusts and wickedness (Romans 1:24, 26-32). When we deviate from God’s way to the right or
to the left, we render ourselves vulnerable to sin, cut off from God’s saving grace. Thus we nd every form of moral
perversity, from fornication to homosexuality, associated with idol worship.16
Because a deference to images leads to these abominations, the images themselves are “abominations”
(Deuteronomy 27:15).17 Their substance of silver or gold—now polluted—also constitutes an “abomination,”
something that must be burned with re (Deuteronomy 7:25) or ground to powder (Exodus 32:20; 2 Kings 23:6,
16). By the Lord’s standard, even the idolaters themselves become “abominations” (Isaiah 41:24) and “pollutions”
(Mormon 8:38). The end result of their life-style is to “perish quickly from off the good land” the Lord gave them
(Joshua 23:16).18

Those who worship images thus participate in a grand subterfuge, one that endangers not only themselves but an
entire people. As many biblical examples show, idolatry is contagious. Once an individual or group gets caught up
with it, others tend to follow.19 Then, within a short time, everyone is doing it. But the idolaters do not recognize
what happens to them. They become spiritual imbeciles and mindless without being aware of it (Jeremiah 51:17).
Before they become aware, calamitous judgments fall upon them.20 In the end, people deem the images to which
they ascribe power to shape the course of history (Isaiah 48:5) as worthless, mere objects of mockery (Jeremiah
10:15).
Meanwhile, no one expects such a drastic result. Among idol worshipers no clear perception exists of impending
calamity (Isaiah 57:1). Of God’s hand in the affairs of men, idolaters are “unaware and insensible; their eyes are
glazed so they cannot see, their minds are incapable of discernment” (Isaiah 44:18).21 Nor, in the end, can
idolaters free themselves from the sudden catastrophe that overtakes them (Isaiah 47:11-14). They have long
ceased to deal spontaneously with spiritual verities (Isaiah 57:11-13). Their behavior when all was well conditions
their behavior in the time of crisis (Isaiah 45:16, 20). They are not prepared for the bizarre reward of being
unpro table servants of the Lord (Isaiah 42:17-25).
Not much imagination is required to see parallels of image worship in the modern gentile culture, and thus among
the Latter-day Saints. While statues and pictures of deity play their part, “images of the creature” appear much
more proli cally. The greater part of today’s entertainment industry comes to us in the form of images via
television, movies, and videos. These comprise images of people, of birds and beasts, images in color, of male and
female.
We put up the graven and molten apparatuses which transmit these images in our own houses as well as in houses
set apart for that purpose. Upon these images we dote, preoccupied for hours at a time with our telestial urim and
thummim. In order for the images to entertain us, we must bend ourselves down toward them. Preferably, we
worship in the dark, like imbeciles mindless of one another. When a social need arises, we resent its intrusion. Our
behavior toward one another is colored by what our images dictate. Their power, somehow, diverts our whole
attention.
Moreover, to acquire an apparatus that transmits these images, we must spend precious resources, laboring for
“what is not bread” (Isaiah 55:2). We set our hearts on the privilege of possessing such an apparatus as we would
on a worthy goal. In this, too, there exists an element of competition with, and thus alienation from, others. Those
of us who invest more resources than our neighbor will enjoy bigger and better images. Of course, we justify this
investment on the basis of personal enjoyment. Make no mistake, the images are there for our self-grati cation.
When we invite others to view them with us, it palliates our soul to know that they share the same interests. It
normalizes an abnormal pastime.
Recent studies, for example, amply document the abnormal effects of watching television. The images our eyes see
are stored permanently in our minds. There they mingle with images of the real world, confusing our perception of
reality and affecting behavior. Watching television accustoms people to the sensational, the arti cial, the novel, so
that they begin to require a regular diet of these things to maintain their interest.22
The answer to this need lies in watching more television, until its addictive and narcotic effect on people enslaves
them. Because their minds and hearts dull toward quiet, normal, everyday happenings, reality appears drab and

uninteresting.23 Television advertising in part compensates for this by creating unnatural wants or needs in
people. People satisfy these wants by sel shly indulging in consumer goods.24
But more than this, television teaches a false social code, enculturating people, especially children, into norms of
divorce, disrupted family life, the supremacy of the peer group, af uence, unisex, alcohol consumption, fast food or
junk food habits, coercive health practices, and so forth. Closely linked to this chaotic social structure is television’s
false morality. While television de nes no clear-cut standard of right and wrong and denies the concept of sin, it
accepts immorality as normal. Because the ner human emotions are not portrayed well on this medium, television
inculcates a national taste for what is depraved, coarse, and unintelligent.25 It not only vulgarizes the use of
language, but stunts its development, discouraging reading and intellectual growth.26
That the effects of television, to name but one medium of modern imagery, parallel exactly those of ancient image
worship—turning men’s minds and hearts away from God, alienating people through a diet of permissiveness,
carnality, and servility to a false moral code—we cannot deny. The prophet Micah foretells that images would
prevail among the Lord’s people in the last days. Micah uses the common rhetoric of “graven images” and “standing
images” in predicting that men will worship the works of their hands (Micah 5:13). Jesus af rms that Micah’s
prophecy relates to the last days when he says that those who will not repent in that day will be cut off from the
house of Israel (3 Nephi 21:17, 20).
John the Beloved saw that the ultimate human image will be that of the Antichrist, a tyrannical world-ruler who
rises up in the last days.27 John prophesies that all except a very few will worship the Antichrist’s image, an image
that will “speak” and command worship (Revelation 13:4, 14-15). For this, the Lord will severely punish people
(Revelation 14:9-11; 16:2). Only those who resist worshiping the image, on pain of death, will merit salvation
(Revelation 15:2; 20:4). Of course, in order to worship the Antichrist, those now worshiping images will not switch
to anything really new. His worship will merely climax a saga that even now is in full play.
2. Violence and Sex
The Lord, on many salient occasions, warned the Israelites through his prophets about their carelessness in letting
their neighbors’ Baalism in uence them.28 Baalism itself, however, we have not understood well. The cult centers
around a myth or ctional account of a life-and-death struggle between the gods. In this story, Baal, the hero,
overpowers several rivals. He celebrates his prowess by having intercourse with Anath, his female partner.
The fullest available account of the myth comes from the Baal-Anath Epic of Ugaritic literature.29 Its alternating
scenes of violence and sex—reenacted in real-life dramas that took their cue from the Baal myth—become explicit
in their descriptive detail. Pornographic and violent imagery, carved or painted, accompanied reenactments of the
story. The myth so incited Israelites who exposed themselves to the Baal cult that forthwith they “played the
harlot” with non-Israelite women, losing all awareness of their chosen status (Numbers 25:1, 6).
In the Ugaritic myth, Baal obtains permission from a higher authority, El, to command the gods Yamm (Sea) and
Mot (Death) to comply with Baal’s rule or face him in a confrontation. Yamm and Mot represent forces of chaos or
disorder that will make trouble for Baal and for the world if Baal does not subdue them. They resist Baal’s
authority and each ghts him to the death.

Sundry emissaries and cohorts assist Baal and his rivals in their life-and-death struggle. The versatile craftsman
Koshar fashions the weapons Baal uses against his enemies. These weapons can kill, injure, or maim from a
distance. As the central gure of the drama, Baal himself literally kicks up a storm, he being the “lord”30 of thunder
and lightning. Baal nonetheless suffers reverses and at one time appears dead. But with the timely aid of his
violent consort, Anath, he escapes the clutches of death and wins the victory at the last. The myth thus credits Baal
with restoring order in the world, everyone pro ting from his extraordinary prowess. Sexual relations between
him and Anath, hitherto hampered by adversity, now receive full expression in a lustful orgy.
In comparing the Baal myth with anything in today’s culture, we recognize readily the basic plot that inspires so
many movies and dramas in our media. Their very success lies in the amount of violence and sex they contain. The
hero and his cohorts get authorization to kill and do anything they please, so long as they subdue the enemy and
restore order. They do battle using weapons that kill and injure from a distance, weapons that strike swiftly like
lightning, that clap aloud like thunder.
In ful lling his bizarre task, the hero nonetheless experiences setbacks, receives the wounds of battle, stares death
in the face. But help always arrives in the nick of time, often by a woman driven to violence. In these stories, sexual
aberrations abound—as they do in the Baal myth. Their scenes of sex and violence appear both subtle and explicit
—as they do in the Baal myth. The many variations of their crude plots match ancient counterparts. In the biblical
narrative we thus nd Baal-Peor, Baal-Berith, Baal-Zebub, and other Baals.
The spilling over of violence and sex from ctitious dramas into real life is as well attested today as it was among
the Canaanites.31 By making carnality legitimate in their culture, the Canaanites—and later the Israelites who
conquered them—marked themselves ripe for destruction. Through the media that constitute an everyday part of
our lives, we let characters enter our homes and minds to perform acts we abhor in real life.
The pornographic images our media depict—the licentious manner of the characters, their distorted standard of
values, their predisposition to murder and violence—all subvert and pollute our minds and hearts. Once there,
they become a part of us and we of them. By indulging such images we do the contrary of “stopping our ears at the
mention of murder, shutting our eyes at the sight of wickedness” (Isaiah 33:15). Yet this forms the standard—an
uncompromising standard—that the Lord makes a prerequisite of salvation.
3. Rock Music
The Lord commanded not just ancient Israel but every covenant people to keep themselves unspotted from the
world.32 This commandment applied as much in the days before the Flood as it does in the latter days. One
account of the period leading up to the Flood33 tells how the people of the covenant, who lived on a high mountain
plateau, lost their chosen status: they let the people of Cain, who lived on the plain, entice them down the
mountain.
From the days of Adam, the rst man, the Lord commanded the children of the covenant “not to mingle with the
children of Cain, and not to learn their ways” (2 Adam and Eve 19:4). In the days of Jared—whose name means
“going down”—the children of the covenant nonetheless mingled with them and soon became as they were. When
the Flood came, it swept away both, the people of Cain and of the covenant alike. Only Noah and his immediate
family, as a type of things to come,34 preserved their covenant status and were spared (Genesis 6:17-18).

Whether the account that the books of Adam and Eve give is accurate, or whether it represents but a folk memory,
does not matter a great deal.35 What matters is the thing it describes, a phenomenon that could occur among any
chosen people.
The scriptures predict that the Flood and the apostasy that preceded it represent something that will repeat itself
in the last days.36 The kind of wickedness and corruption that lled the earth before the Flood (Genesis 6:5, 12)
should therefore serve to forewarn us. We cannot—in the last days—presume to be on the side of Noah when we
live the law of the people of Cain. Those whom the Lord preserved through the Flood anciently not only abstained
from wickedness, but actively resisted its in uence.37 When, at the Flood, the Lord baptized the earth with water,
Noah and his family alone merited deliverance. So also, in the last days, when the Lord cleanses the earth in a ood
of re, only those puri ed “as with re” will be delivered.38
The books of Adam and Eve identify drunkenness, licentiousness, hatred, murder, and secret combinations as
existing among the children of Cain (2 Adam and Eve 20:4-10). With this, all known scriptural accounts of the
period before the Flood concur.39 Prophecies of the last days tell us that these same evils will precipitate the
Lord’s judgments40—until “the elements . . . melt with fervent heat” (2 Peter 3:12). In describing the period before
the Flood, the books of Adam and Eve attempt to spell out what the scriptures say perfunctorily.
In brief, what enticed the people to come down from the Holy Mount and mingle with the children of Cain was the
appeal of a certain kind of music. This music possessed the power to ravish people’s souls (2 Adam and Eve 20:3).
Once the people descended from the mount, all manner of lusts overcame them. The music had conditioned them
for this (2 Adam and Eve 20:20, 30-32). The music transformed people who had kept the divine law, who had
regularly prayed and fasted, from children of God into children of the devil (2 Adam and Eve 20:15-16, 27, 35).41
The music robbed people of their self-control, and thus of a measure of their agency (2 Adam and Eve 20:3, 9). The
music’s intensity and momentum, when played at all hours by impassioned musicians, in amed people’s hearts and
won them over. A godly habit of life gave way to the abominations that were the commonplace of the Cainites (2
Adam and Eve 20:2, 4, 12-13).
The account relates how a man called Genun, whom Satan inspired, made various kinds of trumpets, horns,
stringed instruments, cymbals, psalteries, lyres, harps, and utes and “gathered companies upon companies to play
on them” (2 Adam and Eve 20:2, 4). When Genun and his companions played the instruments, “Satan came into
them, so that [out of] them were heard beautiful and sweet sounds that ravished the heart” (2 Adam and Eve 20:3).
When the bands played, the children of Cain “burned as with re” among themselves, and as a consequence Satan
“increased lust among them” (2 Adam and Eve 20:4).
As the music became a part of everyday life, the bands gathered at the foot of the Holy Mountain for the purpose
of letting the covenant people hear it (2 Adam and Eve 20:11). After about a year of exposure to the music, many of
the covenant people came regularly to look down at the musicians (2 Adam and Eve 20:12). Satan then again
entered Genun. Satan “taught him to make dyeing-stuffs for garments of divers patterns, and made him to
understand how to dye crimson and purple” (2 Adam and Eve 20:13). To those of the covenant people who came to
be entertained, the Cainites “shone in beauty and gorgeous apparel, gathered together at the foot of the mountain
in splendor, with horns and gorgeous dresses” (2 Adam and Eve 20:14).
When Satan revealed to Genun a way down from the Holy Mountain, Jared admonished his people that if they
went down, God would not permit them to return (2 Adam and Eve 20:26). Over a period of time, however,

company after company descended until but few remained (2 Adam and Eve 20:30; 21:1). For “when they looked at
the daughters of Cain, at their beautiful gures, at their hands and feet dyed with color, tattooed in ornaments on
their faces, the re of sin kindled in them” (2 Adam and Eve 20:31). Moreover, “Satan made them look most
beautiful,” so that the people lusted after each other like ravenous beasts, committing abominations and falling into
de lement (2 Adam and Eve 20:32-34).
When, in remorse, some tried to return up the mount, they were unable. Having “come down from glory,” they had
forsaken their purity and innocence (2 Adam and Eve 20:33-34). Through transgressing—to which the music
incited them—the covenant people estranged themselves from being the people of God (2 Adam and Eve 21:4-5).
What strikes us about this story is how it resembles our society today. When we recognize the physical descent
from the Holy Mount as symbolizing a spiritual descent, the account reads like a contemporary happening. Today,
as then, the younger generation of the covenant people has commenced yielding to the enticement of this music. If
there exists any doubt that rock music ravishes the soul, in ames the heart, or sets on re the lusts of the esh, we
have but to witness a concert by any well-known rock group. The spectacle they create—its fantasy, frenzy, and
hysteria—appeals to the very basest of human emotions, and the physical appearance of the musicians—their
gaudy and glittering attire and their lewd and suggestive gestures—parallel in every way the Cainites that the
books of Adam and Eve describe. As Isaiah foresaw, “the look on their faces betrays them: they aunt their sin like
Sodom; they cannot hide it” (Isaiah 3:9).
We cannot explain away the fact that rock music today exempli es what is “carnal, sensual, and devilish” (cf. Mosiah
16:3; Moses 5:13). Its origin in primitive jazz and soul music, and its “maturing” into hard, punk, and porno rock,
mark it as “the way of Cain,” as “a corruption” and “a riot” (cf. Jude 1:11; 2 Peter 2:12-13). Its development into a
modern cult, with its attendant rituals of liquor, prostitution, and drugs, attests to its satanic nature. In many
instances, the musicians themselves confess to pacts with Satan, admitting that he inspires their music and
lyrics.42 Scott Temple, a former hippie, calls the spirit of the music the “unholy ghost.”
Studies show that even milder kinds of rock music are but stepping stones to hard rock.43 The principle holds true
that once people wallow in the mire, they become the “servants of corruption” (2 Peter 2:17-22). Attempts to use
rock music—a telestial medium—to convey the celestial message of the gospel constitute, at best, an abomination.
Syncretism has ever sought to prostitute what is holy and sanction what is profane.
Since rock music entered Western culture in the 1950s, moral decline in Christian nations has reached an
unprecedented low. Latter-day Saints who tolerate the cult are discovering, to their dismay, that their moral level
is no higher than that of other Christians. Latter-day Saints have perhaps taken longer to make the “descent,” but
moral problems of equal magnitude now plague Latter-day Saints and sectarian Christians.
As in the Babylon of Daniel and his companions, when we hear the sound of horns, utes, harps, sackbuts,
psalteries, dulcimers, and all kinds of music, we worship at the shrine of its creators (Daniel 3:3-15). If any of us,
therefore, like Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, would walk through the re in the day of burning (Daniel
3:25),44 it will be because, like them, we refuse to yield to an idolatrous music.
4. Organized Sports
A second propitious diversion that the Cainites used to entice the covenant people, mentioned only brie y,
however, consists of organized sports (2 Adam and Eve 20:14). A much more telling example of organized sports, of

a kind that swayed the Lord’s people in another age, were the popular Greco-Roman games (cf. 1 Maccabees 1:14;
1 Corinthians 9:24-25). In the intertestamental and New Testament periods, the single greatest cultural seduction
of the Lord’s people was the in uence of Hellenism. Those who immersed themselves in Greek and Roman
culture, including the games, were thus called Hellenizers or Hellenists. Among the Jews these principally
comprised the Sadducees, an aristocratic priestly class (although Hellenism affected all Jews to some extent).45
Among the Christians, Hellenists formed the bulk of the Church’s members from the second century of its
existence.46
In Palestine, the only legitimate repudiators of Hellenism, either Jewish or Christian, were the Dead Sea
sectaries.47 These formed an early type of the “church in the wilderness” when they left their urban brethren to
dwell apart. Among the Christians, all ended in apostasy, with Hellenism as the chief cause.48 Both Hellenizers and
Jewish sectaries play an important role as types.
Interestingly, the Greco-Roman games appear to have originated in religious ritual associated with the ancient
Near Eastern fertility cult.49 An idolatrous amusement—one that turns men’s hearts from the law of God to the
law of the brute—organized sports had their heyday among the Romans. Although the early Romans adopted
many aspects of Greek culture, including gymnasia, athletics, and rigorous disciplining, the Roman appetite far
more than the Greek tended toward the sensational, spectacular, and barbaric. Historians link the very decline of
Roman civilization to an inordinate disposition the general populace displayed for brute sports.50
Participants nonetheless executed such sports with all the nesse and sophistication civilization could bring to
bear. Elaborate stadiums, housing as many as 200,000 spectators, with gladiators disciplined and groomed for
contests of skill combined with raw strength, characterized sports Roman style. The distinction between the
Greek and Roman games coincided, in the main, with the amateur and professional status of the players. While the
Greek games were more subdued, nonprofessional events, the Romans went all out in expenditure, professional
training, and fanfare.51
The games, professional or nonprofessional, consisted of chariot races, running, discus throwing, spear throwing,
boxing, wrestling, swordsmanship, and hunting. Men practiced for their contests in special barracks or athletic
compounds, using primitive forms of weight training and exercise. Sports events followed set schedules in the
yearly calendar, advertised by posters in every inhabited region. Contests took place in the gymnasia,
amphitheaters, and circuses that were common to every city. All classes of society, drawn from both city and
neighboring towns, attended the games.52
Stadiums typically contained multiple entrances, stairways, tiers, and blocks of seating. Admission was facilitated
by prepurchased tickets or, as in the case of of cials, by virtue of reserved seats. Spectators not seated in the
immediate proximity of a contest used a primitive form of eld glasses. Great bands of musicians, organized in
festal processions, blared on trumpets before and at intervals during the games.53
Individual contestants often grew popular. They became household names, whom people knew by their personal
statistics and professional records. Women adored certain gladiators almost as gods. People made predictions on
the outcome of the games, betting with one another on the results. Vast, unruly crowds frequented the contests,
waving handkerchiefs, shouting advice, approval, and insults, rising up from their seats during moments of

suspense. When contests neared their conclusion, the fervor of the crowds often reached a dangerously feverish
pitch, accompanied by calls for blood. People debated the results of the games long after the event.54
As the decline of Roman civilization set in, the games became the total preoccupation of the elite as well as the
masses; people made no pretense at anything higher in life. They devoted exorbitant resources to the games, so
much that charitable programs rated a poor second.55 Of all peoples in the Roman Empire, it seems only pious
Jews shunned the games, considering them a heathen pastime.56
In our own culture, a widespread and rapidly growing preoccupation with sports—whether football, basketball,
baseball, athletics, boxing, wrestling, car racing, horse racing, hunting—must make us ask whether we, too, like the
Romans and Hellenists, nd ourselves in a state of moral and civil decline. Although our laws prohibit bloodshed,
so explicit appear the parallels of human behavior that we cannot say that we are different. The abandon and
frenzy of the human spirit at such events, the foul language, anger, and even bloodlust re ect the kind of coarse
disposition the Romans displayed.
So all-consuming have today’s games become that they govern people’s very thoughts, moods, and actions. In the
cause of sports, men desecrate the Sabbath. Family life suffers to the point that we hear of “sports widows and
orphans.” Upcoming events are no longer victories we ourselves win in working out our salvation, but the next
game or the one after.
The fanfare and pageantry we impose on the games, the vast resources of money and man-hours we devote to
organized sports, betray an entrenched cult, a full-blown diversion from life’s real contest. It is of absolutely no
consequence to us, in the eternal perspective, whether so-and-so wins a match, or whether such and such a team
retains its ranking. Our all-absorbing quest to become Number One in sports means that we become secondstring players, or perhaps mere bench warmers, in our quest for Zion. When we love sports with all our might,
mind, and strength, as we do, we are indeed damnable idolaters. Once we catch its infectious spirit, it will not leave
us alone. We must ever be following the progress of a team, making that, not the gospel, our daily talk, the focus of
our thoughts. To be a “fan” of, or “faithful” to, something other than God means that we entertain a substitute for
true worship.
The type we outline teaches us that few, if any, involvements with organized sports exist—in their modern
embellished form—that are not idolatrous in nature, that do not divert the mind and heart from being
preeminently involved with things of the spirit. This, of course, does not include our individual pursuit of excellence
while magnifying our talents. But where sports form an end in themselves, where they become an all-consuming
quest for excellence for its own sake—or for the sake of money or becoming popular with the world, beating the
world at its own game—then we overstep the bounds on the side of idolatry. The total abstinence by pious Jews
from the games cult that swept away a civilization, and with it the early Church, surely constitutes a type and
shadow of a latter-day contest.
5. Human Idols
The idea of human idols ows naturally out of other forms of idolatry. Indeed, many ancient gods of myth and ritual
had human beginnings, some claiming divine parentage or ancestry.57 The Hebrew prophets refer to various
individuals as false gods. Jeremiah calls an apostate ruler in Judah “a despised broken idol” (Jeremiah 22:28). The
Lord punishes this ruler by “writing” him childless (Jeremiah 22:30)—the covenant curse of having no posterity.
Zechariah describes false prophets as idols who speak folly and singles out a certain “idol shepherd” who forsakes

the ock (Zechariah 10:2; 11:17). Instead of feeding the ock, this religious leader consumes the esh of the
fattest (Zechariah 11:16). The Lord punishes him by smiting him in the arm and blinding him in one eye (Zechariah
11:17), in mock imitation of a marred statue. This punishment renders him ritually blemished and his ministry
illegitimate.
Isaiah, through a subtle play on words, identi es prominent gures in society as “idols.” By using terms possessing
different levels of meaning, Isaiah implies that the people idolize certain “celebrities” or “bigwigs”; the people are
“enchanted” and “captivated” by them, and exhibit “covetous desires,” “fawning adulation,” and “carnal lust” toward
them (Isaiah 1:29-30).58 The idols, on the other hand, exercise “immunity” from the law on account of wealth,
power, or fame; they and their enterprises make up the very spark that sets off a ery destruction of the Lord’s
people (Isaiah 1:29-31).
The Hebrew prophets predict, as does John the Revelator, that the ultimate human idol will be the Antichrist of
the last days.59 Biblical types of this archtyrant abound: the king of Babylon, the king of Assyria, the king of Tyre,
the king of Greece.60 To this list we may add later Antichrist types, from Nero to Hitler. As in Isaiah, the latter-day
Antichrist forms a composite of all evil world-rulers who precede him. He, like them, commands the worship of
men (Revelation 13:4, 8). Satan lends him his own power (Revelation 13:2). His heart, like theirs, is lifted up, and he
thinks, “I am a God; I sit in the seat of God, in the midst of the seas” (Ezekiel 28:2).
Like some gure out of Star Wars, the Antichrist rises in the heavens like the morning star to set his throne above
the stars of God (Isaiah 14:13). He ascends above the altitude of the clouds and makes himself “like the Most High”
(Isaiah 14:14). He sets his nest on high, in order to escape calamities on the earth (Habakkuk 2:9). He exalts
himself above all gods, defying even the God of Gods (Daniel 11:36).
With divine irony, the Lord does not let the Antichrist arise until the world is full of false gods. Worshiping this
human idol consists of but an extension of what is already transpiring. As God’s instrument, the Antichrist
nonetheless condemns the false gods of all peoples to the re, including those of the Lord’s people (Isaiah 10:11;
37:19). He regards no god other than himself, but “magni es himself above all” (Daniel 11:37).
Under his tyrannous rule, all human idols now worshiped, exalted, extolled, glori ed, revered, idolized, and adored
will be things of the past. Rock stars, movie stars, sports stars, superstars, tycoons, barons, and bigwigs will be but
“despised broken idols.” Through the instrumentality of the Antichrist, the Lord will “make all glorying in excellence
a profanity, and the world’s celebrities an utter execration” (Isaiah 23:9). Until the Lord displaces the Antichrist as
King of Kings and Lord of Lords when he comes in glory, the Antichrist’s coercive worship will serve as punishment
of our present voluntary worship of man.
6. Imaginations of the Heart
Virtually every instance of the expression “imaginations of the heart” in the Bible equates such imaginations with
idolatry and following other gods.61 At a covenant ceremony, Moses warns Israel, “Lest there should be among
you a man, woman, family, or tribe whose heart turns away this day from the Lord our God to go and serve the
gods of these nations; lest there should be among you a root that bears gall and wormwood” (Deuteronomy
29:18). Moses goes on to cite a classic kind of self-deception, at the same time harking back to the curses he has
just enumerated in connection with the covenant: “And it come to pass, when he hears the words of this curse, that
he bless himself in his heart, saying, I shall have peace [salvation], though I walk in the imagination of my heart, to
add drunkenness to thirst” (Deuteronomy 29:19).

Moses thereby gives us to understand that self-deception or “drunkenness” follows a personal lack of or “thirst”
for the knowledge of God. Paul concurs with this when he says that imaginations, or reasonings, form a kind of
conceit or pretense that exalts itself “against the knowledge of God” (2 Corinthians 10:5). Moses thus concludes
his warning by showing how the Lord will not withhold his anger and jealousy from such but will bring “all the
curses that are written in this book” upon them, separating them unto evil from his people, blotting out their name
from under heaven (Deuteronomy 29:20-21).
Imaginations of the heart nonetheless constitute something each of us has to live with. They form an integral part
of being mortal, expressing a person’s innate disposition to think or do evil. Unavoidably, “the imagination of man’s
heart is evil from his youth” (Genesis 8:21). People possess a natural tendency to be proud, mischievous, and
wicked (Proverbs 6:18; Luke 1:51).62 But when people let the imagination of their hearts rule them, when they do
not make captive every thought in obedience to Christ (2 Corinthians 10:5), then they fall. Then, though “they
knew God, they glori ed him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their
foolish heart was darkened” (Romans 1:21).
When God’s prophet calls on the people to repent, they think, “There is no hope”—they continue following their
own devices, relying for guidance on the imaginations of their heart (Jeremiah 18:12). Instead of hearkening to the
Lord’s counsel, they hearken to those who say, “Ye shall have peace. . . . No evil shall come upon you” (Jeremiah
23:17). In the end, the Lord esteems such people as good for nothing and vents his wrath upon them (Jeremiah
13:10-14). Biblical types of falling prey to the imagination of the heart include the people before the Flood, the
people at the Tower of Babel, and Israel and Judah before the Exile.63
Nephi identi es the large and spacious building he and his father saw in vision as the “vain imaginations and the
pride of the children of men” (1 Nephi 12:18). Nephi notes that a great and terrible gulf—the justice of the eternal
God—divides those in the building from the godly (1 Nephi 12:18). Those who gather in the building consist not
just of non-Israelites but also of the house of Israel, mocking, scorning, and ghting their humble brethren (1 Nephi
8:27, 33; 11:35). What distinguishes the multitude in the building is the exceeding ne manner in which they dress
(1 Nephi 8:27). Their sophistication and pointing the nger re ect a preoccupation with unreality, as the building
in the air, standing high above the earth, also signi es (1 Nephi 8:26). The building’s fall, as Nephi sees, is the
destruction of all wicked nations, kindreds, tongues, and people (1 Nephi 11:36)—an event of the last days.64
Without identifying everything today that would qualify as imaginations of the heart, it seems self-evident that
what is worldly and subject to change—all things “new,” novel, fashionable, or in vogue; all trends, fads, crazes, and
gimmicks; in short, all that is not of God but concocted in the minds of people65—the Lord dooms to destruction
along with those who love these things. They make up but a passing parade of phantoms intruding upon our
senses, whose purpose is to confuse and to befuddle. Because imaginations of the heart vary constantly, those
who follow them know no stability. Every wind of change, as it were, sweeps them away.
God, and what is of God, does not behave so. In God there exists no “shadow of changing” (Mormon 9:9). Unlike
man, “God doth not walk in crooked paths, neither doth he turn to the right hand nor to the left, neither doth he
vary from that which he hath said” (D&C 3:2). His thoughts do not re ect our thoughts, nor his ways our ways
(Isaiah 55:8). As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are his ways higher than our ways and his thoughts
higher than our thoughts (Isaiah 55:9). In summary, those of us who seek not the Lord to establish his
righteousness, but walk every one in our own way, after the image of our own god—whose image is in the likeness
of this world, whose substance is that of an idol—shall perish in Babylon, which shall fall (D&C 1:16).

7. Nature Cults
The prophet Isaiah, in several instances, refers to nature worship prevailing among the Lord’s people. Nature
worship deviates from true worship in that it furnishes a ready substitute for paradise. To Isaiah, a preoccupation
with parks or gardens (Hebrew gan; gannah) spells idolatry (Isaiah 1:29-30).66 Nature lovers often frequent such
places to escape responsibility toward God and humanity. The beauties of nature excite the romantic instinct in
people, while nature’s seclusion paves the way for licentiousness and sexual abuse. Nature religionists can do
pretty much as they please away from the common constraints of society. In addition, various cultic quirks
characterize nature enthusiasts. These include a preference for particular sorts of foods, a ritualistic way of
preparing them, and their communal consumption in the appropriate surroundings. Naturalists shun and make fun
of their puritanical brethren. On the other hand, they look up to and imitate favorite personalities.
Isaiah speaks of those who cherish and choose the nature experience in the act of forsaking the Lord their God
(Isaiah 1:28-29). These provoke God to his face by “sacri cing in parks, making smoke upon bricks” (Isaiah 65:3).
Their favorite resorts include canyons, ravines, and riverbeds (Isaiah 57:5-6). They frequently spend the night in
hideaways, among green trees, and under crags of cliffs and rocks (Isaiah 57:5-6; 65:4). There, they burn with lust
and commit fornication with one another (Isaiah 57:5; 66:17). They eat the esh of animals the Mosaic code
prohibits, among them pork, prawn, and rodents (Isaiah 65:4; 66:17). They pour drink libations as a toast to their
cult; they consume polluted beverages (Isaiah 57:6; 65:4).
Those not of their life-style they bid keep their distance, considering themselves “holier than thou” (Isaiah 65:5).
Often, they amuse themselves over the Lord’s true worshipers, though they themselves are the slaves of sin
(Isaiah 5:18; 57:4). Heedless and in abrogation of their own agency, they ape the behavior of those on whom they
center their attention (Isaiah 66:17). Called the offspring of adulterer and harlot, they are born of sin (Isaiah 57:34), the product of an apostate people beset by satanic in uences. The summital act of their wickedness consists of
abusing and slaying children (Isaiah 57:5). In similar style, the Lord makes an end of them in the day of his burning
wrath (Isaiah 66:17, 24).
The various kinds of nature worship that prevail in our culture repeat the ancient pattern. From overemphasizing
perfection in home gardens and landscaping (while disregarding the needy who pass by in the street) to spending
an inordinate amount of time at the ritualistic gatherings and barbecues that many indulge in—the same selfgratifying imbalance marks the society of the Lord’s people then and now. Isaiah could have had the latter-day
camper culture in mind when he observed idolaters “hitched to transgression like a trailer” (Isaiah 5:18).
The nature lovers among us for whom nature has become a religion could hardly have been outdone by the
primitive cult. The fervid weekenders and their sport, and even backyard enthusiasts, display a sophistication the
ancients would not have guessed. Today’s proliferation of campers, dirt bikes, dune buggies, four-wheelers, skis,
snowmobiles, yachts, speedboats, gliders, and related accoutrements betoken a rampant and costly cult. When
recreation becomes an end in itself, when promiscuity seeks out recreation as a means of self-expression, then
there results a classic kind of idolatry.
8. Mammon
The scriptures in all ages warn that the “mammon of unrighteousness” (Luke 16:9)—the riches of this world— have
been and will be the downfall of countless souls. The Lord himself has told us plainly that we cannot serve God and
mammon. Each is a “master,” to be loved at the expense of hating the other.67 So many are the scriptural counsels

warning about the riches of this world that we must suppose they dulled the ears of those who perished with their
riches. Or perhaps the rich did not think of themselves as rich, and so did not apply these warnings to themselves.
The scriptures speak of self-deception as a trait frequently af icting the rich.68
From the way the scriptures emphasize equality among the Lord’s people,69 we see that the Lord’s idea of the rich
draws a contrast between the haves and have-nots. A rich man from another country we may not consider rich in
our own, though he possess a surfeit of what others lack. Being rich, in the scriptural sense, includes having when
others do not, creating inequality.
To round out this de nition, I will cite the dominant characteristics of the rich that the scriptures give. Those who
“hasten to be rich have an evil eye” and are not innocent (Proverbs 28:20, 22). They soon fall into temptations and
snares, into foolish and hurtful lusts, which “drown men in destruction and perdition” (1 Timothy 6:9). Trusting in
“uncertain riches” (1 Timothy 6:17), people grow wise in their own conceit (Proverbs 28:11) and wax proud (Alma
4:6). They lift up their hearts because of their riches (Ezekiel 28:5), refusing to give heed to the word of God (Alma
45:24), becoming unfruitful (Matthew 13:22).
The rich pass over the deeds of the wicked and do not judge the needy’s cause (Jeremiah 5:28). They despise the
poor and drag them before the judgment seats (James 2:6). They set their hearts on riches and the vain things of
the world, scorning and persecuting those who do not believe according to their will and pleasure (Alma 4:8).70
The rich defraud and condemn the just and suppose that they are better than they (Jacob 2:13; Mosiah 4:22). In
brief, the love of money is the root of every kind of evil, causing men to “err from the faith” (1 Timothy 6:10).
When “their treasure is their god” (2 Nephi 9:30), the rich suffer evil consequences. The rich can hardly enter the
kingdom of heaven because they already have their consolation (Matthew 19:23; Luke 6:24).71 Because they are
puffed up, God despises them, thrusting them down to hell (2 Nephi 9:42; 28:15). They lay up treasure for
themselves on the earth, only to lose their souls (Luke 12:16-21). They carry nothing of their glory or riches
beyond the grave (Psalm 49:17). In the day of burning heat, the rich fade away like withering grass whose ower
falls (James 1:11). The riches they have swallowed down, they must vomit up again (Job 20:15). Riches “pro t not
in the day of wrath” (Proverbs 11:4).
In such a day, the treasures of the rich become slippery, so that the rich cannot retain them (Helaman 13:31). The
rich who do not give of their substance to the poor will lament in the day of judgment, crying, “The harvest is past,
the summer is ended, and my soul is not saved” (D&C 56:16).72 In the great day of the Lord, the rich hide
themselves in dens, crying to the mountains and rocks, “Fall on us, and hide us from the face of him who sits on the
throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb” (Revelation 6:15-17).
Yet there is something redeeming about riches. On those who are industrious, Providence often smiles most
pleasantly (Jacob 2:13). If men do not learn how to administer the unrighteous mammon, how can the Lord
commit to their trust the true riches? (Luke 16:11). As for the rich, they “do good” if they are ready to distribute
their wealth to those in need and are willing to communicate with them (1 Timothy 6:18). The Lord has decreed a
way to provide for his Saints, namely, “that the poor shall be exalted, in that the rich are made low” (D&C 104:16).
The Lord justi ed the wealthy Zacchaeus, a hated publican who climbed a tree in order to greet him (Luke 19:2-9).
Zacchaeus regularly gave “the half of my goods . . . to the poor; and if I have taken any thing from any man by false
accusation, I restore [unto] him fourfold” (Luke 19:8).

Jacob counseled the rich to think of their brethren like unto themselves, to be familiar with all and free with their
substance—”that they may be rich like unto you” (Jacob 2:17). Before people seek for riches, he advised, they
should seek for the kingdom of God, obtaining rst a hope in Christ (Jacob 2:18-19). A hope in Christ means that
as we devote our lives to God, we at some point receive a witness by the Holy Ghost that we have obtained a
remission of our sins. We can justify pursuing riches, therefore, but only within a narrow compass: “for the intent
to do good—to clothe the naked, and to feed the hungry, and to liberate the captive, and administer relief to the
sick and the af icted” (Jacob 2:19). In the scriptures, that constitutes the sole justi cation of pursuing riches.
Since the sel sh pursuit of riches is so widespread today, what do the ancient parallels portend for the future? The
Lord warns us, the Latter-day Saints, not to become as the Nephites of old (D&C 38:39). Yet the Nephite prophets
foresaw that we would indeed become like them.73 In another type of the last days, the people of the Church at
Laodicea had grown rich and increased in goods, lacking nothing (Revelation 3:17). Spiritually, however, they were
wretched, miserable, poor, blind, and naked (Revelation 3:17). Because they were neither hot nor cold but
lukewarm toward the gospel, the Lord spewed them out of his mouth (Revelation 3:16).
Hosea describes Ephraim as saying, “I have become rich, I have found me out substance: in all my labours they shall
nd none iniquity in me” (Hosea 12:8). But the Lord responds that he will yet make them dwell in tents (Hosea
12:9).74 Likewise, before the Lord came to the Nephites a great inequality existed among them, so that the Church
broke up (3 Nephi 6:14). This happened because of the immense wealth of some, while others suffered in the
depths of humility (3 Nephi 6:10, 13). Finally, the scriptures warn us that rst will come the day of the rich and the
learned, the wise and the noble (D&C 58:10). After that will come the day of his power, when “the poor, the lame,
and the blind, and the deaf, come in unto the marriage of the Lamb, and partake of the supper of the Lord” (D&C
58:11).75
9. Babylon
The name Babylon means many things to many people. The Hebrew word (babel) goes back to a kingdom Nimrod
founded, where the ancients built the tower of Babel, or Babylon (Genesis 10:9-10; 11:1-9). This kingdom evolved
into an idolatrous materialistic civilization that reached a zenith in the powerful neo-Babylonian empire of
Nebuchadnezzar (cf. Daniel 2:37-38). The prophet Isaiah identi es Babylon typologically as both a people and a
place: the sinners and the wicked; the earth and the world (Isaiah 13:1, 9, 11). He predicts latter-day Babylon will
suffer the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah, thus likening the world’s desolation to a ery cataclysm falling upon the
wicked (Isaiah 13:4-19).
Jeremiah calls Babylon a “destroying mountain” (har hammashît), an expression that in Hebrew also means a
“corrupting” or “decadent” kingdom (Jeremiah 51:25). Babylon’s destiny is to become a burned mountain, desolate
forever, because Babylon corrupts—and thus ultimately destroys—all the earth (Jeremiah 51:25-26). Babylon’s fall
in the last days forms a key event ushering in the Millennium.76
Isaiah and Jeremiah single out something about Babylon that corrupts all, including the Lord’s people. Those who
engage in it become “Babylon” themselves and in the end perish with it. This involves the manufacturing,
promoting, and selling of idols—the works of men’s hands.
A story I heard in rabbinic school relates how Abraham’s father, Terah, in the land of Ur of the Babylonians, at times
put young Abraham in charge of his store. When Terah, who made and sold idols, went into the forest to fetch
wood for their manufacture, Abraham was to sell the idols in his father’s place. Typically Abraham would dissuade

buyers, reproving the adults for esteeming statues as gods. One day, fed up with his duty, Abraham smashed all his
father’s wares except a large idol that stood on a top shelf. When Terah returned from the forest, he ew into a
rage, demanding an explanation. Abraham responded, “The big one did it!” implying that these were no gods at all,
or they could have saved themselves. After that, Abraham became unpopular in Ur and the people sought his life. A
sequel to this story appears in the book of Abraham, which commences with, “I, Abraham, saw that it was needful
for me to obtain another place of residence” (Abraham 1:1).
As Hugh Nibley has often pointed out, the essence of this sort of idol worship is not that people really believed the
idols to be gods, but that their manufacture, promotion, and sale provided them with a living. It formed a
socioeconomic system that afforded urban dwellers a means of sustenance. One problem with this system lay in
its false economic base and the instability it bred—it fed on itself.
Economic factors determined social behavior—the law of supply. Manufacturing the works of men’s hands yielded
income but constituted idolatry, because what so many people worked at, oriented their lives around, was
ultimately nonproductive. The work of idols did not sustain itself, but demanded to be sustained. It enslaved to a
false idea not merely those directly involved with it, but also those who produced foodstuffs and raw materials.
The latter labored additionally to provide for all the rest.
The reverse of this phenomenon also applied: false spiritual values in uenced directions the economy would take
—the law of demand. Because of their association with deity, idols represented something socially acceptable into
which people might pour time and money. The prestige the idols furnished made people protective of the system.
Those who prospered from it had found a niche. Their real source of subsistence—farmers and husbandmen—took
second place in people’s minds. Society measured wealth in terms of money and the idols it could buy, rather than
by how much food could be produced.
We can thus liken Babylon’s socioeconomic structure to an upside-down pyramid, which, as it grows, ever narrows
at its base. In it, the many depend on the few for their support. Babylon’s mass of people, engaged in producing and
selling idols, remain out of touch with their life source, rendering them vulnerable to catastrophe. The greatest
height to which Babylon attains thus also forms her lowest point of stability. For when, through some unforeseen
(divine) intervention, a single stone jars loose from the base, the entire structure collapses.
By way of contrast, Zion’s economy is not so structured. As Israel’s prophets outline, Zion possesses a broad rural
base, in which every family works its inheritance of land.77 This makes Zion a stable, self-sustaining structure. In it
abide neither poor nor those who appropriate what belongs to others. Zion’s people look to their Head, their
cornerstone, to bless them with increase. Old Testament and Book of Mormon examples show that such a
structure can weather most storms, endure most attacks, and quickly repair or rebuild itself. The direct means of
sustenance— the capacity to produce foodstuffs and raw materials—is ready at hand. Even when a people must
ee temporarily into the wilderness, this provides them with the greatest maneuverability.
In short, the works of men’s hands on which people set their hearts, on which they spend natural and human
resources are, by de nition, “idols” (Isaiah 2:8; Jeremiah 10:1-5). As the prophets describe them, these are idols
that people invent, design, sketch, carve, forge, molten, cast, weld, plate, t, hammer, rivet, and mass produce.78
Manufactured, promoted, and sold for gold and silver (Isaiah 44:9; 46:6), the idols form the fruits of a technology
of well-nigh magical dimensions (Isaiah 47:10, 12). They follow trends and engage the whole of society (Isaiah
44:11; 47:13). Depending on the kind of idols, people both carry them about and set them in place in their homes
(Isaiah 45:20; 46:7).

The entire production of idols, however, is erroneous and vain (Jeremiah 51:18). It causes people to become like
the idols themselves—sightless and mindless to things spiritual, unaware and insensible to impending disaster
(Isaiah 42:17-20; 44:9, 18; 45:16). It constitutes a “wine” that makes people drunk and mad—the wine of Babylon
(Jeremiah 51:7).
A law unto herself, Babylon tyrannizes and enslaves; yet people do not discern her for what she is (Isaiah 44:20;
47:6-8, 10). In reality, Babylon suffers from gross defects, open wounds that no one can heal (Jeremiah 51:8-9). At
her height, she mounts up to heaven, from whence the Lord suddenly and utterly casts her down (Jeremiah 51:8,
53). On her destruction, those intoxicated with her wine do not so much as wake up from their sleep (Jeremiah
51:39). Since their gods, the works of men’s hands, did not save them, they pro ted them nothing in the end (Isaiah
44:9; 46:7).
Although Jeremiah—at Judah’s exile—advised his people to serve the king of Babylon (Jeremiah 27:6-17; 40:9),
Jeremiah did not mean, “When in Babylon, do as Babylon does!” Indeed, both Isaiah and Jeremiah looked forward
to the time Israel would exit Babylon before the Lord destroyed her (Isaiah 48:20; Jeremiah 51:6). The time would
come, as with Abraham, when it would no longer be advisable to remain in Babylon. The more she ripened in
wickedness, the less possible it would be to live in Babylon but not be of Babylon.
Isaiah depicts the coming of the Lord’s people out of Babylon as a new exodus, patterned after the ancient exodus
out of Egypt (Isaiah 48:20-21; 52:11-12). He likens the gathering of a repentant remnant of Israel from the ends of
the earth to Abraham’s coming out of Babylonia into the wilderness (Isaiah 41:8-9; 51:1-3). The prophets,
therefore, speak both of a literal, spontaneous exodus from Babylon on the eve of her destruction, and of a
gradual, premeditated exit before that time.79 As Lot’s wife illustrates, those ensconced in Babylon nd it hard to
leave at a moment’s notice.
Doing “the works of Abraham”—in order to merit an exaltation that compares to his80—thus includes leaving and
forsaking Babylon as he did, becoming wholly pure of her abominable idols (cf. Isaiah 51:2; 52:11). Not
unexpectedly, the limits of any alternative to Babylon are extremely narrow. In prophetic thought, what is not Zion
is Babylon and what is not Babylon is Zion. In effect, only two choices remain for the Lord’s people: either build up
Zion or build up Babylon. This requires that we gain a clear idea about Zion and Babylon—how the prophets de ne
them, what they stand for, and how to implement Zion.
Isaiah, for example, de nes Zion as both a people and a place: those of the Lord’s people who repent, and the place
to which they gather—a safe place in the wilderness during the Lord’s day of judgment.81 According to Isaiah, the
Lord’s people must urgently repent of Babylonian idolatry—worshiping the works of men’s hands.82 Scriptural
precedents prove the principle that those who leave Babylon under the Lord’s direction inherit a promised land.83
According to Jeremiah, a person leaves Babylon in order to go to Zion, throwing in one’s lot with the Lord by an
everlasting covenant (Jeremiah 50:1-5). To leave Babylon means to go out from among the wicked to establish
Zion somewhere else (D&C 38:42; 133:4-9). All who remain in Babylon do so at the peril of their lives.84
As for the works of men’s hands in today’s Babylon, we need say little more to recapture the ancient scene.
Essentially the same materialistic economy that prevailed then prevails in our day. Like the ancient port city of
Tyre, Babylon’s mercantile arm,85 latter-day Babylon encompasses every kind of trade and merchandise—
whatever the souls of men lust after by way of material possessions (Revelation 18:1-24). The manufacture and

promotion of contemporary works of men’s hands form virtually an unlimited enterprise. Reduplicating the
socioeconomic structure of ancient Babylon is the very stuff of modernization.
Technology of almost magical proportions consumes humanity to the point of enslaving us to it. By orienting our
lives around their production, sale, and maintenance, we set material things above the glory of God. Taking care of
the works of men’s hands and servicing them are terms synonymous with loving and serving idols. And yet, as with
her ancient counterpart, men do not discern modern Babylon for what she is. The wine with which all nations of
the earth are drunk blinds men to life’s divine charge and to Babylon’s looming collapse (Revelation 17:2; 18:3). As
with many other peoples who have grown up in captivity, we ourselves are not cognizant of, or else take for
granted, the fact of our bondage.
The question remains, what will Abraham’s children do? Will they continue to imbibe the wine of Babylon, or will
they ask the way to Zion?
10. The Arm of Flesh
To Israel’s prophets, Pharaoh king of Egypt epitomizes the arm of esh on which the Lord’s people lean in times of
national crisis. Ancient Egypt—the type of a great latter-day superpower86—exempli es human industry, wealth,
and political stability (Ezekiel 31:2-9). At Israel’s judgment, however, Pharaoh proves to be but a “splintered reed
which enters and pierces the hand of any man who leans on it” (Isaiah 36:6; Ezekiel 29:6-7). When put to the test,
Egypt’s ample resources of chariots and horsemen prove no match for the ruthless world power the Lord raises up
against his people.87
By making treaties and alliances with foreign nations, Israel only adds sin to sin—she rejects the Lord’s covenant
and relies on the arm of esh (Isaiah 30:1-2). The very act of the Lord’s people turning to human strength for
protection causes their hearts to turn away from their true source of strength (Jeremiah 17:5-8). In response to
such conduct, the Lord denies his protection and shames his people, causing them and their allies to fall before
their enemies.88 Though the Lord holds out a way of escape for the righteous of his people, by far the majority do
not “see when good cometh” because they turn their eyes in the wrong direction (Jeremiah 17:6).
But the arm of esh assumes other forms besides relying on manpower and weaponry. All such forms constitute
idolatry, because they put humanity before deity. They overlook God as the author and creator of all, as he who
holds all things in being. God gives life and takes it away, often in ways that seem to men miraculous or untimely.
God himself raises up adversaries, personal and national, and God disposes of them.89
Even as the Lord promises his people a land of inheritance and an enduring posterity—as a covenant blessing, on
condition that they live righteously—so he promises to protect them in the face of a mortal threat. The Hebrew
prophets do not predict that the Lord will destroy the righteous in the day of judgment. On the contrary, the Lord
grants salvation both temporal and spiritual to those who keep his commandments. In the theology of Israel’s
prophets, temporal and spiritual salvation go hand in hand.90 Perhaps some of the Lord’s people may get killed in
order to ll up the measure of their sacri ce, and as a testimony against the wicked.91 Nevertheless, personal
righteousness, in the last days as anciently, is the only criterion for being delivered from death.92
Isaiah, therefore, reduces every kind of dependence on things human to a “covenant with Death” (Isaiah 28:15,
18). That includes looking back on past victories and glory (Isaiah 28:1, 4), believing human predictions of a bright

future for humanity (Isaiah 30:10; 47:13), relying on the outward observance of worship (Isaiah 29:1, 13), being
guided by anything less than direct, divine revelation (Isaiah 28:7-13), contriving secret schemes and contingency
plans (Isaiah 28:15; 29:15; 30:16), plotting machinations and intrigues (Isaiah 30:12; 47:12), and every other way
of “taking refuge in deception and hiding behind falsehoods” (Isaiah 28:15).93 In the Lord’s day of judgment, the
people’s covenant with death proves void: a terrible scourge overruns those who trust in the arm of esh (Isaiah
28:18).
All means of warding off woe by somehow indemnifying against it will then disastrously default (Isaiah 47:11-15).
These will prove to be merely bonds that bind men down to destruction (Isaiah 28:22). At the last, human
agreements and alliances will be held in contempt and come to nought (Isaiah 8:9-15; 33:7-8; 47:13-15). The
compacts people make are deceitful—no brother can be trusted (Jeremiah 9:4-6). Even as they speak together in
peaceable terms, people lie in wait to take advantage of one another (Jeremiah 9:8). In summary, all who trust in
human counsel are under a curse and will be broken (2 Nephi 28:31; D&C 1:19).
It is no secret that human pacts pervade Western nations today. At the national level, leaders set up compacts
such as UN, NATO, and SEATO, ostensibly for the welfare and protection of all. Leaders nonetheless consider
simultaneous arms buildups essential for self-preservation. At the individual level, men set up various kinds of
securities, indemnities, and insurance, ostensibly to bene t people and their dependents. By fortifying ourselves
through these devices against possible future disasters, however, we in fact turn away from the direction whence
good comes.
Such human helps betray a lack of trust in him who governs human affairs. These helps serve as a substitute for
the welfare and protection that come from keeping one’s covenant with God. Relieving people of personal
accountability before God, they seek to forestall his righteous decrees. Keeping a lesser law, people reap the fruits
thereof. They reject the blessing of the Lord’s covenant of life for the curse of a covenant with death. Being
concerned primarily for their temporal well-being, people lose spirituality as a governing principle.
Another consequence of man’s trusting in man is that, once made, human bonds can be undone often only with
dishonor and loss of face. In the Lord’s sight, we cannot simply walk away from our word (Ezekiel 17:15-21).
Biblical examples, however, show the worst feature of human bonds to be the mind-set individual parties develop.
The very disposition of those who rely on the arm of esh holds them in its grip like a disease. Though they might
acknowledge the Lord God, they cannot bring themselves to believe there exists any other way. Like all idolatry,
relying on the arm of esh blinds people to a divine purpose or providence—that God saves those who trust in him
(Isaiah 42:17-21). Such an alternative forms an intangible that scares people to death (Isaiah 51:12-13). Even
when the Lord brings upon people all manner of extremities, they remain insensible as to the cause (Isaiah 42:2225). They cannot relate current woes to their own actions. Though they exercise good intentions after suffering
the Lord’s chastisements, they remain as prone as ever to trust in man before trusting in God (Jeremiah 42:144:30).
But when they exercise mighty faith in him who is the source of all good (Jeremiah 33:6-11), when they do not put
the counsel of man before the counsel of God (Isaiah 29:15), when they cease to play God—killing those who
should live, keeping alive those who should die (Ezekiel 13:19)—when they truly make the Lord their Judge, their
Lawgiver, and their King (Isaiah 33:22), then the Lord extends his promise to them. In the destruction God has
decreed upon us and our generation,94 some he will endow with power from on high as a testimony against those
who depend on human strength.95 In that day, a remnant of Ephraim will nd the Lord a sure source of strength to
repulse the attack at the gates (Isaiah 28:5-6).

11. Elitism-Pharisaism
Parallels between the ancient types and their modern counterparts have till now seemed easily discernible. The
two remaining parallels I leave for the reader to judge. Anciently, both conditions of idolatry immediately preceded
the destruction of the Lord’s people, the Lord delivering only a remnant. If the types hold true, therefore, the
recurring of these forms of idolatry will signal the same result. Conversely, when the calamities of the last days
appear at the door, it will be because these and other forms of apostasy have grown prevalent among us. For in the
last days all types come together, whether for good, as in the restoration of keys and blessings of former
dispensations, or for evil, as in the idolatry of Israel that precipitates the great and dreadful day of the Lord.
In setting out these biblical types, I may seem to assume the role of the devil’s advocate. In fact, the types
incriminate none but the offenders themselves, those who do not learn the lessons of history. We should remind
ourselves, however, that such offenders cannot, nor ever will, constitute grounds for our growing disaffected with
the Church. The great paradox, the test the Saints endure in our day, surely consists of remaining true, while all
around people indulge in idolatry. Every parallel I mention possesses this as a moral.
Hugh Nibley serves as an inspiring example of such faithfulness to the Church. Although he recognizes the great
good and the many evils in the Church, he stands aloof from all disaffection. He scrupulously maintains the ne line
between discontent—often voiced openly to inspire us to higher things—and malcontent. Malcontent, the sure
path to apostasy, receives not so much as a whisper from him.
On the other hand, should we take ourselves so seriously as to get up our ire or plunge into guilt feelings at the
whisper of anything critical? Should we not increase our capacity to see through the problems and even laugh at
ourselves? The Jews, having endured a much longer history of spiritual heights and depths than ours, form
perhaps the best example of a people exercising collective resilience and resourcefulness. Although the Jews take
pains to preserve their religious integrity, they never view themselves so sullenly as to decline to discuss their
faults and foibles past or present.
To omit the last two parallels would render this study incomplete and therefore defective. Were we to be selective
about types or fail to see their total context, we might as well ignore them all. We then would not learn our lesson
but would exemplify the folly of man that they teach. The total effect of the parallels surely does not cause us to
point the nger at others. Rather, it helps us take the attitude, “Let him who is without sin cast the rst stone” (cf.
John 8:7). More than that, aberrations existing within a people’s leadership, whether political or religious, tend to
be symptomatic of the general condition—our leadership re ects what we ourselves are, both at our best and at
our worst.
I call this form of idolatry elitism-Pharisaism, because it simultaneously partakes of social pride and hypocrisy. It
constitutes idolatry because it puts the institution or peer group before the individual: a person serves the
corporate entity, not vice versa. It involves worship, in effect, of the system or organization to which people belong
and thus is a kind of self-worship. Typifying this sort of idolatry are the Pharisees of the New Testament period, a
group whose elitist tendencies we know well from Jesus’ discourses with them. Book of Mormon examples of the
same sort of idolatry (not cited here) include the priests of King Noah and the Zoramites (Mosiah 11:1-12:37;
Alma 31:1-32:5).
These persons display a form of godliness lacking the power thereof (2 Timothy 3:5). They harbor a naive
presumptuousness about being a chosen and elect people (Luke 3:8). They consider others—their righteous
brethren—a lost and fallen people, worthy to be despised as lesser mortals (John 7:47-52).

A paradoxical aspect of the elitist-Pharisaic phenomenon is that its pastors and teachers do in fact possess
authority to teach and instruct. The Lord requires, therefore, that his people obey them (Matthew 23:1-3). In
reality, however, they have taken away the key of knowledge and shut up the kingdom, neither entering it
themselves nor letting others enter (Matthew 23:13; Luke 11:52). As a result, they cannot answer dif cult
religious questions nor recognize the signs of the times (Matthew 16:2-3; 22:46). They are blind leaders of the
blind, yet they assume they see things aright (Matthew 15:14; John 9:41). They confuse their priorities and what is
real (Matthew 23:16-24; Luke 11:42). They cancel the good effect the word of God has in people’s lives, overruling
intuitive devotion with conventions (Matthew 15:3; Mark 7:13).
Yet, observant in their religion and esteemed by men, they consider themselves righteous by their own standards
(Luke 16:15; 18:11-12). But their religion consists of what appears in public (Matthew 23:5). Their thoughts tell
another story (Luke 12:1-3). On the outside they appear righteous, but inwardly they raven like wolves; they yield
to wickedness, oppression, excesses (Matthew 23:25-28; Luke 11:39). Though they believe in Christ, they care
more for men’s praise than God’s (John 5:44; 12:42-43). Like leaven in bread, hypocrisy permeates their
establishment (Luke 12:1). Their hypocrisy, likewise, inspires their communal prayers (Matthew 23:14). They love
for men to call them by ecclesiastical titles, to greet them publicly and hold them in admiration (Matthew 23:7;
Luke 11:43). In token of reserved seats in the kingdom of heaven, they take the foremost places at meetinghouses
and banquets (Matthew 23:6; Luke 14:7-8). Yet quickly they nd fault with those not conforming to their exterior
of worship (Mark 2:18, 24; 7:2, 5; Luke 6:7).
While they themselves covet the things of the world, they hate those mingling with sinners in attempts to rescue
them (Matthew 9:11; Luke 7:33-34; 16:14). Their fear of political repercussions outweighs their love of spiritual
obligation (John 11:47-48). In the end, they disfellowship those who love and confess Christ (John 12:42). The
converts to their form of religion, whom they go to great lengths to gain, they make twofold more children of hell
than themselves (Matthew 23:15). Hypocrisy lls their lives so much that it appears incurable (Matthew 23:3133).
To assure themselves that their religion is well founded, the elitist-Pharisaic faction makes frequent mention of a
key prophet or forebear on whom they base their authority.96 So far have they departed from the prophet’s
message, however, that if some came among them who taught as he did, they would seek to kill them as did their
forefathers (Matthew 23:30-34; Luke 11:47-49). Were their acclaimed prophet to confront them, he would be the
rst to assert that neither God’s love nor word abides in them (John 5:38, 42, 45). Thus, the most righteous among
them—one like their acclaimed prophet—they call a deceiver and make a scapegoat (Matthew 27:63; John 11:50).
At that point, the Lord removes the kingdom from them, giving it to a people who will bring forth its fruit (Matthew
21:43).
In summing up this somber biblical type, we see among the ancient elitist Pharisees many forms of priestcraft that
Jesus and his apostles predicted would corrupt the church of the last days. Indeed, the things they prophesied that
would befall us repeat the Pharisaic phenomenon as nearly as any type. Just as their love had waxed cold because
of iniquity among them, so will the love of many in the church of the last days wax cold because of iniquity
(Matthew 24:12). As they loved themselves and were covetous and treacherous, so also will many in the church in
the last days (2 Timothy 3:1-4). As they were ever learning but never coming to a knowledge of the truth, so will
many in the church of the last days (2 Timothy 3:5). As they admired men for personal advantage, so will many in
the church of the last days (Jude 1:16). As they failed to believe that enemies would invade and destroy their land
because of their iniquity, so will many of the church in the last days be willingly ignorant of their role in

precipitating a ery destruction of the wicked (2 Peter 3:3-10). By their idolatry and hypocrisy, they will pollute
the church of God, bringing upon themselves God’s judgment (Mormon 8:38).
As a consequence, just as messianic impostors from among the Jews preceded Jesus’ rst coming (Acts 5:3637)97—with the notable exception of John the Baptist—so false Christs and prophets will precede his second
coming (Matthew 24:5, 11, 23-24; Mark 13:6, 21-22). The true prophets they will nonetheless withstand, as the
false prophets withstood Moses (2 Timothy 3:8-9) and as the Pharisees withstood Jesus.98
The righteous among them they will hate, mock, and betray (Matthew 24:10; Mark 13:12-13; Jude 1:18), just as
the Jews hated, mocked, and then betrayed Jesus and his disciples to ecclesiastical and political authorities.99
They will deliver many to councils to be judged and punished for their testimonies, smiting some and killing them
unlawfully (Matthew 24:9, 49; Mark 13:9)—even as they delivered Jesus and his disciples to be persecuted and
killed by ecclesiastical and political authorities.100 In the day of judgment that will then be upon them, they will
suffer the fate of all hypocrites. Cutting them off from his people, the Lord will cast them into outer darkness,
where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth.101
12. Pollution of the Temple
A nal kind of idolatry, one that caused the Lord’s presence to depart from his people as invading armies advanced
on them (Ezekiel 8:6; 9:1-11), concerns the pollution of the temple by idols. Several kinds of idolatry polluted the
house of God anciently, including the symbol of envy,102 a man-made idol situated at the inner entrance and exit
(Ezekiel 8:3, 5). Men also viewed all manner of images portrayed against a wall (Ezekiel 8:10-12); elders of Israel
made clouds of perfume or sweet odors (Ezekiel 8:11);103 women at the temple bewailed the death of a popular
cult gure (Ezekiel 8:14); and men worshiped the great luminary in the temple’s precincts (Ezekiel 8:16).
Because the Lord’s people polluted the house of God by setting up their abominations in it (Jeremiah 7:30; 23:11),
the temple proved no place of protection for them in the time of judgment (Jeremiah 7:4-10). When Israel’s
enemies entered the land, they went in and destroyed the temple (Jeremiah 52:13), or polluted it yet further by
setting up their abominations in it (1 Maccabees 1:54). Beginning at the temple, they slew all except a certain few
whom the Lord protected (Ezekiel 9:6-7). The latter sighed and cried continually because of the abominations in
their midst (Ezekiel 9:4).
Conclusion
Lest we assume that I have overstated the case of idolatrous types, or that somehow we are better than or
different from former generations of the Lord’s people, I have drawn ten points from President Spencer W.
Kimball’s bicentennial address to the Saints, entitled “The False Gods We Worship”:104 (1) an idolater is one who
sets his or her heart or trust in something other than the God of Israel; (2) an idolater cannot be saved in the
kingdom of heaven; (3) telling parallels exist between ancient forms of idolatry and the behavioral patterns of the
Latter-day Saints; (4) we live today in conditions resembling the days of Noah before the Flood; (5) “we are, on the
whole, an idolatrous people”; (6) idolatry forms a grave and singular contradiction in the lives of the Saints; (7) we
must forthwith leave off our idolatry, or be damned; (8) we must serve the Lord at all costs and prepare for what is
to come; (9) our modern life-style, tainted by idols, contrasts the rural ideal of a generation ago; (10) if we live
righteously, the Lord will protect us from all our enemies.105

I trust that what I have attempted by way of saluting our beloved mentor, Hugh Nibley, will have only a positive
effect in the lives of the Saints, will help us eliminate the imbalance that is idolatry and move us to center our souls
in God. As it has been Brother Nibley’s manner to state his case and disappear in the crowd, so I write these words
in the same spirit. The imperative to purify our lives seems self-evident. Whether we can do so in time, not
whether we must, is the question that hangs over us all. Although we live in a world that combines the evils of the
past, the principle that the Lord gives no commandment unless he prepares a way to keep it (1 Nephi 3:7) surely is
true of the rst commandment—to love the Lord with our whole heart and soul, and with all our might.
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Repentance Also Means Rethinking
Gary P. Gillum
Although Latter-day Saints have a knowledge of the process of repentance, they lack a complete understanding of
how the scriptures use the term repentance: repentance consists not only of remorse, confession, restitution, and
forgiveness, but a literal changing of one’s entire perspective on life, so that eventually a Latter-day Saint may
“repent of having to repent.” In a world where temporal, statistical, commercial, political, and pseudoscienti c
experiences have taken the place of our God-given eternal, moral, and revelatory rights, it is is easy for any of us to
be led astray—if we are not prepared. And I submit that repentance is the most important survival tool the Lord
has placed at our disposal. “Say nothing but repentance unto this generation; keep my commandments and assist
to bring forth my work, according to my commandments” (D&C 6:9). God’s rst rule is that all men must repent. All
men. Repentance is not only for those who have committed sin—it is for everyone, so that they may come to know
the mind of God and his eternal perspective. This process also replaces the natural man with the new man in
Christ.
Wanting to nd true repentance so that I could really feel that I was forgiven of my sins led me to The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and to the waters of baptism twenty years ago. I came from a church whose
major theological tenets were faith alone, grace alone, and scriptures alone. As a student of the ministry I don’t
remember learning anything about repentance except for a brief paragraph in my theology textbook by Alan
Richardson, which read, “Repentance is thus a ‘sine qua non’ of the Christian life, not only in its beginning but at
every stage; it involves a constant awareness of the fact that all our faith and all our virtue are God’s gift and not
our achievement.”1 Most of this quote is mere theological opinion or the commandments of men which ignore free
agency and man’s potential, relegating us to a life of simple subservience to God. However, in exploring the
“rethinking” aspect of repentance, I would like to emphasize two phrases of Richardson’s: “constant awareness”
and “at every stage.”
During the rst twenty-four years of my life, repentance was not a remorse for sin followed by proper confession
and restitution. It was merely a recognition of original sin and of Martin Luther’s principle of pecca fortiter—”sin
boldly that grace may more fully abound!” Who in his right mind would be too concerned about his sins if he felt
that the greater the sin the more Christ’s atonement would settle the de cit of purity? We were so thoroughly
taught of our sinful nature that we were encouraged not to dwell on it, but simply to ask forgiveness from the Lord
and confess our sins with the rest of the congregation on communion Sunday once monthly. But I felt no peace. I
wanted to be cleansed thoroughly from my sin but didn’t know where to turn. Accordingly, like Enos and Joseph
Smith, I began praying more from the heart instead of from a prayerbook—with greater sincerity and a desire to
nd some answers. The Lord taught me patience rst, however, rescuing me only just before I was going to pack
my bags and leave for San Francisco’s Haight-Ashbury to live the “good life” of sex, drugs, and ultimate freedom
that 1968 clamored for. That Friday, the thirteenth of December, showed me that the God whom I thought had
forsaken me was really alive and supporting me. My spiritual and emotional frustrations from visiting a different
church or two every Sunday trying to nd the truth were nally allayed, for the missionaries taught me three
things which I had never really learned before: the value of a testimony, the importance of living by the Spirit, and
the true nature of repentance.
The Old Testament on Repentance

No theologian, minister, or fellow ministerial student rst taught me a glimpse of true repentance: just a prophet
of the Lord, Elijah. This happened in a very vicarious manner, through the music of Felix Mendelssohn’s great
oratorio “Elijah.” While in my freshman and sophomore years at St. John’s College in Win eld, Kansas, the choirs in
this school joined with the choirs at the Methodist college in town, Southwestern College, to sing this soulsearching piece of music. I was intrigued by Elijah’s life and the power of God which he had access to. But I was also
lifted up by his humility before the Lord and his human frailty, which approached that of Jonah. Consider what he
was able to accomplish with the power of the Lord: healing the widow’s son, withholding rain from the people of
Israel, and nally subduing and slaying the priests of Baal. But when Jezebel and Ahab went after him, Elijah felt
like all he had done was in vain and wanted the Lord to remove him from that wicked world: “It is enough; now, O
Lord, take away my life; for I am not better than my fathers” (1 Kings 19:4). Here he was implying to the Lord that
what had happened to this point had been Elijah’s doing—that the conversion of Israel was entirely up to him, and
that he was not succeeding. But the Lord strengthened Elijah even more, so that later in the oratorio, before he is
translated by means of a chariot of re, he hints of the repentance that had taken place in his life: “I go on my way
in the strength of the Lord.” In the words of Paul: “I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me”
(Philippians 4:13). Elijah had not sinned by being immoral or any such thing. His thinking was merely wrong. He
then experienced the change of perspective to the mind of God that all of us need—the kind that guides all of our
actions through the help of the gift of the Holy Ghost. We nd throughout the Old Testament that it was not only
Elijah who needed a boost in self-con dence: Moses, Jeremiah, and Enoch are also good examples of prophets
who needed to have their minds and hearts infused with a portion of the mind of God.
Two words are used for repentance in the Old Testament. The Evangelical Dictionary of Theology2 states that the
Hebrew word niham is used thirty- ve times. It is usually used to signify a contemplated change in God’s dealings
with men for good or ill according to his just judgment. (“It repenteth me that I have made them,” Genesis 6:7; 1
Samuel 15:11, 35; Jonah 3:9-10). Only in ve places does niham refer to human repentance or relenting. Teshuvah
is the other word referring to repentance: a true turning toward God. It also means “recover,” “refresh,” “restore,”
“convert,” “return,” “reverse,” or “turn again.” It indicates a return to God and the right path (cf. Hosea 14:2; 2 Kings
17:13; Jeremiah 13:14; and Joel 2:12-13). The Rabbis have a saying for teshuvah: “Great is ‘teshuvah,’ for it brings
healing to the world. Great is ‘teshuvah,’ for it reaches to the throne of God. Great is ‘teshuvah,’ it brings
redemption near. Great is ‘teshuvah,’ for it lengthens a man’s life.”3 This rabbinic saying probably has its roots in
Deuteronomy 30:9-10, which gives us the essence of the doctrine of repentance in the Old Testament: “And the
Lord thy God will make thee plenteous in every work of thine hand, in the fruit of thy body, and in the fruit of thy
cattle, and in the fruit of thy land, for good: for the Lord will again rejoice over thee for good, as he rejoiced over
thy fathers: If thou shalt hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to keep his commandments and his statutes
which are written in this book of the law, and if thou turn unto the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all
thy soul.” This seems to indicate that God is unfailingly responsive to repentance, thereby indicating the depth of it;
for as we become ever closer to the mind of God we not only automatically bless ourselves but are blessed by God
who responds to our “change of mind.” Otherwise, “my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my
ways, saith the Lord” (Isaiah 55:8-9). How can we know the ways of the Lord unless we do those things that help us
to that end? David the Psalmist also recognizes that repentance is a change of thinking: “Create in me a clean
heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me” (Psalm 51:10-11). Two nal examples from the Old Testament:
“Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life” (Proverb 4:23), and “As a man thinketh in his
heart, so is he” (Proverb 23:7).
The New Testament on Repentance

The most common Greek words used in the New Testament for “repentance” are metanoeo (the verb), metanoia
(the noun), and metamelomai (the present participle). These Greek words usually mean not merely feeling sorry, or
changing one’s mind, but a complete alteration of the basic motivation and direction of one’s life. This explains why
John the Baptist demanded baptism as an expression of this repentance, not just for obvious “sinners,” but for the
“righteous” Jews as well. Metanoia was often used in the Septuagint to translate the Hebrew niham. So de ned,
repentance might seem purely intellectual, but this is not the case, for writers of the Bible seemed to be aware of
the unity of human personality. To change one’s mind was to change one’s attitude, and thus to change the actions
and even the whole way of life.4 Metanoeo occurs thirty-four times and is mostly used in a favorable sense to
include faith. Metanoia is used twenty-three times in the sense of the whole process of change. It can mean an
inward change of mind, affections, and convictions as well as a commitment rooted in the fear of God and sorrow
for offenses committed against him. When accompanied by faith in Jesus Christ, this repentance results in an
outward turning from sin to God and his service in all of life. It is a gift from God, and the repentant person never
regrets having repented.5 The Roman Catholic Douai version of the Bible interprets metanoia as penance, the
performance of ecclesiastically prescribed acts to make satisfaction for postbaptismal sin. According to The New
International Dictionary of the Christian Church, this use of the word has no place in New Testament Christianity.6
Metamelomai is used very seldom and means “regretting” or “having remorse.”
If the use of repentance is both God’s gift and man’s responsibility, then the call for repentance on the part of man
“is a call for him to return to his creaturely and covenant dependence on God.”7 It should be clear to all of us that it
is God’s way that is important, not ours. Paul said it best in Romans 8:6: “Set your minds on things which are above,
where God and Christ dwell, for to be carnally minded is death, but to be spiritually minded is life eternal.” God
encouraged the Saints, after they had forgotten or erased undesirable thoughts and attitudes and things which
were behind, to plant good thoughts in their place, as in Philippians 3:13-14 (or Article of Faith 13): “But this one
thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press
toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ.” Paul must have experienced repentance in a big
way, for prior to his conversion on the road to Damascus he was sure that he was doing the will of the Lord.
However, after the Lord had set him straight, he began to change his mind—and heart—about a lot of things,
becoming himself renewed in the spirit of his mind, as he later exhorted the Saints in Ephesians 4:17-24. Or as in
Romans 12:2: “And be not conformed to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye
may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God.” The exhortation of Jesus Christ to “Be ye
therefore perfect” (Matthew 5:48) could only be preceded by a change of mind and understanding opened to the
things of the Spirit. Otherwise perfection would be impossible both in this world and the next. As it is, “If any man
be in Christ, he is a new creature; old things are passed away; behold all things are become new” (2 Corinthians
5:17).
As I read some of these passages of scripture before my own conversion, I had to ask myself a few questions: Is it
true that all things are new for me, too? Do I feel renewed in the mind and spirit? If not, is it perhaps because I feel
repentance is only for committed sin, not an act which is calculated to bring me ever closer to the Father? Hence,
my own change from human thinking to divine understanding was truly a necessary consequence in “putting on
the new man.” The act of repentance had always been for me a mere remorse for sin and often a half-hearted
promise “never to do it again,” even though I suspected that the next chance I got I would sin again—such was the
force of “negative” theology in my life. It is important to consider, then, that true conversion is incomplete unless it
is preceded not only by a remorse for former sins and future rejection of them, but a total transformation of one’s
entire thought process—one implying an erasure of thoughts and images foreign to the pure gospel revealed to us
by the Holy Ghost.

The Book of Mormon and Doctrine and Covenants on Repentance
The Book of Mormon tells us three very important things about repentance: (1) All people must repent, (2) there
must be enough time for all people to repent, and (3) faith must be present in the process. One verse covers the
rst two well: “And the days of the children of men were prolonged, according to the will of God, that they might
repent while in the esh . . . for . . . all men must repent” (2 Nephi 2:21), and another covers the third: “And behold,
ye do know of yourselves, for ye have witnessed it, that as many of them as are brought to the knowledge of the
truth, and to know of the wicked and abominable traditions of their fathers, and are led to believe the holy
scriptures, yea, the prophecies of the holy prophets, which are written, which leadeth them to faith on the Lord,
and unto repentance, which faith and repentance bringeth a change of heart unto them” (Helaman 15:7).
Understanding the meanings of repentance as used in the Book of Mormon or the Doctrine and Covenants is
more dif cult than in the Bible simply because the English language is not as precise as Hebrew or Greek. We
must understand the meanings of these by context, inspiration, and revelation—and only secondarily by language.8
Mosiah 27:26 elucidates this further: “And thus they become new creatures; and unless they do this, they can in
nowise inherit the kingdom of God.” If Alma the Younger’s teaching is to square with Pauline doctrine in the New
Testament, then we must assume that the rethinking type of repentance is also necessary to reach this new state.
Finally, there is an excellent example in the Book of Mormon about this change of mind in action after true
repentance. When the brother of Jared presented the problem of light in the vessels in which he and his company
were to cross the ocean, the Lord did not answer the problem, but threw the question back at him: “What will ye
that I should do that ye may have light in your vessels?” (Ether 2:23). The brother of Jared was prepared to answer
because he had studied it out in his mind already. If the Lord were to tell us what to do all the time, we would not
grow; we would not learn to think as he does (D&C 9:7-8).
Following my conversion, I found that my renewed mind and understanding now freed me from the bondage of not
only wrong thinking but wrong actions which had proceeded from human thinking. In my freedom I also
discovered that I could now act according to the Spirit instead of being acted upon by the natural desires of the
esh.
The Doctrine and Covenants points out some additional teachings about repentance. Sections 137 and 138 are
two very important sections which are too often ignored by Latter-day Saints. To me, however, these are two of
the most important passages of scripture, both because they can lead to true repentance by helping us to
understand better some of the more ineffable facts about our eternal existence and because they answer the
challenge of the Lord: “Let the solemnities of eternity rest upon your minds” (D&C 43:34). Joseph Smith has
further added this well-known admonition, “The things of God are of deep import, and time and experience and
careful, ponderous and solemn thoughts can only nd them out. Thy mind, O man, if thou wilt lead a soul unto
salvation, must stretch as high as the utmost heavens, and search into and contemplate the darkest abyss, and the
broad expanse of eternity. Thou must commune with God.”9
Those two revelations, added in 1976 to the Doctrine and Covenants, both talk about death and the life hereafter.
Perhaps they are important to me because, like many people throughout the world (Latter-day Saint or not), I had
a life-after-death experience in 1963 while trying to recover from a critical automobile accident. The experience
was like that of Joseph Smith’s learning more by looking into the heavens then by reading many books, but the
experience has had advantages and disadvantages: on the one hand a small portion of my faith has been replaced
by absolute knowledge of life after death. On the other hand, such a glimpse into the eternities results in an extra
measure of discernment which gives me a sorrowful impatience concerning the world. (It’s like looking into the

hearts and minds of anyone you meet, and although it can be very useful in helping teach a wayward student here
at Brigham Young University, it can be frustrating to be out in the world where sin and ignorance of spiritual
matters are the measure of the children of man.) Moreover, this type of experience gave me an immediate
megadose of repentance, or rethinking—what to many people is a gment of foolish imagination rather than a
serious matter of eternal consequences. (A friend once remarked to me that with such knowledge I could almost
start my own church. Surprised at his comment, I answered that I would not do such a thing because of the
experience I had had. That very conversation gives us a further hint into how people behave differently in various
stages of repentance.)
Several passages of scripture in the Doctrine and Covenants give us further practical information about
repentance as well, and I believe they reveal as much about rethinking as they do about remorse, confession, and
restitution. One sobering thought is that “surely every man must repent or suffer, for I, God, am endless” (D&C
19:4). However, the Lord graciously gives us our free agency, for the farther along we are in our repentance, the
less we have to suffer. In some cases this is simply a change of our attitude, for our sufferings will work to our
eternal betterment if we allow them to be growth experiences. Even so, the more our mind thinks like God’s, the
less we will suffer. Furthermore, the Lord tells us that our “sorrow shall be great” unless we “speedily repent, yea
very speedily” (D&C 136:35). That reminds us how much more God knows about each of us and the direction in
which we are headed. Do not just “do it,” he is saying, “do it now.” “And how great is his joy in the soul that
repenteth” (D&C 18:13). And what godly parent would not want his children to have the mind and wisdom and
knowledge of life he or she has had?
Teachings from General Authorities on Repentance
Spencer W. Kimball is one of the Church’s leading experts on the teachings of repentance, especially the practical
applications of it. Particularly well-known are his ve steps for repentance: (1) sorrow for sin, (2) abandonment of
sin, (3) confession of sin, (4) restitution for sin, and (5) doing the will of the Father.10 Rather than spend a lot of
time summarizing his own teachings on repentance, I am going to list them brie y so that you will be able to see
how they support repentance as rethinking.
1. Repentance must be as universal as sin.11
2. The delay in repentance encourages the continuation of sin.12
3. If we are humble and desirous of living the gospel, we will come to think of repentance as applying to everything
we do in life, whether it be spiritual or temporal in nature. Repentance is for every soul who has not yet reached
perfection.13
4. Conscience is a celestial spark which God has put into all people for the purpose of saving their souls. It awakens
the soul to consciousness of sin, spurs a person to make up his mind to adjust, to convict himself of the
transgression without soft-pedaling or minimizing the error, to be willing to face facts, meet the issue, and pay
necessary penalties—and until the person is in this frame of mind [!] he has not begun to repent.14
5. Repentance is timeless. The evidence of repentance is transformation. We certainly must keep our values
straight and our evaluations intact.15

6. True repentance incorporates within it a washing, a purging, a changing of attitudes, a reappraising, a
strengthening toward self-mastery. It is not a simple matter for one to transform his life overnight, nor to change
attitudes in a moment, nor to rid himself in a hurry of unworthy companions.16
7. In abandoning sin one cannot merely wish for better conditions. He must make them. He needs to come to hate
the spotted garments and loathe the sin. He must be certain not only that he has abandoned the sin but that he has
changed the situations surrounding the sin. He should avoid the places and conditions and circumstances where
the sin occurred, for these could most readily breed it again. He must abandon the people with whom the sin was
committed. He may not hate the persons involved, but he must avoid them and everything associated with the sin.
He must dispose of all letters, trinkets, and things which will remind him of the “old days” and “old times.” He must
forget addresses, telephone numbers, people, places, and situations from the sinful past, and build a new life. He
must eliminate anything which would stir the old memories.17
The last passage would seem to indicate practical acts which would enable not only the sinner but the would-be
Saint to acquire a godly perspective which enables one to see the eternal plan more clearly. Moreover, all of the
passages seem to support one important result of repentance: the ability to forgive all people.
Church leaders who are contemporary with President Kimball can lend further insight to our study. David O.
McKay once said that to repent is “to change one’s mind [and one’s heart] in regard to past or intended actions or
conduct on account of regret or dissatisfaction.”18 By now, however, we can see that it is in nitely better and
easier to repent before reaching the point of regret or dissatisfaction. In fact, Bruce R. McConkie elucidates this
further: “Repentance is easy or dif cult of attainment by various people depending upon their own attitude and
conduct, and upon the seriousness of the sins they have committed.”19
Nor can we leave out Church leaders who preceded our own day. According to the Prophet Joseph Smith, “It is the
will of God that man should repent and serve Him in health, and in the strength and power of his mind, in order to
secure his blessing, and not wait until he is called to die.”20
Repentance is a thing that cannot be tri ed with every day. Daily transgression and daily repentance is not that
which is pleasing in the sight of God.21 (The Prophet is probably speaking of penance here.)
Repent! Repent! Obey the Gospel. Turn to God.22
Parley P. Pratt, “Cultivate the mind, renew the spirit, invigorate the body, cheer the heart, ennoble the soul of
man.”23 All of these things make up true repentance. Brigham Young, “Train your minds.”24 What a simple
de nition for repentance! And nally, President Young’s reverse de nition of repentance, “Sin consists in doing
wrong when we know and can do better.”25
Hugh Nibley on Repentance
If Spencer W. Kimball is the Church’s most proli c of cial spokesman on the meaning of repentance, Hugh Nibley
is certainly the most proli c apologist and scholar on repentance. Unfortunately, not enough members of the
Church take him seriously when he talks about doctrinal subjects. As I have studied his writings during the past
few years, I found that most of his recent addresses have more or less been cries of repentance, or as he calls it,
“the eschatological viewpoint.” That viewpoint is best exempli ed by his parable in the November 1955 issue of the

Improvement Era.26 It is much too long to share here, but since it is one of his most inspiring writings, I would highly
recommend it to you for thorough study. Brie y, it tells of a successful businessman who has been told by his
doctor that because he suffers from a serious disease, he has but a short time to live. Facing imminent death, the
priorities in his life change considerably, so that his perspective has become “eschatological,” or having to do with
the last things and last days. His colleagues believe he has gone crazy, because the things of the world no longer
mean that much to him anymore—it’s the intangible, everlasting things about life that now attract our
businessman. But lo and behold, he nds out a few days later with a second series of tests that he may yet live for
many years. With this new piece of news you would think that this good man would go back to his old habits, but
no, he retains his “eschatological” or “repentant” viewpoint, continuing in this positive and eternal mode for the
rest of his long life. And that, Nibley insists, is the true eschatological attitude which all Latter-day Saints would do
well to emulate: act as if you knew you were to die in the very near future.
Elsewhere, in an article entitled “The Historicity of the Bible,” Brother Nibley de nes this viewpoint:
The eschatological viewpoint is that which sees and judges everything in terms of a great eternal plan.
Whether we like it or not, we belong to the eternities: we cannot escape the universe. All our thoughts
and deeds must be viewed against an in nite background and against no other. Eschatos means ultimate
and refers to that which lies beyond all local and limited goals and interests. Limited objectives are very
well in their way, but only as contributing to something eternal. Extreme as this doctrine may seem, the
only alternative, as the philosophers of old repeatedly observed, is a trip to nowhere, a few seconds of
pleasure in an hour of pain, and after that only “the depth of “27
When asked what do we think about in this life, Nibley responded, “That very question.”
How so, I wondered? I looked in my Nibley subject index under repentance to nd out what else he had written,
and found the following juicy tidbits:
1. “Sin is waste. It is doing one thing when you should be doing other and better things for which you have the
capacity. Hence, there are no innocent idle thoughts. That is why even the righteous must repent, constantly and
progressively, since all fall short of their capacity and calling.”28
2. “The fatal symptom of our day is not that men do wrong—they always have—and commit crimes, and even
recognize their wrongdoing as foolish and unfortunate, but that they have no intention of repenting, while God has
told us that the rst rule that he has given the human race is that all men everywhere must repent.”29
3. “The gospel of repentance is a constant reminder that the most righteous are still being tested and may yet fall,
and that the most wicked are not yet beyond redemption and may still be saved. And that is what God wants: ‘Have
I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die?’ There are poles for all to see, but in this life no one has reached
and few have ever approached either pole, and no one has any idea at what point between his neighbors stand.
Only God knows that.”30
4. “Does not one person need repentance more than another? . . . You can always nd somebody who is worse than
you are to make you feel virtuous. It’s a cheap shot: those awful terrorists, perverts, communists—they are the
ones who need to repent! Yes, indeed they do, and for them repentance will be a full-time job, exactly as it is for all
the rest of us.”31

5. “You are either repenting or not repenting and that is, according to the scriptures, the whole difference between
being righteous or being wicked.”32
Famous Protestant theologians like Malcolm Muggeridge have also spoken out in ways similar to Hugh Nibley, but
William Temple comes the closest: “The world, as we live in it, is like a shop window into which some mischievous
person has got overnight, and shifted all the price-labels so that the cheap things have the high price-labels on
them, and the really precious things are priced low. We let ourselves be taken in. Repentance means getting those
price-labels back in the right place.”33
Further Religious Notions of Repentance
Notwithstanding Judaism is considered a non-Christian religion, it is interesting to note that Mormonism comes
closer to Judaism than either Protestantism or Catholicism in the understanding of some theological subjects.
Repentance is one of them. In fact, it is regarded so fundamental by Judaism that it is enumerated in the Talmud as
one of the seven things created by God before he created the world.34 According to rabbinic teachings, man was
created with an evil inclination (tendency to sin) to which repentance is the antidote—as long as it means a sincere
changing of ways and returning to God.35 To the Jew, repentance means “to think differently after; to change one’s
mind, opinion, moral thought, re ection, apprehensions, character, conduct; the tendency of personal life as a
whole.”36
Rabbi Joseph Dov Baer Halevi Soloveitchik is an orthodox rabbi who studied the typology of man and of human
society. His teachings on repentance are probably the most proli c of any religious writer I have run across. He felt
that there were four main types of men: repentant, halakhic (dutiful or obedient), religious, and rational.37 To the
Rav, “repentance implies that there are powers in man which allow him to leap from that sense of sin, which
profoundly oppresses him and casts him far away, to a different feeling of hazarty le-fanekha (I am again in Your
presence).”38
Repentance means nothing other than (1) retrospective contemplation of the past and the distinction between the
living and the dead in it; and (2) the vision of the future and its utilization according to the free determination of
man. Man’s very existence is contingent upon these two realms of activity: (1) in the memory of those situations
and experiences undergone by man in the past and which, in many senses, have not died or been erased, but rather
continue to exist in the inner recesses of his heart, and (2) in his expectations of the future, in his plans and hopes
for the morrow, and for the day following. In these two realms man responds to the question, “Who am I?” Memory
and expectation come together and focus on the character of man and give signi cance to the whole of his life,
above and beyond the ow of meaningless time, whose ux is devoid of signi cance and purpose.39
The Rav de ned “repentant man” as follows:
1. He expresses his humanity as a creature created in the divine image.
2. He possesses independent creative powers coupled with a compulsion to draw near to the Creator. This
creative power enables him to forgo uprooting the past. Rather, it enables him to take up the past and exalt it, and
to shape it so that it can be molded with the future to create the present, himself.

3. He has four characteristic traits: profundity of suffering, a depth of experience, the ability to make decisions in
the light of free choice, and the capacity to create.40 Finally, “repentance not only cleanses the sinner of the lth of
iniquity, but it contains a kind of fresh act of covenant-making between the individual and the Almighty. . . .
Repentance is not merely the puri cation of the personality, but a special sancti cation of the individual, making
him ready once more to conclude a covenant.”41
Another Jew represents our own day—Dave Brubeck, an American composer not only of jazz music but of the
powerful oratorio “The Light in the Wilderness.” I had the opportunity to sing this work as part of the Indianapolis
Symphony Choir in 1969—with Dave Brubeck at the piano. During the dress rehearsal, Mr. Brubeck gave each of
us performers a mimeographed sheet which included some of his feelings concerning the writing of his music and
the two men he described in the wilderness: John the Baptist and Jesus. His comments were the germ for my
consideration of repentance as rethinking, coming as it did while I was being taught by the missionaries:
When it was clear to Jesus who he was and what he must do, he emerged from the desert wilderness with
the passionate cry to RETHINK! . . . RETHINKING precedes effective learning and obedience and
sacri ce. . . . Jesus in the wilderness is only touched upon by the synoptic gospels. Whatever went on in his
mind during his solitary fast, it must have been a soul searching beyond our imagination; and yet he must
have asked —Who am I?42
Other non-Christian religions also have a contribution to make to our understanding of the principles of
repentance, but only very brie y. In the Qur’an, Sura 47:24, the question is asked: “What, do they not meditate in
the Qur’an? Or is it that there are locks upon their hearts?” Is that an unrepentant attitude? In Arabic metanoia is
usually rendered by tawba, which means “repentance,” especially in the sense of turning away from the world and a
change in perspective and values.43 According to Sri Ramakrishna, the Bengali Hindu teacher, “A man cannot see
God unless he gives his whole mind to Him.”44 Hujwiri, a Su anthologist of Afghanistan (ca. 1070), allows that
there are two types of repentance: of fear and of shame. The former is caused by the revelation of God’s majesty,
while the repentance of shame is caused by a vision of God’s beauty.45 And of course the best kind of repentance
is that which comes not from fear or shame but because of faith, testimony, and a desire to be obedient to the
commandments of God.
Secular Notions: Literature, Music, Art, Philosophy, and Psychology
While growing up, some of the earliest in uences we have upon our minds and our style of thinking come from the
books that are read to us by our teachers and parents, and later from the reading we do ourselves. As a librarian, I
am quite aware of how much reading affects behavior. Those who would assert, for instance, that pornographic
literature does not affect the reader’s behavior are at the same time negating the in uence, positive or negative, of
any kind of reading material. Speaking for myself, at least, I was so sure that the books I had read before my
conversion had been instrumental in my conversion that I compiled an annotated bibliography of those
preconversion books, and I came up with some startling conclusions. (You may wonder how I could remember all
of the things I read. Easy. One of the most important things I have done in my life is to keep a journal since I was a
sophomore in high school. The books are listed there, and I still own most of them.) The most important conclusion
was that reading material had as much effect upon my later conversion as any other factor. As I reread portions of
those books, I was able to nd key passages which I had underlined earlier, and most of these had to do with
eternal matters—with the deepest sources of knowledge in my soul, those feelings and thoughts which Plato said
we learned in a premortal life. As one passage after another superimposed itself on previous passages, I found

myself wondering where I could nd the distillation of all these things I was not yet experiencing in my life but
which I knew were true. (I did not yet know anything about a “testimony.”) This process of rethinking, of taking
certain parts of my learning and replacing them with things which were “true,” is another phase of repentance—
renewing and purifying the mind.
You might think at this point, that the types of literature I am talking about are the theological and doctrinal books
which I was required to read for my preministerial classes. And you would be partly right. But I hasten to add that
just as much came from reading ction: Charles Dickens, especially A Christmas Carol; for in that perennial favorite
of mine the three spirits of Christmas give Scrooge a gift that most people cannot enjoy—some help in rethinking
his entire life. Repentance? Conversion? You could call it either one, but the fact is Scrooge had to do some
rethinking rst. Dickens, Tolstoy, Dostoevski, Shakespeare, and Dante inadvertently, or perhaps on purpose, follow
the advice of Alexander Pope’s “Essay on Man”: “Know then thyself, presume not God to scan; the proper study of
mankind is man.” But of course the truth is that since God was also once a man, we are not incorrect in studying his
life either. And that’s why we ponder the scriptures. How could I not be affected by Lew Wallace’s sentiment that
repentance must be more than mere remorse of sins: it comprehends a change of nature be tting the heavens.46
Or that “sin is . . . a turning of our gaze in the wrong direction?”47
Many of us have teenagers, and I think right away you can understand why I would correlate rethinking with music.
I do not at this time want to pass judgment on any kind of music, for there is bad classical music, good rock music,
lousy jazz, and beautiful country and western. The key for me in judging good music of any genre is what it does to
me. Does it merely excite physically? Or does it also affect me spiritually, emotionally, and intellectually? I have
found out that my personal “Top Forty” consists of music which affects all four simultaneously, like Dmitri
Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 5, Simon and Garfunkel’s “Bridge Over Troubled Waters,” or John Denver’s “Sweet
Surrender.” While working on this paper I had my radio tuned to KBYU-FM listening to Richard Strauss’s “Death
and Trans guration.” I had to pause from this paper during parts of it, and especially at the end, because this piece
of music, like many of my favorites, was as much a look into the eternities for me as it was for the composer. Thus,
music cannot only redirect our thinking towards the goal of the Rav’s “Repentant Man” but can also constantly
remind us of the good, the true, and the beautiful. For me, music is therapeutic on the physical, emotional, spiritual,
and mental level. It is one of the ways toward man’s highest goals: inner freedom, purity, perfection.
Art, on the other hand, is a bit more dif cult to consider. Like music, one of art’s highest purposes is to help us see
more clearly: ourselves, society, the common things around us, and the uncommon things we should be enjoying
but are not. While teaching the epistles of Paul one semester, I required projects of everyone in the class which
re ected either their majors or interests. An art major painted an excellent portrayal of Paul’s conversion on the
road to Damascus, showing me for the rst time that truly spiritual experiences can differ from one individual to
the next. The painter showed that one of Paul’s companions was frightened by the light, another of the voice, and a
third was looking around with a puzzled look on his face, wondering what all the fuss was about. Truly good art, like
good music, is never on trial: we are, and usually we do not fully understand either until we immerse ourselves in
them. For example, I never really understood art through an appreciation class as I did when I took a drawing class.
Only then did I begin to understand the creative mind of the artist and the work and sensitivity involved. It’s not at
all surprising to me, moreover, that most artists and composers have nothing but disdain for the trivia of the world.
They are looking to the stars while many of us grovel in the dust. Oh, for the praise of David: “The heavens declare
the glory of God; and the rmament sheweth his handywork” (Psalm 19:1). The very truest music and art is of God:
the art of nature and the music of the spheres.

A standard joke in academia as well as in society in general is that philosophy never helped improve society: it’s just
there so that eggheads can have something to think about. I disagree. Many philosophers think only on important,
eternal matters and can help us change our outlook, viewpoint, and perspective—if we take to heart what they are
writing. They can give us deeper insight into life and a change of attitude leading to an entirely new life—beyond
consensual reality to a new state of consciousness about all life. As your view of the world changes, so your source
of motivation changes. In your mind your frame of reference has changed, and your reasons to act have changed.
They can effect a complete change of mind consequent upon the apprehension of the true moral nature of things,
providing an excellent service. For if one wants to revolutionize the thinking of the world without destroying it,
how does one begin? With a reorientation of the fundamental thinking patterns of men into a spiritual, eternal
frame of mind. In other words, knowing who we really are and what we are here for. Most of the world lacks this
knowledge. Other popular “philosophers” are prescribing their own brands of repentance or rethinking. Fritjof
Capra’s The Turning Point, John Naisbitt’s Megatrends, and Marilyn Ferguson’s The Aquarian Conspiracy are
examples of this new thinking about society. Other grass-roots philosophers such as Dick Gregory identify more
with the poorer classes of people, as well as with his fellow Black race, but ends up with a message strikingly
similar to our Latter-day Saint “law of the harvest”: “Now I realize that you just go on planting the seeds, and be
honest and ethical and regardless of what anybody thinks, there’s gonna be harvest time. . . . Once you get clear
spiritually, it’s gonna clear up everything you’re gonna do. . . . Your reasoning gets better. And then a lot of old petty
things that you normally get hung up with, you don’t. That’s the rst step. The second step is ushing out the
mind.”48
Psychologists and brain scientists have been working for years in two different areas of what we would call
rethinking. The rst had to do with why the brain retains some messages and learning and disregards others. Here
at Brigham Young University in the seventies I did some research with the Youth-Talk Foundation: The
International Institute of Self-Image Research. “Riq-ology,” the brainchild of the late Ralph Nance (with help from
Maxwell Maltz and his “Psychocybernetics”), sought to help grade school children to rethink by eliminating selfdefeating self-talk, hang-ups, and mental blocks. Its theories were used successfully with hundreds of local
students to help them to unthink, rethink, and reprogram negative “tapes” in the brain so that life would be more
ful lling and positive for them. According to Bernell L. Christensen, who also worked with the institute, the
conscious and subconscious mind has to deal with the whole gamut and spectrum of human error, be it moral sin
or social impudence. These all have to be dealt with in the mental processes. Mistaken thoughts can include
physical clumsiness; mental preoccupation; pleasure at the expense of others; prejudice to the personality or
cultural background of others; indiscretions of speech and social actions; attention-getting traits, jokes and sneers
for social attention and approval at the expense of the feelings of others; failure to develop little but signi cant
habits of health; and malicious acts of revenge and hatred. Movies, lmstrips, plays, handbooks, and songs were
generated from these studies, and some of the nest researchers on campus were involved with it.
Unfortunately, the program lost impetus when Ralph died from injuries suffered in an automobile accident.
Nevertheless, his basic theories are correct: We can change all negative and downgrading thoughts which we have
“programmed” into our brain and substitute them with more positive and uplifting ones. It is surprising to me how
many Latter-day Saints have self-images which are far beneath the wholesome image we should have of ourselves
as literal children of our Father in Heaven. Repentance is therefore a necessity for anyone with a low self-image,
for the highest human and divine potential cannot be attained without a healthy self-image. It involves asking
ourselves what we think of ourselves and then asking what the Lord thinks of us.
The second area of psychological research is that of brain research—speci cally with that involving left- and rightbrain styles of thinking. I am now entering deep water, and although Joseph Smith said he was wont to swim in

deep water, I am not. I may have read everything that has come out on the research in these theories, but that does
not make me as quali ed as a trained psychologist in the area. Therefore, let me only brie y outline my theories.
Dr. Roger Sperry, a neurosurgeon, was given the 1981 Nobel Prize for his proof of the split-brain theory. His
research shows that problem-solving and decision-making skills, as well as our physical, emotional, and mental
abilities, and even our personalities, are strongly in uenced by which side of the brain we happen to be using.
Further studies in a number of books show that people range anywhere from extreme left-brained to extreme
right-brained preferences and anywhere in between, including the ideal “balanced” or “orchestrated.” This brain
research has yielded vast storehouses of insights and understanding which have so far aided interpersonal
communication, improvements in educational testing and teaching methods, and enhanced self-knowledge.
Unfortunately, religion has so far been untouched, except for a rare article here and there. This has occurred
probably because such insights may have the tendency to devolve into more religious intolerance, narrow dogmas,
and strict authoritarian notions as to which preferences may be true for a given faith system.
What does all of this have to do with rethinking? Balance. Consider for a minute the predilections of the two
hemispheres. A left-hemisphere-dominant person thinks in a sequential or linear manner. He loves to deal with
parts (specialization), numbers, and words. He is very rational and logical. He who is on the “right” thinks in images,
patterns, and wholes, preferring to look at the creative and artistic “Big Picture” of life. An orchestrated person
lives freely in both spheres, and that is where the rethinking part of repentance comes in.
I was raised in a church which preferred rational theology over revelation, prophecy, and visions, which belong on
the right. My initial testimony at conversion was one of reason: The Latter-day Saint Church makes sense. But my
reasonable testimony did not keep me from tearing up my baptismal certi cate six months later and nearly
apostatizing. It was wise home teachers who knew what kind of testimony I needed yet, and that was a spiritual
one based on knowing that Joseph Smith experienced what he said he experienced and that the Book of Mormon
was truly the word of God. What aided me in rethinking along those lines? Prayer and fasting—exactly what my
home teachers prescribed. Apostate Christianity evolved through rational expediency—Artistotelian philosophy
and pagan traditions—while the Latter-day Saint Church was founded on prayer, revelation, and visions. Today the
Church is run rationally but would mean nothing without the continuing guidance the Lord gives us through a
prophet. Having come from the outside, it is no surprise to me that Christians have a dif cult time accepting some
of our teachings—they were raised on reasonable theology, not the mind and will of the Lord through revelation.
Why do fundamentalist Christian groups tend to lean to the right?
Would it be correct to say that while Lehi was right-brained dominant, Nephi was balanced and Laman was left
dominant, not understanding of spiritual things because they were not reasonable?
Would Jesus Christ, Paul, and Joseph Smith be considered “balanced?”
How do these theories enlighten us on the preference of the ancient Jews to seek for a sign while the Greeks
considered early Christianity “foolishness?”
How does this research explain the differences between Eastern and Western philosophies?
Is The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints a balanced faith system which relies on intuition/inspiration and
logic/reason?

How does this research help to explain the secularism and humanism so rampant in all religions?
You may be surprised to know that there are tests you can take to discover where your dominance lies, that there
are exercises in books which help you to think more on one side or the other, and which if tailored to the Latterday Saints could indeed help the left-brained Saint better attain a testimony of right-brained spiritual matters. The
possibilities are endless and may release a new age of thinking about thinking: about ourselves, about our
Heavenly Father, about the nonmember family we are about to teach, and about our loved ones all around. My
colleague and friend Curtis Wright would call this a “restructuring of the Thinkatorium.” It can also show how the
physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual experiences of our lives will predispose us to certain attitudes and
perspectives. This may, for instance, explain why a balanced team effort of Dan (left) and Ron (right) Lafferty would
go off the deep end.
Roadblocks and Freeways to Repentance
Little discussion is needed here. Lists of roadblocks and freeways should suf ce, for they will sound very familiar to
you. Repentance, the rethinking kind, is blocked by many things, but here are the most serious:
1. Excuses.
2. Rationalizations.
3. Justi cations (repentance, on the other hand, should never lead to self-justi cation).
4. Defense mechanisms.
5. Lack of humility.
6. Procrastination.
7. Incorrect doctrines.
a. Cheap grace (Dietrich Bonhoeffer).
b. Ecclesiocentrism instead of Christocentrism.
c. Outward appearances meaning more than the soul. (Some of my fellow theology students were more concerned
about bishop’s rings, colorful stoles, and clean altar vestments than about saving souls.)
d. Ambivalence or wanting the best of both worlds at the same time. (In Umberto Eco’s excellent novel, The Name
of the Rose, the narrator insists that there is a midpoint between good and evil, at which place a man could go in
either direction. The difference between penitence and repentance is that in the rst, man is content to stay in the
midpoint, having constantly to decide which way to go. The repentant man, however, makes the decision to stay in
the good and is overcome by temptation only rarely or never at all.)
8. The complexity of life (simplicity de nitely helps us to keep our perspective better).

9. Centering our lives around “having,” “knowing,” and “doing”—rather than “being” and “becoming”—who we really
are.
Unfortunately, the entire process of repentance can be simulated and phony. Only the Lord and I, the repenter,
know the difference, for even though repentance should change the relationship I have with myself, others, and my
Father in Heaven, it is still conceivable that I could deceive myself. I have found from experience that without an
inward and prayerful change of attitude there really was no conquest over the esh, and thus no true conversion
of internal life, let alone perfection.
What helps us in rethinking?
1. Fasting, which includes not only the physical self, but the emotional, mental, and spiritual self as well.
2. Prayer and meditation.
3. Learning by study and also by faith, especially the scriptures. (Drink deeply, do not simply absorb it.)
4. Forgiveness and patience at all times. (Learn to turn to each person as the most sacred person on earth.)
5. Love and understanding.
6. Humility and teachableness.
7. Crying repentance, but overlooking the sins of others while concentrating on yourself.
8. Reading good books, listening to good music, enjoying nature.
9. Keeping a journal, for by so doing, you keep track of your spiritual progress.
10. Genealogy and temple work (there is much that could be said on how these help rethinking, and I will leave
that to your imagination).
11. Asking what Christ would do?
12. Living as if to expect his coming at any moment.
Conclusion
I once asked my Gospel Principles and Practices students on the nal exam what one principle of the gospel they
found the most dif cult to live. Most felt that because of the call of the world repentance was that principle,
echoing the good rabbi’s earlier comment. I submit, however, that it is not only the tempting call of the world that
makes repentance dif cult, it is that we do not fully know ourselves. I would challenge us to two things: First, we
should not disparage ourselves or underestimate our capabilities. We are much greater than we know. Oh, how
different from the way I was raised: that man is totally depraved, not merely corruptible, and that I was therefore a
“worm” who could do no good. It’s no wonder I’ve had to work on my own self-image ever since I joined the
Church. Secondly, we need to learn what God thinks of us—through meditation, revelation, the scriptures,
patriarchal blessings—and how we touch others around us.

By way of a conclusion, I would like to quote the best little dialogue on repentance I have yet seen. It is packed with
meaning and insight, and I share it with the hope that it will set something in motion within you like it did within me.
It happens to be part of Hugh Nibley’s “Intellectual Autobiography,” in Nibley on the Timely and the Timeless:
We: Dear Father, whenever the end is scheduled to be, can’t you give us an extension of time?
He: Willingly. But tell me rst, what will you do with it?
We: Well . . . ah . . . we will go on doing pretty much what we have been doing; after all, isn’t that why we
are asking for an extension?
He: And isn’t that exactly why I want to end it soon— because you show no inclination to change? Why
should I reverse the order of nature so that you can go on doing the very things I want to put an end to?
We: But is what we are doing so terribly wrong? The economy seems sound enough. Why shouldn’t we go
on doing the things which have made this country great?
He: Haven’t I made it clear enough to you what kind of greatness I expect of my offspring? Forget the
statistics; you are capable of better things—your stirring commercials do not impress me in the least.
We: But why should we repent when all we are doing is what each considers to be for the best good of
himself and the nation?
He: Because it is not you but I who decide what that shall be, and I have told you a hundred times what is
best for you individually and collectively—and that is repentance, no matter who you are.
We: We nd your inference objectionable, Sir—quite objectionable.
He: I know.49
In conclusion, I know what it is like to wonder where I came from, what I was doing here, and where I was going. I
know what it is like to have been taught the truth of the atonement of Jesus Christ without having a true
conception of his Father. I now know the difference between avoiding hell and working for heaven, with the help of
the Lord. But most of all, I now know that I am here to learn all I can from the Lord and from his servants, the
prophets, who communicate with him through the wonderful gift of revelation. And this is what makes this Church,
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the most effective instrument on the face of the earth for
teaching our Father’s children the truths of heaven and earth. It is my prayer for all of us that we may spend our
days in renewing our knowledge of the eternities and of our familial friendship with Heavenly Father and his son
Jesus Christ.
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Is There a Cure for Authoritarianism in Science?
Richard F. Haglund Jr.
It is a commonplace that “in our time . . . the sciences, physical and social, will be to an increasing degree the
accepted point of reference with respect to which the validity (Truth) of all knowledge is gauged.”2 Yet, as
Professor Nibley and others have warned, it would be a grave mistake to accept without reservations the
hegemony of the sciences in the house of intellect.3 The widely held notion that science has delivered us an
absolutely authoritative source of knowledge simply cannot withstand close scrutiny.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the history of novel theories and experiments in science. Scientists with
radically new ideas have dif culty getting an audience among their more orthodox brethren. Sometimes they are
ignored or rejected because of personal animosities or simple inertia. In other cases, the rejection seems to violate
the canons of open-minded scienti c inquiry. Through the whole spectrum of the sciences, one can document an
astonishing disregard for facts which contradict fashionable theories, stereotyping of acceptable approaches to
problems and theories, and the waving of academic credentials and ritual invocation of the specialist’s mystique to
discourage criticism from “outsiders.”4 In these instances, the intellectual conservatism of the scienti c community
appears to be authoritarian rather than authoritative in character.
The occurrence of authoritarian behavior patterns appears at rst glance to be completely pathological in view of
our idealization of science as an objective inquiry after “stubborn irreducible facts.” But the personal vanities and
insecurities of individual scientists cannot reasonably be invoked to explain widespread authoritarianism in
science. Moreover, since the stigmata of rigidity and dogmatism are observable in physics as well as archaeology,
the problem cannot arise simply from the peculiarities of individual disciplines, but must be connected with
general features of science.
The dif culty lies with the presumed objectivity of scienti c investigation.5 For facts are not normative in science—
the consensus is. To achieve that consensus, the community of science is often forced to make subjective judgments
about the relative weight to be given to data, methodology, theoretical elegance, and the credentials of scientists.
This sense of the community may be either imposed in authoritarian fashion, or proposed on defensible scienti c—
and hence authoritative—grounds. But science will always be torn between loyalty to the discipline as it exists and
to the ideal of progress, between the desire to possess the truth and the striving to discover it. Therefore, even
though this fundamental tension may on occasion lead to authoritarian behavior, it cannot be eliminated without
destroying an essential mechanism of scienti c activity.
Theory as the Source of Facts
Almost any science textbook contains a statement to the effect that “experiment, rather than preconceived ideas,
are the ultimate authority in science.”6 Because we have been convinced that “an hypothesis will be rejected if
even a single known fact is at variance with it,”7 we tend to view the subordination of fact to theory as prima facie
evidence of authoritarian, even antiscienti c, attitudes.
Such a naive view grossly oversimpli es matters of fact. For all experimental data are, in N. R. Hansen’s felicitous
phrase, “theory-laden.” Two people may experience the same photochemical reaction at the surface of the retina
but see entirely different things.8 Thus, as Einstein said, “It is the theory which decides what we can observe.”9 This

is true even in so-called “crucial experiments”—which are supposed unambiguously to reject or falsify a given
hypothesis, and thus give an authoritative denial of a theory. Philosophers and historians of science disagree
sharply about the problems of de ning such experiments.10 But in practice, the results of such an experiment are
unlikely to win easy acceptance if they fail to match previous expectations.
The genesis of the special theory of relativity provides an instructive case history. In 1864, in his “Dynamical
Theory of the Electromagnetic Field,” James Clerk Maxwell proposed that electromagnetic waves were
transmitted as “vibrations of an aethereal medium lling space and permeating matter.”11 However, the
mechanical properties required of this “lumeniferous ether” were an embarrassment; worse yet, it de ed all
attempts even to verify its existence.
Finally, the American physicist Michelson devised an experiment which, it was hoped, would settle the issue once
and for all. The basic idea was to measure the speed of light in two mutually perpendicular directions—parallel and
perpendicular to the trajectory of the earth’s orbit. The ether theory predicted that the two measurements would
show a slight discrepancy (on the order of one part in a hundred million). By 1887, Michelson had perfected an
interferometer capable of measuring the anticipated effect.12 But a series of extraordinarily careful
measurements showed no detectable difference in the speed of light in the two directions.
Now if a crucial experiment were in fact an unambiguously authoritative way to resolve scienti c controversy,
Michelson and everyone else should have abandoned the ether theory. Instead, his reaction was that “since the
result of the original experiment was negative, the problem is still demanding a solution.”13 Most physicists agreed
with him. Numerous hypotheses were put forward to explain the null result of the experiment without abandoning
the ether, although they were never more than ad hoc proposals which could not be connected with more general
principles.14
Then, in 1905, the most famous patent clerk in history proposed the special theory of relativity, which began with
the postulate that the speed of light is constant in all frames of reference, thus neatly “explaining” the Michelson
result. Furthermore, starting from this and two other similarly general postulates, Einstein was able to remove
some mathematical inconsistencies in Maxwell’s theory of moving charges and to cast into uni ed form the
transformation equations of particle mechanics and the electromagnetic eld.
Nevertheless, Einstein’s paper was received skeptically rather than gratefully.15 And it would be a mistake to label
this negative response as simple authoritarianism. On the contrary, it effectively demonstrates the impossibility of
settling a scienti c controversy by means of a single fact. The ether was only one facet of a theory of mechanics
which had successfully explained everything from universal gravitation to the motion of a spinning top. And
implicit in the modest form and tone of Einstein’s paper was a demand for the drastic revision of the classical
concepts of space and time—a great weight to hang on the result of a single experiment.
Once special relativity was accepted as authoritative, however, physicists willingly based its validity solely on the
null result of the Michelson-Morley experiments.16 In fact, when a later experimental test of the ether drift
appeared to invalidate special relativity, H. A. Lorentz hastened to assure physicists that the experimental results
only “indicate the existence of some unknown cause which it will be very important to discover . . . but I think . . .
that relativity will be quite safe.”17 Eventually the results were found to arise from a systematic error—thus

con rming Eddington’s dictum that “It is also a good rule not to put overmuch con dence in the observational
results . . . until they are con rmed by theory.”18
Problems with Paradigms
During periods of “normal science,”19 the authoritative standard of scienti c truth is not data, but the paradigm—a
framework of validated theories, concepts, and methods of attacking problems which both guides the course of
experiment and embodies the data it produces. But, as with the ether-drift experiment, even when a paradigm
fails, it will not be torn down until a new one can be constructed. The new consensus is usually not achieved by
gathering more data, or by “multiplying existing hypotheses beyond necessity,” but by nding a new way to see
existing theory and experimental experience. This process of “scienti c revolution” is, in Polanyi’s words, “the
classical case of Poe’s Purloined Letter, of the momentous document lying casually in front of everybody, and hence
overlooked by all.”20
The dif culties of constructing a new paradigm are illustrated nicely by the quantum theory of light. In 1887,
Heinrich Hertz found experimental con rmation for Maxwell’s conjecture that light was an electromagnetic wave.
Ironically, he also observed what we now know as one manifestation of the photoelectric effect—in which light
rays eject electrons from the surfaces of some materials. Over a period of almost two decades, other
experimenters after Hertz reported similar phenomena. But the data could not be explained by Maxwell’s theory,
nor, it seemed, by any other reasonable scheme, so the experiments were mostly ignored by theorists.21
In another of his famous trio of 1905 papers, Einstein proposed an heuristic explanation of the result, assuming for
purposes of calculation that light waves behaved as particles when interacting with matter.22 However, he was not
taken seriously, because experiments done early in the nineteenth century by Young, Fresnel, and Foucault had
convinced physicists that light consisted of waves, not of particles.23 Gradually, though, Einstein satis ed himself
that the wave or particle character of light is not determined a priori, but is contingent upon the way in which the
light is observed. And although he showed how the photoelectric effect and related phenomena could be
explained by his theory, Einstein’s arguments rested primarily on his emerging view of a fundamental duality in
Nature—between waves and particles, matter and energy.24 To Robert A. Millikan, accustomed to thinking of
waves and particles as mutually exclusive entities, this duality
seemed completely unreasonable because it apparently ignored and indeed seemed to contradict all the
manifold facts of interference and thus to be a straight return to the corpuscular theory of light. . . . I spent
ten years of my life testing that 1905 equation of Einstein’s, and contrary to all my expectations I was
compelled in 1915 to assert its unambiguous experimental veri cation in spite of its unreasonableness.25
However, even “unambiguous experimental veri cation” was not suf cient to establish the dual nature of light as a
new paradigm. In 1916, for instance, Max Planck (who had suggested the concept of energy quanta in 1900)
nominated Einstein for membership in the Prussian Academy of Science with the caveat:
That he may sometimes have missed the mark in his speculations, as for example in his hypothesis of light
quanta, cannot really be held too much against him. For it is not possible to introduce fundamentally new
ideas, even in the most exact sciences, without occasionally taking a risk.26

Not until 1923, when Compton showed that the scattering of x-rays from electrons could be treated simply as a
collision between particles, did the wave-particle duality in light begin to nd unreserved acceptance by
physicists.27 From there it was a short step to de Broglie’s hypothesis of wavelike behavior in particles—and what
had been a nicely compartmentalized world of particles and waves dissolved almost overnight into a hash of
“wavicles.”
The tortuous evolution of the wave-particle paradigm is not evidence for authoritarian resistance to the concept.
Instead, it shows plainly that neither the content nor the internal logic of paradigms furnishes authoritative
standards for judging experimental results of a completely novel type. The photoelectric effect was simply
incommensurable with existing concepts of the nature of light. It was not predicted by existing paradigms in
advance, and, after Hertz’s accidental discovery, there was no way to “save the appearances” by grafting new
hypotheses onto Maxwell’s theory, even in an ad hoc fashion. Thus this work was an authentic case of premature
discovery—today’s anomaly or embarrassment which turns out to be the kernel of tomorrow’s paradigm.28
Unfortunately, one can seldom judge accurately today whether the result is humbug or the makings of a Nobel
Prize.
Thus, the prototypical controversy about new paradigms appears to be a struggle with language. “In the beginning
of the investigations,” writes Heisenberg, ” . . . the words are connected with old concepts; the new ones do not
exist yet.”29 Thus, the solution of the controversy cannot come from the rules which relate the paradigms to one
another, but from a higher level of thought which comprehends the paradigms as special cases—just as a dispute
about grammar cannot be resolved by the rules of spelling.30
It is tempting to say that questions about paradigms must be settled by metaphysical arguments, but physicists are
more easily swayed by elegance than by metaphysics. “It is more important,” wrote Dirac, “to have beauty in one’s
equations than to have them t experiment,” because whatever discrepancies exist “may well be due to minor
features . . . that will get cleared up with further developments of the theory.”31 Certainly, the nal acceptance of
Einstein’s quantum theory of light seems to have resulted as much from the strong aesthetic appeal of his
conceptualization as from its explanation of the photoelectric effect.
Community, Certi ability, and Quality Control
If neither the data nor the paradigms of science are absolutely authoritative, we are left in a precarious position.
The responsibility for adjudicating con icting claims rests ipso facto on the community of science—but the rules of
evidence admit not only objective criteria but also such subjective considerations as the aesthetic qualities of
theories.32
A set of subjective standards may be internalized by the formation of a “school” of scienti c thought, but such
enterprises have not enjoyed spectacular success.33 Hence, one may legitimately wonder if there is some way for
the community of science to de ne itself and its patterns of growth so that controversial theories and experiments
will always be examined on intellectual merit alone.
But two contrasting idealizations of scienti c identity make this an extraordinarily problematical task. On one
hand, there is a view of the community of science traceable to Sir Francis Bacon, which stresses the inductive,
experimental character of its work; the formal, public apparatus of consensus—journals, societies, and
conferences; lengthy schooling and socialization of scientists during which they acquire loyalties to, and are in turn

certi ed by, the community; team research; the elaboration and extension of existing paradigms; and the
progressive vanquishing of ignorance across a broad front. On the other hand, there is a tradition personi ed by
René Descartes, which emphasizes the deductive, theoretical side of science—the informal networks of
information which spring up among those of like temperament and interest, individual research, imaginative,
unorthodox approaches to problems, and the breakthrough to new discoveries in problematical areas of inquiry.34
The temper of the average modern scientist is predominantly Baconian, and he senses an enduring and
inescapable con ict between himself and the solitary Cartesian genius who periodically shakes the foundations of
science. A classic example comes from the history of thermodynamics, one of the frontiers of physics during the
early nineteenth century. In 1845, James Waterston explained some of the thermodynamical properties of gases
by assuming a gas to consist of “hard-sphere” molecules, moving in random directions with some distribution of
velocities. In terms of his model, for instance, the pressure of a gas on the walls of its container would be caused by
the aggregate force of all the molecules colliding with the wall. Although Waterston was not a Fellow of the Royal
Society, the Society’s rules would have permitted his paper to be read before the Society and to be published in its
Philosophical Transactions. However, the referees did not like Waterston’s work, and though it was read in 1846, it
was not published by the Society. Due to a technicality in the Society’s rules, however, the only copy was retained
in its archives, so that Waterston was unable to publish it elsewhere.35
In 1892, Lord Rayleigh discovered the paper in the Royal Society Archives and had it printed. In his preface, he
remarked that “highly speculative investigations, especially by an unknown author, are best brought before the
world through some other channel than a scienti c society,” and that someone in Waterston’s position should
establish a reputation “by work whose scope is limited, and whose value is easily judged, before embarking on
higher ights.”36
Hindsight is always cruel, and particularly so in this case, since James Joule won ready acceptance for essentially
the same theory about twenty years later.37 But one ought not to judge Lord Rayleigh’s authoritarian
pronunciamento too harshly. If one is committed to the search for truth, one must also be wary of being led astray.
One must leave no stone unturned, but one must also be careful how much time and energy one spends turning
over stones that have only the same beetles underneath. The scientist knows from experience that revolutions are
infrequent and genius is rare. He is therefore properly skeptical of the paper which proposes “a general theory of
Space, Time, Matter and Radiation—an attempt to outdo Quantum Theory and Relativity, Cosmology and the
Theory of Elementary Particles in one splendid stroke.”38 He is also likely to be wary of strangers and young
upstarts, and to mistrust work which does not appear in his own literature, which he can usually be sure is
competently reviewed before getting into print.39
On the frontiers of science, his standards may be relaxed somewhat, as a concession to emotional equilibrium in
areas where controversy is rife. Recently, for example, the prestigious Physical Review Letters simply quit
refereeing papers in high-energy physics—a “hot” eld where priority and the chance to publish controversial
results are highly esteemed.40 But as long as the community of science is struggling with the con icting aims and
standards of the Baconian and Cartesian ideals, there will always be people like Waterston who are denied their
due.
One can argue, of course, that the danger of rejecting possible new insights outweighs the danger of letting
uncerti ed and possibly incompetent persons into the discussion. But science would thereby lose the strength of
consensus, which establishes a body of knowledge upon which all can agree for discussion. Take that away, and one

has not science, but a collection of warring factions, busily anathematizing one another. If you prefer that, the
Baconian would argue, better that you should form your own scienti c society!41
Prognosis
We began with the question of a cure for authoritarianism in science—implying the existence of an illness in the
body scienti c. Some believe the illness to be acute, and have called for radical therapy.42 But such a pessimistic
diagnosis is almost certainly unwarranted. “Under small perturbations,” as they say in physics, the values of the
community of science provide authoritative standards for balancing the competing ideals of scienti c practice.
These normative structures break down primarily when the data fall far outside expectations, when paradigms are
incommensurable with experience, or when new methods, new languages, or infant disciplines are struggling
through their early development, a circumstance exacerbated by the specialization of science.43 Thus one may
properly speak of “essential” rather than “acute” authoritarianism: The patient cannot be cured—in fact, the
symptoms can be removed only at the cost of his life. But the symptoms can be controlled by making the patient
aware of his limitations and moving him to a more salubrious climate. This analysis suggests the following course
of treatment.
First, scientists—and those who would like to be—need constant reminding that the intellectual and emotional
state of a eld of inquiry is a sensitive and complicated function of the quality of available data, the complexity and
generality of models, and of the patterns of growth in that area. Hence, they must be prepared to change interests
and amphoras as the eld matures through successive stages: from collecting and classifying data, through the
embedding of heuristic schemes into more comprehensive and elegant theories, and nally to the stage where the
foundations and interconnections of theories are of paramount interest.44 To ignore the question of what
activities are fruitful for a eld at a given stage in its development is to risk carrying on a mere parody of science.45
Second, diligent effort is prescribed both in de ning paradigms and in exploring their practical and conceptual
limitations, to avoid the situation where theories are dismissed without adequate analysis. For sciences where
paradigms are as yet not well established, this means a frank recognition that a discipline cannot be a science until
a paradigmatic consensus is achieved, no matter how narrow its boundaries.46 For the “harder” sciences, this
medicine contains, in addition, a liberal dose of pessimism about the durability of paradigms. Physicists have lived
to see an astonishingly successful and long-lived paradigm—that of classical mechanics—altered almost beyond
recognition by experimental and theoretical developments in the early twentieth century. It may well be time for
younger sciences to stop mimicking the outworn mechanistic determinism of nineteenth-century physics and to
consider how their own discipline’s evolution and their efforts will reshape existing paradigms.47
The most important part of the cure is fresh air. If science is about real problems, there must be solutions which
cannot yet be described, and which cannot be discovered in any formally prescribed way. The patient, careful work
of the Baconian scientist—deeply specialized, intimately familiar with his paradigm—is absolutely essential to the
conduct of science. But precisely because of his faithful adherence to the prevailing consensus, he is unlikely to
foresee the outlines of those solutions. The germ of a new paradigm is more likely to be brought into the
discussion by the Cartesian doubter, the amateur, or the generalist.48 The formal approaches of the consensus
scientist “are certainly bene cial,” wrote Einstein, “when one is trying decisively to formulate an already discovered
truth, but they almost always fail as heuristic aids.”49 What is needed for revolutions in science is clear vision, and
as Bohr often said, “Clarity is gained through breadth.”50

The overall goal of this cure is not to change the dependence of science on consensus, but to ensure that it is
achieved in a healthy way. Where a scienti c consensus is established by certifying some given set of data,
methods, or credentials as authoritative, that consensus will be enforced, paradoxically but inevitably, in
authoritarian fashion. As Popper observes, the setting up of such standards is based on the false assumption that
“knowledge may legitimize itself by its pedigree.”51 But if, instead, a consensus is sought without xed norms for
resolving controversies, but with the stipulation that debate continue as long as the participants show good faith,
one can avoid the destructive authoritarianism which vitiates scienti c inquiry by preventing the free ow of ideas.
It thus becomes desirable to give up the view of rationality as the search for universal, absolute truth in science by
means of some speci ed (and in nitely debatable) set of logical procedures. In its place, we may adopt “the
Socratic idea of rationality as a process of con ict between universality and speci city, . . . to wit, rationality as
Socratic dialectic.”52 To do so is to accept the quintessentially tentative nature of scienti c inquiry, and to be
content, if necessary, with the modest task of nding errors in our knowledge by means of civilized and critical
discussion.
Professor Nibley has given an appealing sketch of this ideal of science, not as rational explanation, but as rational
dialogue: The method of science, he writes, is “to talk about the material at hand, hoping that in the course of the
discussion every participant will privately and inwardly form, reform, change, or abandon his opinions . . . and
thereby move in the direction of greater light and knowledge.”53
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Language, Humour, Character, and Persona in Shakespeare
Arthur Henry King
The rst Oxford English Dictionary (hereafter OED)1 use of “character” as “a personality invested with distinctive
attributes and qualities by a novelist or dramatist” is in Fielding’s Tom Jones (1749). OED does not list the
Theophrastian2 use re ected in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century character-sketches, for example Ben
Jonson’s play, Every Man Out of His Humour, “the characters of the persons” (1599),3 those in the then current
satires, and in translations and collections.4
Another OED entry under character, “personal appearance” (entry 10) correctly interprets Twelfth Night 1.02.51
“outward character”; but that phrase implies “inward character” too, and OED misinterprets Coriolanus 5.04.26 as
the outward sense; but “I paint him in the character” refers to this description of Coriolanus (16-28):
He no more remembers his mother now than an eight-year-old horse. The tartness of his face sours ripe
grapes. When he walks, he moves like an engine, and the ground shrinks before his treading. He is able to
pierce a corslet with his eye, talks like a knell, and his hum is a battery. He sits in his state, as a thing made
for Alexander. What he bids be done is nish’d with his bidding. He wants nothing of a god but eternity and
a heaven to throne in. . . . I paint him in the character. . . . There is no more mercy in him than there is milk in
a male tiger.
Compare Coriolanus 2.01.46-65, where Menenius sketches an ironical “character” of himself and makes
“character” statements about the tribunes:
I am known to be a humorous patrician, and one that loves a cup of hot wine with not a drop of allaying
Tiber in’t; said to be something imperfect in favoring the rst complaint, hasty and tinder-like upon too
trivial motion; one that converses more with the buttock of the night than with the forehead of the
morning. What I think, I utter, and spend my malice in my breath. Meeting two such wealsmen as you are (I
cannot call you Lycurguses), if the drink you give me touch my palate adversely, I make a crooked face at it.
I cannot say your worships have deliver’d the matter well, when I nd the ass in compound with the major
part of your syllables; and though I must be content to bear with those that say you are reverend grave
men, yet they lie deadly that tell you have good faces. If you see this in the map of my microcosm, follows it
that I am known well enough too? What harm can your beesom conspectuities glean out of this character,
if I be known well enough too?
So Shakespeare knew this use of “character,” just as he was familiar with “humour.” But to which, if any, of his own
dramatis personae would he have applied the terms? Which would have been taken so by his audience? Which could
we now agree to be “humour” or “character”? How do the terms affect our view of what we now call “characters”
(in the sense in which Fielding used it in Tom Jones, 1749, and as it has been used since)?
The character-sketch genre, strictly Theophrastian or not, ethical, social, or both, combines typical traits (often
“humorous” in at least two senses) with generalizations, and reaches its highest expression in La Bruyère5 (whose
link with Molière is clear). The genre descends through Spectator, Tatler,6 and Fielding to a nineteenth-century
situation in which the word “character” could cover Flora Finching in Dickens’ Little Dorrit and Eugene Wrayburn in

his Our Mutual Friend—far too broad a category and one from whose breadth we still suffer. It is what we today
would call a caricature or even a cartoon.
Though both derive from Greek physiology and psychology, we can probably agree that the “humour”7 differs
from the “character” by having a dominant trait, whereas the “character” represents a number of traits embodied
in a portrait. Though I dare not say that Shakespeare would have found this abstract distinction worth making, I
will try to exemplify it as a sketch for some temporary scaffolding that may prove useful.
The dominant trait is normally expressed through a linguistic one. Examples:
Pistol (bombastic scraps).
Nym (the word “humour” in possible and impossible senses).
The Host of the Garter (exclamatory allocution and epanalepsis—compare Juniper in Ben Jonson’s play,
The Case is Altered [ca. 1597-98], Tucca in Jonson’s play, Poetaster [1601], and in Thomas Dekker’s play
Satiromastix [1602], and Lucio’s parody in Measure for Measure 3.02.43-85 of “this tune, matter, and
method” [48]).
Slender (the language of a provincial fool); a “la” man—he shares this with only one other male, Pandarus.
Evans and Fluellen (too busy being Welsh to be much else).
Caius (being French—cf. Doctor Dodypoll).
Shallow (senile recollections; epizeuxis and epanalepsis; NB this is Shallow in Henry IV, Part 2; his function
in The Merry Wives of Windsor makes him less senile).
Dull, Dogberry, and Elbow (malapropisms).
Osric (periphrastic complement laboured to the absurd).
Probably Holofernes (as a synonymic pedant) but not Armado.
Probably Thersites (speaking in contemporary prose not unlike Jonson’s, and using accumulatory
invective with comparisons drawn largely from disease) but not Jacques.
Would it be true to say that we could introduce these into a Jonson play without disturbing the atmosphere?
I cannot imagine Shakespeare’s thinking of the following as humours; but, in view of Menenius’ remarks, he might
well have called them “characters.” They have not dominant traits, but are complete portraits in language
consistent from beginning to end. They are, in fact, static; they end as they began:
Nurse, Mrs. Quickly, Casca, Jacques, Belch (but not Falstaff), Sir Andrew (very different from Slender),
Malvolio, Polonius (but not Menenius), Lucio (he provides an interesting contrast between “character” and
“humour” by the parody of Tucca I have already mentioned above).

Each of these “characters” has determined to be what he presents himself as, which means that there is a touch of
caricature in them all.
Armando presents a problem: he apparently repents, but his language does not:
For mine own part, I breathe free breath. I have seen the day of wrong through the little hole of discretion,
and I will right myself like a soldier (Love’s Labour’s Lost 5.02.722-25).
but contrast 882-87:
I will kiss thy royal nger, and take leave. I am a votary; I have vow’d to Jacquenetta to hold the plough for
her sweet love three year. But, most esteemed greatness, will you hear the dialogue that the two learned
men have compiled in praise of the owl and the cuckoo?
We may regard his repentance as his nal posture.
Parolles’ repentance is re ected in his language:
Yet am I thankful. If my heart were great,
‘Twould burst at this. Captain I’ll be no more,
But I will eat and drink, and sleep as soft
As captain shall. Simply the thing I am
Shall make me live. Who knows himself a braggart,
Let him fear this; for it will come to pass
That every braggart shall be found an ass.
Rust sword, cool blushes, and, Parolles, live
Safest in shame! Being fool’d, by fool’ry thrive!
There’s place and means for every man alive
(All’s Well That Ends Well 4.03.330-39).
Cf. also 5.02 and 5.03.238-66; he is not a “character.”
To clarify our categories, may we regard Bodadilla as a humour, Armado as a “character,” and Parolles as a person?
This brings us to persona. We have hitherto been dealing with matters that are major in Jonson and Molière, but
minor in Shakespeare. Our consideration of persona is the reason for our preliminary consideration of the
trivialities of humour and character.

I use the word persona to be able to retain the sense “mask,” for which “person” has apparently not been used. I
remember here Yeats’s comment that we can be more ourselves with a mask on than without it. At the same time,
the Latin form covers also the main English senses I have in mind: “role,” “appearance,” and “individual.” “Person”
also makes a distinction between ourselves and other animals.
The ancient Greeks had “characters” not only by Theophrastus, but before him by Plato in the Republic—for
example, the stages of the character of the tyrant; and Aristophanes parodied real people (e.g., Cleon, Euripides,
Socrates), making fun of their language. Such parts in Aristophanes appear to be static and may well be classed
with “characters.”
However, Aeschylus and Sophocles put on the stage personae, who are not particularly distinguished by their
language (any more than are the people in Homer) but appear to live (Oedipus, Orestes) somewhat as
Shakespeare’s personae do. For the distinction that I am trying to make, therefore, I take the word “persona” to be a
part for the interpretation of an actor or producer, covering, not a set of trait-dominated speeches, or of speeches
“in character,” but a sequence of varying stylistic experiences. Shakespeare’s major parts are not linguistically
consistent and their linguistic inconsistencies set up tensions, ironies, and ambiguities fundamental to their nature.
We need to remain open-minded in our interpretations, and not to think of these parts, any more than we think of
ourselves, as obviously consistent people. There may be consistency—it may ultimately be felt—but it comes after
a full and open consideration of all the uncertainties and inconsistencies, after experiencing and living the part. It
can be talked about but not formulated. And beyond each part, there is a relationship of the parts to the play as a
whole, a whole which can be talked about, but not formulated. A persona and a play are never formulae.
We might think of two examples from artists at Shakespeare’s own level of genius and not so distant from him in
time: Michelangelo’s Last Judgment with its inclusion of Charon’s boat, a vigorous, beardless Christ, and the artist’s
own face attached to St. Bartholomew’s ayed skin; or of Bernini’s St. Theresa in coital/mystical ecstasy; or of
Bernini putting his own head on the statue of slinging David. We ought to be neither so strong nor so crude as to
say “either,” “or,” but rather to say “both.” “Bothness” involves irony, but that is inevitable: where there is more than
one set of values there is irony.
Though visual examples are clearer, bearing in mind Michelangelo and Bernini is not enough. We might recollect
also the ambivalence of the end of Faust, with its juxtaposition of a Roman Catholic mysticism verging on the
absurd, Mephistopheles’ homosexual enthusiasm for young angels, and the nal dubious remark about the
in uence of the eternal feminine; or the ambivalence of Ibsen’s Brand and Peer Gynt (or for that matter most of his
plays). Or which posturings of Beethoven’s middle period are self-betraying romantic self-assertion, and which
dramatic conveniences to convey a deeper irony than the romantic one.
This brings us to posturing. If we are to consider the personae of Shakespeare’s own time we have to consider the
dramatic posturing of that time. The most important element here is Seneca.8 We are familiar with the crudities of
those Elizabethan translations; we have admired Eliot for getting something out of them, and above all for drawing
the line forward to what Marlowe made of Seneca and in particular that element of the grotesque which Eliot
exempli ed in “Cassandra sprawling in the streets,” and “swung her howling in the empty air.” Eliot might have gone
further and indicated the series of evermore re ned and varied effects that Shakespeare, knowing little of Greek
tragedy, developed from the Senecan tradition. We may need to recognize that most of Shakespeare’s work is
“posturing.” Is Titus Andronicus deliberately absurd? Or at least grotesque? What part has the Player’s speech in
Hamlet in the development? How much of Shakespeare’s greatest parts may be described as super-Senecan rant?

As we bear in mind this unexampled progress of Shakespeare from Titus Andronicus to Coriolanus, do we not need
to remember that Shakespeare’s age made no distinction between aesthetic and moral judgments? Bad language is
associated with bad conduct, good language with good. “Language most shewes a man: speake that I may see
thee.”9
I have been trying in this long parenthesis quickly to establish some universe of discourse among us before
exemplifying the sequencing of styles in the treatment of personae. Now let us go back to Menenius. He was wrong
about Coriolanus: he painted Coriolanus in the character, but it was not Coriolanus’s character, because
Coriolanus is not a “character.” His vituperative choler is given, as is its occasional incoherence. But they do not
prepare us for 2.01.175-79,
My gracious silence, hail!
Wouldst thou have laugh’d had I come cof n’d home,
That weep’st to see me triumph? Ah, my dear,
Such eyes the widows in Corioles wear,
And mothers that lack sons,
or the entirely reasonable political statements of 3.01.91-161, which are not opportunist but grimly true to an
important political standpoint—and the language in which they are expressed is worthy of their importance.
Coriolanus is also an imaginative and reasonable man.
Now consider his two soliloquies in 4.04 at Antium (the only time when he is alone with himself).
A goodly City is this Antium. City,
‘Tis I that made thy widows; many an heir
Of these fair edi ces ‘fore by wars
have I heard groan and drop. Then know me not,
Lest that thy wives with spits and boys with stones
In puny battle slay me.
There is a grimly self-parodic humour in the last two lines. The second soliloquy,
O world, thy slippery turns! Friends now fast sworn,
Whose double bosoms seem to wear one hart,
Whose hours, whose bed, whose meal and exercise

Are still together, who twin, as ’twere, in love
Unseparable, shall within this hour,
On a dissension of a doit, break out
To bitterest enmity,
echoes in a Midsummer Night’s Dream‘s (3.02.203-8) atmosphere of mechanical treachery.
We, Hermia, like two arti cial gods,
Have with our needles created both one ower,
Both on one sampler, sitting on one cushion,
Both warbling of one song, both in one key,
As if our hands, our sides, voices, and minds
Had been incorporate.
And indeed the soliloquy as a whole re ects a simplistic sense of fate and fortune (probably ironic) which is not at
all the political maturity of Coriolanus 3.01.
But most remarkable is the stylistic sequence of Coriolanus 5.03: the contradictions of 22-37 with the grotesque of
“as if Olympus to a molehill” should “In supplication nod” and “such a gozling”; his address to his wife he himself
characterizes as “I prate” (48), if we are to accept Theobald’s conjecture. The climax of his arti cial self-protection
comes in the ironic rant of his comment on his mother’s kneeling to him (58-62),
Your knees to me? to your corrected son?
Then let the pibbles on the hungry beach
Fillop the stars; then let the mutinous winds
Strike the proud cedars ‘gainst the ery sun,
Murd’ring impossibility to make
What cannot be, slight work,
and the ironically exaggerated complement of his address to Valeria (64-67):
The noble sister of Publicola,
The moon of Rome, chaste as the icicle

That’s curdied by the frost from purest snow
And hangs on Dian’s temple—dear Valeria!
Note also the contrast between the register of his address to his son (70-75), and the register of the boy’s own
later comment on the situation (127-28):
70. The god of soldiers,
With the consent of supreme Jove, inform
Thy thoughts with nobleness, that thou mayest
prove
To shame unvulnerable, and stick i’ th’ wars
Like a great sea-mark, standing every aw,
And saving those that eye thee!
127. ‘A shall not tread on me;
I’ll run away till I am bigger, but then I’ll ght.
Coriolanus’s self-defense is marked as futile by its arti ciality. He collapses into simplicity at 182-89.
O mother, mother!
What have you done? Behold, the heavens do ope,
The gods look down, and this unnatural scene
They laugh at. O my mother, mother! O!
You have won a happy victory to Rome;
But, for your son, believe it—O, believe it—
Most dangerously you have with him prevail’d,
If not most mortal to him (cf. Hamlet 2.02.122).
We cannot believe after this sequence of very different styles and the development which it connotes that
Coriolanus could merely revert to vituperative choler in 5.06.102-29 too. We can only presume that he allows his
mechanical rage to take over as a means of inciting the Volscians to kill him: he sets his own mousetrap. This
interpretation ful lls the development that Shakespeare’s variations of style seem to point to and allows
Coriolanus a “successful” death instead of one forced upon him by infantile regression.

A few comments on the stylistic variety that is given to Hamlet. We are all familiar with the way in which he plays
the Fool with Polonius, with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, and with Claudius. Not all of us perhaps would agree
on how serious his monologues may be. The exclamatorily confused if not actually anacoluthic syntax of Hamlet
1.02.129-59 appears to point to a confused spontaneity, but in that case what are those classical references to
Hyperion, to Niobe, and to Hercules doing? And above all why is he making a deliberate joke about himself in “but
two months dead, nay, not so much, not two” (138), “within a month” (145), “a little month” (147), and “within a
month” (153), particularly since he carried that joke further in 3.02.127: “and my father died within ‘s two hours.”
The syntactical confusion is repeated again in “So oft it chances” (1.04.23-38)—all one sentence and probably
incomplete at that. What about the reference to “my tables” in 1.05.107? The grotesque interview reported by
Ophelia in 2.01.74-97? The deliberately affected letter which ts in with that grotesque appearance (2.02.10928), a letter which the Queen nds it hard to believe, came from Hamlet (114). There is the player’s speech with its
kitchen imagery: “Bak’d and impasted” (459), “roasted” (461), and “mincing” (514); its compounding of pedantic
and Anglo-Saxon: e.g., “coagulate gore” (462); and “see . . . a silence” (483-85)—compare A Midsummer Night’s
Dream 5.01.192-93:
I see a voice! Now will I to the chink,
To spy and I can hear my Thisby’s face—
Do these point to an example of Hamlet’s taste or may his attitude be regarded as “camp”?
“O that this” (1.02.129-59) and “O all you hosts” (1.05.92-106) are exclamatory and lead to nothing. A third
exclamatory monologue, “O what a rogue” (2.02.550-87), apparently leads to an excited decision but one already
taken: Hamlet has already considered in some detail what to do with the forthcoming play (540-43).
Three of the monologues are in a re ective rather than an exclamatory style. Two of them seem to be tryings-onfor-size of an attitude (“To be”—3.01.55-87 and “Now might I do it”—3.03.73-95). “How all occasions” (4.04.32-66)
does lead to a decision on a posture (“from this time forth, My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth!”) which
Hamlet seemingly for the purpose of contrasting himself with Fortinbras? “Now might I do it” (3.03.75-96), if it was
Senecan, might lead to assassination; but instead it is a frivolous piece of reasoning for taking no action. “To be”
may be compared with the Duke-Friar’s speech in Measure for Measure 3.01.1-41, a speech which provides
completely unchristian advice and is ineffective (cf. Claudio’s reaction, 117-31). The fundamental point about the
“To be” speech is not whether he is knowingly doing it in front of Ophelia and possibly other listeners, but whether
he is posturing or not; and the answer is that he is posturing—to himself or others, and certainly to the audience.
Hamlet’s super-Senecan element (which he shares with his father in 1.05) comes out in 92-106 (“O all you hosts of
heaven”), 2.02.550-81 (“O what a rogue and peasant slave am I”), 3.02.388-96 (” ‘Tis now the very witching time of
night”), a good deal of 3.04 (the interview between mother and son); but not in the nal interchanges while he is
dying (5.02.331-58). Hamlet reacts vigorously against an earlier stage of Senecanism in Laertes’s outburst at the
grave of Ophelia (5.01.246-54) by parodying it (254-58, 269-71, 274-83). I think everybody is agreed about this,
but they may not be agreed about recognizing the style of this as that of the player’s speech Hamlet purports to
admire.
Another aspect of Hamlet’s stylistic changes which may not suf ciently have been dealt with is the gusto of the
passage in 3.02.271-95 (“the strooken deer,” etc., shared with Horatio), of the letter about the pirates in 4.06, and
above all of the “Up from my cabin” account to Horatio in 5.02.12-70 (which covers not only his intense pleasure in
success, but also his parody of his uncle’s style, his gloating over the fate of Guildenstern and Rosencrantz, and his

need to defend to Horatio what he has done about them). We may well have in these scenes Hamlet’s own
straightforward style, but it is not one that distinguishes him from others. What distinguishes him as a persona is
the variation in sequencing of the styles he adopts, though none of these is by itself peculiar to him; for example,
his style as a Fool is mostly of the “absolute” kind that links him with Feste, Lear’s Fool, and to some extent with
Touchstone. As a Fool he has a higher absoluteness paralleled by the lower absoluteness of the First Gravedigger.
And his syntactic complexity (at times almost turgidity) he shares with Fincentio, with Claudius, and with Prospero
in Prospero’s account of his dethronement (though the cause of that complexity may in each case be different).
Complex as Hamlet’s series of rhetorical stances is, critics seem more able to accept his lack of dignity than they
are willing to admit the dubiety of Othello’s rhetoric. On the whole, Othello remains the prisoner of his own
rhetoric from 1.02 to his very last speech (the comment on which by Lodovico is “O bloody period,” which can
hardly not be a quibble). Iago’s characterization of Othello’s wooing of Desdemona as “fantastical lies” (2.01.22324) is not incorrect. There appear to be threatening lies in 3.04.55-75, when Othello gives an account of a
handkerchief which, in contrast to the grim, witchlike atmosphere that Othello weaves around it, has a strawberry
pattern (3.03.435).
There are, however, points in the development of Othello that take him beyond the region of a “Character,” a mere
superbraggart at the top end of the scale beginning with Bobadilla and passing through Armado and Parolles.
There is the unfortunate disclaimer of Desdemona’s marital affection (1.03.248-59) by his favorseeking 261-74
(“Vouch with me heaven I therefore beg it not”). The jargon of this is striking: “Comply with heat (the young affects
in me defunct),” “serious and great business,” “light wing’d toys of feather’d Cupid,” “wanton dullness,” “speculative
and of c’d instruments,” “my disports corrupt and taint my business,” etc. There is Othello’s determination
(apparently based on pride and a sense of inferiority) not to confront Desdemona with the accusations against her
in delity. There is his outburst of intense vicious rage when Desdemona has been “raised up” (2.03.250-51). There
is the pact between Othello and Iago which mounts from low-Senecan (“Arise, black vengeance, from the hollow
hell,” 3.03.447) to the super-Senecan of “Like to the Pontic Sea . . . I here engage my words” (453-62). Iago enters
the pact in the same register (463-69), and it is problematic whether this is to be regarded as parody, or whether
Iago has lost himself with Othello in the enthusiasm of hate. There is certainly a special bond between Iago and
Othello in the sense that the one is satanically passionate to tempt and the other infernally eager to be tempted.
There is the inability of Othello to go outside his rhetorical stance except into chaos. This happens at 4.01.35-43,
where it ends in a t; and again at 5.02.276-82, where he descends from super-Senecanism to standard
declamation (“O cursed slave. . . . O Desdemon! Dead”); and declines into mere rolling exclamation. As for his nal
speech, we have been familiar with the alternatives since Eliot wrote about it, but Eliot’s “cheering himself up,”
though a keen pointer, does not cover the consonance of this nal speech with the whole of the play.
We are given the revelatory contrast with all this rhetoric in Desdemona’s simple nal words (5.02.124-25):
“Nobody, I myself. Farewell! Commend me to my kind lord. O, farewell!”
Othello’s sequence is thus very different from that of Coriolanus or Hamlet: he opens up to a potential experience
with Desdemona, he can match her simplicity (4.01.195-96, “but yet the pity of it, Iago! O Iago, the pity of it,
Iago!”); but reverts to his Senecan savagery (“I will chop her into messes. Cuckold me!” 197) and to the rhetorical
carapace by which he conceals himself from others and from himself.
It is easier to accept the stylistic sequencing in Lear. In Lear himself the super-Senecan rant is shown up by the
Fool’s running commentary and by Kent’s realism. The height of this rant is reached in 3.02.59-60: “I am a man
more sinn’d against than sinning,” which is a simple statement, but a hardening and not a softening one; followed

immediately by “my wits begin to turn.” Before entering the Fool’s world, which is the way to mental health, Lear
shows sympathy with the outcasts (one of whom he now is), but in the wrong register—his own injustice and that
of the heavens are mixed up in his mind and these are not the words of a broken heart and a contrite spirit
(3.04.28-36). The Fool’s role extends to Edgar’s simulated role at the bottom of the world; but Lear’s criticism is
still directed at society and still alternates with self-assertion (4.06.83-187). However, the posturing ends in
4.07.43-84, a simplicity shared between father and daughter.
There is no more posturing in Lear after this, unless his endeavor to comfort his daughter in 5.03.8-25 should be
so regarded; but if so, it is a posture of a very different kind. There is posturing in the rest of 5.03, especially by
Edgar, but that demands treatment on another occasion; as does the question of the button (5.03.310). I would
con ne myself here to saying that utter simplicity has its interpretive dif culties as much as extreme complexity.
However, rhetorically speaking one would need to take the most famous epizeuxis in all literature (“Never, never,
never, never, never” 311) as a slow one, and note that the epanalepsis and alliteration of 311-12 (“Do you see this?
Look on her! Look her lips. Look there, look there!”) express a quickening and an excitement. The alliteration
emphasizes lips and the question narrows down to “What is to be looked for on her lips?” My own belief is that the
button is not Lear’s but Cordelia’s, that its undoing releases some pent-up breath from the dead lungs, that there is
some movement of the lips in consequence, and that Lear dies in the belief that Cordelia is alive (a matter that has
symbolic importance for the play). But to dispute about this nal passage is unnecessary: the climax of the play is
not here, but in 4.07.43-84.
I suggested that the sequencing of Lear’s part was exemplary. I say so because the development is carefully
monitored, can be made clear dramatically in the part on the stage, and issues in one of the supreme scenes (if not
the supreme scene) of all literature: 4.07.
In Lear the sequencing has an upward movement. The movement in Macbeth’s part is downward and this may well
have been the main reason why Lear has been regarded as the greater play and indeed as Shakespeare’s greatest.
However, that should not disguise the fact that in many points the sequencing of Macbeth’s part is more subtle
than that of Lear.
I have hitherto been talking arti cially about the sequencing in isolation of a part, in order to simplify what I am
trying to show. It was almost impossible to do this in Lear, since the sequencing of Cordelia’s part needs to be seen
in parallel with that of her father; but when we come to Macbeth, it is impossible to handle the sequencing of
Macbeth’s part without dealing with Lady Macbeth also. Here, again, I must con ne myself to points that are not
usually stressed.
Senecan rising to super-Senecan is dominant for them both, and that is no wonder since Macbeth is introduced to
us in 1.02 as a butcher (22, “He unseam’d him from the nave to the chops”) and is dismissed as a butcher in 5.09.25
—”this dead butcher and his endlike queen.” Lady Macbeth’s “Come, you spirits” (1.05.40-54), although far more
imaginative and linguistically rich than Seneca, nevertheless resembles Seneca’s Medea and through it the source
in Euripides.
About the sensitivity in Macbeth’s earlier monologues: a good part of it is fear of being found out and
apprehension of public opinion against the dead. “If ’twere done, when ’tis done” (1.07.1-28) moves from an
apparently rational consideration of disadvantages into a much-admired chaotic hyperbole; but note the
oxymoron of a “naked newborn babe Striding the blast,” and the grotesque fancy that blowing “the horrid deed in
every eye” will produce enough tears to drown the wind (it takes a heavy rainstorm to do that). The oxymoron, the

irrelevance of “sightless,” the Baroque “blowing,” and the hyperbole add up to something grotesque rather than
noble: “Pity” is Macbeth’s enemy in working up public opinion against the deed. Blake’s illustration only succeeds in
accentuating the posture. And indeed the tone of the monologue immediately drops to Macbeth’s re ection about
his own inadequacy as an excuse for not daring to do what he wants to do.
The theatricality of “Is this a dagger” (2.01.33-64) shows Macbeth’s imagination helping his resolution rather than
detracting from it. Having dismissed the dagger as an illusion, he proceeds to paint a night-picture which lls him
full of dramatic importance (the posture is not merely super-Senecan in language but Senecan in implied stagedirections). Thus both monologues emphasize sensitiveness by its suppression. True sensitiveness would have
conjured up the image of Duncan on arrival at the castle, at the banquet, and now in sleep.
The sense of pleasure in his own importance which is adumbrated in 2.01.49-64—”Now o’er the one half world,” is
carried further and made more clear when he makes his bloody hands bearable by envisioning the crime on a
cosmic scale and discovering in so doing that he is beginning to take pleasure in slaughter (2.02.57-60).
Will all great Neptune’s ocean wash this blood
Clean from my hand? No; this my hand will rather
The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
Making the green one red.
“The multitudinous sea incarnadine,” with its two neologisms, shows a pleasure in language which denote this
deeper pleasure, and enables us to see more than arti ciality and suspectness in 2.03.111-15:
Here lay Duncan,
His silver skin lac’d with his golden blood,
And his gash’d stabs look’d like a breach in nature
For ruin’s wasteful entrance; there, the murtherers,
Steep’d in the colors of their trade, their daggers
Unmannerly breech’d with gore.
The affectation in this last passage has long been seen as evidence of Macbeth’s guilt; all that I maintain now is that
the same kind of evidence is present in various kinds of arti ciality in Macbeth’s language throughout; and that we
may extend, by careful rhetorical inspection, this category of arti cial language, revealing the buried intent of
many speeches in Shakespeare’s plays that may in the past have been admired “for themselves.”
Macbeth’s almost gloating trend is carried still further by the twilight meditation of 3.02.46-56. The language in
which he describes the scene enables him to consider the process of nature as assistant to the crime he is having
committed. The reaction to Banquo’s ghost in 3.04. is not pity for what Banquo has been reduced to, as a mangled
piece of esh, and not repentance at having ordered this transformation, but a combination of fear and anger at

being disturbed, an accusation to the ghost for behaving unnaturally, indignation that ghosts should be allowed to
do these things, and an attempt to exorcise the phenomenon. All these posturing processes enable him to hide
from himself the real horror: not what the ghost of Banquo looks like, not his threat to Macbeth, but the mere fact
that Macbeth has had him murdered.
From now on Macbeth’s paranoid posture of de ance and destruction is xed, any compunction unreal nostalgia
(5.03.22-28—”I have lived long enough”), combined with self-pity. A posturing self-pity combined with cheap
philosophizing celebrates his wife’s death (“Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow” 5.05.19-28) and leads to the
nal part of the sequence—the pseudo-heroic man of battle on the eld as he was described to us at the beginning
of the play.
It remains to bring out more clearly than is usually done the struggle for power between Lady Macbeth and
Macbeth. Lady Macbeth appears to be the dominant gure at the beginning, but it was not she who took the
initiative in broaching the question, and it is not she who carries out the deed. As soon as Macbeth is ensconced as
king he withdraws his con dence from her and proceeds to plot on his own (and from then on she lives in constant
fear of their being found out). He apparently has a relapse at the banquet and she has to sustain him; but actually
he is in a state of de ance beyond being found out. After the banquet scene, in any case, he keeps himself entirely
to himself, and it is the apparently more courageous Lady Macbeth who collapses: she turns out to be more
dependent on him than he on her. In the sleepwalking scene she uses the simplest of language, but it is not the
language of repentance or even remorse; she is concerned in her dream with getting rid of the evidence and that
seems to be the main reason for saying, “Yet who would have thought the old man to have had so much blood in
him,” (5.01.39-40) which is a coarse rather than a pitying remark. In saying “the Thane of Fife had a wife” (42-43)
with its kind of rhyming tag, she is more likely to be drawing a parallel between herself and Macduff’s wife than
pitying her: she may even be apprehensive that Macbeth’s next step will be to get rid of herself because she is now
more likely to give the game away than he. There is also a touch of narcissistic self-pity in “all the perfumes of
Arabia will not sweeten this little hand” (5.01.50-101). Simple though Lady Macbeth’s language is, it does not by
any means reveal a simple state of mind.
The complex sequencing of Cleopatra’s part is well known to us all, but I would wish to concentrate on two
passages where I think this complexity has not been suf ciently brought out, the rst of which involves one of
Shakespeare’s developments of Senecan style.
In 4.15.9-11 she reaches the highest level of super-Senecan declamation
O Sun,
Burn the great sphere thou mov’st in! darkling stand
The varying shore o’ th’ world!
But levels change quickly in this scene and when Antony asks to “speak a little” Cleopatra interrupts at 43-45, “no,
let me speak, and let me rail so high, That the false huswife Fortune break her wheel, Provok’d by my offense.” Note
“rail” and the Fortune image. Her interruption is a distinctly comic point followed by the comic point of Antony’s
recommending Proculeius to Cleopatra, whereas he is going to be Cleopatra’s betrayer (5.02.9-64). At the death
of Antony, Cleopatra has lines which we all agree have the poet’s full musical endorsement (4.13.62-68).
O, see, my women:

The crown o’ th’ earth doth melt. My lord!
O, wither’d is the garland of the war,
The soldier’s pole is fall’n! Young boys and girls
Are level now with men; the odds is gone,
And there is nothing left remarkable
Beneath the visiting moon.
When she recovers from her swoon she continues in the same tone.
No more but e’en a woman, and commanded
By such poor passion as the maid that milks
And does the meanest chares (73-75).
But this is immediately followed by a Senecan passage at a much lower level which recurs to railing (75-82).
It were for me
To throw my sceptre at the injurious gods,
To tell them that this world did equal theirs
Till they had stol’n our jewel. All’s but naught:
patience is sottish, and impatience does
Become a dog that’s mad. Then is it sin
To rush into the secret house of death
Ere death dare come to us?
This is again succeeded by a few lines of simple and natural language that in its turn modulates once more into
super-Senecanism (86-89):
and then, what’s brave, what’s noble,
Let’s do’t after the high Roman fashion,
And make death proud to take us. Come, away,
This case of that huge spirit now is cold.

The railing is still there in the protest to Proculeius (5.02.49-62),
Sir, I will eat no meat, I’ll not drink sir;
If idle talk will once be necessary
I’ll not sleep either. This mortal house I’ll ruin,
Do Caesar what he can. Know, sir, that I
Will not wait pinion’d at your master’s court,
Nor once be chastis’d with the sober eye
Of dull Octavia. Shall they hoist me up,
And Show me to the shouting valotry
Of censuring Rome? Rather a ditch in Egypt
Be gentle grave unto me! rather on nilus’ mud
Lay me stark-nak’d, and let the water- ies
Blow me into abhorring! rather make
My country’s high pyramides my gibbet,
And hang me up in chains!
and in the attack (or pseudo-attack) on Seleucus (154-58).
The second passage is quite different. It has the Senecan hyperbole about it, but it seems to combine Seneca with a
touch of Rabelais and one wonders whether Cleopatra is not, for part of this passage at least, trying to bemuse
Dolabella.
His face was at the heav’ns, and therein stuck
A sun and moon, which kept their course, and
lighted
The little O, th’ earth . . .
His legs bestrid the ocean, his rear’d arm
Crested the world, his voice was propertied

As all the tuned spheres, and that to friends;
But when he meant to quail and shake the orb,
He was as rattling thunder. For his bounty,
There was no winter in’t; an autumn it was
That grew the more by reaping. His delights
Were dolphin-like, they show’d his back above
The element they liv’d in. In his livery
Walk’d crowns and crownets; realms and islands
were
As plates dropp’d from his pocket (5.02.79-92).
Note in particular “stuck A sun and moon” which is certainly grotesque as a comparison to two similar eyes. “His
legs bestrid the ocean, his rear’d arm Crested the world” is an interesting reminiscence of Cassius’ description of
Caesar and both seem to have a ring of irony in them. The Rabelaisian touch is rather “in his livery Walk’d crowns
and crownets”; realms and islands were “As plates dropp’d from his pocket.” But in between we have
For his bounty,
There was no winter in’t; an autumn it was
That grew the more by reaping. His delights
Were dolphin-like, they show’d his back above
The element they liv’d in.
Here Cleopatra modulates not into super-Senecanism but a strain of the poet’s musical endorsement in praise of
generosity, including erotic generosity.
The musical endorsement of Cleopatra’s end from the entry of Iras with the robe crown, etc., down to Charmian’s
last words to the soldier I dare say none of us will deny; but it is worth pointing out two humorous touches of a
kind which in his other passages of the highest musical endorsement Shakespeare does not use. One is the
humorous eroticism of 312: “Nay, I will take thee too” in the midst of the murmurings by which Cleopatra equates
death and coitus; and the other is made by Charmian, who produces an ironical parallel in matching “ass
unpolicied” (307-8) with “lass unparallel’d” (316). This is one of Shakespeare’s nest effects in his combination of
high music with the placing of Octavius de nitely in a low world; a placing con rmed immediately afterwards by
Octavius’ entering and pursuing the cause of death like a less effective Lord Peter.

The syntactically, if not lexically, conversational simplicity of Shakespeare at his highest points does not ourish in
solitude. This kind of experience can be had only by sharing—not singly between a persona and the audience, but
between a persona and others on the stage and audience. The height of Cleopatra’s death scene could not be
reached without Iras, Charmian, and the entry of the guard. Indeed, it may well be that the climax of the whole
thing and the best contrast with the Senecanism and the super-Senecanism with which we have had to deal is, “It is
well done, and tting for a princess descended of so many royal kings” (5.02.326-27).
The experience of a shared simplicity is also the essence of the reconciliation scene between Cordelia and Lear, as
it is of Prospero’s repentance at The Tempest 5.01.20: “Mine would, sir, were I human” (Ariel), “And mine shall”
(Prospero). The sharing widens in 200-213 when Gonzalo (who, not Prospero, is the moral center of the play)
bestows a blessing and praises the ways of providence. His comments lead us readily to the most prolonged of
these shared scenes of simplicity, heightened by its being a kind of anagnoresis: the passage 5.03.21-128 in The
Winter’s Tale‘s nal scene. The Pericles anagnoresis in 5.01.101-235 is not so convincing except for the passage
190-97 (“O Helicanus, strike me, honored sir”). But it does have a great deal of the simplicity we are talking about,
and it is shared between father and daughter on stage and with an audience.
The most important point of this paper is to bring out the stylistic sequencing of a persona and consequently we
have been concentrating arti cially on protagonists. More important than the protagonists, however, is the
rhetorical pattern of the play as a whole. This invariably follows the main line of the protagonist’s part. It may, for
example, as in King Lear, The Winter’s Tale, The Tempest, be from complexity to simplicity; as in Othello and Macbeth,
never emerge from the rhetorical prison except in contrasting moments (“the pity of it,” “nobody; I myself,” “He has
no children”). Ophelia’s madness no more relieves the riddle of Hamlet than Lady Macbeth’s sleepwalking
alleviates Macbeth. Horatio’s simple “So Guildenstern and Rosencrantz go to’t” (5.02.56) presents in a ash the
whole problem of Hamlet’s eternal future, a problem not solved by “Good night sweet prince, And ights of angels
sing thee to thy rest!” (359-60) or by Hamlet’s own “Absent thee from felicity a while” (5.02.347). With all that has
gone before, Hamlet can hardly mean the felicity of existlessness, nor is Hamlet any more likely than Faust to be
snatched up to the highest heaven. Yet there is a touch of musical endorsement about these two lines. Coriolanus
proceeds, like King Lear, to a penultimate simplicity, but its ending, unlike that of King Lear, provides a further twist.
Measure for Measure is written as if to crown us when Isabella kneels for Angelo’s life, and her lines on the
Atonement (2.02.73-79) with their musical endorsement seem to promise us that; but instead we are given
something rationally perfunctory. Romeo and Juliet, with the musical sweep of the balcony scene and the aubade
exchange of the rst eleven lines of 3.05, has to decline upon the super-Senecan rhetoric of Romeo’s nal speech.
In Julius Caesar, political satire as it is, we have to content ourselves with a mere few remarks between Brutus and
Lucius which do not reach lyrical height. In Henry IV, Part 1, and Henry IV, Part 2, the Prince (not yet Prince Hamlet)
moves up from his shared amusement with Falstaff to the resolution but not simplicity of kingship; while at the
same time Falstaff, in spite of his insight in Part 1 into the falsity of honour, declines to greater and greater
corruption and less and less awareness of his impending fate in Henry IV, Part 2. The sequencing of Richard II
demonstrates how much more complex and sensitive a play it is than Edward II. Shakespeare has not chosen to
resolve for us whether Richard II moves out of posturing into simplicity—the monologue of 5.05.1-66 does not
make up for everything that has gone before: sixty lines of two posturings lead to two contradictory reactions to
the music he hears; and his nal lines are as much a posture as Caesar’s last.
What is required of the highest dramatic solution is “a condition of utter simplicity, costing not less than
everything”—everything, that is except itself. If we are to look for the cause of this type of dramatic construction
where individual posturing, self-assertion, and self-betrayal are solved or not solved in a shared simplicity, we need
to look to the societies with which even the greatest were produced and at odds, and in which hardly anything

other than ironical comment was possible (the introduction of another world to come, could, once again, make
possible nothing but irony). Other societies have produced different types of literature. In Homer, the gods may
behave like apotheosized feudal lords, and the relation of Odysseus with Athene is hardly that of Christ with his
Father; but beyond all that is a sense of order and justice that Homer succeeds in making real and not ctive or
fantastic. Vergil, with a deep sense of a peaceable agrarian society, had to reconcile singing for that with
celebrating a gross and harsh imperium. Dante, placing his friends and enemies at appropriate points in the
hereafter, could not but give Francesca an affectation of speech reminiscent of the discarded Provençal style—he
would have found it impossible to use Abelard and Heloise. Goethe, constricted in Weimar but with some hopes of
an open America, could nish his ironical Faust, but not his Wilhelm Meister. Cervantes, ranging the styles almost as
variously as Shakespeare himself, produces the nal scene of his great book at Don Quixote’s deathbed; and
Shakespeare himself conforms to the deeper Christianity at the base of his two corrupt contemporary churches by
simply making Prospero’s epilogue a prayer.
The sequencing of personae in the comedies up to Twelfth Night requires a separate paper, in which humour and
courting would play the largest part, and the stress would lie on the complement derived from Arcadianism
instead of on the Senecan strain. In those changed terms, the contrast of affectation with the genuine would
remain the same.
Notes
1. Oxford English Dictionary, 13 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1933, 1961, repr.), 2:281, entry 17.
2. Theophrastus (372-ca. 287 B.C.), Greek philosopher who wrote Charakteres, thirty brief character sketches
outlining moral types, for ethical purposes.
3. “The Characters of the Persons” is a brief character summary of the primary “dramatis personae” in Ben
Jonson’s play Every Man Out of His Humor.
4. Theophrastus, Characteres, 8 vols. (Lyon: Le Preux, 1592); for other works by him see Mark Pattison, Isaac
Casaubon 1559-1614 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1892); cf. also Joseph Hall, Meditations and Vows . . . with Characters of
Virtues and Vices (London: Fetherstone, 1621); also his Virgidemise ca. 1597, satires and character sketches in A.
Davenport, ed., The Collected Poems of Joseph Hall (Liverpool: University Press, 1949), 18-87.
5. Jean de La Bruyère (1645-1696), Les Caractères (1699); it accompanied his translation of Theophrastus’
Charakteres and was written in the Theophrastian style which de ned qualities (e.g., jealousy) and depicted them in
sketches of actual people. La Bruyère commented on the “characteristics” of the age, attempting to reform
behavior and morals.
6. The Tatler was a periodical printed in London from 1709-11 and written by essayists Richard Steele and Joseph
Addison. It satirized manners, society, and ideals. It was succeeded by The Spectator (1711-12), another satirical
periodical written by the same authors.
7. “Humour,” as a dominant trait, derives from the early de nition of “humour” as one of four bodily uids (OED
“humour” entry 1.1.2,2b) that determine “mental disposition, . . . constitutional tendency, . . . mood” (OED “Humour”
entry 2.4,5). Shakespeare’s knowledge of these usages is found in Taming of the Shrew 4.01.209, and Richard III
1.02.227-28.

8. Cf. T. S. Eliot, “Christopher Marlowe” and “Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca,” Elizabethan Essays (New
York: Hasbell, 1964), 21-31, 33-54.
9. Cf. Ben Jonson, Discoveries, Maurice Castelain, ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1906), 104. This is the “oratio imago animi,”
the “language picture of the soul,” or “language as a picture of the soul.” The sentiment is from Apuleius, Florida 2,
The Works of Apuleius (London: Bell, 1893), 374.

Talent and the Individual's Tradition:
History as Art, and Art as Moral Response
Arthur Henry King,
C. Terry Warner
For(e)bearance
In his essay, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” T. S. Eliot said that “not only the best, but the most individual parts
of [the poet’s] work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most
vigorously.”1 The poet’s ancestors are those to whom he is indebted for all that he has inherited—his language, his
sensibility, his outlook, and his standards of conduct. He acknowledges his debt by letting these forebears speak
through his work. Paradoxically, the more freely and fully he allows them to speak—which is to say the less he selfindulgently tries to make his work appear original with him—the more completely his work bears the stamp of his
individuality. Tradition provides discipline; out of the discipline springs the unselfconscious and uncontrived
quality of all good writing, which in this essay we will call “spontaneity.”
Eliot wrote this essay before he was converted to Anglicanism. He thought he was describing a general cultural
phenomenon, which is that a cultural tradition (for example, that of Europe) could liberate the artist who
assimilated it. We agree with Eliot’s thesis, but only if it is taken to its proper conclusion. That conclusion is that
tradition will liberate the artist only if he becomes a guileless and self-forgetful individual, and we believe selfforgetfulness is possible only by yielding one’s heart to God.
Why are assimilation of the tradition and personal self-forgetfulness indispensable qualities of a genuine artist?
Why do we add this to Eliot’s thesis? Because the artist’s talent is more than air and ability that he possesses
naturally. It is also a sensitivity to the ways and heritage of his people; probably without being aware of it he speaks
for them, because he uses the language and images bequeathed to his people by its forebears. So, in signi cant
part, his talent is something entrusted to him by others, and it is just for this reason that using this talent selfservingly is forbidden. If he does (and nonuse, too, is a kind of self-service), what he will produce will be arti cial.
On the other hand, the tradition is given fresh life in and through artists who magnify their talents without selfregard. Nowhere else does literary tradition live. Nowhere but in such artists can a living past be encountered.
Without them, ritual petri es and folk art becomes sentimental or vulgar.
We have inverted the title of Eliot’s essay because we want to express this modi cation of Eliot’s thesis. The
inversion expands the usual connotations of the terms “talent” and “tradition.” It suggests that there is a strong
sense in which talents are fully employed by individuals only when they do not regard them as their own (or simply,
do not regard them), and that there is an equally strong sense in which tradition exists only in the form of
individuals in whom it is reincarnated. We use this word rather than “transmitted” because it suggests that
tradition is not merely transported intact by individuals along the passageway of time, but renewed and
revitalized.
Eliot was thinking of the literary tradition in a way that comprehends the whole of that tradition, including the
writing of philosophy, criticism, drama, social tracts, psychology, and history. What we have to say about the
historian in this essay might be said (with appropriate adjustment of detail) about any practitioner of any literary
art, and this is a point that needs to be kept rmly in mind if our thesis is to be intelligible. For our motivation in
thinking about the subject is not accusatory. We would do ill to write of other people, present or past, as if their

plight were not ours. Indeed, we have keenly felt the moral hazards that beset historians in our own disciplines of
philology and philosophy.
The discipline that must be acquired in order to assimilate one’s tradition is more than an accumulation of
information. In the historian’s case this discipline is a matter of care, in every sense of that word: carefulness in
studying the random residue which past people have left of themselves and caring for them even though they are
no longer with us. Without careful discipline there can be no incarnation of tradition, and without incarnation
there is no individuality.
By de ning the historian’s discipline this way, we want to distinguish it from method. Method can be mastered and
misused. For some practicing historians (philosophers, psychologists, and so forth), this is just what happens; their
method is not simply the thoroughgoing care with which they set out a story of the past. Instead it is an affectation,
a style deliberately adopted with an eye for professional legitimacy and success. In the writing of the disciplined
historian who is absorbed in what is to be done rather than in any social advantage that might accrue from doing it,
there is unmistakable freshness, individuality. On the other hand, the historian who employs method and style for
social recognition’s sake cannot duplicate these results. The reason is, in seeking recognition he is withholding part
of himself from his work, controlling his response as a whole human being to historical situations in favor of what
he thinks is an ideal response of a historian. However he may try to make it “original,” his work will be stylistically
stereotyped. He will produce less than he understands in order to conform to the accepted canons of historical
writing. Method and rigor are necessary for the sort of historical work we want to praise, but not suf cient—just
as the law is honored by all who live the gospel, but not all who live the law honor the gospel. Our subject, then, is
the abuse of method which might be thought of as an academic analogue of self-righteousness. And our thesis is
that those who are in the historian’s profession primarily for themselves will, like the self-righteous, make sounds
of brass.
Until recent years, stylistic anonymity among historians for self-promotional purposes masqueraded as
“objectivity.” But the issue is not an epistemological one about the possibility of telling the past’s story “wie es
eigentlich gewesen ist,” even though historiographers may have thought otherwise for decades. The issue is a
psychological one about the quality of the historian’s motivation. With the breakdown of philosophical positivism
in our century, many historians have disclaimed any profession of objectivity, yet even some of these still assess
one another’s work against (largely tacit) methodological and stylistic norms. It is not the objectivity/subjectivity
axis that should command our ultimate historiographical concern, but the purity-of-heart/impurity axis. The
question is not whether the historian, like other craftsmen, colors what he makes with his own personality, for
inevitably he does. Rather, the question is what sort of colors he gives it. Does he discolor it by harboring selfseeking intentions?
We have no disposition to pick on historians. Philosophers are probably even more self-crippling, because the
modes of philosophical thinking are more explicit, canonized, and coercive than the modes of historical thinking.
For example, many philosophers assume that, except in its most extreme speculative reaches, contemporary logic
de nes not only the standard of one type of discourse among others, but the single type of discourse in which
certain kinds of truths may be stated. Historically, logic was no such standard; instead, it was considered a branch
of rhetoric—and that in fact is what it is. To speak with philosophical precision is to adopt a very narrow register of
human speech in which much that human beings experience cannot be expressed or described. Why would anyone
speak so arti cially? Why would anyone be willing to censor his responses as a whole person in deference to
narrow philosophical canons of expression? Recent work in the rhetoric of scienti c discourse suggests that at
least some of the motives are self-assertion and professional legitimacy, and if there are others, we do not know

them. So philosophers and historians alike make myths when they take themselves too seriously: when they
promote themselves in their work. (Of course, this means not taking themselves seriously enough as individual
human beings—trusting the canons of their discipline more than their own sensibility.)
Believing that a disciplinary method is a mode of knowing rather than a heuristic device for arranging material for
speci c purposes may not be simply an error. It may be a sin. The historian or philosopher who uses his discipline
self-promotionally nds immediate promise of exoneration in the view that the discipline can validate his work
independently of his intentions. He clings to the idea that his social purposes are professionally irrelevant. By this
means, he provides himself with an alibi if his conscience accuses him of seeking his own interest. How can he be
accused of coloring his materials, he insists, when his constant aim is to rid them of coloration? Preoccupation with
technique and method ts Plato’s de nition of sophistry and pinpoints the self-seeking in it: one sends out a highly
controlled signal in order to elicit a highly manipulated response. One can sin in scholarship as anywhere else. It is
wrong in writing to do anything but write what is in us to be written.
Understanding Past People
The problem of understanding people in the past, including their policies and institutions, is only a form of the
problem of understanding people generally. By setting out certain features of our ability to understand our
contemporaries, we may illuminate the claims we are making about historical knowledge. Consider the following
points:
Knowing about people is not knowing them; that is, it is not understanding them. One cannot but withdraw from
other human beings—and thus render them humanly unreal—if one concentrates on what properties they have,
for that construes them as objects. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Buber, Polanyi, and Levinas have all taught us this by
numerous cogent insights. When we know a person, we know more than we can tell; and supposing otherwise is a
mode of pushing that person away. Understanding people, as opposed to knowing about them, comes in the
course of being with them unselfconsciously; it is a residuum of living in a sharing, trusting, and caring community
with them. Hence to observe people in order to know about them rather than to respond unguardedly to them is to
withdraw from the conditions which must obtain if they are to be understood.
Thus, acting as if one is an observing center rather than a person does not mean one is disinterested. Such action is
an apparent self-obliteration in the form of a perceptual and stylistic anonymity which is actually an intense
preoccupation with guarding, vindicating, and advancing the self. It is an intense form of self-assertion.
A historian can live with and understand past people only if he regards the accoutrements of his profession (the
habits, the jargon, the frame of reference, and so forth) as inferior to, and less valuable than, himself as a man and
any man as a man. Only then can he enter with unselfconscious empathy into others’ situations.
The Historian as Tradition Incarnate
Contrast the self-seeking, depersonalizing writer of history with the guileless one. The former imposes
generalizations and theories upon “the data.” The latter expresses patterns of selection in his work that go beyond
what he can deliberately produce or even completely comprehend. These living patterns of selection taken
together are an expression of what he is as one who by historical study has assimilated tradition through his
language, in his interaction with his immediate forebears. This tradition then expresses itself in his unselfconscious
writing and teaching. And therefore what he produces is right. It is not false to what he transforms. When he
speaks or writes it is as if history is nding one expression of its accumulating truth in his responses to that part of

the world which has preceded him. The self-serving historian, on the other hand, stylizes what he comprehends of
the past and thwarts the ow of tradition through him. He is untrue to the living tradition that has enabled him to
become both a person and a historian.
If a historian accepts the gospel, he is adopted; he gains a new ancestry; a fresh heritage becomes active in him. His
open, artless, and fresh way of seeing and speaking about the past will be a correlative, an expression, of the new
person he has become. If purely motivated, he gives the history he has absorbed a spontaneous—that is, an
unguarded and guileless—expression. That kind of expression is wisdom. On the other hand, the self-deceived
historian performs something extraneous to the purpose of the history which had made him what he is, and he is
thereby unfaithful to himself. And if he knows anything about the gospel, he is unfaithful to the Lord. He does not
produce wisdom.
Let us further contrast generalization and wisdom. Generalizations are generally valid for general purposes; they
are not valid for speci c purposes. We may induce a generalization from a number of speci cs, but when we have
done so we nd that it does not completely apply to any of them. Perhaps in natural science it could (or could it?),
but historically it will not. Any generalization to be valid has to be one arising totally from a total speci c situation,
not a generalization inductively arrived at over many instances.
This is where the word “wisdom” comes in: We read history in order to gain the great historian’s wisdom. In him we
encounter a unique historical situation alive in a living, interfusing, and blending individual, the historian. And we
discover in the nature of that unique totality something of the nature of all other unique totalities—something
which cannot be expressed in any list of generalizations, however lengthy. That is why history is an art rather than
a science (we are assuming, we suspect incorrectly, that there are in fact sciences, the essence of which can be
expressed in a theory, i.e., in an adequate and consistent set of generalizations). It is why a ne history, like a
Baucis-and-Philemon pitcher, is inexhaustible (though not unfathomable). There is no essential difference
between the way in which Herodotus and Thucydides use their material and the way in which Aeschylus and
Sophocles use theirs. The Swedish philosopher, Hans Larsson, said in 1892 (in spite of the shadow of Herbert
Spencer) that social scientists should not ignore the fact that literature has given them far more subtle exemplars
of human behavior than they themselves describe. (The converse is also true: When social scientists describe
behavior well, they write literature; Adler is not literature but Freud is, and that is the only reason why Freud is
worth more attention.)
The historian can be true to the history reposited within him only if he endeavors to give it the form that suits the
whole of it, and not merely parts of it. In doing this, he is doing the same thing as someone who makes a poem. He
should from this point of view recognize himself as an artist and realize that his totality of knowledge should be
expressed through a totality of means. The historian who has a style that is true to him will produce history that is
also true to him, and because it is true to him in this naive sense it will have truth in it.
This is a patently different sense of “truth” than is current among many social scientists. It is predicated upon the
view that contact with history is not contact with the past as such but with the historian who embodies the
tradition in his own unique way. The book he writes is only an aspect of what he has achieved in human terms and
cannot be understood apart from that achievement. The historian whose style is true to him will be one in whom
the tradition will have been truly incarnated; style and what we are calling “incarnation” are but aspects of the
same thing. And if the style is wrong, the history written will be wrong. There is no question of the style’s varying
independently of the “facts”—of the style’s being wrong and the “facts” right or of the style being right and the
“facts” wrong. To think otherwise is to have a befuddled—an objectivist—view of factuality. In the light of this

personifying view of truth Gibbon comes off as a great historian, for his style expresses himself. The same can be
said of Thucydides, Herodotus, and Livy; it could not be said of those nineteenth-century historians who were
eager to put rational order onto the material; or of those twentieth-century historians who consider it imperative
to order the material professionally and impersonally. There is never a more signi cant result of the study of
history than the historian himself.
Historical Uniqueness and Moral Universalizability
These three things happen together if they happen at all: the author is self-forgetful, the historical situation is
captured in its uniqueness, and—we have not mentioned this yet—the history written serves as an inexhaustible
fund for moral lessons. Yet it is not didactic in any ordinary sense of that term. Only a history that in the rst
instance tried to abstract out the moral content of a past situation would in the second instance be compelled to
try to reimpose it in the form of cautionary conclusions.
A situation captured in its uniqueness has moral relevance because it is a whole situation like our own situation.
We are free to see it in any of inde nitely many ways, including those most instructive for us. But when the
historical situation is subsumed under a generalization, it is seen in just one way, and we can easily exclude
ourselves from it. Many similarities between that situation and our circumstance are arti cially suppressed. (This
is one of the great lessons of Nietzsche’s doctrine that all events, including the propagation of ideas, have multiple
genealogies.) We let our preoccupation with discrete personal properties and comparisons become a pseudoMosaic alternative to conscience. (Why aren’t we led by everything we see to have a broken heart and contrite
spirit? Certainly it is not because we don’t have ample cause.) But letting the story tell itself in all of the
completeness with which we spontaneously apprehend it is tantamount to a repudiation of this pseudo-Mosaic
context. The reader is left to face up to the whole of the matter—to be impressed by moral dimensions and
standards inherent in the story, dimensions which even the author may not suspect are there.
Take the example of David. David is not just any oriental monarch. He has been chosen by the Lord to be the leader
of Israel. He has shown himself obedient in every particular to the Lord. He has not tried to hasten or evade the
Lord’s plan for him; he has not anticipated the time when he is to take over the kingdom; he has left the shape and
direction of his destiny to the Lord. He spares Saul’s life more than once. He makes his way faultlessly to the
throne. Who else in history ever did that? Only after he has achieved the throne does he fail, and the story of his
failure, down to his last bloody deathbed utterance, is told in more detail than the story of his success. Now to
make the moral point of the story of David other than the way in which Nathan did would be to hide that point.
That is, to impose a super cial moral generalization on the story would be to rob it of its moral applicability to
every reader— its moral universalizability. What Nathan did was to set David a trap by presenting a parable, and
David fell into the trap. The climax of David’s life is Nathan’s statement: “Thou art the man.” This climax is not set
out in detail and the moral point is not put in a proposition: it could not be. We cannot even say that the story
shows the moral point (i.e., the punishment for adultery and murder). That is too cut and dried and limited a
characterization, for the punishment does not “ t the crime”: the crime’s consequences are its punishment—to be
an adulterer is the punishment for adultery. Instead, the history’s moral point pulsates throughout the whole of it,
as through a parable, and cannot be abstracted from it. And we in our own individual and different ways—in ways
apposite to our individual cases—draw the parable’s conclusion—a conclusion which may well differ from what we
may discover upon returning to the story later, after further experiences have altered us. We are allowed to
experience David’s life totally, to sense its emotive tides, to work out the ironical implications of the account. The
inspired historian has produced, in a language of the whole man which uses all the devices of rhetoric (including
juxtaposition), a better biography, a ner account, than any other anywhere. It is written for a spiritually educated

and subtle people. It goes as far as history can go, which is to re-create the story of a past human being in the
terms in which it is lived and valued, which is to say, in predominantly moral terms.
The closest a self-deceiving historian can come to morality is this: “There but for the grace of God go I.” This effort
at self-decontamination is not found in a historian who produces pure history, precisely because his
acknowledgment of impurity has been for him a path to purity. The response of the guileless historian is therefore,
“Lord, have mercy on me, there go I also.” This is what the prophet Nathan, speaking for the Lord, meant when he
said, “Thou art the man.” And for us, in all of the pages of history, there is implicit in every line the unarticulated
reminder: “We are the men.”
Thus does the response of the guileless historian place him in community with the past people he encounters in his
work. He understands them as people. It is remarkable that only as we become more individual, rather than less,
can we live in community with one another. And conversely: Only as we live in and through one another in our
individual uniqueness—the historian taking past people to understand and they taking him to be understood by—is
it possible for us to partake of each other’s strengths and be individually richer for it. Otherwise, our relation to
one another is manipulative: we treat ourselves and each other as replicable—indeed, as artifacts which in our
social interaction with one another we ourselves are continuously producing. For those of us who insulate
ourselves from one another by using each other, even the present is a sort of past, cadaverized, an unbridgeable
distance away; whereas for the pure even the past is present, vivi ed and immediately felt. This is in the spirit not
only of the gospel but of thinkers like Heidegger, who have tried to clear away the intellectual debris from our
modern mentality so that we might receive the revelation from God if only it were to come.
What Shall It Pro t a Man?
It cannot pro t a person to try to be individualistic in his way of perceiving others’ situations or in his way of
writing about them. It is as unpro table as trying to be nonchalant or sincere. One who does not feel exigencies in
his present situation is nonchalant; one who tries to be nonchalant is tense. One who is concentrating wholly on
something other than himself in what he is doing is sincere; one who is trying to be sincere is concentrating on
himself, no matter how hard he pretends he is not. Taking thought to make ourselves or our work be some
particular way or other is in principle self-defeating.
Another reason why it is pro tless to try to be an individual is that taking thought to make ourselves is selfdelimiting. Taking thought for the morrow in any way at all means trying to conform to an anticipated pattern of
self which in principle is too simple to be a self. The more we conform to that pattern, the more we make of
ourselves not an individual but rather a replicable artifact—our own artifact. And the work we produce is also too
simple to be the work of the self, for behind it was the motivation to produce that which will re ect a character too
simple to be a self.
A third reason why we cannot by taking thought add a cubit to our stature as historians: By trying to conform
ourselves to a replicable model of what a historian should be we block our own creativity. How? Taking thought for
the morrow means substituting an imagined tomorrow for the one that is really going to be there. And as we do
not know the one that is really going to be there, we prepare ourselves for a number of hypothetical tomorrows
that will never come. We do this instead of being ready, by merely being ourselves, for any tomorrow that will
come. When we wake up in the morning, we don’t readily pick up the thread of the day that awaits us, for we have
determined in advance where it will be, and therefore we do not see where it really is. Alas for Benjamin Franklin,
planning his day at 5:00 A.M., how he will manipulate various Philadelphians! He must compulsively and

obsessively try to extrude many threads, to manipulate many clues to the labyrinth in order to convince himself
that he is on the right track. And Franklin’s kind of planning for the future is simply the mirror image of the selfserving historian’s planning for the past. The generalizations the historian has convinced himself are the right
guidelines for interpreting history preclude him from discovering new patterns in the history he encounters; he is
only able to gather more details.
Here is a fourth reason why writing the kind of history we have suggested is not something a person could possibly
set out to do: To try to get for ourselves in any fashion is to be anxious over the treasure we seek, and to be thus
anxious is to forfeit the freedom and spontaneity or openness necessary for a total response to a total situation.
That is a message of W. H. Auden’s poem, “The Bard.”
He was their servant—some say he was blind— And moved among their faces and their things; Their
feeling gathered in him like a wind And sang: they cried—’It is a God that sings’—
And worshipped him and set him up apart And made him vain till he mistook for song The little tremors of
his mind and heart At each domestic wrong.
Songs came no more: he had to make them. With what precision was each strophe planned. He hugged his
sorrow like a plot of land, And walked like an assassin through the town, And looked at men and did not
like them, But trembled if one passed him with a frown.2
The moment we start to care about succeeding we forfeit every possibility of it.
Auden’s bard was, to begin with, a servant; later, a slave. At rst he did not regard himself as being original. He did
not repeat himself at all. Instead he expressed what came to him to be expressed and thus passed on an oral
tradition. Later, he insisted on his originality and individuality and suffocated his creativity. In the rst phase he
was a classicist; in the second, a romantic. A Milton landscape is a characteristic landscape—it is a typical
landscape; yet at the same time it is Milton’s landscape. He did not try to make it his: it is his because in looking in
another direction than himself he did not obstruct the expression of his personality in and through it. It is only the
inferior artist who feels a need to make a highly individual response in order to be able to do something original,
new, and different. The result is strained. The result is precious. The result, ironically, is replicable: the original of
the piece is already a stereotype. For his part, the classicist is never concerned with individuality for its own sake.
He is concerned with tradition. Were we living in 1798 and af icted with tremors of insecurity about whether
what we were writing would be regarded as individual, we might take exception to this statement, because our
contemporaries would be interpreting the tradition as a means of throttling individuality. But the truth is that
tradition can liberate the person who interacts with it.
Almost any moderately intelligent human being could produce something highly individual and profound if he took
no thought for what was in it for him, provided he had assimilated a good deal of the tradition. The old statement
that everyone has at least one book in him is relevant here; and, indeed, we have had occasional examples in
English literature of a peculiar pellucidity appearing just once. John Woolman’s Journal is an example. Compare it
with Franklin’s Autobiography. The inadequacy and arrogance of Franklin resemble the explanations of the knights
in Eliot’s Murder in the Cathedral. They are murderers who rationally explain away their act. (Whatever books there
may have been in Franklin, he murdered them.) It is not beside the point that in creating the rationalizing knights
Eliot was satirizing Shaw. Shaw’s plays are appealing to many, for they offer an easy clarity, and (like many

psychiatrists and psychotherapists and like Eliot’s knights) a facile—a reasonable—mode of explaining away
personal guilt. The witch doctor, the advertiser, and the politician make similar offers—reasonable offers.
These offers are quackery. An essential feature of this kind of quackery is its respectability. The offers come in the
guise of a virtuous practice to be followed, an approved technique or method, with all of the half-suspected
quasitheory shared by the people who endorse it. The quacks rail at historicism and point to the history Hitler
wrote as a misuse of history. That is a way of establishing their respectability by comparison. Their doctrine is
almost irresistible when made so respectable—so decently indecent. From that point they can perpetrate
immoralities in an atmosphere of legitimacy, as in the contemporary theater where lewdness frolics on the stage
without being condemned as such because, besides being immoral, it is also dishonest about what it is. Was not
Hitler partly seduced by the wrong kind of history that he read?
For a person to be a historian—a genuine historian—is for him cheerfully to run the risk that he may never be
acknowledged as such. He will also have to concede in advance that he himself may discover what he has had to
say after, rather than before, he writes his words. He will draw his identity at a source different from the well of his
peers’ opinions.
Enthusiasm
We have been advocating what used to be called “enthusiasm.” Contrary to what some would have us believe,
enthusiasm has nothing to do with romanticism; and if they think it historically has nothing to do with classicism, it
is because they tend not to consider the classicists, like Milton and Dante, who were enthusiastic Christians.
We acknowledge that nothing could be more alien to the intellectualist ideal of calculated impersonality. It is true
that this ideal seems not altogether unwarranted, for historical instances of enthusiasm have been justi ably
attacked. There is this danger in enthusiasm, that impure people, like Hitler, will yield to an impure spirit. Our
thesis in this paper is that by the same token, there is an equally horrifying danger in the repudiation of enthusiasm
—namely, in the protection which some erect against novelty and spontaneity in themselves—a disguised form of
demonism in which seizure by the Holy Spirit is precisely what is resisted. The one alternative to being possessed
by some sort of devil is to yield to—voluntarily to let ourselves be taken over by—God’s Spirit. The depersonalizing
“wisdom” of the age, like the so-called wisdom of ages generally, will when unmasked be seen to be only the selfprotective smoke screen of a professional clique so fearful of self-revelation through their productions that they
have yielded themselves up proudly to the demon of reasonableness.
What was to be the value of the long looked forward to, Long hoped for calm, the autumnal serenity And
the wisdom of age? Had they deceived us Or deceived themselves, the quiet-voiced elders, Bequeathing
us merely a receipt for deceit? The serenity only a deliberate hebetude, The wisdom only the knowledge
of dead secrets Useless in the darkness into which they peered Or from which they turned their eyes.
There is, it seems to us, At best, only a limited value In the knowledge derived from experience. The
knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsi es, For the pattern is new in every moment And every moment is a
new and shocking Valuation of all we have been. We are only undeceived Of that which, deceiving, could
no longer harm. In the middle, not only in the middle of the way But all the way, in a dark wood, in a
bramble, On the edge of a grimpen, where is no secure foothold, And menaced by monsters, fancy lights,
Risking enchantment. Do not let me hear Of the wisdom of old men, but rather of their folly, Their fear of
fear and frenzy, their fear of possession, Of belonging to another, or to others, or to God. The only wisdom
we can hope to acquire Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless. —T. S. Eliot, “East Coker”3

If you ask us to point to a historian who represents much of what we say, we can readily do it: Hugh Nibley, of
whom we thought as we wrote. Who among us has been more completely absorbed in peoples of the past and less
occupied with impressing anyone with his style? Who has expressed his own personality so well, with so little
thought for it? Who has better inspired us to care about and learn from the vast population of historical souls who
have intrigued and delighted him over the years? And he has done this not by exhortation but by his example of
wonder and absorption in his constant learning and his gracious acts of sharing it with us.
Notes
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The Challenge of Historical Consciousness:
Mormon History and the Encounter with Secular Modernity
Louis Midgley
Martin E. Marty, distinguished Professor of the History of Modern Christianity at the University of Chicago, has
made an important contribution to the understanding of “the crisis in Mormon historiography.”1 I will set forth his
arguments and examine their soundness. I will also show that on most issues this most esteemed American church
historian is close to the position I wish to advance, and that his stance is more re ned and better grounded than
that taken by historians who fashion naturalistic explanations of the Book of Mormon and Joseph Smith’s
prophetic claims. Marty’s analysis of what is currently being discussed by Mormon historians constitutes both a
clari cation of key issues upon which there has been some confusion, and a sound starting point for further
clari cation.
In spite of the narrow focus of Marty’s essay, he manages to describe a quandary of faith among Mormon
historians that is older than the two decades in which the writing of Mormon history has become professionalized.
The crisis which he describes, which he seems to see as rather recent, has actually been unfolding for half a
century. The rst signs of an exigency over the Mormon past reached the attention of the Saints with the
publication in 1945 of No Man Knows My History, Fawn M. Brodie’s notorious biography of Joseph Smith,2 which
began as an attack on the Book of Mormon,3 and eventually constituted a full-scale naturalistic explanation of
Joseph Smith’s prophetic claims. Set over against such efforts were various essays by Hugh Nibley, who after
1948 became the primary intellectual champion of the truth of the Book of Mormon, including both its message
and historical authenticity, and also for the related prophetic claims of Joseph Smith. His understanding of the
restored gospel manifests a disdain for secular fundamentalism, an ideology which, by the end of World War II,
had decoyed almost an entire generation of Latter-day Saint intellectuals, as well as an aversion to the sentimental
sectarian fundamentalism found in much American conservative religiosity.4
The current spate of Revisionist accounts,5 and the ensuing discussion of their implications and coherence, which
indicate for Marty a “crisis in Mormon historiography,” are not always as forthright or elegant as the work of earlier
internal dissenters like Brodie or Dale L. Morgan.6 Still, in subtle ways these accounts entail the transformation of
Latter-day Saint faith by the use of naturalistic terms and categories to interpret the Mormon foundational texts
and events. And they spring from a desire to reach an accommodation with modernity, and especially with
elements of secular fundamentalism—the naturalistic ideology which has dominated the understanding of divine
things in academic circles since the Enlightenment.7 The historiographical crisis which Marty examines has only
recently drawn serious attention from those either inside or outside the Mormon community,8 even though it is
clearly rooted in older struggles, and it somewhat resembles an older debate that has taken place in Christian and
Jewish communities. Though the details of those older debates are not immediately relevant to Marty’s analysis of
“the crisis of Mormon historiography,” it seems to me that what is at stake in the current debate is nothing less
than the content and even the possibility of faith as Latter-day Saints have known it. I wish to show that the
founding events and texts—Joseph Smith’s prophetic claims and the Book of Mormon—are now being discussed
and debated in an academic arena in which a struggle is being waged for the control of the Mormon past, and that
this struggle is central to the faith. To see why this is so and to grasp exactly what is at stake, I will now turn to
Marty’s analysis.

Scandal, Controversy, and Crisis
Professor Marty understands Mormon faith to be characterized by a “thoroughly historical mode and mold”9 that
opens it to both inquiry and controversy. Joseph Smith told a strange story. Was it the truth? If he was the victim of
illusion or charlatanry and his message false, ultimately we have nothing that places us in touch with deity. But if he
told the truth, and if the foundational texts like the Book of Mormon are genuine, then we have something. History
is therefore the arena in which the truth claims of the restored gospel have been contested. Those who have
received the Book of Mormon and the story of Joseph Smith’s prophetic gifts have found therein the grounds for
faith in God. Others do not receive the message, and, according to Marty, “there have been Mormons who left the
faith because their view of the historical events which gave shape to it no longer permitted them to sustain it.”10
The Book of Mormon and Joseph Smith’s story are clearly a stumbling block, but they also furnish the grounds for
a distinctive community of memory and faith.
As the writing of Mormon history in the last two decades has moved from cottage to academic industry, Marty
believes that the discussion of the historical foundations of faith has grown in both intensity and urgency11 to the
point where it has now reached a critical stage. Some of the questions now being debated concern the very core of
the faith. “Mormon thought is experiencing a crisis comparable to but more profound than that which Roman
Catholicism recognized around the time of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65).”12 The Catholic crisis was
dogmatic; the Mormon agitation is historical in the sense that it involves the understanding of the historical
foundations of the faith.13
The reason for the crisis of faith among some Mormon historians, according to Marty, is that a “faith attached to or
mediated through historical events has always had some dimensions of an ‘offense’ or ‘scandal’ to the insider just
as it has been only that to the outsider who despises.”14 Some nd unseemly the account of Joseph Smith’s
prophetic gifts, visits with angels, the Book of Mormon and other revelations. But why should the ferment now
reach inside the community and touch the faith of some intellectuals? It was inevitable, according to Marty, since
the Mormon faith is thoroughly historical in “mode and mold,”15 that this kind of crisis would overtake some Saints
as they confront their past under the impact of the assumptions at work behind some elements of secular culture.
The primary source of the present crisis of faith is the appropriation by some historians of competing or con icting
ideologies that began to dominate the thinking of educated people beginning with the Enlightenment.16 The crisis
is rooted in con ict between the substance of Mormon faith, especially the prophetic claims upon which it rests,
and certain of the dominant ideas found in the secular culture. Prophetic claims appear questionable, if not absurd,
from the perspective of secular modernity, which also provides the ideological grounds for both rival explanations
of the faith, and competing secular accounts of the meaning of life.
Marty maintains that the current crisis centers on the attempts of certain Latter-day Saint historians to assess the
historical foundations of the faith in the light of categories and assumptions borrowed from the larger culture.
Naturalistic or secular explanations may compete with the content of faith and may also provide intellectual
justi cations for unbelief. The crisis is not generated by the discovery or publication of texts; new texts only
complicate or enhance the picture of the Mormon past. The dif culties arise in the way texts are to be understood,
and this always involves assumptions brought to the task by the historian. The crisis is, therefore, not a dif culty
forced on Latter-day Saint historians by some dramatic discovery that suddenly unravels the truth claims of the
faith. Marty describes the dif culty confronting Mormon historians as a crisis of understanding, and hence of faith,
and not of history as such.17

Marty correctly rejects as “trivial the question of whether the faith is threatened by the revelation of human
shortcomings” of the Mormon people or its leaders.18 This question raises public relations and pedagogical issues,
or what he calls “political embarrassments” or merely “borderline religious issues.”19 As important as such issues
may appear to be, “intellectually these are not of much interest.” Marty attempts to “cut through all the peripheral
issues”20 that plague the discussion of the history of Mormon things in order to address what is really at stake. He
shows that the crisis centers on the way the founding events are to be understood—it is not a crisis brought on by
the dazzling refutation of something essential to the faith, though it centers on the understanding of Joseph
Smith’s gifts, special revelations, and the Book of Mormon.
The substance of the current discussion is traced by Marty to the impact on Mormon historians of certain of the
dominant ideas of the larger culture. He holds that both the content as well as the possibility of faith are linked to
the way the past is understood. He correctly insists that “if the beginning . . . , the First Vision and the Book of
Mormon, can survive the crisis, then the rest of the promenade follows and nothing that happens in it can really
detract from the miracle of the whole. If the rst steps do not survive, there can be only antiquarian, not fateful or
faith-full interest in the rest of the story.”21 This is a clear statement of the decisive issue in the current
controversy generated by fashioning new naturalistic (or secular) understandings on the crucial foundations of
Mormon things.
The Acids of Modernity
Marty grants that there has been no proof that Joseph Smith was a fraud or the victim of an illusion or delusion or
that the Book of Mormon is ction;22 there is only a crisis of faith. The roots of this crisis he traces to ideologies
that began corroding Protestant and Roman Catholic piety with the Enlightenment. According to Marty, the
challenges to the historical foundations of the faith of the Saints are analogous to those corroding Christian and
Jewish faith. In other essays, he describes the challenges to Christian faith from “modernity,”23 a term commonly
used to describe a cluster of related, though also competing, secular ideologies that distinguish the Modern from
the Pre-Modern world.24 He uses the expression “acids of modernity”25 to describe “the process of corrosion
which affected the vessel of apostolicity.”26 Modernity yields scientism—a new secular religion of science, as well
as the ideologies that dislodge God from history and the world generally. Modernity eventually comes to full
fruition in the writings of Marx, Nietzsche, Darwin, and Freud—the so-called “God-Killers.”27
Modernity includes the new understandings of history that challenged the historical foundations of biblical faith,
as well as the rise of an historical consciousness which plunged all elements of culture into a sea of relativity. The
source of the malaise, instead of being religion within the limits of reason alone that challenges the claims of
historically grounded and mediated faith, becomes the historicist belief in the relativity of all positions, especially
those resting on special revelations, and even of those grounded in unaided human reason. It is not that the truths
of history cannot be demonstrated; even that understanding of truth, from the perspective of historicism, is itself
only a part of the perpetual ux of ideas in history.28
The “crisis of historical consciousness” that Marty believes has “cut to the marrow in the Protestant body of
thoughtful scholars in Western Europe in the nineteenth century”29 continues to trouble the Christian world. The
crisis is analogous to the one which the Saints are now facing as they emerge from a prere ective naiveté about
their past. One of the chief sources of the crisis is a remnant of Enlightenment-grounded fear of superstition. The
assault on Christian piety also came from ideologies linked to an historical consciousness which began “to

relativize Christian distinctiveness in the face of other ways.”30 Modernity thus includes the Romantic reaction to
the Enlightenment, commonly known as historicism.
Modernity includes other ideologies that have found their way into the hearts and minds of historians: “In the
nineteenth century,” according to Marty, “the age of modern critical history, the crisis of historical consciousness
became intense and drastic. Now no events, experiences, traces, or texts were exempt from scrutiny by historians
who believed they could be value-free, dispassionate. Today, of course, no one sees them as being successful in
their search. They were tainted by radical Hegelian dialectics, neo-Kantian rigorisms, or the biases of a positivism
that thought it could be unbiased.”31 All this now seems naive, but it was once “highly successful at destroying the
primitive naiveté among those who read them seriously.”32 Marty traces the crisis among Mormon historians to
ideologies with roots going back to the Enlightenment: to con dence in reason and fear of superstition, to naive
positivist notions of historical objectivity, to the historicist insistence on the relativity and hence equality of all
faith or of all religions. But these ideologies have now fallen on hard times. Should these intellectual fashions of the
past serve as the foundation for the understanding of the Mormon past? On that issue he is silent.
Elsewhere, Marty both describes and expresses apprehension about the wanton capitulation of believers to the
fashions of modernity. He has made the delicious irony of the various encounters between the faithful and
modernity the core of his interpretation of American religiosity. He also argues persuasively that Christian faith,
whatever its content and contours, has a legitimate place in the doing of history.33 The corrosive effects of
modernity have an impact on diverse types of religiosity in different ways. The particular “aspect of modernity”
that has generated the current crisis of faith among some Mormon historians “has to do with the challenge of
modern historical consciousness and criticism,” which, he maintains, is rooted in what he calls “the burden of
history” that “confronts Mormons most directly.”34
Christians who confronted the corrosive ideologies of the nineteenth century responded in various ways. Marty
describes the range of these responses. “Some lost faith,” he explains, as they felt the pull of what was earlier
described as a secular fundamentalism. While others, according to Marty, found ways of af rming their faith in
some seemingly more satisfactory manner; others transformed the content of faith to accommodate secular
ideological pressures, and some turned to “defensive fundamentalisms,”35 which were earlier labelled sectarian
fundamentalism. Yet, when Marty examines the impact of modernity on Mormon historians, he does not
acknowledge the same range of responses.36 His account would have been more balanced and complete—more
coherent—if he had examined the full range of responses to the crisis of faith among Mormon historians. These, as
will be shown, have issued as dissent and denial, or loss of faith, or radical alterations to the content of faith to
accommodate certain competing ideologies in revisionist accounts. But in some notable cases it has yielded more
adequate accounts of the Mormon faith and its history.37 Unfortunately, Marty neglects to carry through on the
range of alternatives set forth in his analogy.
The crisis, Marty realizes, does not involve secondary or peripheral issues38 like polygamy or the faults of the
Saints, or their leaders. His discussion is focused on “generative issues.”39 The primary question concerns the
veracity of Joseph Smith’s “theophanies” and “revelations.” Joseph’s epiphanies—the prophetic charisms, visits
with angels, and the seer stones, are linked to the founding revelation—the Book of Mormon. These work together
to constitute “a single base for Mormon history. When historians call into question both the process and the
product, they come to or stand on holy ground.”40 If the revelations do not survive “there can be only antiquarian,
not fateful or faith-full interest in the rest of the story.”41 The primary issue becomes a combination of two related

questions: Was Joseph Smith a genuine seer and prophet, and is the Book of Mormon true? If either one or the
other is true, because both are linked, the truth of the other is thereby warranted. Marty insists that the primary
questions must be answered in the af rmative for there to be more than antiquarian curiosity concerning the
Mormon past. Hence a fateful response to the Mormon past depends upon those founding events being simply
true. “To say ‘prophet’ made one a Saint” and to deny or reject the prophetic claims “is precisely what made one
leave Mormonism or never convert in the rst place.”42
Fashioning a More Socially Acceptable Past
The “stark prophet/fraud polarity”43 troubles Marty. Asking if Joseph Smith was a genuine prophet exerts a
chilling effect on discussions between believers and sympathetic unbelievers, and it seems unlikely that it is a
question that can be resolved to the satisfaction of everyone. In any case, most historians do not wish to
concentrate on that particular question. Perhaps a different way of formulating the fundamental question might
facilitate attention to secondary issues with which historians, especially those in the grasp of modernity, would feel
somewhat more comfortable. Marty struggles to move outside of or “beyond the prophet/fraud issue addressed
to generative Mormon events.”44 But he also explains why Joseph Smith’s claims are such that they demand either
a prophet or a not-prophet answer. When dealing with the generative events, Marty senses that one cannot have
it both ways.
Yet, Marty strives to avoid the old prophet/fraud dialectic, while still addressing Joseph Smith’s prophetic claims.
He has proposed two ways to do this. First, historians might simply bracket or suspend the question of whether
Joseph Smith was a genuine prophet and the Book of Mormon an authentic ancient history. They could do so in
order to deal with what Marty calls “a new range of questions,” which include: “what sort of people are these
people [who believe such things], what sort of faith is this faith, what sort of prophet with what sort of theophany
and revelation was Joseph Smith?”45 The primary question can be bracketed in order to inquire into secondary
questions. But whether it is possible to deal with those “other questions” without an implicit answer on the
primary issue coming into play has not been discussed, let alone settled.46
Marty also holds that it is unlikely that historians are going to disprove Joseph Smith’s prophetic claims. They “may
nd it possible to prove to their own satisfaction that Smith was a fraud,”47 but may have dif culty convincing
others that they have succeeded. In any case, “the issue of fraud, hoax, or charlatanry simply need not, does not,
preoccupy the historical profession most of the time,”48 but that is not to say that it does not occupy the attention
of historians some of the time, or that the opinions historians form on the truth of Joseph Smith’s prophetic claims
do not wield a subtle in uence on answers to the questions that preoccupy them most of the time. Marty admits
that those historians who attempt to bracket the question of the truth of Joseph Smith’s claims are still “nagged or
tantalized”49 by it. The answer to the question of whether Joseph Smith was a genuine prophet and the Book of
Mormon true may in uence if not control what they make of the rest.
The second way around the question of the truth of Joseph Smith’s prophetic claims has been fashioned by some
Latter-day Saint historians who have started asking “more radical questions than before. They had to move
through history and interpretation toward a ‘second naiveté’ which made possible transformed belief and
persistent identi cation with the people. They brought new instruments to their inquiry into Mormon origins.”50
Marty grants that these historians, no doubt, have achieved a “transformed belief” through their
“interpretation.”51 The product of such transformations could well be called revisionist history. For them the

historical events which shaped their faith no longer sustain it, and yet some “remained with the Mormon people”
for various reasons. They have, he feels, “made their own adjustment.”52 Hence some Mormon historians have
experienced the corrosive power of the ideological acids of modernity, but they still desire “persistent
identi cation with the people” of their own faith.53
“They brought new instruments to their inquiry into Mormon origins,”54 and instead of charging Joseph Smith
with fraud, pictured him as a sincere though superstitious rustic with a genius for expressing the religious
concerns of his age. He was a mystic, a magician, a myth-maker who eventually managed to found a new religious
tradition. The new revised standard version differs from the old standard version in that it does not accuse Joseph
Smith of fraud or deceit, as did the line of critics running from Alexander Campbell through Fawn Brodie and Dale
Morgan. Instead, the revised standard version sees in Joseph Smith an inventive, con icted, dissociative, sincerely
superstitious scryer or magus. This is, of course, one possible way around the “prophet/fraud dialectic.”55 But the
revised standard version ends up denying the historical foundations of the faith, and with them it also
compromises Joseph Smith’s prophetic claims—there can be no equivocation on that issue. To begin to understand
the foundations as essentially mystical,56 mythical,57 or magical58 is to deny that they are simply true. Why is that
so?
Abraham Joshua Heschel, from the Hasidic tradition, has examined the range of possible explanations of special
revelations. For Heschel, one who confronts the core message of the Bible is presented with certain claims. “The
problem concerning us most is whether revelation has ever taken place,” and again, “Is revelation a fact? Did it
actually take place?”59 Heschel nds that “there are only three ways of judging the prophets: they [a] told the
truth, [b] deliberately invented a tale, or [c] were victims of an illusion. In other words, a revelation is either a fact
or the product of insanity, self-delusion, or a pedagogical invention, the product of a mental confusion, or wishful
thinking [that is, an outgrowth of ‘the spirit of the age’] or a subconscious activity.”60 The so-called “New Mormon
History,” in its secularist mode,61 entertains or embraces one or more of these alternatives but without always
carefully considering whether they are inimical to a faith-full response to the Mormon past.
Marty describes three approaches to religious history that can be used to explain the Mormon past that go
“beyond the prophet/fraud issue [and that can be] addressed to generative Mormon events.”62 The rst approach
includes what he calls “consciousness” studies or psychological explanations of Joseph Smith that would “make
plausible the prophethood and throw light on prophetic character.”63 Both Klaus J. Hansen and Lawrence Foster
have turned to psychological explanations after atly rejecting the Book of Mormon and Joseph Smith’s prophetic
claims.64 The second approach is most attractively presented by Jan Shipps. She strives to avoid the question of
whether Joseph Smith was a genuine prophet. She believes, according to Marty, that the Book of Mormon and
Joseph Smith’s story are “best understood in the context of his sequential assumptions of positions/roles that
allowed the Saints to recover a usable past” by linking the Saints with ancient and true Israel through mythical
histories, that is, through what is essentially ction—the Book of Mormon—which Joseph Smith either knowingly
or unknowingly fabricated. “That was his religious function and achievement.”65
Shipps holds that “as far as history is concerned, the question of whether Smith was prophet or fraud is not
particularly important.”66 But to make that question seem unimportant, for historians, is not the way to suspend
unbelief in order to enter into understanding, or to bracket questions about truth. Obviously it is not important
whether Joseph Smith was a genuine prophet in the history that is done by one with only an antiquarian curiosity

about Mormon things. Nor does it make a difference whether the Book of Mormon is true or whether Joseph was
a genuine prophet from an essentially historicist perspective.67 Though her recent book is insightful, especially
about the place of the Book of Mormon in the faith of the Saints, and she approaches her subject matter with
sympathy, Shipps does not manage to suspend unbelief; she merely makes questions of truth seem irrelevant to
her questions. Her approach does not genuinely allow the possibility that the Book of Mormon is simply true.
But, of course, from the point of view of the believer or potential believer the question of whether Joseph was a
genuine prophet and whether the Book of Mormon is true makes all the difference in the world. Shipps correctly
insists that the Saints cannot nally prove that the Book of Mormon is true or that Joseph Smith was a prophet.
From that she wrongly concludes that the Book of Mormon “has never lent itself to the same process of
veri cation that historians use to verify ordinary accounts of what happened in the past. The historicity of the
Book of Mormon has been asserted through demonstrations that ancient concepts, practices, doctrines, and rituals
are present in the work.” However, she claims that “such demonstrations point, nally, only to plausibility. Proof is a
different matter.”68 Historians, from her point of view, provide proofs, that is, those who are objective (and not
mere apologists for the “myths” of faith) deal in proofs and not just plausibilities; they may seek “intellectual
veri cation” and try to know “what really happened.”69 On this issue she is simply wrong, for plausibility is about as
good as one might expect from any historical account or explanation. But from her vantage point, real historians
tell us what really happened in the past by providing proofs, while believers are seen as in thrall to a mythical or
ctional past which apologists for the faith can render only plausible.70
The Question of the Integrity of Faith
Marty does not examine the background assumptions at work behind the history done by Hansen, Hill, Foster and
Shipps. Instead, he merely bestows “integrity” on both the radical mythological and psychological accounts of
Mormon foundational texts and events. But he also admits that such accounts have obviously “transformed
belief.”71 Both what is believed and the belief itself have been radically altered when the story of Lehi and his
people is understood as ctional and the messenger with the plates transformed into merely crude magic,72 or
into a product of a dream of surcease of a troubled rustic with the urge to prophesy, or into an expression of
mysticism, or when the message or teachings of the Book of Mormon are seen as Joseph Smith’s own imaginative
effort to deal with sectarian controversies in his own time through expansions on various theological themes in
biblical fashion.
Marty’s “two integrities” identify rst, the integrity of the faith that a child might have (or an entirely unre ective
adult) and, second, the integrity of one whose faith has survived an encounter with ideas in the outside world
which compete with the content of faith.73 This more mature faith—Marty’s “second naiveté”—has faced and
overcome doubts brought on by the confrontation with the secular fundamentalism of modernity. The crisis he
depicts is the turning point in which either the desire for faith or the presence of faith, or both, eventually
disappear in a loss or denial of faith, or are af rmed in a more complete and mature faith. When the soul of the
troubled one is healed of unbelief by a new and deeper af rmation of faith, one could speak of a new secondary
integrity. But such an integrity cannot exist if the essential grounds and content of faith are compromised. In such
a case there would be no genuine faith, but only denial or loss of faith or perhaps what Marty calls a “transformed
belief” in which an alien content has taken the place of faith. This has to be the reason Marty holds that the
“generative events” (the Book of Mormon and the special revelations owing from the prophetic gifts) must
survive for there to be a “fateful or faith-full” response to the Mormon past. “If the rst steps do not survive, there

can be only antiquarian, not fateful or faith-full interest in the rest of the story.”74 His “two integrities” identify a
condition of soundness of faith that stands on either side of the crisis of faith. The crisis is clearly centered in the
heart and mind of those charmed as well as troubled by modernity.
A puzzling thing about Marty’s essay is the attention he gives to the work of Shipps and Foster. Neither is a Latterday Saint, and neither entertains the possibility that the Book of Mormon is authentic history. Standing outside the
faith, they are at their best when they ask, for example, how the Book of Mormon functions in the life of believers.
From their perspective the Book of Mormon is ction, or what Shipps calls “myth,” and not a genuine historical
reality. And one would expect no more from even a sympathetic outsider. But why should Marty wish to draw
attention to their work? Has either Shipps or Foster really fashioned ways in which troubled Latter-day Saint
historians might resolve their own crisis of faith? Presumably, from Marty’s perspective, they have. Yet, at the
same time, he seems to move beyond, and perhaps even to dismiss, their approaches in favor of another way of
understanding and doing history.
Shipps did not invent her account of a “usable Mormon past”—she borrowed the outlines from Marvin S. Hill. She
drew upon his opinion that there is a kind of middle ground somewhere between genuine prophet and fraud.
Presumably such a stance would somehow avoid the old quarrel over the truth of the Mormon faith. Hill provided
Shipps with a seemingly scholarly Latter-day Saint peg upon which to hang her new explanation of “Mormonism.”
She has, however, moved away from her earlier claim that Joseph Smith was a typical mystic and the Book of
Mormon a typical mystical text—the explanations with which she began her own career; she now holds that he
began as a magician and, eventually, also became a powerful myth-maker.75
Hill has tried to work out an explanation of the story of the Book of Mormon and an account of Joseph Smith’s
prophetic claims that would nd room somewhere between the prophet or fraud alternatives.76 His argument
runs as follows:
In attempting a psychological explanation of Smith rather than that of daring deception, the mature
Brodie seems to be telling us that her old interpretation was too simple. Perhaps what Brodie may have
recognized at last is that her original interpretation perceived Joseph Smith in falacious [sic] terms, as
either prophet in the traditional Mormon sense or else as a faker. Her original thesis opens considerable
room for speculation because its either-or alternatives were precisely the same as those of the early
Mormon apologist and missionary, Orson Pratt.77
Fawn Brodie thought that the key to Joseph Smith was the Book of Mormon.78 Once one determined that the
Book of Mormon was ction, the rest involved working out a plausible explanation of how and why Joseph made it
up. Brodie played with a number of different explanations for the Mormon imposture. In 1959, Hill seems to side
with an explanation that he labeled the “Smith hypothesis” that comes out against the view that the Book of
Mormon is an authentic history. In setting forth the idea that the Book of Mormon was Joseph Smith’s romantic
ction, Hill attempted to discredit the work of Hugh Nibley on the Book of Mormon.79 Hill’s version of the “Smith
hypothesis” was a sketchy modi cation of the account already worked out by Fawn Brodie in No Man Knows My
History. Following a line of explanations that began with Alexander Campbell,80 she tried to show that Joseph
Smith’s claims were fraudulent—her “Joseph” began with a tale which only later took on the trappings of religion.
Hill has striven to locate what he called in 1974 a “broad, promising middle ground” between the traditional
alternatives of genuine prophet or faker-fraud.81 Hill’s account, like that of Shipps, rests on the assumption that

Mormon things must be explained in “naturalistic terms.”82 When that is done, prophetic claims are clearly made
to t within the category of delusion or illusion—Morgan and Brodie were at least clear on that issue. Needless to
say, such a one may, according to Marty, desire “a personal identi cation with the people.”83 But such history will
necessarily compete at crucial points with both the grounds and categories of faith.
In subsequent essays, Hill has elaborated his thesis in such a way that he could distinguish it from certain details in
Brodie’s accounts. He stresses Joseph’s sincerity as well as his superstitious (or mystical and magical) religiosity.
Joseph’s “religion” was the product of elements common in his culture, his religiosity was the product of his
attempt to provide surcease for stresses in his environment. Hill attributes Joseph Smith’s story of visits with
heavenly messengers and the resulting revelations (including the Book of Mormon) to superstition, sincere
confusions, and later embellishments of youthful half-forgotten dreams; it was all a product of mysticism, magic,
and myth rather than gross imposture, deception, or charlatanry. That Joseph was both sincere and “religious” in
his illusion or delusion seems to constitute Hill’s middle ground between genuine prophet and faker or conscious
fraud. Shipps has appropriated some of Hill’s position on these issues, but she goes further in the direction of a
mythological rather than a psychological-environmental explanation. One can, of course, fashion explanations of
the Book of Mormon and of Joseph Smith’s prophetic claims that render them false without picturing them as
instances of conscious deception and fraud and, in that way, work around the “prophet/fraud dialectic,”84 as Marty
calls it. But the prophetic claims are such that they present the believer and unbeliever alike with either a prophet
or not-prophet alternative.
Until recently, the standard “gentile” explanation of the beginnings of Mormonism was that Joseph Smith was a
conscious or intentional fraud—his was a “deliberately invented . . . tale,” to use Heschel’s language. Joseph Smith is
pictured in the revised standard version as a sincerely religious victim “of an illusion”85 that was put upon him by
his crude magic-saturated, rustic, and deeply superstitious environment. Perhaps he was confused, caught up in
the spirit of his age, even dissociative or some combination of possibilities, all of which tend to render the
prophetic claims questionable or false through a kind of inadvertence. These new alternative accounts of Joseph
Smith (and the Book of Mormon), logically preclude the possibility of the gospel he preached being true. And, as
Marty points out, if the rst steps do not survive, all that is possible with these new explanations is antiquarian
curiosity, not “fateful or faith-full” response.
Revisionist History—The Great Leap Forward
Some are still insisting that the Church must abandon the traditional understanding of the beginnings of the
faith.86 Why is such a revisionist history, as it is now being called, especially by RLDS historians, either desirable or
necessary? Presumably, a competent, honest scrutiny of the historical foundations of the faith, that is, a serious
look at the beginnings, discloses what Sterling M. McMurrin labels “a good many unsavory things.”87 McMurrin,
for example, charges “that the Church has intentionally distorted its own history by dealing fast and loose with
historical data and imposing theological and religious interpretations on those data that are entirely
unwarranted.”88
For McMurrin, the Mormon “faith is so mixed up with so many commitments to historical events—or to events that
are purported to be historical—that a competent study of history can be very disillusioning. Mormonism is a
historically oriented religion. To a remarkable degree, the Church has concealed much of its history from its
people, while at the same time causing them to tie their religious faith to its own controlled interpretations of its
history.” The problem, as McMurrin sees it, is a “fault of the weakness of the faith” which should not be tied at all to

history.89 He strives to separate faith from history, substituting “naturalistic humanism”90 for prophetic faith—
promoting the enterprise of philosophical theology as a substitute for divine special revelations. McMurrin
provides the least sentimental statement of the intellectual grounds for a secular revisionist Mormon history, that
is, one done entirely in naturalistic terms. McMurrin sees the Mormon past in what Leonard Arrington once called
“human or naturalistic terms.”91
We should, from McMurrin’s perspective, begin with the dogma “that you don’t get books from angels and
translate them by miracles; it is just that simple.”92 A history resting on that premise would require a fundamental
reordering of the faith.93 His program would retain only fragments of a culture resting on abandoned beliefs.
Marty, straying from the core of his argument, eventually introduces “many kinds of integrity. Some of these are
appropriate to insiders and others to outsiders, some to church authorities and some to historians.”94 But given
what Marty had already shown about the necessity of the decisive generative events surviving the acids of
modernity, it is dif cult to see how he could defend the integrity of a stance such as McMurrin’s. Certainly
McMurrin’s denials do not permit the survival of the crucial historical foundations. But still, Marty defends the
history being done by some of those on the fringes of the Church whose arguments are not as coherent as those
of McMurrin, yet whose premises are not unlike certain of his dogmas.95
Faith and the Limits of History: Listening to the Text
Marty’s nal approach to doing religious history rests on a rather different understanding of the method and limits
of history96 than of those historians for whom he offers an apology, or of those who approach Mormon history or
the Book of Mormon with naturalistic assumptions. Marty claims a superiority—not merely a distinction—for his
approach over that of others. He also claims that his way has been used by some Mormon historians to achieve a
“second naiveté,” but without citing any instances. Marty, unlike the others, has no illusions about objectivity or
about the desirability of avoiding bias.97 “People used to say,” according to Marty, “they should be ‘objective,’ but,”
he claims, “objectivity seems to be a dream denied.”98 Ironically, Marvin Hill began his doctoral thesis, which was
signed by Marty, with a claim of objectivity or “detachment,” as he called it. Hill also appeals to something called
“objective evaluation.”99 Recently he has passionately defended “the possibility of an objective history” against
what he describes as the view “that historians can never escape their own culture and personal biases.”100
Unfortunately, Hill still seems enthralled by outmoded dogmas about the necessity and possibility of objectivity.
Marty describes those historians who “used to say they should be ‘objective,’ but objectivity seems to be a dream
denied,”101 while Hill seems to cling to such a dream, perhaps because it provides for him the only possible way to
avoid what he feels would be a destructive relativism and nihilism, if historians were unable to avoid having biases
or preferences.102 But thoughtful scholars now realize that positivism (or historical objectivism) lacks coherence,
and that talk about the necessity of avoiding bias, detachment, and neutrality is confused and even illusory
precisely because the historian always brings assumptions, biases, and a viewpoint to the task of interpreting texts
and providing explanations. Nor does Marty hold, unlike Jan Shipps,103 that it is possible to discover what really
happened in the past, or that historians provide proofs.
Drawing upon some portions of the current literature on hermeneutics, Marty maintains that all understanding
rests on preunderstandings.104 Historians strive to understand the texts that provide windows to the past from
within the formal and informal preunderstandings with which everyone necessarily must approach texts.105 The
older challenges to the historical foundations of faith were “tainted” by ideologies about which some historians

remained naive and uncritical. Historians were then, as some of the Saints are now, enthralled by what Marty calls
“the biases of a positivism that thought it could be unbiased.”106 Just such a bias fuels the demand for objectivity,
neutrality, or detachment from faith that ows from the new secular revisionist Mormon history.107
For Marty, history “is not a reproduction of reality,” hence “the historian invents.”108 Since historians are
necessarily involved in a “social construction of reality,” they cannot discover what really happened. Only faint
“traces” of the past remain, and from these only more or less plausible social constructions of a past are open to us,
and these are accessible only through texts which are themselves colored by understanding. Even plausibility is
dependent upon a network of preunderstandings. And every text or complex set of texts remains open to more or
less plausible, though competing, interpretations and explanations. Marty’s account of method is unlike that of
historians currently enthralled by some variety of historical objectivism.
Marty’s description of the method, limits, and situated character of the historian has something to contribute to a
resolution or clari cation of the current debate over Mormon history. Historians may not even be aware of the
assumptions upon which they operate, because these form, for them, a natural horizon. Marty has helped to
identify certain of the powerful ideologies that control the way in which cultural Mormons do history. He also sets
out a version of historical skepticism which seems to make room for the possibility of faith in the face of scientism,
naturalistic humanism, and dogmatic unbelief. A suspension of unbelief is what is needed in order to enter into the
categories, norms, and explanations internal to the faith. But the dogmatisms of modernity stand in the way of the
suspension of unbelief that is necessary for the truth of the faith to shine through when we encounter prophetic
messages. Even genuine historical understanding rests on suspension of unbelief, or a willingness to grant the
possibility that things are other than what the dogmatisms of secular modernity demand.
I agree with Marty that proof is not possible in history, and it is neither possible nor necessary in matters of
faith.109 Still, faith, if it is an “historical faith,” is one in which texts witness to divine things.110 The texts upon
which the Mormon faith rests confront us with a message that makes claims upon us, and through listening to it we
may come to what Marty calls a testimony of the truth of the message. Marty tells us that we can, if so disposed,
hear the message contained in texts; we must then judge whether it will be true for us. He calls this, following Paul
Ricoeur, the “hermeneutics . . . of testimony.”111
How then do we come to believe and then justify our faith? What is it that we believe when faith has as part of its
object a complex network of events in the past? We are, of course, shielded from direct access to the past and can
only encounter a small segment of it already interpreted for us through texts. The historian, like everyone else, is
confronted with the question of whether certain of these texts, for example, the crucial Book of Mormon,
witnesses to the truth. An “historical faith,” like that of the Saints, comes to be believed by hearing and listening,
that is, by our seeking the truth found in the witness contained in the sacred texts. The Book of Mormon makes
claims upon us concerning a then and there in which the deity acted, which we must judge by hearing the witness
and receiving the testimony of the message for our own here and now. In that way, a text like the Book of Mormon
may serve as the bearer of the memory of divine things which we may begin to appropriate through the
interpretative enterprise. Marty struggles toward just such a view of the thoroughly historical faith of Latter-day
Saints.
The Book of Mormon, when viewed as a ctional or mythical account, and not as reality, no longer can have
authority over us or provide genuine hope for the future. To treat the Book of Mormon as a strange theologically
motivated brand of ction, and in that sense as myth, is to alter radically both the form and content of faith and

thereby fashion a new “church” in which the texts are told what they can and cannot mean on the basis of some
exterior ideology. To reduce the Book of Mormon to mere myth weakens, if not destroys, the possibility of it
witnessing to the truth about divine things. A ctional Book of Mormon fabricated by Joseph Smith, even when his
inventiveness, genius, or inspiration is celebrated, does not witness to Jesus Christ but to human folly. A true Book
of Mormon is a powerful witness; a ctional one is hardly worth reading and pondering.112 Still, the claims of the
text must be scrutinized and tested, then either believed or not believed without a nal historical proof.
An historically grounded faith is vulnerable to the potential ravages of historical inquiry, but it is also one that
could be true in a way that would make a profound difference. We are left, by God, with a witness to mighty acts,
but we must judge, for we are always at the turning point between two ways. And listening to the text, not proving
it true—an impossibility if not a presumption—to discover what its truth is for us, both reveals its truth and makes
the sacred past plausible and thereby gives meaning to the life and deepest longings of the believer.
The truth of the prophetic message found in the Book of Mormon is linked to both its claim to be an authentic
history and to Joseph Smith’s story of how we came to have the book. To be a Latter-day Saint is to believe, among
other things, that the Book of Mormon is true, that there once was a Lehi who made a covenant with God and was
led out of Jerusalem and so forth.
Marty feels that to begin to understand the message of a text like the Book of Mormon frees us so that we are
somehow “less burdened by concern over the exact reference to literal historical events.”113 He is correct if he
means that a deeper and more profound understanding of the Book of Mormon removes obstacles that seekers
may confront in grasping its truths, and thereby assists them in trusting its message. In various ways, the Book of
Mormon has provided an anchor for the faith of the Saints; it also offers guidance for those anxious and willing to
grasp its truths. But when the Book of Mormon is understood as ction, and in that sense the material for what is
sometimes called “the Mormon myth,” we have, at best, one more melancholy instance of human folly and, from
that perspective, not the word of God. To begin to suppose that it is even possible that the Book of Mormon is
true, requires that the text be taken with genuine seriousness in all its various aspects. Therefore, it is a mistake to
argue that a mature faith calls for or yields a lessening of concerns about details in the Book of Mormon, which
somehow makes the historical and literary elements in that text less crucial, or allows the faithful to abandon the
question of whether there was a Lehi colony with whom God made a covenant, with whether Jesus was
resurrected or whether angels visited Joseph Smith. Only when faith is an empty routine or reduced to mere
sentimentality, and thereby shorn of its deepest substance and meaning, as well as separated from hope, does it no
longer matter if the Book of Mormon is an authentic ancient history and its teachings true. What it means for the
Mormon faith to have what Marty describes as a “thoroughly historical mode and mold”114 includes, among other
things, that Joseph Smith’s story and the Book of Mormon are known to be a genuine history providing prophetic
access to divine things, and not merely entertained in some weak Pickwickian, allegorical, or sentimental sense.
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magic does not indicate that psychobiographer Fawn M. Brodie was necessarily correct in describing Joseph
Smith as a village scryer who engaged in conscious deception. It is entirely possible that rather than being quite
aware that he was creating a work of ction that he afterward came to accept as true, Smith became convinced as
the text of the Book of Mormon started to take shape that the words he dictated” constituted the restoration of an
ancient history (Jan Shipps, “The Reality of the Restoration and the Restoration Ideal in the Mormon Tradition,” in
Richard T. Hughes, ed., The American Quest for the Primitive Church [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988],
184).
73. Marty uses Paul Ricoeur’s expression “primitive naiveté” to describe the beliefs of the child or isolated tribe or
unre ective adult, and uses “secondary naiveté” to describe the faith of one who has faced a crisis of faith by
encountering competition to his beliefs and has managed to retain them. Marty makes much of the “primitive
naiveté” of the Saints (Marty, “Two Integrities,” 5, 9 [306, 312]), or of what he calls “unre ective” Saints (ibid., 10
[312]). The crisis is brought on by threats to naive faith through the recognition of other possibilities. But the
Saints have always been involved in controversy over the connection of faith to the Mormon past because their
faith is tied to history, and that seems often to have taken them beyond primitive naiveté to re ective
understanding.
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than a conscious fraud, if one began with the assumption or otherwise reached the conclusion that he could not
have been a genuine prophet. Morgan held that a Great Divide logically separates the kind of history that can be
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religion “true” is merely its “essential social usefulness” (ibid.). After incorrectly charging Noel Reynolds with
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to disprove it” (ibid., 116, cf. a similar remark in Hill, “Brodie Revisited,” 72). By denying that the historical
authenticity of the Book of Mormon can be tested, Hill skirts the question of whether Joseph Smith’s prophetic
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historians, even if the issue of veracity cannot be settled in that manner. To treat the Mormon faith as anything but
rmly rooted in history is to rob it of its essential character, and thereby transform the faith (Midgley, “Faith and
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New Mormon History,” 25), he mistakenly attributes it to Moses Rischin, a non-Mormon historian, who in a brief
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they share basic agreement that the Mormon religion and its history are subject to discussion, if not to argument,
and that any particular feature of Mormon life is fair game for detached examination and clari cation. They believe
that the details of Mormon history and culture can be studied in human and naturalistic terms—indeed, must be so
studied—and thus without rejecting the divinity of the Church’s origin and work’ ” (Moses Rischin, “The New
Mormon History,” American West 6/2 [March 1969], 49, quoting Arrington’s “Scholarly Studies of Mormonism,”
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of naturalistic explanations of the causes of revelation (Hill, “The ‘New Mormon History’ Reassessed,” 117). Robert
B. Flanders, with roots in the RLDS community, in 1974 fastened the label “New Mormon History” on middleground revisionist accounts of the Mormon past (“Some Re ections on the New Mormon History,” Dialogue 9/1
[Spring 1974]: 34-41). “Thirty years ago,” according to Flanders, “Leonard Arrington in Great Basin Kingdom raised
for Mormons a fundamental question of epistemology: can empiricism, the secular method of modern history,
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work” (Robert B. Flanders, Review of New Views of Mormon History: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Leonard J.
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92. McMurrin, “An Interview,” 25.
93. Such a history would dispense, except for sentimental purposes, with the traditional belief that Joseph Smith
had access to divine things through special revelations. A seemingly less radical approach would be to begin to
treat the historical portions of the foundational texts and events as instances of myth or ction and not as
historical reality. For example, Arrington is prepared to accept Joseph Smith’s visions or the Book of Mormon as
symbolic, or metaphorical, or mythical, or as actual events (Arrington, “Why I Am a Believer,” 37). From his
perspective, it does not seem to matter how one understands them. He explains that the religious “truth” he nds
in those accounts is on the same order as one might nd in something like Pearl Buck’s The Good Earth. This may
explain John Farrell’s having reported that “during the Arrington years, the historians tried to gently nudge the
church away from its insistence on literal interpretation” (Farrell, “The Historian’s Dilemma, 45). Arrington came
to the study of Mormon things already equipped with the notion of “myth” which he learned from reading George
Santayana, which allowed him to understand the sacred texts and founding events as myths or symbols, if they
were not genuine historical realities. From his point of view, it does not matter whether messengers from heaven
visited with Joseph Smith or whether the resurrected Jesus visited Nephites because Santayana held that even
ction could contain “religious truth” (see Arrington, “Why I Am a Believer,” 36-37). “Liberal Latter-day Saints,”
according to Farrell, “would nd it easier to stick with their church if only it would treat The Book of Mormon as an

allegorical story that teaches righteous behavior but isn’t necessarily historic truth—the way the Christian
churches treat” the Bible (Farrell, “The Historians Dilemma,” 42). Farrell also commented that “it would be easier if
the church were willing to treat . . . the Book of Mormon and the Book of Abraham as parables, but the hierarchy
won’t back down” (ibid., 45).
94. Marty, “Two Integrities,” 19, cf. 10 [324, cf. 312].
95. What meaning and authority might the Book of Mormon have, when read as “the casting of theology in story
form” (Hutchinson, “A Mormon Midrash? LDS Creation Narratives Reconsidered,” 16), or as “inspired ction” (ibid.,
15)? He insists that “such a sensitive and crucial subject is too complex and broad to be addressed” in a sixty-four
page essay setting forth a revisionist ideology. And yet he af rms that stories, when understood as mere myths,
have “in some ways gained a new power because of their newly acquired clarity of meaning,” though he also grants
that he “suffered a sense of loss,” and “experienced a certain disappointment” as he rejected “the claim of many of
Joseph Smith’s works that they not only have a divine origin but also have an ancient origin” (ibid., 70). He now
advances the notion that “imaginative appropriation” (ibid., 12), “imaginative reworking” (ibid., 14), or “creative
reworking” of older beliefs, stories or traditions by “inspired” redactors constitutes divine revelation. The product
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myth seeks to mediate” (ibid., 17, n. 3; cf. Midgley, “Faith and History,” 221-22). When might that be? “The power of
a myth about redemption through Christ cruci ed and resurrected, however, seems directly dependent on
whether Jesus in fact died and then bodily reappeared to his disciples” (Hutchinson, “A Mormon Midrash? LDS
Creation Narratives Reconsidered,” 17, n. 3), but the power of the restored gospel is not dependent upon whether
angels visited with Joseph Smith, or whether certain of Joseph Smith’s works have a genuine ancient origin. The
Book of Mormon, book of Abraham, and book of Moses (including the Enoch materials) are, for him, merely
“myths” generated by Joseph Smith’s “creative reworking” of biblical and other lore. Those in thrall to naturalistic
accounts of the Book of Mormon (and hence of the Mormon past) turn to what McMurrin once denigrated as
“sophisticated theories of symbol and myth” (McMurrin, Religion, Reason, and Truth, 143), borrowed from
Protestant or Catholic theologians or similar sources in an effort to turn prophets into mystics in order to salvage
some semblance of “religious” meaning from stories no longer believed to be simply true. The difference between
a Hutchinson and a McMurrin is the degree of sentimentality about elements of the faith whose grounds have
been rejected or abandoned.
96. Marty, “Two Integrities,” 4-5 [305].
97. Cf. Hill, “Richard L. Bushman,” 125-33. Hill seemed troubled by the ease with which Bushman was able to tell
Joseph Smith’s story and defend the Book of Mormon against traditional criticism. He faulted Bushman’s book
because he saw it as an apology, and, from his perspective, faith necessarily introduces a corrupting bias. Hill has
also faulted Richard L. Anderson for manifesting a “pro-Mormon bias of such intensity that it leads too often to
overstatement, errors in logic, and misreading of evidence” (Marvin S. Hill, Review of Richard L. Anderson, Joseph
Smith’s New England Heritage, in The New England Quarterly 46/1 [March 1973]: 156.) Hill (review of Leonard J.
Arrington and Davis Bitton’s The Mormon Experience, in American Historical Review 84/5 [December 1979]: 148788) complains that the authors of that book have a “booster spirit” or an “af rmative bias” that causes them to
overlook or distort things. They “demonstrate a strong Mormon bias that leads to errors that may not be observed
except by specialists.” He claims, by way of illustration, that they fail to mention that two of the three witnesses to

the Book of Mormon later denied their testimony, and they are guilty of “ignoring the romantic disposition” of the
plot and characters of the Book of Mormon. Hill’s polemic against Bushman’s book also re ects a demand among
certain historians, who long for the appearance of neutrality and dispassionate objectivity, for detachment from
belief in the doing of Mormon history. By clinging to the myth that the historian can and must be detached from
the corrupting bias of faith, Mormon historians may or may not sense that the naturalistic bias standing behind
environmental explanations betrays the faith.
98. Marty, “Two Integrities,” 4 [305]. “Subservience to a particular religion is therefore incompatible with honest
inquiry, whether by historians or by anyone else” (James L. Clayton, “Does History Undermine Faith?” Sunstone 7/2
[March-April 1982]: 34).
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American Historical Profession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
102. Hill, “The ‘New Mormon History’ Reassessed,” 125.
103. Shipps, Mormonism: The Story of a New Religious Tradition, 28.
104. Marty, “Two Integrities,” 14 [318]. Revisionist historians tend to be uncomfortable with this literature. The
following is an example: “Most of the recent interest in the study of hermeneutics,” according to Hutchinson,
“in uenced by New Criticism, the philosophical hermeneutics of the late [Martin] Heiddeger [sic], and French
Structuralism, has centered in noematics [thoughts about texts and their meaning] and the question of intent”
(Anthony A. Hutchinson, “LDS Approaches to the Holy Bible,” Dialogue 15/1 [Spring 1982]: 119, n. 9). “Although
the recent discussion is needed and somewhat helpful, I think,” Hutchinson opines, “that some basic cautions are
needed,” though he has not indicated what they might be. He has been in uenced by the discussion of
hermeneutical issues, for he grants that a presuppositionless exegesis of texts is impossible (ibid., 118, n. 8). His
misgivings about philosophical hermeneutics may betray an uneasiness about a discussion of the implications of
the assumptions upon which his own ideology rests.
105. Marty turns to the current literature on hermeneutics (Marty “Two Integrities,” 6, 14-18 [307, 317-24]).
Martin Heidegger has shown, according to Marty, “that unprejudiced, objective knowledge was not possible” by
identifying the formal and informal preunderstandings that stand behind all interpretations and explanations.
Marty assumes that what he calls hermeneutics is a special approach to texts. It is actually the attempt to
understand the conditions necessary for understanding any text or text analogue. Hermeneutics is an endeavor to
clarify historical method and is not a special technique that can be set over against other techniques. Marty also
seems to neglect the function of tradition in making the meaning of texts accessible.
106. Marty, “Two Integrities,” 6 [307].
107. Though the bulk of his essay is an effort to show that no one doing so-called “New Mormon History” has been
in uenced by positivism, Alexander now admits that “the term ‘objectivity’ has become so weighted with the
positivistic connotation of full detachment . . . that it should be abandoned.” Furthermore, he admits, “it is clear that
some historians, including some of the New Mormon Historians—in the search for objectivity—have tried to

detach their personal religious and moral views from their writing” (“Historiography and the New Mormon
History,” 39). He cites Hill and Melvin T. Smith as examples, but the list could be extended to include others like
Michael T. Walton and George D. Smith. The pressure on Mormon historians to leave their own belief out of their
history comes at least partly from those who simply do not believe. Both the demand for objectivity in the sense of
detachment from faith, and for naturalistic treatments of Mormon history originally came from unbelievers who
thought they had somehow avoided the corrupting commitments of those they brushed aside as mere apologists.
Morgan and Brodie, both writers with roots in Mormon culture, were ush with that illusion. But both Morgan’s
work, as well as the recent seemingly more neutral or detached history done by people like Hill and Hansen, suffer
in comparison with that done by those who are believers, and who are not embarrassed to have their faith, rather
than an absence of faith, play a role in their history. The strength of Morgan’s position is that he correctly sensed
that it had to be one way or the other—that there is a Great Divide necessarily separating those who write history
with naturalistic assumptions from those who allow the possibility that the prophetic claims could be simply true.
When Bushman’s Joseph Smith and the Beginnings of Mormonism is compared with Morgan’s efforts—both cover
somewhat the same ground—it turns out that Bushman’s work is clearly superior in content, style, and plausibility,
yet it does not manifest the affectation of seeming detachment or neutrality that leaves the reader guessing about
the controlling biases. Those signals are often placed in the text by writers anxious to make their writing
acceptable to what Bitton and Arrington call the demands of different audiences.
108. Marty, “Two Integrities,” 5 [305].
109. Ibid., 15 [319-20].
110. Bushman, Joseph Smith and the Beginnings of Mormonism, 187. The crux of Hill’s quarrel with Bushman
concerns the Book of Mormon. Hill claims “that Bushman says nothing about the theology of the Book of Mormon”
(Hill, “Richard L. Bushman” 127, 129-30), and that “Bushman’s conservatism is also manifest in his failure to treat
Book of Mormon themes, except to argue that Book of Mormon theocratic tendencies hardly match Republican
values in 1820 America” (Hill, “The ‘New Mormon History’ Reassessed,” 120, citing Bushman, Joseph Smith and the
Beginnings of Mormonism, 132-33). Though Bushman provided a rather full account of its prophetic message (see
chap. 4, 115-42, which is entitled “The Book of Mormon,” and also Bushman’s ne essay entitled “The Book of
Mormon in Early Mormon History,” 3-18, which Hill overlooks), he did not, as Hill seems to prefer, opine that the
Book of Mormon contains a pessimistic Calvinism which Joseph Smith later contradicted and replaced with an
optimistic, progressive (or liberal) view of man, and a correspondingly different view of God. Alexander maintains
that it is “bad history” to hold that even the central prophetic messages of the restoration—the understanding of
God and man—unfold in a coherent manner or “build on each other in a hierarchical fashion.” To hold such a view,
he feels, “leaves an unwarranted impression of continuity and consistency.” Instead, he sees in the teachings of
Joseph Smith and others after 1835 a radical shift away from a form of Calvinism (or “basically sensual and devilish
man”), as well as an “essentially trinitarian” understanding of God similar to that found in nineteenth-century
American Protestantism. He seems anxious that the current interest in the message of the Book of Mormon will
replace what he (and others) see as a later optimistic, “progressive theology,” which he thinks came on the scene in
what he calls the “progressive reconstruction of doctrine” between 1893 and 1925 (Alexander, “The
Reconstruction of Mormon Doctrine: From Joseph Smith to Progressive Theology,” Sunstone 5/4 [July-August
1980]: 24-33; reprinted in Sunstone 10/5 [May 1985]: 8-18). Though he denies that the revelations to Joseph
Smith constitute a coherent line-upon-line adding to the Mormon understanding of divine things, Alexander still
feels that “the Book of Mormon is an ancient text and that the doctrines explicated in the book are doctrines
believed by the Nephites and other ancient peoples whose record the book contains” (Alexander, “Afterwords,”
BYU Studies 29/4 [1989]: 143). That avowal may make his theory of a radical “reconstruction” of the early and

presumably pessimistic views on man and God to a later optimistic, “progressive theology” somewhat less
attractive to revisionist historians. He is anxious to defend “progressive theology” against the presumably
pessimistic Calvinist orthodoxy, moderated with touches of Arminianism, to which he nds parallels in the Book of
Mormon and other early revelations. This appears to be an argument against what he and others (for example,
McMurrin and O. Kendall White, Jr., Mormon New-Orthodoxy: A Crisis Theology [Salt Lake City: Signature Press,
1987]) have labelled “Mormon Neo-Orthodoxy,” which they fault for taking the contents of the Book of Mormon
and Joseph Smith’s prophetic claims seriously. Alexander claims that even the understanding of “the atonement
and salvation,” which he concludes was originally “similar” to the teaching “that might have been found in many
contemporary Protestant denominations,” underwent a “transformation” or “reconstruction” in the “doctrinal
development” of the Nauvoo period (Thomas G. Alexander, ” ‘A New and Everlasting Covenant’: An Approach to
the Theology of Joseph Smith,” in Davis Bitton and Maureen U. Beecher, eds., New Views of Mormon History: A
Collection of Essays in Honor of Leonard J. Arrington [Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1987], 57-58). The
King Follett funeral sermon is, for Alexander, the culmination of a radical transformation in “Joseph Smith’s
theology” (“Reconstruction of Mormon Doctrine,” 28; “A New and Everlasting Covenant,” 58-59). Hill assumes that
“Alexander has demonstrated the negative, Calvinistic view of man in early Mormonism” (Hill, “Richard L.
Bushman,” 127), and he conjectures that Bushman skirted those troubling conclusions in his treatment of the
Book of Mormon. Hill’s paraphrase of Alexander’s inference, however, is awed, for Alexander actually maintains
that “the Mormon doctrine of man in New York contained elements of both Calvinism and Arminianism, though
tending toward the latter” (“Reconstruction of Mormon Doctrine,” 25). Alexander’s language is ambiguous. For
example, a number of his inferences can be read as holding that Joseph Smith drew upon strands of Protestant
sectarian theology in fashioning the Book of Mormon and early revelations, a position that Alexander would want
to deny. But this leaves unclear the meaning of his claims that the Book of Mormon and early teachings of Joseph
Smith are “close” or “similar” to contemporary orthodox Protestant theology. In one place he argues that “biblical
interpretation is dependent upon a theological system. . . . The system of interpretation which Mormons adopted
in 1830 was drawn from contemporary Protestantism” (“The Reconstruction of Mormon Doctrine,” 18, n. 23).
These statements seem to entail that the system of theology entertained by Mormons in 1830 was drawn from
contemporary Protestantism. But Alexander is very anxious to eschew such an inference. Unfortunately he has
remained silent on the crucial issues, as he has maintained that “Mormon theology” underwent a “transformation”
or “reconstruction” after 1835, as it became more “optimistic,” and “progressive,” or what others (McMurrin,
White) call “liberal.” The evolutionary explanation of Mormon beliefs raises fundamental questions about both the
character of revelation and the position of the Book of Mormon. Other than Alexander, the tendency of those who
argue that there has been a radical “reconstruction” of “Mormon theology” is to hold that the Book of Mormon has
no authentic ties to the ancient world, and is, therefore, simply Joseph Smith’s ction, inspired or otherwise.
Alexander has yet to explain how one can both believe that the Book of Mormon is an authentic ancient text and
yet contain teachings remarkably similar to contemporary Protestantism or whether such apparent similarities
are signi cant. Others, for example, McMurrin, Hutchinson, and perhaps Ostler, have tried to fashion more explicit
and coherent revisionist explanations of the Book of Mormon, but have jettisoned, either in whole or in part,
historical components of the text, as well as the account of its coming forth through the agency of an angel.
111. Marty, “Two Integrities,” 15 [319]. This portion of Marty’s essay (Marty, “Two Integrities,” 14-18 [317-24]) is
mired in a terminology he borrows from the literature on hermeneutics where he is not particularly at home. But it
is also the best part of his essay because he has gotten to the crux of the issues and has separated himself from
both the relativistic historicism and historical objectivism of writers like Shipps and Foster.
112. Hutchinson argues that the Book of Mormon is “nineteenth-century ction,” but it is still somehow “inspired”
(Anthony A. Hutchinson, “The Word of God Is Enough: The Book of Mormon as Nineteenth-Century Fiction,”

transcript of a talk delivered at the 1987 Washington Sunstone Symposium, May 15-16, 1987, 1, 7-9.) He insists
that it is now necessary for specially enlightened Saints to see that the Book of Mormon is not genuine history in
order, among other things, to avoid idolatry (ibid., 7-8), as well as to begin to conform to the standards of secular
fundamentalism that he thinks constitutes the standard of scholarship. His primary target is Hugh Nibley (ibid., 34). But he is also critical of Blake Ostler’s view (ibid., 5) that, while there may be some reasons for believing that the
historical portions of the Book of Mormon are authentic, the teachings found in that text were inventions by
Joseph Smith (Blake Ostler, “The Book of Mormon as a Modern Expansion of an Ancient Text,” Dialogue 10/1
[Spring 1987]: 66, 76-87, 108-15). In order to make his theory of “expansions” palatable, Ostler claims that the
absorption and adaptation of dogmas from the sectarian environment by Joseph Smith must now be understood
as constituting a kind of “inspiration.” Hutchinson correctly senses that one must atly reject the understanding of
revelation contained in the Book of Mormon—an understanding directly linked to “its claims about itself”
(Hutchinson, “The Word of God Is Enough,” 6), and hence to its claim to be an authentic historical record—in order
to put in place the kind of theology which he has in mind and which he has borrowed from Catholic and Protestant
theologians. Less thoughtful and less strident versions of the position advanced by Hutchinson are occasionally
offered, sometimes where the need to see texts like the Book of Mormon as merely inspired ction is made to
grow out of assessments of the ndings of critical historical studies on the Bible. Ostler is less coherent than
Hutchinson and hence seemingly less radical. However, he also senses that his “expansion” theory demands
fundamental alterations in the understanding of what constitutes divine revelation. He advances what he labels “A
Mormon Model of Revelation” (Ostler, “The Book of Mormon as a Modern Expansion,” 109-11). His novel theory
of revelation feeds his “expansion” theory. And he grants that “some may see [his] expansion theory as
compromising the historicity of the Book of Mormon. To a certain extent it does” (ibid., 114). Hutchinson, at this
point, complains that Ostler has failed to see that, once one has compromised any of those claims (Hutchinson,
“The Word of God Is Enough,” 5-7), all of the claims made by the Book of Mormon about itself must be rejected.
Hutchinson, unlike Ostler, capitulates entirely to secular fundamentalism to avoid what both consider the
sectarian fundamentalism inherent in the Latter-day Saint understanding of the Book of Mormon and Joseph
Smith’s prophetic claims. Quinn seems to have incorporated some version of the Hutchinson-Ostler type of
approach to the Book of Mormon (Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 150, where he cites Ostler, “The
Book of Mormon as a Modern Expansion,” 66-67, 100, 104-15), but without attempting to show how that position
can be reconciled with an acceptance of the Book of Mormon as an authentic ancient text and Joseph Smith as a
genuine prophet.
113. Marty, “Two Integrities,” 17 [321].
114. Ibid., 3 [304].

Why No New Judaisms in the Twentieth Century?
Jacob Neusner
Since Professor Hugh Nibley has served the scholarly community as a scholar of religion through the study of his
specialty, it is appropriate to speak of religions through the study of another particular specialty. What I wish to
explain in his honor is what conditions favor the formation of religious systems. This I do through particular
attention to the condition of Judaism in the twentieth century, in which, for a long spell now, there has been no
new Judaism. As we face the onset of a new age of systemopoeia, of the making of religious systems, in Judaism,
with the renaissance of energy and faith so characteristic of contemporary Judaism, it is well to look back on the
barren age now ended. I do so as an act of esteem and respect for a scholar of religion who, when he receives his
audience, will be seen as one of the fecund intellects of the study of religion in our century.
The middle of the twentieth century—until practically our own time—has produced no important and in uential
Judaic systems. The well-established Judaisms that ourish today—Reform, Orthodoxy, Conservative Judaism—
all took shape in the nineteenth century, and in Germany. From after the beginning of Reform Judaism at the start
of the nineteenth century to the later twentieth century we identify three periods of enormous system-building in
Judaism, or, to invent a word, Judaic systemopoeia. At each of these the manufacture of Judaic systems came into
sharp focus: 1850-60 for the systems of Orthodoxy and the positive Historical School; and, for the secular
Judaisms, 1890-1900 for Jewish Socialism and Zionism. So all of the Judaic systems came into being in the
hundred years from 1800 to 1900: rst Reform, then, some decades later, in the middle of the century, Orthodoxy
and the Historical School; thereafter, again some decades later, at the end of the century, Zionism and Jewish
Socialism. We therefore wonder how it is possible that one period produced a range of Judaic systems of depth
and enormous breadth, which attracted mass support and persuaded many of the meaning of their lives, while the
next three quarters of a century did not. And, further, what are we now to expect, on the eve of the twenty- rst
century? For I think we are on the threshold of another great age of systemopoeia in Judaism.1
POLITICAL CHANGE AND SYSTEMIC INERTIA
Why no new Judaisms for so long? We may eliminate answers deriving from the mere accidents of political
change; given the important shifts in the political circumstances of Israel, the Jewish people, we should have
anticipated exercises in symbolic redefinition to accommodate the social change at hand. That is to say, the
stimulus for system-building surely should have come from the creation of the Jewish state, an enormous
event. Take the state of Israel, for example. The creation of the first Jewish state in two thousand years
yielded nothing more interesting than a flag and a rather domestic politics, not a worldview and a way of life
such as the founders of the American republic, Madison and Hamilton, enunciated, for example, and such
as their contemporaries, Washington and Jefferson, for instance, imagined that they constructed. Statebuilding need not yield large visions and revisioning of everyday life and how it should be lived; in most
cases it has not done so, though in the American case it did. In the Israeli case, it did not. But no Judaic
systems have emerged there, only rehearsals and re-presentations of European ones. The rise of the state
of Israel destroyed a system, the Zionist one, but replaced it with nothing pertinent to Jewry at large.
But American Jewry presents the same picture. Wars and dislocations, migration and relocation—these in the past
stimulated those large-scale reconsiderations that generated and sustained system-building in Jews’ societies.
The political changes affecting Jews in America, who became Jewish Americans in ways in which Jews did not
become Jewish Germans or Jewish Frenchmen or Englishmen or women, yielded no encompassing system. The
Judaic system of Holocaust and Redemption leaves unaffected the larger dimensions of human existence of
Jewish Americans—and that is part of its power. When we consider the strength, in the Judaisms of America, of
Reform, Orthodoxy, and Historical or Conservative Judaism, each in its German formulation, we see the reality.

The Judaic systems of the nineteenth century have endured in America, none of them—until now—facing
signi cant competition of scale. That means millions of people moved from one world to another, changed in
language, occupation, and virtually every other signi cant social and cultural indicator—and produced nothing
more than a set of recapitulations of three Judaic systems serviceable under utterly different circumstances. The
failure of Israeli Jewry to generate system-building nds its match in the still more startling unproductivity of
American Jewry. Nothing much has happened in either of the two massive communities of Israel in the twentieth
century.
Political change should have precipitated fresh thought and experiment, and Judaic systems should have come
forth. So change of an unprecedented order yielded a rehearsal of ideas familiar only from other contexts. Israeli
nationalism as a Jewish version of third-world nationalism, American Judaism as a Jewish version of a national
cultural malaise on account of a lost war—these set forth a set of stale notions altogether. Let me now recapitulate
the question, before proceeding to my answer: why no system-building for seventy- ve years or so? And we come,
then, to the reason for what is, in my judgment, the simple fact that, beyond World War I, Judaic system-building
(with the possible exception of the system of Judaic reversion) has come to an end.
WHY NO NEW JUDAIC SYSTEMS FOR SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS?
I see three pertinent factors to explain why no Judaic systems have come forth since the end of the
nineteenth century. I do not claim that these factors are sufficient. But I think they are necessary to answer
the question before us.
The Holocaust
The demographic factor comes in two parts. First, the most productive sector of world Jewry perished. Second,
the conditions that put forth the great systemic creations vanished with the six million who died. Stated as naked
truth, not only too many (one is too many!), but the wrong Jews died. What I mean is that Judaic systems in all
their variety emerged in Europe, not in America or in what was then Palestine and is now the state of Israel, and
within Europe they came from Central and Eastern European Jewry. We may account for the systemopoeia of
Central and Eastern European Jews in two ways. First, the Jews in the East, in particular, formed a vast population
with enormous learning and diverse interests. Second, the systems of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
arose out of a vast population that lived in self-aware circumstances, not scattered and individual but composed
and bonded. The Jews who perished formed enormous and self-conscious communities of vast intellectual riches.
To them, being Jewish constituted a collective enterprise, not an individual predilection. In the West, the prevailing
attitude of mind identi es religion with belief to the near-exclusion of behavior, and religion tends to identify itself
with faith; so religion is understood as a personal state of mind or an individual’s personal and private attitude. So
the Judaic systems that took shape beyond 1900 exhibit that same Western bias not for society but self, not for
culture and community but conscience and character. Under such circumstances systemopoeia hardly ourishes,
for systems speak of communities and create worlds of meaning, answer pressing public questions, and produce
broadly self-evident answers. This can be seen in the contrast between the circumstance of reversionary systems
of Judaisms, which involves individuals “coming home” one by one, with the context of the ideological Judaic
systems, all of them, in fact, mass movements and Jewish idiomatic statements of still larger mass movements. The
demographic fact, then, speaks for itself. I do not know whether one can specify a particular demographic (and not
merely intellectual) base necessary for the foundation of a given Judaic system. As I said, the reversionary systems
demand a demographic base of one person, but Zionist and Socialist systems, millions. Yet everyone who has
traced the history of Judaic systems in modern and contemporary times has found in the mass populations of
Central and Eastern Europe the point of origin of nearly all systems. That fact then highlights our original

observation that the period of the preparation for, then the mass murder of, European Jewry from the later 1930s
to the mid-1940s, marked the end of Judaic systemopoeia. We cannot, then, underestimate the impact of the
destruction of European Jewry.
One of the as-yet-untallied costs of the murder of six million Jews in Europe therefore encompasses the matter of
system-building. The destruction of European Jewry in Eastern and Central Europe brought to an end for a very
long time the great age of Judaic system construction and explains the paralysis of imagination and will that has
left the Jews to forage in the detritus of an earlier age: rehearsing other peoples’ answers to other peoples’
questions. Indeed, I maintain that until Judaic system-builders come to grips with the full extent of the effects of
the “Holocaust,” they will do little more than recapitulate a world now done with, for the systems before us
answered the questions urgent to European Jewry in its situation in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth
centuries—those questions, not others.
Yet the demographic issue by itself cannot suf ce. For today’s Jewish populations produce massive communities,
three hundred thousand here, half a million there, and there are, after all, both American Judaism and Israeli
nationalism to testify to the possibilities of system-building even beyond the mass murder of European Jewry.
When we consider, moreover, the strikingly unproductive character of large populations of Jews, the inert and
passive character of ideology (such as it is) in the Jewries of France, Britain, South Africa, and the Soviet Union, for
instance, in which, so far as the world knows, no Judaic systems have come forth—no worldviews joined to
de nitions of a way of life capable of sustaining an Israel, a society—the picture becomes clear. Even where there
are populations capable of generating and sustaining distinctive Judaic systems, none is in sight. So we have to
point to yet another factor, which, as a matter of fact, proves correlative with the rst, the loss of European Jewry.
The Demise of Intellect
What we noticed about the Judaic systems of the twentieth century—their utter indifference to the received
writings of the Judaism of the dual Torah (i.e., oral and written Torah)—calls our attention to the second
explanation for the end of systemopoeia. It is the as-yet-unappreciated factor of sheer ignorance, the profound
pathos of Jews’ illiteracy in all books but the book of the streets and marketplaces of the day. That second factor,
the utter loss of access to that permanent treasury of the human experience of Jewry preserved and handed on in
the canonical Torah, has already impressed us: the extant raw materials of system-building now prove barren and
leached.
The Judaisms that survive provide ready access to emotional or political encounters, readily available to all—by
de nition. But they offer none to that confrontation of taste and judgment, intellect and re ection, that takes
place in traditional cultures and with tradition: worlds in which words matter. People presently resort mainly to
the immediately accessible experiences of emotions and of politics. We recall that the systems of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries made constant reference to the Judaism of the dual Torah, at rst intimate, later on
merely by way of allusion and rejection. The nineteenth-century systems drew depth and breadth of vision from
the received Judaism of the dual Torah, out of which they produced—by their own word—variations and
continuations. So the received system and its continuators realized not only the world of perceived experience at
hand. They also made accessible the alien but interesting human potentialities of other ages, other encounters
altogether with the potentialities of life in society. The repertoire of human experience in the Judaism of the dual
Torah presents as human options the opposite of the banal, the one-dimensional, the immediate. Jews received
and used the heritage of human experience captured, as in amber, in the words of the dual Torah. So they did not

have to make things up fresh every morning or rely only on that small sector of the range of human experience
immediately accessible and near at hand.
By contrast, Israeli nationalism and the American Judaism of Holocaust and Redemption—the two most in uential
systems that move Jews to action in the world today—scarcely concern themselves with that Judaism. They nd
themselves left only with what is near at hand. They work with the raw materials made available by contemporary
experience—emotions on the one side, politics on the other. Access to realms beyond requires learning in
literature, the only resource for human experience beyond the immediate. But the Judaic systems of the twentieth
century, except for the reversionary Judaisms, do not resort to the reading of books as a principal act of their way
of life, in the way in which the Judaism of the dual Torah and its continuators did and do. The consequence is a
strikingly abbreviated agenda of issues, a remarkably one-dimensional program of urgent questions.
In this regard the reversionary systems point toward a renewed engagement with the canon and system of the
dual Torah, but consequently I think those systems prove (quite properly) transitory and preparatory: ways back to
“Sinai.” So their very de nitive characteristic points toward what has not happened: a systematic exploitation, by
system-builders working out an original and urgent program of questions and answers, of the received Judaism of
the dual Torah. The reason for neglect is the self-evident fact that the Jews of the world today, especially in France
and elsewhere in Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States, but also in Canada, Australia, South
Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and other areas of sizable demographic consequence, in point of fact have lost all access
to the Judaism of the dual Torah that sustained fteen centuries of Jews before now. The appeal to contemporary
experience, whether in emotions or in politics, draws upon not so rich a treasury of re ection and response to the
human condition. And the utter failure of imagination, the poverty of contemporary system-building where it takes
place at all, shows the result. From a mansion Israel has moved into a hovel. Jews in the European, African, and
Australian worlds no longer regard “being Jewish” as a matter of intellect at all, and so far as they frame a
worldview for themselves, it bears few points of intersection with the Judaic canon.
One reason that Judaic systems did not emerge in the American Judaic setting derives from the astounding failure
of education to transmit to the bulk of Jewry in America the received system in any accessible form. American
Jewry denied itself access to the resources on which other Jewish communities had drawn, that is, the canon of
the Judaism of the dual Torah, and attempted to create a domestic Judaism resting on experiences no one had
undergone or would want to. It has virtually no school system for fully half of its children, and most of the other
half receive an education of slight consequence. So Jewish Americans have neither studied Torah nor closely
re ected on their own lives in a free society.
They have opted for neither the worst of one world nor the the best of another. That is, they focused such
imaginative energies as they generated upon “the Holocaust,” and they centered their eschatological fantasies on
“the beginning of our redemption” in the state of Israel. But they had not gone through the one nor chosen to
participate in the other. Not having lived through the mass murder of European Jewry, American Jews restated
the problem of evil in unanswerable form and then transformed that problem into an obsession. Not choosing to
settle in the state of Israel, moreover, American Jews further de ned redemption, the resolution of the problem of
evil, in terms remote from their world. One need not look far to nd the limitations of the system of American
Judaism: its stress on a world other than the one in which the devotees in fact were living. As to the reversionary
Judaisms of the hour, it is too soon to tell what they will yield or how they will endure. By nature transient; by
doctrine alien to the canonical system they allege, they merely recapitulate; and by program of deed separate from
the world to which they allegedly propose to gain access, they have yet to show us how, and whether, they will last.
That is what I mean by failure of intellect.

The Triumph of Large-Scale Organization
Third and distinct from the other two is the bureaucratization of Jewry in consequence of the tasks it rightly has
identi ed as urgent. To meet the problems Jews nd self-evidently urgent, they have had to adopt a way of life of
building and maintaining and working through very large organizations and institutions. The contemporary class
structure of Jewry therefore places in positions of in uence Jews who place slight value on matters of intellect
and learning and that same system accords no sustained hearing to Jews who strive to re ect. The tasks, instead,
are those that call forth other gifts than those of heart and mind. The exemplary experiences of those who exercise
in uence derives from politics, through law, from economic activity, through business, from institutional careers,
through government, industry, and the like. As the gifts of establishing routine take precedence over the
endowments of charisma of an intellectual order, the experiences people know and understand—politics, emotions
of ready access—serve, also, for the raw materials of Judaic system-building. Experiences that, in a Judaic context,
people scarcely know, do not so serve. This I take to be yet another consequence of the ineluctable tasks of the
twentieth century: to build large-scale organizations to solve large-scale problems. Organizations, in the nature of
things, require specialization. The difference between the classes that produce systemic change today and those
who created systems in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries then proves striking. What brought it
about, if not the great war conducted against the Jews, beginning not in 1933 but with the organization of political
anti-Semitism joined to economic exclusion, from the 1880s onward. So in a profound sense the type of structure
now characteristic of Jewry represents one of the uncounted costs of the Holocaust.
Intellectuals, today no longer needed, create systems. Administrators do not; and when they need ideas, they call
for propaganda and hire publicists and journalists. When we remember that all of the Judaic systems of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries derive from intellectuals, we realize what has changed. Herzl was a
journalist, for instance, and those who organized Jewish Socialism and brought Yiddishism all wrote books. The
founders of the system of Reform Judaism were mainly scholars, rabbis, writers, and other intellectuals. It is not
because they were lawyers that the framers of the positive Historical School produced the historicistic system
that they made. The emphases of Hirsch and other creators of Orthodoxy lay on doctrine, and all of them wrote
important books and articles of a re ective and even philosophical character. So much for Reform, Orthodox,
Conservative, Socialist-Yiddishist, and Zionist systems: the work of intellectuals, one and all.
THE UNCOUNTED COST OF THE HOLOCAUST
These three factors—demographic, cultural, institutional and bureaucratic—scarcely exhaust the potential
explanation for the long span of time in which, it would appear, Jews have brought forth few Judaic systems,
relying instead on those formed in a prior and different age and circumstance. But I do think all of them will
figure in any rigorous account of what has happened, and has not happened, in the present century. And
they point directly or indirectly to the extraordinary price yet to be exacted from Jewry on account of the
murder of six million Jews in Europe. The demographic loss requires no comment, and the passage of time
from the age in which the Judaism of the dual Torah predominated has already impressed us. Those causes
are direct and immediate.
But the correlation between mass murder and an exemplary leadership of lawyers and businessmen and
politicians and generals demands explanation. Administrators, not intellectuals, bureaucrats, or charismatic
thinkers, formed the cadre of the hour. In an age in which, to survive at all, Jews had to address the issues of
politics and economics, build a state (in the state of Israel) and a massive and effective set of organizations capable
of collective political action (in the United States), not sages but politicians in the deepest sense of the word,
namely, those able to do the work of the polity, alone could do what had to be done. And they did come forward.
They did their task, as well as one might have hoped. The time therefore demanded gifts other than those prized
by intellectuals. And the correlation between mass murder and a culture of organizations proves exact: the war

against the Jews called forth from the Jews people capable of building institutions to protect the collectivity of
Israel, so far as anyone could be saved. Consequently much was saved. But much was lost.
Celebrating the victory of survival, we should not lose sight of the cost. Determining the full cost of the murder of
the six million Jews of Europe will require a long time. The end of the remarkable age of Judaic systemopoeia may
prove a more serious charge against the future, a more calamitous cost of the destruction of European Jewry, than
anyone has yet realized. The gas chambers suffocated not merely Jews, but spirit too.
JUDAIC SYSTEMS: THE CORPORATE MODEL
The banality of survival forms a counterpoint to the banality of evil: in an age of the common, why look for
distinction in Jewry? People draw upon only their experience of emotions, inside, and politics, without. They
then assign themselves the central position in the paradigm of humanity, seeing what they are as all they
can become. But we need not find that surprising. Who does otherwise, except for those with eyes upon a
long past, a distant future: a vision? The system-builders, the intellectuals, book-readers, book-writers, truthtellers—these are the ones who appeal to experience of the ages as precedent for the hour. This
characterized all the Judaic systems born in the death of the received one: whether Reform theologians
invoked the precedent of change or Orthodox ones of Sinai. Today there are no system-builders, so we can
scarcely ask for the rich perspectives, the striking initiatives, that yield compelling systems of life and
thought. But whence the nullities that have taken the place of the system-builders? And how come the
banality of the Judaic systems of the hour?
The twentieth century presented to Jews the necessity to create large bureaucracies to deal with large problems.
In the nature of things, individuals, participants in systems of belief and behavior, had sought explanations for what
they themselves did. Now the place for the individual was his or her own place: a part of the task, not the entirety
of it. It is no accident that system-building came to an end in the encounter with an age of large Jewish
organizations: armies and governments in the state of Israel and enormous instruments of fund-raising and
politics in America. The resentment of intellectuals, no longer needed, should not allow ready rejection of their
observation. The lawyers and administrators and managers who have succeeded the intellectuals did not build
systems, because they built something else, and what they could build was what the hour required—the last, most
awful charge exacted by the Holocaust from the survivors.
So let us dwell on this matter of the building by specialists of large organizations. Such specialization in modern
times meant that systems required their elite (the specialists) and relegated all others to a life essentially at the
fringes of the system. Every Judaist in a Judaic system of the dual Torah said prayers on his own (women were not
given the same task). But Zionists who attended meetings did not do the same thing as did the Zionists who built
the land, for example. Specialization as part of the construction of a rational system, a calling expressed in a
particularity of work—these characterize organization, that is, collective action, in modern times. And all the Judaic
systems of the twentieth century conformed to the requirements of organization in that age: all formed, as I said,
systems of organization, meaning specialization for all, but then the doing of the distinctive work of the system by
only a few. The specialized work of organizations demanded from all their renunciation of a role in the general
scheme of the system.
In so stating, of course, I draw upon the image of the iron cage of Max Weber.2 Weber alludes to the “iron cage” in
the following famous passage: “The care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the saint like a light
cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment, but fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.”
What he says—in a justly famous passage of enormous power—about economic action applies equally to the sort
of large-scale systemic, existential behavior to which we refer when we speak of a Judaism characterized by the
following:

Where the ful llment of the calling cannot directly be related to the highest spiritual and cultural values, . .
. the individual generally abandons the attempt to justify it at all. . . . No one knows who will live in this cage
in the future. . . . For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: Specialists
without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization
never before achieved.3
The point of intersection with organizations in the twentieth century I locate at the reference to “specialists
without spirit.” When we note the division of labor that has rendered a mockery of the category of a way of life
joined to a worldview, we understand why we cannot de ne a distinctive way of life associated with a given
worldview.
When I describe the worldview of a movement, in the nineteenth century I allude to an encompassing theory that
explains a life of actions in a given and very particular pattern. When I speak of the worldview of a movement of
the twentieth century, I refer to the explanation of why people, in a given, distinctive circumstance, should do
pretty much what everyone is doing somewhere, under some equivalent circumstance: an army is an army
anywhere, but study of the Torah is unique to Israel. Anyone can join a union, and why invoke a Judaic worldview to
explain why to join a Jewish union? I know only that Judaic worldviews did offer such an explanation and made a
great difference to those to whom that explanation answered an urgent question. What has changed? I nd the
answer in the history of Western civilization. The processes that shaped the Judaic systems of modern and
contemporary times form part of the larger movement of humanity—a distinctive and therefore exemplary part to
be sure. Let me specify what I think has made all the difference.
The critical Judaic component of the Christian civilization of the West spoke of God and God’s will for humanity,
what it meant to live in God’s image, after God’s likeness. So said the Judaism of the dual Torah, so said Christianity
in its worship of God made esh. So that message of humanity in God’s image, of a people seeking to conform to
God’s will, found resonance in the Christian world as well: both components of the world, the Christian dough, the
Judaic yeast, bore a single message about humanity. The rst century beyond the Christian formulation of the
West, that is, the twentieth century, spoke of class and nation, not one humanity in the image of one God. Calling
for heroes, it demanded sacri ce not for God but for state. When asked what it meant to live with irreconcilable
difference, the century responded with total war on civilians in their homes, made foxholes. Asked to celebrate the
image of humanity, the twentieth century created an improbable likeness of humanity: mountains of corpses, the
dead of the Somme of World War I and of Auschwitz of World War II and all the other victims of the state that
took the place of church and synagogue, even up to the third of the population of the Khmer killed by their own
government, and the half of the world’s Armenians by what, alas, was theirs,—and the Jews, and the Jews, and the
Jews.
The rst century found its enduring memory in one man on a hill, on a cross, the twentieth, six million making up a
Golgotha—a hill of skulls—of their own. No wonder then that the Judaisms of the age struggled heroically to frame
a Judaic system appropriate to the issues of the age— and failed. Who would want to have succeeded to frame a
worldview congruent to such an age, a way of life to be lived in an age of death? And no wonder—if I may pass my
opinion—that the Judaisms of the age proved transient and evanescent. For, I like to think no Judaic system could
ever have found an enduring t with an age such as the one that, at the turning of the century, draws to a close. The
age of reversionary Judaisms, dawning at the rst light of the century beyond, forms the right, the hopeful epitaph
on the Judaisms of the dying century. They had formed Judaisms that, to Israel, the Jewish people, struggled to
speak of hope and of life in the valley of the darkest shadows. But they had to fail, and their failure forms their

vindication. For the Jews are a people that never could nd a home in the twentieth century. That, in the aspect of
eternity, may prove the highest tribute God will pay to those whom God among humanity rst chose.4
THE END OF THE JUDAISMS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
But I think the impact of the Holocaust has run its course. While the events will never pass from our hearts,
the power of those events to form a system is pretty well exhausted by the Judaism of Holocaust and
Redemption. And that Judaism, for a variety of reasons, is losing its hold. First, it stresses negative
experiences, on which people find they cannot raise their children. Second, it focuses upon the world
beyond, not the life within, and people turn to a Judaism to guide their lives together, not their public policy
toward the outside world. Third, the Judaism of Holocaust and Redemption appeals, for the redemptive
myth, to the creation of the state of Israel. But that event has now lost its power to surprise and enchant. The
state of Israel is an important fact of Jewish existence, which most of us celebrate every day. It is not the
object of wonder and awe that it was forty years ago, nor should it be. In all, we have outgrown the events of
World War II and its aftermath. And that is as it should be: generations do pass.
But among the ve great Judaisms of the rst third of the twentieth century, none retains vitality, and all have lost
nerve. Jewish Socialism cum Yiddishism is a victim of the Holocaust. Zionism achieved ful llment and has no
important message that Israelism within the complex of the Judaism of Holocaust and Redemption fails to present.
Conservative, Reform, and Orthodox Judaisms all have lost out, Conservatism because of a failure of purpose,
Reform because of a failure of nerve, and Orthodoxy because of a failure of intellect.
Conservative Judaism struggles to nd room in the vital center that it created, for everyone wants a place there.
Reform Judaism, having sold its soul to the Judaism of Holocaust and Redemption, has lost the source of its energy
and power in the prophetic tradition of Judaism. Western Orthodoxy answered questions about living by the
Torah in Western society that few seem to wish to ask anymore. Those who want tradition and also a place in an
open society—the question that Hirsch answered in nineteenth-century Germany— nd it in a variety of Judaisms.
The diverse Orthodoxies now concur, with the exception of the minority around Yeshiva University, that to be
Orthodox is to live a life of segregation and scarcely veiled hostility to the rest of the world of Judaism, not to
mention to goyim. Accordingly, everyone wants a place in the center.
The single most powerful idea in modern and contemporary Judaic life is the ideal we now identify with
Conservative Judaism. All but a few extremists on the fringes of far-out Reform and Orthodoxy share that ideal,
and, for the Jewish lay people, it is the one thing on which most concur. That ideal is that we wish to be Judaic in an
integrated society, and that we want our Judaism to infuse our lives as Americans with meaning. That is a
mediating, a healing, a centrist and moderate de nition. Clearly, most Jews in America wish to live like other
Americans and not in conditions of a ghetto. Equally obviously, most Jews in America wish to remain distinctively
Jewish, with traits that join them together and distinguish them from others. And, the third truism, most Jews in
America look to the Judaic religious tradition for guidance on how to be different—but not too different.
And that is the centrist position. It de nes the tensions and limits of the vital center. We look to tradition for
guidance, but we make up our own minds—that is one way of stating matters. We want to live by something we call
“Judaism,” but we want to accept the possibility of change and modi cation where appropriate, where necessary,
where desirable (thus, modern Orthodoxy, Conservative, Reform). The alternative positions are those of selfsegregation, which requires no change in whatever is perceived to be “the tradition,” and total assimilation, which
permits no point of difference with “everybody else” (if there is an “everybody else”).
Now that I have outlined what I think is the basic conviction of the vital center, readers probably recognize two
facts. First of all, in simple terms, I have spelled out the social policy of the Conservative Movement in Judaism. It is
what Conservative Judaism represents to us. Second, I also have outlined views that equally well characterize

much of Orthodox and most of Reform and Reconstructionist Judaisms as well. And that is my point: Conservative
Judaism is only one of the many center-movements in contemporary American Judaism, and while its centrist
position enjoys enormous appeal and power (as I believe it should), it is the position that matters, not the
institution.
The institutions of Conservative Judaism, as distinct from the ideology of the vital center, are weak. They do not
enjoy the nancial support of the lay people. Much of the Conservative rabbinate is alienated. Many of the people
in charge treat with disdain and scorn the movement “out there” and regard as their private park and personal
garden the affairs of the movement and its policies. In consequence many people wonder what is going to happen
to the vital center. They ask whether Conservative Judaism has a future at all, or will it disintegrate and divide up
among Orthodoxy and Reform (as, rabbis tell me, people now expect). In institutional terms, I not only do not know
the answer to that question, I also do not care, because I do not think it matters.
If the Jewish Theological Seminary of America forms a center for the living Judaism of the vital center, if from that
institution and its associated organizations important ideas come forth, inspiration and leadership, energy and
imagination—then the future of the institutional Conservative movement matters a great deal. But it is bright and
secure (and, by the way, the money will ow). If the Jewish Theological Seminary of America continues its present
attitudes and policies toward its constituency near at hand and toward Jewry at large (and many of us hope that
the institution will change those attitudes and policies and come back to Jewry at large with humility and hope),
then what difference does it make? We can have a new Jewish Theological Seminary of America—if for the twentyrst century that is the best institutional model. Or we can decide to educate our rabbis and teachers and cantors
and other religious gures in different ways. The institutional model of a private and isolated institution, doing
everything on its own and by itself, certainly competes with alternatives.
No institution can claim a permanent hold, and none has a mortgage on our future. The vital center—that religious
attitude and position presently represented (but only partially) by the Jewish Theological Seminary, United
Synagogue, Rabbinical Assembly—will ourish, if not in the presently deeply awed, paralyzed institutions and
organizations that today represent the center, then in the many others that now ourish or will come into
existence. It is the religious ideal, the Judaic ideal, that will endure: the ideal of free Jews, freely choosing to be
Judaic and to build a distinctive Judaic religious life in an integrated and open society. No institution has a
monopoly on that ideal: it is American Judaism for—I would guess—90 percent of American Jews. So much for the
vital center: too crowded for the Judaism that created it. What of Reform Judaism?
If I had to choose two words to characterize the contemporary state of Reform Judaism, they would be sloth and
envy. I call Reform Judaism slothful because it has become lazy about developing its own virtues and so deprives
all Judaisms of its invaluable gifts, its insights, and its powerful ideas. I call it envious because it sees virtue in
others and despises itself. The single greatest and most urgent idea in the Jewish world today is the one idea that
Reform Judaism has made its own and developed for us all, and that is the idea that God loves all humanity, not
only holy Israel. Today, no single idea is more urgent than that one. Reform Judaism in the temples and in the
schools lacks vitality, even while it correctly points to enormous growth. Reform Judaism in the United States is
the most numerous Judaism and is growing faster than Conservativism and, in absolute numbers, much faster
than Orthodoxy. The reason is that Reform Judaism has accurately taken the measure of the condition of
American Jewry and has framed a Judaism that deals with the real and urgent issues of contemporary American
Jewish life.

But that success, for which the lay people must take credit, since they are the creators of Reform Judaism, has yet
to make its mark on the morale and attitude of the Reform movement. The movement still regards itself as a
second-class and somehow less than fully legitimate Judaism. By “the movement” I do not mean a few theologians
at Hebrew Union College who have set forth a solid and substantial rationale for Reform Judaism in both history
(Michael A. Meyer) and theology (Jakob J. Petuchowski). I mean the vast number of pulpit rabbis and lay persons,
who see more observant Jews and think they are somehow inferior, who meet more learned Jews and think they
are in some way less.
Without conceding for one minute that less observance or less learning are to be treated as unimportant, I think
Reform Judaism has a message to offer to all Jews, including the most Orthodox of the Orthodox and the most
nationalistic of the nationalists, and one that in importance outweighs not eating lobster and studying the Talmud.
It is that Judaism as Reform Judaism de nes Judaism as a religion of respect and love for the other, as much as for
the self. Reform Judaism teaches that God loves all people, nds and emphasizes those teachings of the received
holy books of the Torah that deliver that message, and rejects bigotry and prejudice when practiced not only by
Gentiles but even by Jews.
And there should be no doubt at all that the single most urgent moral crisis facing the communities of Judaisms
today is the Jews’ self-indulgent hostility toward the other or the outsider. The novelist, Norman Mailer,5 in
language reminiscent of the prophetic tradition stated what I conceive to be the great contribution of Reform
Judaism to the life of Jewry everywhere:
What made us great as a people is that we, of all ethnic groups, were the most concerned with the world’s
problems. . . . We understood as no other people how the concerns of the world were our concerns. The
welfare of all the people of the world came before our own welfare. . . . The imperative to survive at all
costs . . . left us smaller, greedier, narrower, preternaturally touchy and self-seeking. We entered the true
and essentially hopeless world of the politics of self-interest, “is this good for the Jews?” became, for all
too many of us, all of our politics.
Mailer concluded, “The seed of any vital American future must still break through the century-old hard-pack of
hate, contempt, corruption, guilt, odium, and horror. . . . I am tired of living in the miasma of our inde nable and
ongoing national shame.” I nd in Mailer’s comments that morally vital prophetic tradition that Reform Judaism—
alone among contemporary Judaisms—espouses. But today Reform Judaism has lost its nerve, and just when
Jewry needs precisely that for which Reform Judaism has always stood, the message is muf ed.
The costs to the Jewish people are to be measured by our incapacity to work out our relationships to the world
beyond. I refer to an address by Professor Yehoshaphat Harkabi, Hebrew University, to the Council of Reform and
Liberal Rabbis at the Liberal Jewish Synagogue in London last year. Harkabi chose his platform well, the only
religious Judaic platform for his message, that there is a crisis in our relationships to the Gentiles (“the goyim”). He
raised in a stunning public statement the issue of the divisive power of the Jewish religion within the Jewish
people itself. Harkabi raised the possibility that “the Jewish religion that hitherto has bolstered Jewish existence
may become detrimental to it.” Harkabi pointed to manifestations of hostility against Gentiles, formerly repressed,
but ascendant in the past decade. In the state of Israel, in particular, that hostility took such forms as the following:
The Chief Rabbi Mordekhai Eliahu forbade Jews in the state of Israel to sell apartments to Gentiles. A former
Chief Rabbi ruled that a Jew had to burn a copy of the New Testament. A scholar who has received the Israel Prize
in Judaic Studies, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, declared that a Gentile should not be permitted to live in Jerusalem.

The body of a Gentile woman who lived as a Jew without of cial conversion was disinterred from a Jewish
cemetery.
Explaining these and many other expressions of anti-Gentile prejudice, Harkabi pointed to the belief of what he
called “religious radicals” in the imminent coming of the Messiah as explanation for these developments. They are
not limited to the state of Israel. Harkabi called for “discarding those elements” of Judaism that instill or express
hostility to outsiders. He said, “Demonstrating to Orthodoxy that some of its rulings are liable to raise general
opprobrium may facilitate the achievement of a modus vivendi between it and the other streams in contemporary
Judaism.”
Where are we to nd the corpus of ideas concerning Gentiles to counter these appalling actions and opinions of
the pseudomessianic Orthodoxy of the state of Israel? I nd them these days mainly in Reform Judaism. And in the
state of Israel Reform Judaism has made its mark. But in our own community, it is, as I said, lazy and envious of
others, insecure and slothful and conciliatory of views it must reject and abhor. That is not to suggest that only
Reform Judaism has a contribution to make to the moral renaissance of the Jewish people, correctly characterized
by Mailer as now too self-absorbed for their own good. Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion has
delivered to Reform Jews a corps of rabbis bearing a moral concern and—more important—an intellectual system
and structure that form a monument to the capacity of Israel— the Jewish people—to think both of itself and also
of the other, and to love not only itself but also the outsider. Now, when we need Reform Judaism more than ever
for the moral renewal of all Israel—the Jewish people—what Reform Jews must nd within their hearts are not
sloth and envy but the two opposite virtues: energy and conviction.
And what of Orthodoxy? If Reform Judaism exhibits a failure of nerve, all Orthodox Judaisms display a failure of
intellect. It is not that they are stupid or wrong or venal, merely that they are irrelevant to the great issues of the
world and the age. Except for Yeshiva-University Orthodoxy, all of the Orthodox Judaisms of the day (the
“Haredim” in various guises) exhibit the same enormous incapacity to speak to the Jewish condition. In the various
formulations claiming to give us true-blue Judaism, all of them sailing under the ag of Orthodoxy (a whole eet of
motley ships, from rowboats to battleships, all of them obsolete), we nd the same failure of mind. And the worst
thing a religion can do is fall silent before the urgent issues of the age. Khomeini is, at least, relevant, capable of
shaping events. Whether in Bnei Braq or among the Lubovitch Hasidim and at all stations inbetween and around,
all Orthodox Judaisms pretend there is no there there.
That is not to suggest Orthodox Judaisms are ignorant of the classics of Judaism or misrepresent their content. To
the contrary, the representation of Torah-true Judaism by the Haredim is sound on every point. Knowledgeable
people can quote chapter and verse in talmudic writings in support of their position on all issues. On issue after
issue they represent the Torah—oral and written—precisely as the received, classical sources of the Torah portray
matters.
And that is precisely why the policies and program of the Haredim, and therefore of the Judaism of the dual Torah,
oral and written, as they accurately represent those policies, offer no meaningful option to Jews in the world today
—I do not say to “Orthodox” or “Religious” Jews, but to any Jews. The Haredim appeal, after all, to the fact that
they authentically portray “Judaism,” or the Torah, more accurately than anyone else, more so than Western or
Modern Orthodoxy, more authentically than the Orthodoxy of the Zionist-Religious parties. And that appeal, to
the spiritual and the romantic in us all, is very real. It is why the Haredim gain converts to their Judaism from
among the Religious-Zionists and the secular alike: there is a very real choice. So there is, and the 95 percent of
the Jews who by instinct reject the reading of the Torah, or of Judaism, by the Haredim, make a sound judgment.

The claim to authenticity to “the tradition” or “the Torah” requires us to ask whether the Torah in its received or
authentic or accurate version, as the Haredim represent it, can serve in the twenty- rst century. I think it cannot.
The Torah as the Haredim read it (rightly, as I said) omits all systematic doctrine on the three critical matters of
contemporary life: politics, economics, and science. The Torah in its authentic version has nothing at all to say
about three matters so fundamental that any Judaism today that authentically realizes the Torah, oral and written,
demands that Jews live only a partial life and, in the case of the state of Israel, dismantle the Jewish state. Jews
living in the Golah or Exile, for their part, without a position on politics, economics, and science simply will have to
retreat into ghettos, having no way to cope with the formative forces in the world today. The Haredim want to
make us all into Amish, and the Jews are not going to agree, even though, just now, more than a few would like to
walk out on the world as it is.
The three most powerful and formative forces in all of human civilization today are democracy, capitalism, and
science, and on those three subjects, the authentic, classical Judaism, accurately represented by the Haredim,
either has nothing at all to say, or simply says the wrong things. Authentic Judaism, as the Haredim teach it, is
ignorant of the things that matter today. We cannot look to the Haredim for intelligent public policy. The Haredim
can make their extravagant claims on the rest of us only by relating to the remainder of the Jewish people
essentially as parasites: we do the politics, the economics, and the science, so they can live out their private lives
off in a corner. Abandon the Jewish state, for Israelis, and give up all public life, for Jews in the Golah; that is the
message of their authentic Judaism, with its stunning silence on democracy, capitalism, and science and
technology.
There are three reasons for this silence, because of their very valid claim to authenticity to the tradition. First, we
look in vain in the Talmud and related writings for a political theory that ts together with the politics of a
democratic state. Israelis need no instruction from the Golah on that awful fact. If the Haredim gain in politics, it
will end democracy in the state of Israel, pure and simple. Second, we nd nothing in talmudic and related writings
that makes possible scienti c inquiry, that is, systematic formulation of theory and empirical testing of hypothesis.
When philosophy, including science, found a capacious place within Judaism, it was only because modes of thought
deriving not from talmudic but from Greek-Muslim philosophical sources had found entry. And they were
perceived as alien. The great philosophers and scientists did not come from the circles who studied only the Torah,
and the institutions of the Torah did not produce philosophy or science, any more than, today, they study those
subjects. The Haredim have nothing to say of interest to, or to learn from, the world of science and technology. But
that is where the world is made today.
Third, systematic thought on economics, such as the Mishnah assuredly presupposes, by the end of talmudic times
had given way to an essentially magical conception that if one studies Torah, economic questions will be solved by
themselves. Rational decision-making, the conception of a market and of a market-economy—these and other
givens of economics nd no place whatsoever in the (at best) petty entrepreneurial thinking of the Torah in its
authentic mode. Consequently, Judaism as the Haredim accurately represent it, falls silent on questions of
economics. How can people utterly ignorant of economics pretend to govern a modern state or to lead the Jewish
community overseas?
Modern Orthodoxy in the United States of America, the Orthodoxy of Bar Ilan University and Yeshiva University,
and of the Israeli Zionist-Religious parties, all have made ample room for science, democracy, and economic theory
in the curriculum in the academy and also in its formulation of public policy (though here, the Zionist Religious
parties seem to leave such matters to the partners in whatever coalition gives them their annual prohibition of

pork or its counterpart). That Western Orthodoxy is losing out, so it seems, to the valid claim of authenticity to the
true Torah set forth by the Haredim and by their political instrumentalities. It is pure romanticism or utter fantasy
to opt for the authentic merely because it is true about the things of which it speaks. Jewish public life, both in the
Golah and in the Jewish state, have also to ask about the ominous silences. The Judaism of the Talmud accurately
represented, so far as the sources portray it, by the Haredim, simply cannot and will not work, not because it is
wrong or humanly de cient, but because it falls silent when the work of the world has to be done.
No state can work without well-crafted public policy, without economic policy, without access to science and
technology. Any lingering appeal of the Haredim to that isolationism that makes us Jews want to turn our backs on
the world, any deep impulse in us all to be only Jewish, always Jewish, and, at last, the right way, the way of the true
Torah of Sinai—any appeal to that profound and natural sense in us all of our Jewishness as our fate and faith and
destiny will have to compete with another appeal. It is the appeal to the simple fact that, if we are going to live in
the twenty- rst century, we require not only the Torah but also economics, politics, and science and technology,
about which the Torah, in the authentic statement of the Haredim, simply has nothing to say, nothing whatsoever.
World Jewry has no choice but to turn its back on the Haredim, as they have turned their back on the twenty- rst
century—and for precisely the same reason. Would that God had made the world so simple as the Haredim wish it
to be!
They are right, and therefore all of us have to reject them and their entirely authentic Torah. After all, there were
valid reasons for inventing Reform Judaism and the Orthodoxy of Samson Raphael Hirsch, the Religious Zionist
parties, the secular Jews, Conservative Judaism, Reconstructionist Judaism, Jewish Socialism, Yiddishism, and all
the rest. The opposition to these movements rightly claimed they were not authentic, and the opposition was
right. But Reform Judaism and Western Orthodoxy and the Religious Zionists, Yeshiva University and Bar Ilan
University—these were still more right, because they were, and remain, relevant. They do address all of life as we
now know it, and they have something to say about politics, science, economics, while the Haredim do not.
The Haredim have nothing to say on all the urgent issues of the hour. We do not solve problems by pretending
they are not there. So the Haredim and all the Orthodox Judaisms that nd a place within that classi cation do not
present an option or a possibility for Jews who do not live in ghettos and do not pretend the twenty- rst century
can simply be ignored, as though it were not going to happen. When the dream is over, the world will be there,
perhaps a nightmare, when we wake up. So, fond farewell to the fantasy that the authentic Torah of Sinai, as the
framers of the Bavli read it in the seventh century, is, or can ever be, the authentic Torah of Sinai, as Israel, the
Jewish people everywhere, receive and af rm it in the twenty- rst century: we shall do and we shall hear, indeed:
today.
AND YET: TOMORROW
Were the story to end with the creation of the new Judaisms of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
we should face an unhappy ending. But the advent of the twenty-first century, in my view, marks the
beginning of a new age of Judaic systemopoeia. The vital signs appear round about. I point to the formation
of a distinctively Judaic politics and another among the intellectuals of the Right as well. These two
intellectual formations present two of the three prerequisites of a Judaism: a worldview and a way of life.
Both of them join the everyday and the here and now to an ideal in which people can find the meaning and
purpose of their life together. Whether these political Judaisms can take root in the social worlds of numbers
of Jews and so constitute of themselves not merely theologies and life-patterns but “Israels,” that is, social
entities, remains to be seen. Reform, Conservatism, and Western Orthodoxy, as well as Zionism and Jewish
Socialism-Yiddishism, all formed not merely intellectual positions but social worlds. Their strength lay in
transforming organizations into societies, so to speak. So far what we have in Tikkun and Commentary is
more than a viewpoint, but less than a broad social movement, widely diffused.

I point further to the havurah movement, the renewal of Reconstructionism with Arthur Waskow and Arthur
Green, the development of an accessible Judaic mysticism by Zalman Schachter, the intense engagement by
feminists of Jewish origin in the framing of a what we may call a feminist-Judaism, and the like. Each of these
extraordinarily vital religious formations gives promise of establishing a Judaism: a worldview, a way of life,
realized within a social entity that calls itself (not necessarily exclusively) “Israel.” All of them have identi ed urgent
questions and presented in response answers that, to the framers, prove self-evidently valid. And with these ve
conditions—a worldview, way of life, attained by an “Israel,” that all together identi es an urgent question and
answers it in a manner self-evidently valid to the engaged persons—we have a Judaism. So I think the long period
in which there were no new Judaisms in formation is coming to an end, though it is much too soon to tell which
Judaisms in North America at least will inherit the greater part of Jewry and take over, as Conservative Judaism
did in the second and third generations, and as Reform Judaism has been doing in the third, fourth, and fth
generations.
What accounts for the hopeful future? I pointed to three factors in accounting for the barren age: the intense
political crisis culminating in the Holocaust with its demographic catastrophe, the demise of intellect, and the
(correlative) formation of large-scale organizations that reformed Jewry within the corporate model. The new
Judaisms of the acutely contemporary age succeed, I think, because we have pretty well overcome the
demographic and cultural catastrophe of the Holocaust. We have in North America a vast Jewish population,
capable of sustaining the variety of Judaisms that the vast ocean of Jewry in central and eastern Europe did in the
later nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. It is perfectly clear from the character of the examples of new
Judaisms to which I have pointed that the one source of strength in systemopoeia today is intellect. Jewish
intellectual life within Judaism ourishes in North America in a way that, I think, would have stirred envy in even
the proudest Jews of Germany and Poland between the Wars.
And the corporate model for organized Jewry has shown its limitations. The decay of Bnai Brith, the demise on the
local scene of organizations such as the American Jewish Congress, the retreat of Jewish organizational life from
the scale of the retail to that of the wholesale, the retreat of the Federations from the ideal of forming “the
organized Jewish community” and their transformation into mere fund-raising agencies—these show what is
happening. The decline of the powerful national organizations at the center strongly suggests that, in the everyday
world at home, Jews no longer nd interesting a Judaic existence consisting of going to meetings to talk about
something happening somewhere else. Merely giving money, for instance, to help another Jew help a third Jew
settle in the state of Israel has lost all credibility. People want hands-on engagement, and the corporate model
affords the opposite. Common to all the hopeful signs of nascent Judaic systems is the immediate engagement of
the individual in achieving the purposes of the social group. The hallmark of the havurah movement, at least as
some of us thought it up thirty years ago,6 was individual engagement in the ultimate purpose of the group. And
that rejection of the corporate model and af rmation of the place of the individual at the center of activity now
marks the mode of organization of every important new Judaism today.7
To explain why no new Judaisms, I can therefore account also for why we now see many new and vital Judaisms:
we no longer live in an iron cage, and the ful llment of our calling to be Israel comes only through our immediate
and complete engagement with our highest spiritual and cultural values—whatever our Judaism tells us these are.
We have, in other words, survived the twentieth century.
Notes
A shorter version of this article appeared as “Can Judaism Survive the Twentieth Century?” Tikkun 4/4 (JulyAugust 1989): 38-42.

1. My thanks to Michael Lerner for insisting that I take account of that fact, on which much more presently.
2. My entire intellectual life has addressed the program of Max Weber, from my dissertation onward. My entire
notion of systemic analysis and the comparison of systems within Judaism, worked out most fully and in acute
detail in the study of the Judaic systems of late antiquity, simply applies in detail his main perspectives.
3. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, tr. Talcott Parsons, with a foreword by R. H. Tawney
(New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1930), 182.
4. I amplify these matters in my Death and Birth of Judaism (New York: Basic, 1987).
5. New York Times, 18 April 1988.
6. The original idea of the ancient Jewish havurot as a model for social organization is in Jakob J. Petuchowski’s
article in The Reconstructionist in 1957. There followed my articles on the subject, collected in my Fellowship in
Judaism (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1963), where I proposed the idea of regaining access to the havurot of
antiquity. Other early writings by those active in the earliest phases of the movement are collected in the book I
edited, Contemporary Judaic Fellowship in Theory and in Practice (New York: KTAV, 1972).
7. The Tikkun conference in New York City is an example of that fact. I see no clear counterpart in the political
Judaism of the Right, which seems to me fragmented in social circles, e.g., around Commentary for some, around
National Review and Chronicles for others (myself included). Professors of Jewish origin in the new National
Association of Scholars, for example, hardly form the counterpart to the social formation attained at the Tikkun
conference. In this regard the Left has provided the Right with a model of how to do things.

Thoughts about Joseph Smith:
Upon Reading Donna Hill's Joseph Smith:
The First Mormon
Thomas F. Rogers
“Toute vue des choses qui n’est pas Ètrange est fausse.”1 —Valery
This paper first lists a number of personal experiences which are mentioned but not unduly emphasized in
Donna Hill’s biography and which, taken together, appear to have been more than coincidental influences on
the formulation of Latter-day Saint doctrine and Church practices. Against the seemingly syncretic character
of Joseph Smith’s activity as a founding prophet who claimed divine authority for his principal
pronouncements are then weighed the following considerations, which cannot be easily dismissed or
explained away:
1. Joseph Smith’s essential innocence, sincerity, un inching forthrightness, other-directness, and self-effacement;
2. The profound and inspiring explication of otherwise less well understood Christian principles in the scriptures
translated and brought forth by his hand and in the ordinances of the temple;
3. The parallels between Joseph Smith’s belittlement and persecution and that of acknowledged prophets in past
ages;
4. The comprehensiveness of Joseph Smith’s ontological vision.
This paper implies our need for respecting and accepting Joseph Smith’s claims on empirical grounds, apart from
what in his history may prove disturbing and, though open to interpretation, cannot be denied.
Donna Hill’s Joseph Smith: The First Mormon strikes me as the man’s rst fully adequate
biography2ócomprehensive, detached, balanced, and fair. Or so it seems. Either what is therein claimed about the
Prophet is true or it is not. So far no one has come forth to dispute its assertions. And I am in a state of shockóor
was for weeks after I read it. Nothing has so much forced me to reexamine my most cherished preconceptions. I
am a middle-aged professor who has for some time dealt with the literary expression of mankind’s thorniest
dilemmas. I have found the play of ideas a delightful stimulation. Nor have I found it particularly dif cult to live with
the ambiguity and paradox that seem to abound at life’s every turn and which are so attested to in the
scripturesóto remain tenuous about so much that seems to “throw” many another believer. At the same
timeóthanks in part to a number of choice experiences afforded by callings in the Churchómy testimony regarding
the restored gospel and the reality and divinity of the Savior has never been stronger, my faith never more
profound.
If what has only so recently come to my attention about Joseph Smithómuch of which in my thinking I had earlier
relegated to malicious rumorócan have “thrown” me as it did, at least temporarily, I can well understand how in the
past those who “knew better” may have been anxious to keep the Prophet’s image so vaguely idealized. By doing
so, however, we fail, I believe, to recognize the nature of the revelatory process in almost every dispensation and
why prophets have been so universally misunderstood, even detested. In his “King Follett Discourse” the Prophet
insisted that no man knew his history. How a reading of Hill’s book con rms that statement: the more one ponders
the available biographical detail, the more enigmatic the man emerges, and the more puzzling, at least on the

surface, appear his motives. Like nothing else, the experience reminds me of that existential trauma we all
underwent when rst indoctrinated, whether by peers in the back woodshed or by parents, about the birds and
the bees. Those who rst dissected the human body must have been similarly amazed and, for a time at least,
equally dismayed by what they beheld. The facts of life and the reality that is more than skin deep do not generally
accord with a child’s uninformed suppositions. Why then should the truth about another human being, easily as
taxed and torn as we who are less illustrious know ourselves to be, prove to be any less complex?
These are the thoughts which, on balance, have occurred to me, since reading Hill, as I have pondered the man
Joseph Smith. What has been perhaps most disconcerting is that practically everything he enunciated and brought
forth was so syncreticóappears, that is, to have been suggested by the ideas and the experiences he randomly
encountered in his particular social environment. The coincidences, if that is what they are, suggest a consistent
pattern of impressionability and truly ingenious adaptation of both the most bizarre and seemingly most mundane
sources of inspiration, often secular, even spurious in character. We can no longer deny, for instance, that prior to
discovering the Golden Plates and the Urim and Thummim he was several times hired to seek buried treasure by
means of a so-called “peep stone,” being sought after for his adeptness in its use. Moreover, although there is
nothing substantively in common between the Reverend Ethan Smith’s View of the Hebrews and the Book of
Mormon, the earlier work, published in 1823 by a contemporary in a neighboring state, advances a similar thesis,
claiming to trace the history of descendants of the lost ten tribes among the American Indians, and could well have
been known to the Prophet. One of the Book of Mormon’s most signi cant archetypesóLehi’s visionó bears
striking parallels to a dream whichóat least according to his mother’s 1845 accountóJoseph’s own father had
earlier shared with his family members.3 Consequent to a dramatic conversion late in life, moreover, Joseph’s
maternal grandfather had published a book of Christian exhortation and thereupon traveled about, peddling it in
the capacity of an itinerant missionary.
Another puzzling “coincidence” occurs with the Book of Mormon’s quotation from certain New Testament
scriptures. The inclusion of passages from Isaiah in 2 Nephi is, given the plates of Laban, quite understandable. It is
also very conceivable that, in visiting the Nephites, the Savior would reiterate, even verbatim, the wisdom of the
Sermon on the Mount. But the literal citation in Mormon’s teaching of the familiar utterances of both Paul on
charity (cf. Moroni 7:45 with 1 Corinthians 13:4-7) and John on divine sonship (cf. Moroni 7:48 with 1 John 3:2-3)
can only be reconciled by assuming that such statements are so profound and memorable, which these in fact tend
to be, that Christ enunciated them himself and that in both Jerusalem and among the Nephites they were
subsequently passed from one generation of disciples to the next. Consistent with the statement in the New
Testament that “there are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I
suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written” (John 21:25), Mormon
asserts that “there cannot be written in this book even a hundredth part of the things which Jesus did truly teach
unto the people” (3 Nephi 26:6). The foregoing seems a plausible explanation, but, without it, credibility wouldóat
least for those who recognize and ponder such mattersóbe considerably strained.
In addition there is the weird and convoluted history of the Egyptian sarcophagi that Joseph Smith acquired from
the descendant of a sideshow entrepreneur and that contained papyri which, when translated, produced one of
the Church’s four sacred scriptures. And there is Sidney Rigdon’s prior experience with communal living among
the Campbellites and who, after he became the Church’s First Elder, probably urged Joseph to consider instituting
the law of consecration and stewardship or the United Order. Finally, the correspondences between the Masonic
ritual, to which Joseph Smith was initiated, and both the apparel and symbolic gestures of the endowment
ceremony in LDS temples are so strikingly similar that it is hard not to imagine that exposure to the one readily led
to the genesis of the other. Now that these circumstances have so fully come to light, it would ill serve the cause of

the Church to pretend they are not so. Both those within and without who know otherwise will expect their
recognition and further explanation, while those who learn of them from non-Mormon sources will risk even
greater disenchantment.
Indeed, to anyone who does not already have a personal appreciation of Joseph Smith’s spiritual nature, the
cosmic signi cance of his life and work, and their remarkable consequences in the lives of now millions of human
beings, the foregoing circumstances could hardly lead to anything but skepticism and the view that Joseph was a
brazen and fairly incautious plagiarizer with one of the most unbridled imaginations that ever found expression
among the children of men. Let us, therefore, as we can best discern them, take a reading of the other aspects of
Joseph Smith’s personality and behavior to determine how well these corroborate the notion that he was or was
not a charlatan, par excellence: First, a strong case can be madeóthough it does not establish the veracity of his
claimsóthat Joseph was basically innocent and deeply sincere. As a fourteen-year-old with, by present-day
standards, an extremely limited education and knowledge of the world at large, he was, upon entering the sacred
grove, ideally suited to become the transparent vessel for receiving and disseminating astoundingly pristine
principles which those more knowledgeable or steeped in Western theology were far more prone to qualify and
compromise. Such persons would also have been less inclined to seek answers from deity than to rely on both
already established authority and their own intellectual assumptions.
By contrast, from the moment of his hearing of the passage in James which prompted his inquiry about the true
church, the pattern emergesóso natural it seems profaneóthat no revelation, no inspiration would ever come to
Joseph without rst being prompted by some immediate stimulus which in turn impelled the recipient to inquire
about it by next petitioning deity. It is also worth noting that Joseph Smith did not always appear to have so fully
understood the import of the answers he received as those who came after him. What he expressly went to the
grove to learn was fully communicated: no existing churches were authorized by Jesus Christ and God the Father.
The overarching signi cance of their appearance as separate personages with glori ed anthropomorphic bodies
does not seem to have dawned on him, at least at the time, nearly so much as on subsequent Latter-day Saints.
This may be another reason why the First Vision was not recorded or even mentioned until some time later. Nor
did Joseph ever emphasize the fact that the nature of his experience in the grove, including his initial encounter
with the Powers of Darkness, was in the archetypal manner of trial and initiation, always in some isolated natural
setting, which the founders of previous dispensations appear to have undergone prior to receiving a divine
commission to embark on their respective missions. Both the endowment ceremony and the Pearl of Great Price
recount comparable incidents in the case of Adam, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, and Moses. The Old Testament
suggests something similar for Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph, as does the New Testament for Christ during his forty
days in the wilderness. But Joseph Smith never made anything of the parallel in his own instance. It is likely that it
did not even occur to him.
All of this tends to suggest that, far from exploiting a number of circumstances which might have served his
personal self-aggrandizement, the young Joseph was even naively oblivious to their possible implications. It makes
him seem far less a scheming manipulator of other men’s minds. Another area in which Joseph Smith seems less
than shrewd was in his uncompromising sense of urgency regarding the principles and practices that lost for him
the support of so many associates and made him and his movement, in the minds of their gentile neighbors in
Missouri and Illinois, so much more suspicious and threatening. His undeviating persistence in such matters led in
fact directly to his martyrdom. Chief among these was polygamy. As Hill points out, “Joseph seemed more and
more determined that the Saints accept the doctrine of celestial marriage as holy and necessary.” Citing Joseph F.
Smith, she adds, “as the late President George A. Smith repeatedly said, to me and others, ‘The Prophet seemed
irresistibly moved by the power of God to establish that principle, not only in theory in the hearts and minds of his

brethren, but in practice also, he himself having led the way.’ “4 Hill elsewhere asserts, “It never occurred to Joseph
and his followers that their teachings had given gross offense.”5
One of Joseph’s most endearing qualities was his magnanimity and generosity, his deep, impulsive affection for
others, particularly those of humble circumstances. T. Edgar Lyon has, for one, recounted a number of anecdotal
instances from reminiscences by various members in the early days of the Church.6 Joseph’s failure as a
storekeeper in Kirtland because he could not withhold credit from needy Saints is also well established. The
accounts of his great distress at the loss of those who died of cholera in Zion’s Camp and his joyous weeping on the
occasion of his own parents’ baptisms also attest to his sublime and expansive personal qualities. It is surely
meaningful that, knowing their son as only Joseph, Sr., and Lucy could, they and all his siblings were suf ciently
convinced of Joseph’s integrity, credibility, and claim to be a prophet. The great love and undeviating lifelong trust
in Joseph of such practical and worldly wise men as Heber C. Kimball and Brigham Young are also a strong
testimonial to his character; Brigham’s last dying wordsó”Joseph! Joseph!”óa poignant evocation. Hill’s sensitive
analysis further suggests to what extent the Prophet’s insistence on extended kinship and polygamous marriage
evinced an uncontainable Christlike love for all his fellowmen:
If the prophet’s teachings and the cohesiveness and comprehensiveness of his message are not ignored, it
must be recognized that his drive to establish polygamy was complex. It cannot be dismissed, as some
historians have tried to do, simply by the suggestion that he had excessive sexual needs. Neither is it
suf cient to say that Emma was worn out and frequently ill from the hard life of pioneering and
childbearing. Nor can it merely be called an aspect of his Old Testament orientation, nor be said to have
relieved his strict Puritan conscience which would not allow extra-marital sex, nor to have derived from a
wish not to dishonor the women he loved, nor to have been advice to cloak his proclivities by making
polygamy accepted by his community, although a case might be made to support each of these
assumptions. Account must be taken also of his enormous capacity to love, which has been made manifest
by scores of his contemporaries of both sexes and all ages, and of his wish to bind his loved ones to himself
forever, in this life, in the millennium and throughout eternity.7
Reading Hill’s account of the Prophet’s life further strengthens the impression that, upon leaving the grove and for
the rest of his life, Joseph never again knew a moment’s respite from either persecution or misunderstanding on
the part of his closest friends, even his wife, Emma. One unwittingly asks how he or anyone could have borne it and
still maintained all he did if he did not know with a surety that the cause he pursued was “well pleasing” in God’s
sight. The severe test of that saving knowledgeómentioned in the sixth Lecture on Faithówithout which we must
ultimately weary and fall short if we do not willingly sacri ce “all earthly things,” including our very lives, is
profoundly attested by the faithfulness and eventual martyrdom of the Prophet himself. That he fully knew what
he professed is nowhere so plainly, hence forcefully, asserted as in the Doctrine and Covenants 76:22-23: “And
now, after the many testimonies which have been given of him, this is the testimony, last of all, which we give of
him: That he lives! For we saw him, even on the right hand of God.”
It is dif cult not to contrast to him certain self-styled prophets who have arisen in our own dayóthe man named
Jones, for instance, who, in his nal desperate hour, could not succumb without taking with him in Napoleonic or
Hitlerian fashionó”AprËs moi le dÈluge“óhis followers. How unlike such men was Joseph, who knew how to roll up
his shirt-sleeves and shoulder more than his share of toil and whose life was worth nothing to him if not to his
friends.

Despite his claims to be the Lord’s vessel, Joseph was, in a number of instances, also remarkably self-effacing and
far more willing than most Latter-day Mormons to admit his own personal fallibility. On one occasion, according to
a gentile journalist, “he remarked that he had been represented as pretending to be a Savior, a worker of miracles,
etc. All this was false. . . . He was but a man, he said; a plain, untutored man; seeking what he should do to be saved. .
. . There was no violence, no fury, no denunciation. His religion appears to be a religion of meekness.”8
According to Hill:
John D. Lee reported that in 1840 he [Joseph Smith] said publicly that he had his failings, passions and
temptations to struggle against, just as had the greatest stranger to God, and that no man was justi ed in
submitting to his sinful nature. He did not want his followers to sanctify him. In a speech of May 21, 1843,
he said, “I have not an idea that there has been a great many very good men since Adam. . . . I do not want
you to think I am very righteous for I am not very righteous.” To keep his actions from being misconstrued,
Joseph frequently pointed out the difference between his behavior as a man and as a prophet. On one
occasion he told visitors to Nauvoo, “A prophet is only a prophet when he is acting as such.”9
In addition, there are in the Prophet’s teachings and public utterances a number of striking statements that
further convey his truly sublime understanding and espousal of the Greatest Commandment:
If you do not accuse each other, God will not accuse you. If you have no accuser you will enter heaven, and
if you will follow the revelations and instructions which God gives you through me, I will take you into
heaven as my back load. If you will not accuse me, I will not accuse you. If you will throw a cloak of charity
over my sins, I will over yoursófor charity covereth a multitude of sins.10
Nothing is so much calculated to lead people to forsake sin as to take them by the hand, and watch over
them with tenderness. When persons manifest the least kindness and love to me, O what power it has
over my mind, while the opposite course has a tendency to harrow up all the harsh feelings and depress
the human mind.11
You must enlarge your souls towards each other. . . . Let your hearts expand, let them be enlarged towards
others.12
The mind or the intelligence which man possesses is co-equal with God himself. . . . All the minds and
spirits that God ever sent into the world are susceptible of enlargement . . . so that they might have one
glory upon another.13
According to Truman Madsen, the critical and astute B. H. Roberts,
having gone word by word and line by line through the writings of Joseph Smith, and having read
everything he could nd on his life, . . . found Joseph Smith to be possessed of a deeper and richer
comprehension of Christ than anyone he had read in the Christian tradition since the apostles. Through
all Roberts’s buffetings and his intellectual probings, honing his own mind with the major gures in the
history of Western thought, this conviction never diminished. And as his extensive knowledge of the
alternatives increased, his conviction deepened: Joseph Smith told the truth, Joseph Smith was a prism of
the Lord Jesus Christ.14

If, as Paul cogently argued, Christ is the essential cornerstone in the foundation of the church that bears his name,
then Joseph Smith is as much the cornerstone of that church’s restoration. It follows that, besides the priesthood
and authority to which the restored Church makes unique claims; the several volumes of scripture and revelation
which came to light through him, particularly the Book of Mormon; and also the ordinances of initiation,
endowment, and sealing that take place in Latter-day Saint temples15 are essential buttresses to the foundation
and cornerstone of the restored Church. By way of internal evidence and striking compatibility with its purported
cultural matrix, Hugh Nibley’s extensive and provocative writings on the Book of Mormon leave much to
consider.16 In addition there are the aphorisms which, according to Madsen,17 Roberts thought “comparable in
their edge and insight not only to Biblical but also to Hindu and Chinese classics” and like them re ecting “the
moral wisdom of the ages” which only accumulates throughout millennia of life-and-death human experience.
Among such “trenchant sayings,” Roberts listed the following:
• Adam fell that men might be; and men are, that they might have joy (2 Nephi 2:25).
• It must needs be that there is an opposition in all things (2 Nephi 2:11).
• When ye are in the service of your fellow beings ye are only in the service of your God (Mosiah 2:17).
• See that ye bridle all your passions, that ye may be lled with love (Alma 38:12).
• Wickedness never was happiness (Alma 41:10).
• I give unto men weakness that they may be humble; . . . for if they humble themselves before me, and
have faith in me, then will I make weak things become strong unto them (Ether 12:27).
• Charity is the pure love of Christ, and it endureth forever (Moroni 7:47).
• Despair cometh because of iniquity (Moroni 10:22).18
I would expand Roberts’s list, in terms of a number of remarkable spiritual principles nowhere so fully or clearly
expounded as in the Book of Mormon. These include:
• the purpose and function of scripture (1 Nephi 19:23, 2 Nephi 6:5);
• an ongoing elucidation of Christ’s atonement as the central event in human history, including a powerful
explanation of the need for Christ’s passionóthat he might learn godly compassion for all mankind (Alma
7:12);
• the unequivocal identi cation of Christ as Jehovah, thus resolving the Jewish challenge to Christians
that the Old Testament deity pronounced himself “the Savior, and beside me there is no other” (3 Nephi
15:4-5; cf. also D&C 43:34; 76:1);
• an astoundingly sensible resolution of the faith-works controversy which has for so many centuries
divided Protestants and Catholics: both God’s grace and men’s works are necessary to salvation; they are
not mutually exclusive (2 Nephi 25:23);

• the accountability of adult human beings in every generation for their own lives and behavior, with
obvious implications for traditional views on Eve’s complicity and Adam’s Fall: “Adam fell that men might
be; and men are that they might have joy” (2 Nephi 2:11-25); on infant baptism (Moroni 8); and on the
terms, conditions, and consequences of our earthly probation (Alma 28:13-14);
• the nature of true charity (Mosiah 4);
• the quali cations for true discipleship (Mosiah 18; Alma 5; Alma 38:12);
• the nature and process of developing faith (Alma 32), discerning truth by the light of Christ (Moroni 7),
receiving a personal testimony (Moroni 10:3-5), and qualifying for sancti cation (Moroni 10:32-33).
How, one asks, could anyone who was either duplicitous or whose mind and heart were not in fact informed by the
Spirit presume to understand, let alone formulate, such a profound conception of the gospel?
As they reread the Book of Mormon, moreover, young missionaries readily identify with the personal struggles,
the attitudes and feelings of so many young prophets who embarked in great weakness upon comparable
proselyting ventures (cf. 2 Nephi 4:16-35; Enos; Alma 36). With its account of their exploits and the conversions
that followed those of these young proselyters, the Book of Mormon is, among other things, a great
prognosticator of the workings of faith and the attendant feelings experienced by many a latter-day missionary. It
is worth noting, however, that the Book of Mormon was translated and published before the latter-day church was
ever organized and its rst missionaries called. How could Joseph Smith so intimately know what missionary
experience was like before he had undertaken it himself? (It seems unlikely that his Grandfather Mack’s late
tracting, as a traditional Christian among fellow Christians, was nearly so compelling as the accounts of Ammon,
Alma, the sons of Mosiah, and others.) The book’s contrasting depiction of recalcitrants, the atavistic degeneration
of the ungodly, and the mentality of apostates and anti-Christs (cf. Alma 30:12-18) is, in twentieth-century terms,
also strikingly realistic. How deprived the world is without these additional role models and object lessons
afforded by the Book of Mormon.
With the Dead Sea scrolls, a variety of newly transcribed apocryphal sources, and his own research on the pyramid
texts in mind, Nibley argues that
the staggering prodigality of the gifts brought to mankind by Joseph is just beginning to appear as the
Scriptures he gave us are held up for comparison with the newly discovered or rediscovered documents
of the ancients purporting to come from the times and places he describes in those revelations. He has
placed in our hands fragments of writings from the leaders of all the major dispensations; and now, only in
very recent times, has the world come into possession of whole libraries of ancient texts against which his
purported scriptures can be tested.19
As Nibley also knows, these corroborative sources equally support the view that the teachings and ritual symbols
of the Latter-day Saint temple have antecedents which long predate Masonry. The endowment ceremony’s
glorious vision of each mortal’s potential for eternal exaltation and its culminating promise of eternal family union
are movingly enforced by ordinances which, by contrast with the Catholic Stations of the Cross, suggest wherein
Christ’s atonement was also a gesture of the truest, most endearing fellowship wherewith Christ can raise us to
him with ever more secure handholds as, by covenanting with him, we acknowledge and bene t from his ordeal
upon the cross. His passion and our salvation areóor can beóintimately one, culminating one day in his embracing

and welcoming us to his eternal kingdom as beloved heirs. Particularly signi cant among the temple’s several
ordinances is the initiatory anointing: Bearing in mind what each initiate is individually promised there and that the
Savior’s title “Christ” itself literally means “the anointed one,” it is no exaggeration, I believe, that with this most
important anointing we are in turn set apart to be “Saviors on Mount Zion,” with all that implies about our
consecrating ourselves ever after, consistently blessing others’ lives rather than in any way impeding their spiritual
progress, and in turn, throughout the eternities as literal joint-heirs, while realizing our individual divine potential,
enjoying a kind of existence, a fulness of challenge and self-ful llment, which mortals could not and never have
imagined. What could ever more profoundly commit and motivate us to be his faithful disciples? Such meaning,
which is the heart and purpose of all the rest, is quite absent in the mass as in the Masonic rite, by contrast a
somehow well-preserved but empty husk. Its occurrence in even more ancient fragments like the aforementioned
Egyptian rites; certain forms of Buddhist ritual; the Hopi kiva ceremony; the concept of Kundalini Yoga; the
consecration through washing, anointing, and garmenting described in the Hindu Satapatha-Brahmana Veda; an
apparent Judaic source for washing and anointing; and the veil motif in various Catholic churches20ónone of
which were known to Joseph Smithófurther corroborates its pristine origins.
So what was Joseph Smith? A facile or not-so-facile plagiarist? Or one so in touch with the spiritual essence in
otherwise earthly phenomena that, somehow divinely directed to it in the form of seerstones, sarcophagi, and
Masonry, he was also led to interpret and wrest from them a signi cance entirely alien to his culture and his times
but of astoundingly universal importófurther substantiating the notion that “all things denote there is a God; yea,
even the earth, and all things that are upon the face of it” (Alma 30:44)?21 Was Joseph Smith unusually naive and
impervious to the ways of men and to respectable, civilized religious tradition? A megalomaniac who would rework
it all to suit himself, in his own fashion? Or was he, by virtue of his youth and cultural isolation, still suf ciently
pliable and open to what for almost two thousand years God had waited to recall to men’s attention when their
social circumstances would once again allow such a cataclysmic intrusion in their settled affairs, their rationally
ordered but strictly temporal and self-serving alignments of secular, economic, ecclesiastical, and domestic forces?
Was Joseph Smith just unusually stubborn? Or was he faithful unto death, one of God’s few true martyrs? Was he
merely sentimental or lled, like few others, with Christlike love and a seer’s vision of mankind’s glorious potential
as God’s own offspring? For all Hill’s sound, instructive investigation into his lifeóa life not yet 150 years past with
roots and a social context not unlike that of many other English-speaking Americansówe seem no closer to a
satisfying answer than previously.
The only adequate con rmation must, it would seem, be a transcendent one. But how appropriate and how
needful that, point for point, Joseph’s authenticity as a prophet would elude and battle those who seek to
understand spiritual matters by strictly rational means. Was Joseph in this respect really so very different from the
many other prophets, including Christ, who were so often rejected by those closest to them? In the “man of
sorrows” versesówhich gure in the lyrics sung by John Taylor in Carthage JailóIsaiah says that the Lord “hath no
form nor comeliness; and when we shall see him, there is no beauty that we should desire him” (Isaiah 53:2). To his
contemporaries, Jesus’ teachings were hardly more popular than those of Elijah, who cried, “The children of Israel
have forsaken thy covenant, thrown down thine altars, slain thy prophets with the sword; and I, even I only, am left;
and they seek my life, to take it away” (1 Kings 19:14), or of Jeremiah, who complained, “The word of the Lord was
made a reproach unto me, and a derision, daily” (Jeremiah 20:8). Christ seemed less than surprised that this was
so: “Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who should betray him. And he said,
Therefore said I unto you, that no man can come unto me, except it were given him of my Father” (John 6:64-65).
Time and again he seems, almost deliberately, to provoke those who are inclined to take offense at his words: “I am
the living bread” (John 6:51), he asserts, insisting that “Except ye eat the esh of the Son of man, and drink his

blood, ye have no life in you” (John 6:53). “From that time,” we are told, “many of his disciples went back, “(John
6:66).
Is this frustrating circumstance not itself an archetypal substantiation which every prophet, including Joseph, was
understandably anxious to avoid but could not? The austere, “unnatural” nature of a prophet is again well
characterized by Isaiah:
Then said I, Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a
people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts. Then ew one of the seraphims
unto me, having a live coal in his hand, which he had taken with the tongs from off the altar: And he laid it
upon my mouth, and said, Lo, this hath touched thy lips; and thine iniquity is taken away, and thy sin
purged. Also I heard the voice of the Lord, saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for us? Then said I,
Here am I; send me. And he said, Go, and tell this people, Hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye
indeed, but perceive not. Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes;
lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and convert, and
be healed. Then said I, Lord, how long? And he answered, Until the cities be wasted without inhabitant,
and the houses without man, and the land be utterly desolate (Isaiah 6:5-11).
Persons so commissioned do not put the majority of men at ease and traditionally are often exiled or stoned.
Joseph was one of these.
Whenever a prophet arises in any given generation, moreover, he is often least recognized by those who are most
attached to the prophets who preceded him. When the Pharisees taunted Christ for blasphemy, he reminded
them that in their cherished Torah their revered fathers had been told, “Ye are gods” (John 10:33-36; Psalm 82:6).
Perhaps we too should make sure that whatever tends to violate our immediate sense of what is proper and
appropriate not preclude our better perception of as yet unapprehended, ultimate truth. By analogy with the way
we rst reacted to sex and the design of our bodies, we might well expect other realities to shock us. Carl Sagan
vividly describes with what tenacity and courage Johannes Kepler nally came to recognize that the orbits of the
planets were elliptical and not, as seemed to everyone till then, indisputably circular. Of himself, Kepler said, “The
truth of nature which I had rejected and chased away, returned by stealth through the back door, disguising itself
to be accepted. . . . Oh, what a foolish bird I have been.”22 And Sagan adds: “The Thirty Years’ War obliterated his
grave. If a marker were to be erected today, it might read, in homage to his scienti c courage: ‘He preferred the
hard truth to his dearest illusions.’ “23 In this regard one similarly recalls the statement of the renowned historian
of Renaissance Italy, Jacob Burkhardt: “The denial of complexity is the essence of tyranny,” and the deep moral
which underlies the otherwise seemingly frivolous poem by Shakespeare’s contemporary, Robert Herrick:
A sweet disorder in the dress Kindles in clothes a wantonness: A lawn about the shoulders thrown Into a
ne distraction: An erring lace, which here and there Enthralls the crimson stomacher: A cuff neglectful,
and thereby Ribbands to ow confusedly: A winning wave (deserving note) In the tempestuous petticoat:
A careless shoe-string, in whose tie I see a wild civility Do more bewitch me, than when art Is too precise
in every part.24
Life is doubtless so wonderful because it is so much more novel than our limited minds and imaginations would
have it be.

Meanwhile, the claims made by and for Joseph Smith are themselves so novel, so distinctive, their implications so
universally profound, that no one can afford to be indifferent or avoid their serious, unbiased investigation.
Truman Madsen intimates their import as he discusses the sense of limitless multiplicity and ever-expanding, ever
more enriching interpersonal relationships and opportunities for self-realization which, in key phrases like the
promise of “eternal lives,” attended the Prophet’s eternal vision.25 Madsen has acutely perceived wherein Joseph
Smith’s teachings resolve a number of otherwise perturbing age-old philosophical questions: the paradox of God’s
in nite nature; the egoism-altruism controversy; the relativity versus absolutism of Divine Will; the doctrine of
Adam’s “wounding fall” and man’s consequently de cient merit for salvation: “God has to save us though we don’t
deserve it”; man’s corrupt mortal nature, ostensibly precluding the possibility of divine potential in human beings;
and so forth.26 Among the many false dichotomies inherited by Western secular and religious thought since
Platonic idealism reversed the astounding insights of sixth-century B.C. Ionians are indeed the oppressive notions
of disparity between what is material and spiritual, emotional and intellectual, human and divine. By contrast,
Joseph Smith’s expanding vision restores a sense of true eternity (including a premortal existence and the
coeternality of intelligences); affords a sense of relevant human spiritual history which, in terms of priesthood,
ordinances, and revealed doctrine, extends through the dispensations from Adam, rather than effectively from the
meridian of time, as with most Christianity; similarly accounts for the spiritual history of both Eastern and
Western hemispheres; sacralizes the secular, subjecting all human experience, including health and marriage, to
eternal laws and positioning the Earth’s ultimate transformation into a celestial sphere; binds the human family in
ties of eternal kinship, literally turning “the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to
their fathers” (Malachi 4:6); links man to God as his literal heir and thus enables man to know and live for a glorious
eternal destiny of divine promise. Finally, with Joseph Smith’s perspective and vision, faith and reason are no
longer unalterably opposed, and the role of Evil as a necessary counterpoint to Good dispels the dilemma of
theodicy, guaranteeing that, as an always extant intelligence, man is not only fully accountable for his fate but ever
free and obligated to choose.
As Nibley puts it, Joseph gave us “a choice between nothing or somethingóand what a something!”27 As we
ponder that something’s seeming strangeness, we might pro tably consider the criteria which the Savior
suggested in his own behalf: “The same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me” (John
5:36); “Had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me: for he wrote of me” (John 5:46); “If any man will do his
will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself” (John 7:17). John
TayloróJoseph Smith’s counselor, witness to his martyrdom, and his eventual successor (after Brigham Young) as
prophet, seer, and revelatoródeclared in 1853, “If there is any truth in heaven, earth, or hell, I want to embrace it. I
care not what shape it comes in to me, who brings it, or who believes in it, whether it is popular or unpopular.”28 C.
S. Lewis elaborates:
Another thing I’ve noticed about reality is that, besides being dif cult, it’s odd: it isn’t neat, it isn’t what you
expect. . . . Reality, in fact, is always something you could not have guessed. That’s one of the reasons I
believe in Christianity. It’s a religion you could not have guessed. If it offered us just the kind of universe
we’d always expected, I’d feel we were making it up. . . . It has just that queer twist about it that real things
have. So let’s leave behind all these boys’ philosophiesóthese over-simple answers. The problem isn’t
simple and the answer isn’t going to be simple either. . . . Either this man was, and is, the Son of God, or else
a madman or something worse. . . . But don’t let us come with any patronizing nonsense about his being a
great human teacher. He has not left that open to us. . . . I’m trying here to prevent anyone from saying
that really silly thing that people often say about Him: ‘I’m ready to accept Jesus as a great moral teacher,
but I don’t accept His claim to be a God.’ That is the thing we must not say. A man who was merely a man

and said the sort of things Jesus said, would not be a great moral teacher. He’d be either a lunaticóon the
level with the man who says he’s a poached eggóor else he’d be the Devil of Hell.29
These words apply in a lesser measure to Joseph Smith or any true prophet! “In the vocabulary of any relevant
faith there is bound to be the ‘word’ of desperation, as well as of expectancy.”30 As I, a humanist, address this body
of, among others, historiansósome, like myself, believers in Joseph Smith’s prophetic claims, who sometimes doubt
despite their desires; some, skeptics who perhaps at times are overwhelmed and wistful to believe “if it were only
true”ówhat I would now like to say is simply this: to remind you and myself that matters of faith and religion are, by
de nition, fraught with logical uncertainty and that we can never disprove or prove their claims of authenticity,
however absurd or repulsive certain features may strike us on the one hand, or however consistent,
comprehensive, and edifying they may seem to us on the other. So we should stop trying. If we are really
professional, we will, when addressing such phenomena, dissociate ourselves from whatever prejudices and
presuppositions to which we are viscerally inclined. Or we will at least try to. It may also help to remind ourselves
that, in whatever we ultimately place our credence, we have, as Hans K¸ng would say, consciously chosen to do so,
and also that choice is unavoidable: Not to choose is itself a choice.31 Therefore, meaningful conversion to any
religious propositionóeven its rejectionóinvolves a freely and consciously willed personal choice and a
commitment to a particular metaphysical worldview. This is not to say that one’s choice and commitment should
not rest upon the very best, most conceivably rewarding, and spiritually redeeming grounds. And my purpose here
has been to remind us all in the express instance of Joseph Smith just how redeeming are those grounds despite
some appearances to the contrary. Nor is this to deny the importance of transcendental witness and spiritual
con rmation, or that they are possible. They are, after all, the essential epistemological component of all religion.
The Apostle Paul said, “the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto
him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned” (1 Corinthians 2:14). The logical man, the
scholar, as such, is the natural man of whom Paul spoke. No scholar is objectively equipped either to dismiss or to
verify the things of the spirit, at least not in this life. No scholar is objectively equipped to call Joseph Smith either
“a conscious fraud” or, by implication, an unconscious one.
On the other hand, any commitment of faith which fosters reverence for the source of lifeóaf rms life itself and
the special signi cance of the life in every individual, sustains hope, and encourages decency and goodnessóis
sacred and deserves our respect. Moreover, when we too freely begin to prescribe what we think is best for a
given religion, though it be in the light of what we consider most reasonable and just, we are no longer submitting
our mind and will to that of the Lord but subjecting it to our own instead. And that, however enlightened, is no
longer religion.
I was recently introduced to the community of Russian Old Believers, ve thousand strong, in Oregon’s
Willamette Valley. Since the seventeenth century these people have maintained a tight-knit community whose
every activity and codi ed gesture is permeated with devotion to the gospel of Christ and whose families are
strongly bonded by that devotion. To maintain their identity they have variously migrated from Russia to points as
distant as Turkey, mainland China, Brazil, Argentina and, more recently, the United States. But does it lessen any
the beauty and the nobility of their way of life to know that it originated during a dispute we would consider
downright silly? In the 1600s their ancestors broke away from the of cial Russian Church because, among other
things, its patriarch proclaimed that (as in Greek Orthodoxy from which Russian Orthodoxy derived its beliefs and
customs) three ngers should be used in crossing oneself instead of two and not two but three hallelujahs chanted
in the liturgy. In terms of this earlier historical precedent, the Old Believers and all the Russians before them were
seemingly in the wrong and, for their fanatical insistence on Old Russian ritual, were ever after severely ostracized

and persecuted. Yet centuries later and despite their concomitant sense of superiority and exclusiveness, we can
admire, even envy, the way their religion so profoundly informs, sustains, and integrates their individual and
communal existence. If Mormons tend to put others off because of a similar sense of exclusivenessóand they doóit
is really no different. As Kenneth Cragg avers, “With religions comparative, one becomes comparatively religious.
Decisive faith appears unnecessary or intolerant.”32 And insofar as that goes, I would reiterate Ed Ashment’s quite
fairly posed rhetorical question: “Why must the LDS Church stand or fall on the basis of ‘scienti c evidence,’ while
it is not felt necessary for other denominations to be subjected to such rigorous testing?”33 In all fairness the
Mormon Church’s both “unprovable” and “undisprovable” origins deserve the same open-ended recognition by
scholars as those of any other religionónone of which, including the pristine Christian Church, has a more
authoritatively reliable foundation in secular terms.
But all we have considered so far has at least been couched in a comfortable Christian context. What about the
other world religions in which Christ does not supremely gureóthose “other guides than ours to life and meaning”
which, as in the case of too many a so-called Christian, “have not, for the most part, been options freely chosen . . .
but rather denominators of birth and culture, of language and geography”?34 How ought we to address them,
without feeling threatened, yet without condescension? As Cragg, an Anglican specialist, asserts in his The
Christian and Other Religion, “The art of loyalty and the art of relationship must be understood and practiced, as
complementary. . . . Here . . . we have to do with felt and lived religious meaning, rather than with its abstraction
into ‘ism.’ “35 Cragg further pleads
the case of reverence for reverence and the need to penetrate faiths as their insiders know them, if there
is to be hope of reciprocal awareness. This does not mean a sentimentality oblivious of the compromises
or the crimes of which religions have been guilty. But realism has its positive duties, too, and the rst of
these is a hospitable mind.36
No less should be expected of those who take it upon themselves to study the origins, its founding prophet, or any
other aspect of Mormonism. Again, in Cragg’s words:
A particular beginning is as inescapable in any religion, as in any philosophy. One cannot start
presuppositionless. What matters is that the point of departure ful lls itself in where it leads. To end
authentically is to vindicate one’s beginning, and this is what the Christian claims of his Old Testament
indebtedness.37
But to those who in their turn selectively handle Mormon history and discourage our probing it in a number of
areas in order to “gild” the Church’s “lily,” one needs to say (or at least ask): Haven’t we been, if anything, overly
cautious, overly mistrustful, overly condescending to a membership and a public who are far more perceptive and
discerning than we often give them credit for? Haven’t we, in our care not to offend a soul or cause anyone the
least misunderstanding, too much deprived such individuals of needful occasions for personal growth and more indepth life-probing experience? In our neurotic cautiousness, our fear of venturing, haven’t we often settled for an
all too shallow and con ning common denominator that insults the very Intelligence we presume to glorify and is
also dishonest because, deep down, we all know better? Isn’t our intervention often too arbitrary, re ecting the
hasty, uninformed reaction of only one or a couple of in uential objectors? Don’t we in the process too severely
and needlessly test the loyalty and respect of and lose credibility with many more than we imagine? Isn’t there a
tendency among us, bred by the fear of displeasing, to avoid healthy self-disclosureópublic or privateóand to
pretend about ourselves to ourselves and others, and doesn’t this in turn breed loneliness and make us, more than

it should, strangers to each other? And when we are too calculating, too self-conscious, too mistrustful, too
prescriptive, and too regimental about our roots and about one another’s aesthetic, intellectual, and spiritual life,
aren’t we self-defeating?
Ultimately we only come to understand the things of greatest worth through Christlike love: The nature of truth
lies not in knowledge, but in love. If we would constantly keep this in mind we would not fear exposure or what
others could ever say about us. We would have more con dence in the redeeming light we’ve been given. We
would fearlessly let it shine, and it would convince othersóhow many more others?ódespite themselves and their
own feeble logic. The rest would not matter. If our own faith were only not so feeble. And if we were also that
righteous. But, forgetting, we become extremely wary and reticent to be fully disclosing, to the point that we are
discouraged from much alluding to even so familiar and fundamental a feature of the Mormon past as polygamy. It
may not be prudent to disseminate problematic historical facts or freely allude to every complex and dif cult reallife circumstance. We justly resent the common imputation by so many elsewhere that present-day polygamous
cults and their frequently deranged, gangland-style leaders are part and parcel of the mainstream Church. But it is
equally ineffective to suppress the ostensible facts or to intimidate those who know of, and are attempting to be
reconciled to, them. Suspicion, mistrust, the leveling of intellectual expectations, the condescending slanting of
available data will not do. Instead, credibility indeed suffers and the unwarranted idolization of other human
beings, even divinely elected persons, prevents us from loving them as much as we might if we knew them better,
together with the traditions we associate with them. That is surely even more the case for those who do not
particularly cherish such persons and traditionsóin other words, those we would most like to interest in them. It
also offers a eld day to those who wish to disparage what we hold sacred, the implication being that, the more we
deny some things or appear to, the more we must ourselves harbor serious doubts and have something to hide.
If we cannot afford to investigate and face up to the “if only likely” facts, as these come to our attention, and must
instead be content with the most favorable and safe, the most stereotypical generalizations, are we not, besides
cheating ourselves of a more approximate and more real acquaintance with the persons and events in question,
submitting to self-deceptionómuch as have the socialist masses to Marxist theory and propaganda, to an inevitably
one-sided explanation which, deep down, no thinking Marxist believes? The dilemmas are not only historical. They
abound, as they always have, in the context of our contemporary social and institutional life. What is needed is, in
the rst order, a willingness to be more open and honest, more self-disclosing about our doubts and fears. The
consequence of doing so is not necessarily, as some suspect, the dissolution of faith. And here I fully agree with
Professor Foster that it need not “reduce the sense of mystery, awe and power in Mormonism.”38 Indeed all that
the Prophet Joseph ever suggested regarding “unrighteous dominion” (e.g., D&C 121:37) seems most applicable
here, particularly in terms of our need for, and right to, personal intellectual inquiry. No, life and religion are not so
simplistic. God’s ways are not ours. Reality (with a capital “R”) is indeed paradoxical and full of surprises. Our best
attempts to make it seem respectable, predictable, and homogenized in fact avoid and even thwart the necessity to
come to know and believe it alone through the witness that transcends and surpasses our natural capacity for
comprehension, and that is a very personal undertaking. We cannot, moreover, possibly force ourselves to agree
with what we cannot con dently grasp or with what disturbs our conscience. To pretend otherwise is to live a lie.
What, along with our faith, we are intellectually in need of is an essential empiricism, which allows for, in fact,
prescribes the prudent holding in balance of seemingly contradictory phenomena and the statements made about
them. This is an approach which, admittedly, the mainstream members of few, if any, ethnic groups are ever
encouraged to consider. But for those confronted by the dilemmas others manage to ignore, it can make a critical
difference. Here are the perceptive comments of a returned missionary and graduate student:

My mission was a glorious experience: I may say, without boasting, that I did some amazing things, rare
things, miraculous things, because I realized that no one but me could be the judge and director of my
work; yet that realization made me sometimes feel alone, almost existentially “nauseated” with the
freedom and ensuing responsibilities I had. When the sky is the limit (and not 60 hours proselyting time),
then you realize, not without a great deal of fear and trembling, that you alone determine the success you
will have, and not that success automatically follows cheerful, but unthinking, obedience. In light of all
that, then, I think my question is: How do you, in the environment where obedience operates in a causal
fashion, try to instill a sense of the awesome freedom and responsibility each individual missionary has?
Or perhaps that is a sacred, and therefore ineffable, secret, that only those nd out who need to. I
suppose many of my companions never felt such an emotion, not to their loss, they are just different. . . .
Did I go too far in the mission eld to realize that obedience and visible results are not causally connected,
that I was horri cally free? Do I go too far now when I realize that though I have the gospel, there are still .
. . an awful lot of subtleties I must supply for myself? That I ask these questions suggests I do not think
there is a simple answer.
Note these further remarks by a recent convert and returned missionary:
To assume that paradox can be avoided seems naive. There is no question of if, but only of when members
of the Church will be confronted and confused by paradox. . . . Is the confusion and insecurity caused by
confronting paradox any greater than that caused by confronting family and friends (as a convert) and
feeling all their negative social pressure? Is it any greater than the confusion and insecurity produced
when the investigator with his shaky new-found faith has to confront his temptations and weaknesses and
overcome them to live the commandments? And if paradox is avoided, can a meaningful conversion take
place? Con dence and conversion occur after the trials of our faith, and if we avoid certain trials, what
does that tell us about our con dence in the Lord and ourselves, as well as the . . . [depth] of our
conversion?
If we do not feel called upon to walk such a razor’s edge, we may, as certain information even inadvertently comes
to our awareness, be called upon to do so. How likely is it, for those who become so exposed but lack suf cient
training and sophistication, that coping will be at all successful, let alone easy? For those already exposed (an
increasing number), howówithout violating their innermost integrityócan such informationóeven if it is largely
secondary and, like all other earthly information, incomplete and subject to further quali cationóbe ignored and
not somehow reconciled? Only weeks ago I received a pamphlet from the ex-Mormons for Jesus which was
intended to disturb me with respect to the correspondences between Masonry and the endowment ceremony.
How grateful I was that I had already read a transcript of the Masonic rite and was already reconciled to the strong
possibility of syncretism in the founding of the Church and of this being revelation nonetheless. But those who
dare not entertain that possibility could easily be “thrown” by the surface truth in such assertions.
We have mentioned “exclusiveness,” but, however exclusively right for him the true believer must view his
particular faith, he has no right to assume that those in other traditions do not have as valid and meaningful an
access to transcendent virtue and inspiration. If, with all our soul, we are inclined to witness to what is “virtuous,
lovely, or of good report or praiseworthy” (Article of Faith 13)óhence sublimely trueóin our own spiritual
experience, we should also rejoice when anyone else can so witness for his. This applies both to believer and critic.
As Cragg puts it, “only an instinctive courtesy can save him . . . from precipitate judgments where rich issues will be
impatiently foreclosed. He must beware the instinct to set simplicity (his) over against evasion (theirs).”39 I have

cited Cragg so extensively because there are lessons here that many of us need. Mormons so rarely see things this
wayóor their critics.
“Dogma,” Cragg insists,
often thought of as defensive, preservative, even clinical, ensuring truth, must be seen also as hospitable
and inviting. Frontiers that need guards and guardians also enclose areas in which liberties are secured.
Faith, as credally de ned, is a territory to inhabit, a house to occupy, as well as a fence to maintain and a
wall to build. What matters is that habitation should be open to prospectives as well as defensible to
inhabitants. Doctrine means invitation to discovery as well as warning against deviation. . . . The deep
sense the Christian must surely feel . . . that he is in trust with truth he has no mandate to barter but only
to serve and to share, must always be paramount. The question about witness is not Whether? but How?
There must be no evasion of issues. . . . But they must be appropriately joined. This means that they must
be allowed to emerge within, rather than merely against, the intimate meanings and preoccupations of the
other man’s world. An alert sense of the relevance to us and to our witness, of what otherwise we might
be minded to dismiss or to dispute, is truly consistent with the positive and inward loyalties of Christian
doctrine. . . . In so far as religions are cultures . . . with legacies of pride and tradition, the lesson is clear. It is
when they are allowed their cultural selves that they can best reach beyond themselves. It is when they
are consciously under threat that they are suspiciously isolated in temper. It is only when we are allowed
our own humanity that we seek an inclusive humanness. Reciprocal courtesy is, therefore, the wisest, as
well as the truest, prescript for relationship. . . . Relevance in any religion is relevance for all. While they
may be deliberately separate in their ndings, they are common in their human habitation. Perhaps the
largest test of their integrity is their integrity about each other. . . . The mystery of evil is not solved but
dissolved, if there is no liability to accuse.40
Or as Nibley might say to the narrowness on either side, “A plague on both your houses.”
The intent of this paper has simply been to point out those aspects of Joseph Smith’s biography which argue in his
favor as opposed to those which imply he was a charlatan; to list the remarkable theological concepts which
constitute his immensely comprehensive and, at least for his followers, edifying system of thought; to suggest to
what extent that system profoundly explicates and interprets the already extant Christian gospel; and nally to
observe how his enigmatic character and the common response to it in fact parallel what we know of others whom
we have traditionally cast in the prophetic mold. These matters are not intended as testimony, though they may, of
course, be witnessed to in a more personal and subjective manner. The enigmas and controversies that invariably
arise as, with Donna Hill, we view the prophet’s earthly record, nevertheless tend to suggest that few can be
totally indifferent or dispassionate toward Joseph Smith and the claims of the restored Church and that where, for
whatever reason, people resist them, they also tend to draw their own often unwarranted conclusionsóa kind of
testimony by default.
“No man knows [his] history”óso why should any historian? We can view Joseph Smith with great con dence, but
only when assisted by the Spirit and by thoughtfully weighing all he has given us. As we do so, may we, like
Johannes Kepler, always prefer “the hard truth” to “our dearest illusions.”
Notes
This was presented at the Mormon History Association meetings on 7 May 1982 in Ogden, Utah.
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Utopia and Garden:
The Relationship of Candide to Laxness's Paradísarheimt
George S. Tate
I have heard Hugh Nibley tell how he used to ride his bicycle from Provo to Spanish Fork in order to learn Icelandic
and to acquire books from members of the Icelandic community, which was founded in 1855—the oldest
continuous Icelandic settlement in North America. In several of his early articles on political theory, Dr. Nibley
cites customs and institutions (e.g., the war arrow, the Althing, and so forth) in Icelandic sagas and historical texts
to illustrate his arguments.1 This fascination has been passed on to his son, Michael, who took two courses in Old
Icelandic from me some years ago. Because of these interests and also because Dr. Nibley has at times shown a
marvelous capacity for earnest satire, it seemed to me an appropriate contribution to his Festschrift to discuss a
novel about Mormons by Iceland’s Nobel laureate, Halldór Laxness, which is set partly in Spanish Fork and is
in uenced both by the Icelandic sagas and by Voltaire’s satiric masterpiece Candide.
∗

∗

∗

Although an author’s decision to translate a work by a writer of another age or nationality may not be the
surest indication of his own view of the relative importance of the work in the span of world literature, it is at
least evidence of serious appreciation—perhaps, even, an acknowledgment of apprenticeship. One thinks,
for example, of Baudelaire’s translation of Poe, Hofmannsthal’s of Molière, Lundkvist’s of D. H. Lawrence,
and Nabokov’s of Pushkin. It is worth noticing, therefore, that except for his Icelandic translations of several
Danish novels by his fellow countryman Gunnar Gunnarsson, Halldór Laxness has translated only two major
works in over sixty years of literary productivity—both of these in the war years of the early 1940s:
Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms, which he published as Vopnin kvödd in 1941, and Voltaire’s Candide,
which he translated in twelve days late in 1943 and published under the title Birtíngur (Optimist) in 1945.2
Hallberg, Bergsveinsson, and others have examined Hemingway’s in uence on the development of Laxness’s style.
In the preface to Vopnin kvödd, Laxness himself implies this in uence in his discussion of the similarity between
Hemingway’s terse telegraphic style and the laconic style of the sagas. Hallberg argues that Laxness’s translation
of Hemingway’s novel is the corollary to his contemporaneous editing of several of the sagas, using modern
Icelandic spelling. Both of these activities of the early 1940s were, he suggests, preparations for the new terse,
objective, nonsentimental style forged in Íslandsklukkan (Bell of Iceland), which rst appeared in 1943.3
Little has been written, though, on the possibility of Voltaire’s in uence on Laxness. Sønderholm identi es as
Voltairean the praise of daily labor for one’s livelihood with which Laxness concludes his rst novel Barn
náttúrunnar (Child of Nature, 1919), but this is his only mention of Voltaire.4 In his critical study Skaldens hus, Peter
Hallberg limits his discussion of Voltaire’s in uence on Laxness to the gestation of Íslandsklukkan, noting some
similarity between certain military experiences of Candide and Laxness’s hero Jón Hreggvidsson—forcible
induction, drills, attempted desertion, and punishment.5 Beyond this, Hallberg suggests that “Voltaire’s little book
may have contributed a detail or two to the milieu description” of Laxness’s novel, which is set in roughly the same
period, but he does not specify what these details might be.6
The scope of the inquiry needs now to be extended, however, for it is not in Barn náttúrunnar or in Íslandsklukkan
but in his Mormon novel Paradísarheimt, which appeared ve years after his winning of the Nobel Prize, that one
nds the greatest in uence of Voltaire on Laxness’s oeuvre. Indeed, our understanding of this novel is
considerably heightened when it is read against Candide. Even though over fteen years elapsed between his
translation of Candide and the publication of Paradísarheimt, Laxness has indicated that he began wrestling with

the ideas that led to Paradísarheimt as early as 1927, that is, that the novel had begun to take shape in his mind
even before he translated Candide.7 René Hilleret, in the preface to the French translation of Paradísarheimt,
comments in passing on the Voltairean quality of Laxness’s irony: “Et il est impossible, tant par le style que par
l’ironie souriante, mais au fond féroce, de ne pas comparer Laxness î Voltaire, au Voltaire ennemi acharné de
l’intolérance, mère du fanatisme.”8 But no one, to my knowledge, has explored the structural and thematic
correspondences between Paradísarheimt and Candide.
It will be useful to the subsequent discussion to summarize brie y the plot of Laxness’s novel and to identify its
main source. Paradísarheimt tells of a simple Icelandic farmer, Steinar, who dreams of obtaining the Promised Land
for his children. Recalling tales of the muni cence of Viking kings, from whom he is descended, he rst hopes to
purchase a promised land in the form of property by giving a wonder-pony, symbol of his children’s sense of the
marvelous, to the Danish prince when the royalty visit Iceland in 1874 for the millennial celebration of the
founding of the country. But for his efforts he is only invited to visit the royal palace in Copenhagen where he
receives, rather than a kingdom, autographed photographs, which he later trades for four cobbler’s needles. At the
assurance of Bishop Thjódrekur, a Mormon missionary whom he had met in Iceland and now in Denmark, that the
Promised Land of God has been established in Utah, Steinar sets out on the second part of his quest and remains
in Utah, only partly assimilated into the Mormon community in Spanish Fork, awaiting the arrival of his wife and
children who, in his absence, have been physically and economically exploited. His wife dies aboard ship; Steinar
feels estranged from his children who arrive having long since thought him dead. With unarticulated
disappointment, he returns to Iceland as a missionary, eventually making his way back to the old farm whence he
began his quest. In the nal scene he is laying stone upon stone, mending the broken walls of the derelict farm.
The overall plot of the novel is based on the writings of Eiríkur Ólafsson á Brúnum (1832-1900), a colorful gure
and rather well-known writer of naive travel books and other autobiographical pieces, who became a Mormon in
1881. In his rst travel book, Eiríkur tells how he sold a horse to the prince of Denmark during the millennial
celebration in 1874 and how he went to Denmark and was received by the royalty who gave him autographed
photographs. In 1879 Eiríkur, who was born at Hlíd, the setting of Steinar’s farm, moved to Mosfellssveit (where
Laxness grew up) and there became a Mormon, convinced initially by Thórdur Didriksson’s adaptation of Parley P.
Pratt’s A Voice of Warning (which he bought for a bottle of cheap brandy) and nally moved to join the Church by
“the unjusti ed hatred heaped upon the Mormons.”9 He and his family traveled to Utah in 1881 (his wife died in
Nebraska on the way); he stayed in Spanish Fork for eight years, lling one mission to Iceland, before leaving the
Church and returning to Iceland for good in 1889. His second travel book and several shorter pieces document
these experiences.10
Voltaire’s in uence is less immediately apparent. The rst point of correspondence between Candide and
Paradísarheimt concerns genre: both works take their bearings from the picaresque tradition, and both are
characterized by a tension between this tradition and other generic norms. Voltaire, as is well known, disliked the
novels of sentiment and adventure that ourished in the eighteenth century. He developed his own narrative form,
the conte philosophique, in a different direction. As Bottiglia de nes it, the philosophic tale “is a ctitious prose
narrative wherein theme molds all the other component elements (action, character, setting, diction, etc.) into a
stylized, two-dimensional, emotionally sublimated demonstration.”11 The form has “a serious purpose of social
satire or philosophic truth veiled beneath surface pleasantry and brilliance” and “a pervasive ironical tone
pungently avored with realism of detail.”12 But what is interesting about Candide, among the other philosophic
tales, is that Voltaire commingles the conte philosophique and the picaresque novel, appropriating the latter in

order to parody it and turn it against itself through ironic imitation.13 As Pierre de St. Victor has written, “C’est une
destruction de la forme par la forme même.”14
Generic tension works at several levels in Paradísarheimt. In his essay on “The Origins of Paradise Reclaimed,”
Laxness refers to the simple travel accounts of Eiríkur á Brúnum, Steinar’s historical prototype, as “a crude
picaresque story.”15 Laxness seems not only to have perceived the picaresque quality of Eiríkur’s narratives, but
also the ironic possibilities of the picaresque in his other model, Candide. Sigurdur Magnússon has commented
that Paradísarheimt “is not constructed like a novel,” that it is a kind of “ loso sk lignelse” (“philosophical parable”;
cf. conte philosophique), and that it is closely related to the picaresque novel in that there is a moral developed
through irony and humor.16 The picaresque form is at best a tenuous vehicle for the representation of a quest for
a philosophical ideal, but Laxness—ever the ironist whose creative energy thrives on a tension between humor and
pathos—playfully undermines the seriousness of Steinar’s quest for the Promised Land by drawing upon a further
narrative paradigm: the “Lucky Hans” folktale in which a simple-minded peasant sets out to market with a horse,
barters for items of increasingly smaller value (for a sheep, a dog, and so forth), is easily persuaded to foolish
decisions, and, returning home with only some cobbler’s needles for his efforts, loses these as he fords a stream.17
Voltaire had parodied the picaresque novel, it is true, but he had also used it to ironize his own philosophical
inquiry; Laxness compounds the genres of novel, philosophic parable, picaresque narrative, and naive folktale in a
way that at once enhances and undermines the seriousness of his subject.
In speci cs of plotting, Paradísarheimt and Candide differ more than they resemble each other, but in overall design
—beginning, middle, and end—they are remarkably similar. Both begin in a garden of childlike innocence; in the
course of their peregrinations the protagonists of both—notable for their honest judgment and great simplicity of
heart—visit a utopia; and at the end both af rm useful activity in a garden, a garden which stands in some
contrastive relationship to the utopia. As long as Candide’s early experience is limited to the microcosm of the
Castle of Thunder-ten-tronckh, the sententious pronouncement of Pangloss, “the greatest philosopher in the
province and consequently in the entire world,”18 that this is the best of all possible worlds makes perfectly good
sense. Candide listens intently and believes implicitly, “with all the good faith of his age” and innocence.19 Voltaire
drives home the point of this protected garden by referring to the castle and its environs as the “paradis
terrestre,”20 out of which Candide is driven when he is found embracing Cunegonde.
Similarly, Steinar’s little farm is a garden of innocence. The emphasis falls on a sense of continuity with the
historical and legendary past and on the innocent wonder of childhood. Even the adults have “the same expression
as children” and “their tribulations [are] as natural to them as the sorrows of childhood.”21 Whereas the optimist
Pangloss had urged his position on a receptive audience, here his momentary counterpart, District Magistrate
Benediktsson, whom Laxness calls an “idealist,” urges Steinar, who has fostered a sense of the marvelous in his
children: “Never sell your children’s fairy tales.”22 And Steinar himself is heard to say, “The whole point is . . . that
when the world ceases to be miraculous in the eyes of our children, then there is very little left.”23
After a variety of adventures and misadventures dotted here and there by sea travels and a journey across
America (South for one and North for the other), both heroes arrive in a utopia—Candide in Eldorado and Steinar
in “God’s City of Zion” in Utah. There are many points of correspondence between these two utopias: In both, the
visitors are given a guided tour of the city; in both, material prosperity is seen as a sign of God’s special favor and
as substantiation of Truth. In Eldorado, “the countryside was tended for pleasure as well as pro t; everywhere the

useful was joined to the agreeable.”24 In Zion, Pastor Runólfur tells Steinar: “You forget that every single thing
contains a higher concept—good broth no less than a pair of topboots; the Greeks called this the Idea. It is this
spiritual and eternal quality in all existence and in every thing that we Mormons live by. If anyone is so incompetent
that he has neither broth nor topboots . . . he is not likely to have the Spirit, or eternal life either.”25 In both
Eldorado and Zion, engineers build marvelous structures.26 In Eldorado, Candide marvels at the many
“mathematical and physical instruments”;27 in Zion it is the sewing machine that gives practical evidence of the
“cosmic wisdom.” Steinar’s guide says to him, “The cosmic wisdom . . . does not only manifest itself in enormous
truths which can only be contained in the brains of fearfully largeheaded university professors; no, it lives also in
the sewing machines.” Steinar responds that it cannot be denied “that it needs a great deal of philosophy to match
a sewing machine.”28 The old Eldoradian tells Candide that his countrymen have nothing to pray for since
everything they need has been granted;29 in Zion an outsider observes of the inhabitants that “When everyone
has become sainted and is in Heaven, it’s impossible to do anyone any good.”30 In both Eldorado and Zion, God is
praised all day long.31 Candide learns that in Eldorado everyone is a priest;32 in Zion, the lay priesthood extends to
all men. In both Eldorado and Zion tables of plenty are described.33 The sheep of Eldorado differ in color, speed,
and quality from European sheep;34 in Zion Runólfur shows Steinar the sheep he looks after in order to let him
“admire how beautiful and thick their tails [are] compared with the stumps on Icelandic sheep.”35 Whereas Steinar
had thirty sheep in Iceland,36 it is typical in Zion for a farmer to have ten thousand.37 Both of these utopias, which
are bounded by high mountains containing precious metals, are associated with gold. In Zion, society is “governed
by the All-Wisdom according to the Golden Book”;38 Steinar, who like the Eldoradians has never valued gold, says
of Zion, “Sometimes I have the feeling that I am dead and have come to the land of eternity . . . [where stands] a
wondrous palace on pillars, inlaid with gold and brighter than the sun.”39 In Eldorado the “yellow mud” itself is
gold;40 in Zion the clay of which Steinar makes bricks, in cooperation with the “sun which the Lord of Hosts has
given to people of correct opinions,”41 yields a steady stream of coins on which the sun also shines.42
Voltaire scholars disagree whether Eldorado constitutes, as Bottiglia would have it, “a dream of perfection, a
philosophic ideal for human aspiration,”43 “a dynamic perfection,”44 or, as Kahn suggests, “a place of idle, sterile
life” that “does not leave any room for amelioration or for activity, social or otherwise,” a “life pleasant, placid, and
stagnant rather than ideal.”45 But there is no explicit condemnation of Eldorado in the work; here all indeed seems
to be well. It is clear, however, that for all its virtues of Zion—and despite the hymn refrain “All is well, all is well”—
the utopia Laxness describes has imperfections in and about its edges, perceived by people at the periphery who
have not fully caught its vision. There is some religious intolerance (the broken cross on the Lutheran church
testi es of the cosmic wisdom),46 some class distinction between Mormons and Gentiles (a Lutheran says “The
man who has the best doctrine is the one who can prove that he has the most to eat; and good shoes. I have
neither, and live in a dugout”),47 and some social ostracism (people no longer patronize a Josephite seamstress
when her daughter has an illegitimate child by a Gentile;48 and Steinar himself admits in a letter to Bishop
Thjódrekur that he has “sometimes noticed a certain coldness towards him from others”).49 But for believers at
least, it is a place of abundance, a heaven on earth.
These criticisms of Zion are mild compared with those in Eiríkur á Brúnum’s exposé of 1891 or in the books of
various other disaffected Scandinavians (like the Norwegian Julie Ingerøe, the Swede Johan Ahmanson, and the
Dane Christian Michelsen) who wrote sensationally about their experiences in Utah.50 Laxness did considerable

historical research, both in Utah and elsewhere, in preparation for the writing of the novel. This research led to his
publication of several articles on Mormon history and society.51 In addition to Mormon scriptures, studies by
Mormon historians (including Kate Bearnson Carter’s articles on the Icelandic settlement at Spanish Fork),52 and
the writings of Eiríkur á Brúnum and Thórdur Didriksson53 (on whom Bishop Thjódrekur is modeled), Laxness
read many accounts—both positive and negative—by nineteenth-century Scandinavians who experienced the
Mormon Zion rsthand. One such account may have strengthened the connection he had begun to see between
Voltaire’s utopia and Zion. Nels Bourkersson, a Swedish immigrant to Utah who lost his Mormon wife to a
polygamist and returned disillusioned to his homeland, published a relatively well-known account of his
experiences under the title Tre år i Mormonlandet (Three Years in Mormon Country) in 1867. Bourkersson, who
delights in literary quotation (each chapter has its quaint epigraph), refers disparagingly to the Utah of the
Mormons not only as “their ‘paradise’ ” but also as “their Eldorado.”54
After they have experienced their similar utopias in the course of their journeys, both Candide and Steinar nd
themselves nally in a garden. Here Pangloss, feeling that his theory requires unceasing demonstration, reminds
Candide that when man was put into the Garden of Eden he was put there to work it. He then says:
All events are linked together in the best of possible worlds; for, after all, if you had not been driven from a
ne castle by being kicked in the backside for love of Miss Cunegonde, if you hadn’t been sent before the
Inquisition, if you hadn’t traveled across America on foot [as had the Mormon pioneers] . . . , if you hadn’t
lost all your sheep from the good land of Eldorado [related to the “Lucky Hans” tale?], you wouldn’t be
sitting here eating candied citron and pistachios.
That is very well put, said Candide, but we must cultivate our garden.55
In the nal scene of Paradísarheimt, when Steinar, after returning to Iceland as a missionary and being received
with cordial indifference rather than persecution, wanders out to the site of his old farm and notices that stones
have rolled down, knocking over the stone fences,
he laid down his knapsack . . . , slipped off his jacket and took off his hat; then he began to gather stones to
make a few repairs to the wall. There was a lot of work waiting for one man here; walls like these, in fact,
take the man with them if they are to stand.
A passer-by saw that a stranger had started to potter with the dykes of this derelict croft. “Who are you?”
asked the traveller. The other replied, “I am the man who reclaimed Paradise after it had been lost and
gave it to his children.”
“What is such a man doing here?” asked the passer-by.
“I have found the truth and the land that it lives in,” said the wall-builder, correcting himself. “And that is
assuredly very important. But now the most important thing is to build up this wall again.”
And with that, Steinar of Hlídar went on just as if nothing had happened, laying stone against stone in
these ancient walls, until the sun went down on Hlídar in Steinahlídar.56

Although, as Paul Ilie has written, “It would of course be rash to identify Voltaire fully with Candide,” he may
nevertheless be viewed in some sense as his surrogate.57 Ilie, Wolper,58 and others have examined the
biographical matrix of Candide and have concluded that the themes of disillusionment, renunciation, and
disengagement in Voltaire’s letters of the period lie at the heart of the work. Although there is still wide
disagreement about the speci c meaning of the ending of the work and about the relationship of the garden to
Eldorado, it is clear that the idea of cultivating one’s garden—a phrase that becomes a commonplace formula in the
letters—undergoes a development and enlargement in Voltaire’s thinking. To quote Ilie: “Having begun with the
realistic need for protective withdrawal [to his garden-retreat], Voltaire had then idealized the garden as a higher
state of perfection. But now he claimed for gardening a superior state of philosophical activity, an all-inclusive and
hence self-suf cient philosophizing condition.”59 Disengagement does not mean a withdrawal to idleness; it is a
dynamic ideal.
Partly through Laxness’s own invitation, interpretation of Paradísarheimt also nds a corner in the Icelander’s
biography. Hallberg nds it tempting to interpret Steinar’s journey with his “soul-casket” to Copenhagen as
corresponding to Laxness’s early immersion in Catholicism, Steinar’s quest for a material paradise for his family in
Utah as representing Laxness’s socialist stage, and the nal resignation as characterizing his own present refusal
to be identi ed with any ideology.60 Sønderholm sees a relationship between the stages represented by Eiríkur’s
three main works and Laxness’s own development: For him Eiríkur’s rst little travel book on his journey to
Denmark, which has no religious interest, corresponds to Laxness’s life before his conversion to Catholicism;
Eiríkur’s second travel book, which tells of his conversion—his discovery of an ideology of salvation—and his
eventual dif culty in reconciling this ideology with its social and material manifestation in Utah, corresponds to the
two related periods in which Laxness subscribed to salvation ideologies, rst to Catholicism in the 1920s and then
to the radical socialism that dominated his thinking from the 1930s to the 1950s; and nally, Eiríkur’s repudiation
of Mormon theology and custom in his last work of any length corresponds to Laxness’s own renunciation of all
ideologies.61
Although such topical equations are, as Hallberg cautions, perhaps too pat, the novel is at once personal and
universal. There is something of Laxness’s own spiritual and ideological odyssey in Steinar’s. From the standpoint
of its overall treatment of a quest for truth and utopia, Paradísarheimt is perhaps Laxness’s most nearly
autobiographical novel. Steinar’s cultivated habit of never saying yes or no re ects Laxness’s own ideological
neutrality. Characteristic of his renunciation is his loss of interest in truth per se. In an interview for the newspaper
Morgunbladid in which he was asked, “Has your consideration of the life of the Mormons brought you closer to the
truth yourself?” Laxness responded, “I am not so much concerned with truth as with facts. The truth is to me such a
philosophical notion. But those men who have sacri ced the facts for their system and have immersed themselves
in their truth obtain a viable position in the world.”62 The favoring of fact over truth is a theme of the novel, as will
have been apparent from Steinar’s comment that it “takes a great deal of philosophy to match a sewing machine.”
In “The Origins of Paradise Reclaimed,” Laxness discusses his longstanding fascination with the idea of a promised
land ever since he stood before the temple and tabernacle in Salt Lake City in 1927 and recalled his childhood
reading of Eiríkur á Brúnum’s travel books. He tried again and again to treat the topic, but could not get it into
focus and gave up for years. He writes:
The truth is that to write successfully about the Promised Land you must have sought and found it in your
own life with all that is implied in the concept. You must have made the pilgrimage yourself; guratively

speaking you must have crossed the ocean holding the rank of cattle, walked across the Big Desert on
foot, fought within and outside yourself the continuous battles for your land over the years.
You go groping along through a jungle of ideas, which it would take volumes to describe, sometimes you
get into blind alleys, at other times you are stuck in bottomless quicksand and saved by a miracle—until
nally you nd yourself in a small place, in a little enclosure which, it seems to you, has a sort of familiar
look, a place that somehow looks like the old home. Was it the same garden from which you started? It
seems so, but it is not. A wise man has said: He who goes away will never come back; it means that when
he returns he is a different kind of person. Between the garden from which you set out and the garden to
which you return lie not only the many kingdoms, but also the big oceans and the big deserts of the world
—and the Promised Land itself as well.63
Candide ends in community, Paradísarheimt in isolation. The stylized generic mixture of Voltaire’s tale precludes
sympathy with its characters; the novelistic level of Paradísarheimt engages our sympathy. The novel is informed by
a deep melancholia at lost innocence and the passage of time—relieved, yet paradoxically augmented, by the
puzzling humor that plays through the work. The novel suggests that man’s seemingly futile quest for paradise is
not, as he so often supposes, a forward journey to a material promised land, a wedding of “a dream to geography
and its truth to facts,” but an unaware attempt to retrace his steps back to innocence. The mellow tone becomes
more poignant as time progresses in the ctive world Laxness creates and as Steinar senses that he left to nd
what he lost by leaving. As the novel says: only the man who sacri ces everything can obtain the promised land.64
But there is also a more af rmative sense of this ending—a sense more in line, perhaps, with the reading of
Voltaire’s cultiver notre jardin as positive action. It represents a homecoming. In Zion, we are told, “Iceland vanished
as soon as its name was spoken”; no one remembered its proverbs, no one recognized well-known quotations from
the sagas.65 That too had been sacri ced. As brickmaker in Zion, Steinar had molded his clay before sunrise so that
the sun, symbol of the All-Wisdom, could transform these perfect rectangular bricks into the building blocks of
Zion, a harmony of matter and spirit.66 Although “the stone that tumbles down off the mountains of Steinahlídar
on to the home- elds is as froth compared to the hand-made Utah stone sun-baked by the grace of God,”67 even
Steinar’s new name, Stone P. (for Peter “rock”?) Stanford, af rms his fundamental af nity for the irregular stones of
Hlídar. (Stein– in Icelandic means “stone”, as does Old English stan.) Generations had worked the walls of his
home eld, indeed their best sections had been built by his forefathers. This human continuity is suggested by his
patronym Steinsson and his daughter’s name Steinbjörg Steinarsdóttir, just as the rest of his name, Steinar of
Hlídar in Steinahlídar (stone of slopes in stone slopes), links him to the land and to the ancient struggle to establish
order below the peril of stone slopes. Even though, at the end, it is at sunset rather than sunrise that he begins to
repair the old walls of his garden, there is a sense of new beginning, a more fundamental fact than philosophical
truth, a more af rmative act than renunciation.
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